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NEO-COLONIALISM p.165

Intelligentsia and History in the USSR

John Keep Jeffrey Brooks Dimitry Pospielovsky
Yuri Glazov O. A. Altayev

Soviet Union and Africa

Benjamin Nimer Helen Desfosses Cohn
L. H. Gann

Croatian Nationalism

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Judge in a Communist State

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Soviet Intelligentsia and Russian History

Both de Tocqueville and Albert Sorel were struck by the historical continuity between the ancien régime *and the French revolution. A similar observation has been repeatedly made about the Soviet revolution also: the traditional characteristics of Russian autocracy have been only too visible in Stalin's totalitarianism. Yet it is only in the post-Stalin period that a broader pattern of historical continuity began to emerge on the Soviet scene. It manifested itself not only from above in the policies of 'the new tsars', but also from below in the search for reform and the attitudes of the Soviet intelligentsia as reflected in the intellectual discussions conducted in* samizdat. *Differentiation of opinions and attitudes could be articulated in official publications only in Aesopian language and could not be developed. In* samizdat *they could be expressed in an open form and elaborated, thus creating for the first time the nucleus of an authentic public opinion. It soon became clear that the uncensored expression of views in* samizdat *writings tended to crystallize around positions which in many ways were strikingly similar to those of pre-revolutionary ideological trends. Westernizers and Slavophiles reappeared in the new historical context, and so did the whole range of political stands ranging from the new Leninists, through the new social democrats and reformists, to the new Black Hundreds. On the level of culture in general the Westernizers found their heirs in Amalrik and Sakharov, the Slavophiles in Sinyavsky and Solzhenitsyn.*[1] *On the political level, the* samizdat *discussion ranges from Roy Medvedev advocating socialist democracy on a neo-Leninist basis,*[2] *through liberal democratic programmes,*[3] *to the ultra-nationalist* Slovo Natsii.[4]

The samizdat *phenomenon was, although on a small scale, indicative of a more wide-spread differentiation of attitudes. This could easily be seen in official publications where it was manifested in a parallel, though naturally camouflaged form. Indeed, the various tendencies cautiously expressed in the official press, from the modernizing to the reactionary, from the moderately Slavophile to the die-hard nationalist, were subject to a 'fundamental' criticism in a remarkably long and detailed article, 'Against Anti-historicism'* (Literaturnaya Gazeta, *15 November 1972*), *by A. Yakovlev.*

The samizdat *discussions were of course much freer and more explicit. The striking thing about them is how closely they resemble*

[1] Although they all have mixed attitudes, it is clear which are the predominant ones in each case.

[2] Cf. Roy Medvedev, *De la Democratie Socialiste* (Paris: Grasset, 1972).

[3] Cf. K. Volny, 'The Intelligentsia and the Democratic Movement', *Survey*, No. 80, 1971.

[4] Cf. 'A Word to the Nation', ibid.

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the pre-revolutionary debates among the intelligentsia. The participants in them are as self-conscious about Russian history and the role of the intelligentsia in it as their predecessors. The problems of constitutional development, of civil rights, of modernization, and of nationalism still form the points of reference for the debate. However, the revolutionary attitude (which would now be called 'counter-revolutionary') no longer underlies it. The Soviet intelligentsia is not a homogeneous class, but its interests centre around the familiar twin themes of historical change and its own historical identity. These are the themes of the present symposium in Survey *which we hope to continue in future issues.*

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The Current Scene in Soviet Historiography

John Keep

The 24th Party Congress and after

The resolutions of the 24th Party Congress made it clear that the present Soviet leaders intended to continue the hard line towards intellectuals which they embarked upon when they decided to crush the 'Prague spring' of 1968. It would be wrong to see this simply as a reversion to Stalinism, for the clock cannot just be put back by 20 years. The writers, artists and scholars who secured significant concessions from the Party's ideological watchdogs during the Khrushchev era would resist any such change, as would sizeable segments of the ruling *apparat*. For this reason the regime currently places more emphasis on positive inducements to orthodoxy than upon negative repression. The latter is reserved for those dissidents who are brave enough to cast doubt in public upon the legitimacy of the dictatorship or to voice fundamental criticism of its policies. So far as the overwhelming majority of the educated elite is concerned, the means employed to ensure conformity of thought and conduct are more subtle: unceasing propaganda at a fairly sophisticated level, attractive material rewards, and the toleration of discordant opinions on matters of minor importance.

This situation is exemplified by the current state of Soviet historiography, which as always is a sensitive sector of the cultural front. Draconian measures have been taken against such gifted semi-professionals as Andrei Amalrik, but there has been no general purge of the countless thousands who toil in universities or research institutes throughout the country. These members of the 'historical establishment' are basically loyal to the system and have been trained to adapt themselves readily to changes in the intellectual climate. Yet they are not human computers who can be reprogrammed to forget entirely the experience of the recent past. Moreover, there is a fundamental conflict between their interests as scholars in maintaining the autonomy of their discipline and the ideological interests of the cultural bureaucrats or those professional historians who do their bidding (such as the Party historians).

There was a hint of this tension in a phrase in the congress resolution where creative intellectuals were enjoined to enhance their 'ideological-theoretical level' and, in the same breath, their 'professional skill'.[1] Brezhnev called for 'an atmosphere of bold questioning, fruitful discussions, and comradely exactingness', apparently oblivious of the fact that compliance with the third of these desiderata would make the achieve-

[1] *Pravda*, 10 April 1971, as cited in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Vol. XXIII, No. 17), p. 27.

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ment of the first impossible and of the second improbable.[2] For the historians the appropriate moral was drawn in an authoritative leading article which appeared soon after the congress in the journal *Voprosy istorii* ('Problems of History'). They were told to step up their campaign against non-communist historiography ('bourgeois falsification'), but also to devote more attention to such relatively non-political problems as the economic application of science and the history of popular living standards—both of which are respectable and neglected fields of research.[3]

To judge by results up to the end of 1972, more progress seems to have been made in the former field than in the latter. One enthusiast has suggested that a special new 'learned council', such as have been established to coordinate scholarly work in various fields, be set up to handle anti-Western 'refutation literature' (as one might call it).[4] The first monograph on American sovietology [5] may well turn out to be the herald of a flock of book-length studies devoted to Western historical writing on a variety of topics. The 'revisionists' and 'dogmatists' within the communist camp can also expect to receive their due share of such verbal missiles. This campaign, designed to rally Soviet historians against the outside world, necessarily entails a certain risk of exposure to heretical opinions, albeit in 'sanitized' form, especially as the refutations offered must often seem superficial or disingenuous to an increasingly sophisticated public.

As for the other aspect of the current drive, the stress on certain new themes designated as 'topical', this has yet to make itself manifest; certainly there has been little trace of it so far in the leading historical journals. The penultimate issue of *Voprosy istorii* for 1971 opened with the conventional standard article on a contemporary theme—the role of the soviets in the building of communism—and closed with an entertaining disquisition on theatrical life in seventeenth-century Muscovy; between these two extremes there was plenty to interest the discerning reader.

The uncertain state of Soviet historiography today may best be illustrated by a closer look at two recent debates, one in each of the two categories which scholastic jargon in the USSR seems to recognize: *diskussiya* and *obsuzhdeniye*. The former is a learned disputation on a chosen theme, conducted in the periodical press according to certain

[2] L. I. Brezhnev, *Otchetnyi doklad Tsk KPSS XXIV syezdu KPSS* (Moscow, 1971), p. 154.

[3] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 5, 1971, pp. 3–12. One can perhaps detect a hint of reproach in the authors' remark (p. 7) that more work 'apparently' needed to be done on Soviet social history, whereas no such qualification was added in regard to the new emphasis on scientific or economic topics. Among other themes recommended were the unity of Soviet peoples (with the emphasis placed very strongly on the Great Russians' leading role) and relations between socialist states. Cf. also K. V. Gusev, 'XXIV syezd i otechestvennaya istoriografiya', *Istoriya SSSR* (No. 3, 1971), pp. 3–12.

[4] *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (No. 12, 1971), pp. 138ff.

[5] B. I. Marushkin, *Istoriya i politika*, Moscow, 1968.

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rules. The latter implies an element of censure and normally takes the form of a conference attended by selected persons, the decisions of which are then communicated in summary form to a wider audience. The well-attended and freely reported professional gatherings of the Khrushchev era [6] seem to be a thing of the past.

The debate on absolutism

The *diskussiya* on Russian absolutism was inaugurated in the spring of 1968 and seems to have been brought to a conclusion in the summer of 1971. Conducted mainly in the columns of the journal *Istoriya SSSR* ('History of the USSR'), it spilled over at an early stage into the international arena, when some of the disputants paraded their views at a conclave with Italian historians.[7] The debate was less topical in subject-matter than its predecessor in the early 1960s, which was devoted to Russia's transition from feudalism to capitalism; nevertheless the two themes are organically related and are also linked to contentious issues of current politics, as will become apparent.

Reading the contributions to this exchange, one has the impression of a dozen or so pugilists fighting one another in the dark and exchanging blows at random. The disputants develop their arguments in a half-hearted inconsequential way; passages which seem to contain some novel formulation are followed by others of a conventional character, as if to give reassurance that the writer has said nothing unusual. The game ends without any of the participants emerging clearly as the winner. Nor are its rules made explicit. For example, the man chosen to launch such a discussion is evidently allowed more freedom to speak his mind than are those who comment on his paper; these men in turn express agreement and disagreement with the *rapporteur* in roughly equal proportions. In this case the guinea-pig was A. Ya. Avrekh, a specialist in early twentieth-century history and author of a standard work on Russia's pre-revolutionary premier Stolypin.[8] He concluded the debate with some outspoken remarks deploring the manner in which it had been conducted. 'Some historians formulate their positions as imprecisely and vaguely as possible. The thesis they put forward is immediately weakened by one or more qualifications. This is a clear

[6] *Vsesoyuznoye soveshchaniye istorikov o merakh uluchsheniya podgotovki nauchno-pedagogicheskikh kadrov po istoricheskim naukam 18–21 dek. 1962 g.*, Moscow, 1964; *Istoriya i sotsiologiya*, Moscow, 1964. For discussions of the state of Soviet historiography in the early 1960s, see H. Rogger, 'Politics, Ideology and History in the USSR', *Soviet Studies*, (Vol. XVI, No. 3, 1965), pp. 253–75; J. L. H. Keep, 'The Rehabilitation of M. N. Pokrovsky', *Russian History and Politics: Essays for Boris Nikolaevsky*, ed. A. Rabinowitch, Bloomington, Ind. (forthcoming).

[7] *Dokumenty sovetsko-italyanskoy konferentsii istorikov 8–10 aprelya 1968 g.: absolyutizm v zapadnoi Yevrope i Rossii . . .*, Moscow, 1970; cf. the stimulating review by Alexander Gerschenkron, 'Soviet Marxism and Absolutism', *Slavic Review* (Vol. 30, No. 4, December 1971), pp. 853–69, which makes any consideration of this volume here redundant.

[8] A. Ya. Avrekh, *Stolypin i tretya Duma*, Moscow, 1968.

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loss to scholarship.'[9] Frequently, he continued, they would 'adopt reserve positions' to which they could withdraw if charged with having gone too far. One popular ruse was simply to ignore points of criticism and to repeat one's earlier argument unabashed; another was to indict an opponent for expressing views which one had uttered oneself on an earlier occasion. (Avrekh was particularly indignant at this.) Several participants accused each other of selective quotation from 'classical' texts such as Lenin's *Works*. This was hardly fair, since such behaviour is general, and can scarcely be avoided if such statements are treated as holy writ and scholars are prevented from discussing the historical context in which they were originally made. Since each contender must endeavour to demonstrate the orthodoxy of his own views, he naturally tends to represent other men's opinions as irregular, even if this obliges him to distort them; charges and counter-charges of this nature therefore abound. Yet although tempers did sometimes become frayed, the general tone of the debate was fairly 'comradely' (to use Brezhnev's terminology) and there was no sign of it turning into a witch-hunt.

It might be objected that some of these malpractices are not unknown in academic circles outside the USSR. However, on closer inspection, it appears that there is a fundamental difference between a Soviet *diskussiya* and a conventional scholarly exchange of views. In the latter truth is assumed to be infinite and independent of the participants, but in principle equally accessible to all; in the former truth is visualized as finite and in large measure already 'known', so that the discussants' task is to reveal it more fully and to apply it to the concrete material.[10] The real purpose of the debate is symbolic: to display a wide conformity of belief on essentials and a limited diversity of opinion on non-essentials. On the surface the protagonists appear to be trying to convince one another by rational argument; but on a deeper plane they are presenting a certain 'image' of their standpoint, manifested through the skilful manipulation of key phrases and concepts, which are emphasized, omitted or juxtaposed as the occasion requires. Hence the oblique style of argumentation: it is not so much what men say as what they imply that really matters. The techniques of communication in what an earlier and simpler age called 'Aesopian language' would repay fuller investigation. It seems that not much has changed in this respect since Stalin forced intellectuals to engage in 'pseudo-debates' of this kind. However, the atmosphere is no longer so fear-charged as it used to be, and the practitioners of this curious art have become more self-confident and sophisticated in applying it.

TWO principal viewpoints emerged during the exchange, which we shall call 'liberal' and 'conservative', although the conventional

[9] Idem, 'Utrachennoye "ravnovesiye"', *Istoriya SSSR* (No. 4, 1971), p. 72.

[10] Cf. P. Rossi's contributions to the discussion between Italian and Soviet historians in F. Venturi, *Historiens du XXe siècle . . .*, (Geneva, 1966), esp. pp. 211–16.

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Western terminology is rather misleading.[11] Possibly 'Slavophile' and 'Westerner' would be more appropriate labels, but even so they would cover only one point of difference. Those concerned would hotly deny all such attributions, and with some justice, for we are not dealing with anything so clear-cut as two schools of thought. The line of division runs within the conscience of each individual, whose political and professional loyalties are, as we have said, divided. One is reminded of Alexander Herzen's remark that the Moscow *intelligenty* of the 1840s wore 'a Janus face', and of Vissarion Belinsky's agonized wrestling of spirit, which led him to shift his position with dramatic suddenness.

At the root of the differences in this debate lies the problem which Soviet historians rather pompously call 'the relationship between the general and the particular'. The conservatives stress the importance of the 'laws' or 'regularities' (*zakonomernosti, Gesetzmässigkeiten*) which, according to Marxist-Leninist theory, underlie all human history and are universally applicable. The liberals, while not contesting the validity of such laws, are more concerned with the specific manner in which they operate in practice—that is to say, with the situational context. They would argue that historical facts have a value in themselves independent of the role they play in substantiating sociological generalizations.[12] This makes them vulnerable to the charge of 'factography', which as used by the orthodox means not just garnering too many facts or concentrating on narrative but adducing facts which are difficult to reconcile with the official theory of history. In the liberal view this theory should be no more than a general guide to research, and the investigator should be free to make such deductions as are suggested by the material at his disposal. This is equivalent to claiming for history the prerogatives of an autonomous discipline, a point to which we shall return later.

THE debate revolved around three questions. First, did Russian absolutism differ in degree or type from that known to Western Europe? Second, did it emerge as the product of socio-economic change and class conflict (and if so, how), or were 'superstructural' factors more important than 'basic' ones? Third, how should one assess the impact of absolutism on Russia's historical evolution?

On the first question the liberal case was presented in the most sophisticated form by A. N. Chistozvonov,[13] who proceeded from the

[11] A. Ya. Avrekh, A. N. Chistozvonov and N. I. Pavlenko may be ranged among the liberals; S. M. Troitsky, M. Ya Volkov and A. M. Davidovych among the conservatives.

[12] Cf. A. V. Gulyga in *Istoriya i sotsiologiya* (Moscow, 1964), p. 83 and, more recently, A. Ya. Gurevich, 'Chto takoye istoricheskii fakt?', *Istochnikovedeniye: teoreticheskiye i metodicheskiye problemy* (Moscow, 1969), p. 86.

[13] A. N. Chistozvonov, 'Nekotoriye aspekty problemy genezisa absolyutizma', *Voprosy istorii* (No. 5, 1968), pp. 46–62; cf. idem, 'K diskussii ob absolyutizme v Rossii', *Istoriya SSSR* (No. 3, 1971), pp. 72–76.

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point that Marx and Engels' remarks on the subject related only to France and England, where absolutism had assumed its 'classical' form. He could not of course say point-blank that their analysis was irrelevant to Russia, but he could argue that they had recognized important distinctions between French and *Spanish* absolutism: in the latter country, where capitalism had been less advanced, the state had shown more concern for the interests of the 'feudal' nobility. Russia was a still more extreme example, for here absolutism had involved the reduction to serfdom of the bulk of the population. (Some quotations from Lenin to this effect came in *à propos* at this point.) Chistozvonov closed by appealing to his colleagues to avoid 'schematism' by studying absolutism 'as a complex' of socio-economic and political factors—in other words, to look at each country's experience in its own historical context. Similarities of form might conceal differences of substance. His implication clearly was that Russian absolutism belonged to a different genus from the French—although he deliberately obscured his tracks by speaking in the same breath of 'types' and 'variants' as if the two words were interchangeable.

His appeal seems to have fallen on stony ground. Most discussants chose not to pursue the comparative approach; some sidestepped the issue by noting points of difference between Russian and Spanish history, and there was no lack of tributes to the universality of the Marxian scheme. An extreme conservative (or Slavophile) view was put forward, possibly with tongue in cheek, by A. M. Sakharov, who contended that Muscovite absolutism had been no harsher or more cruel than that of the English Tudors: Elizabeth I had ruled her country as an 'oriental despot', and Peter I's arbitrary excesses had owed much to his well-known enthusiasm for things English.[14] In reply Avrekh pointed out that it was not a matter of comparing the severity of the acts of violence committed by individual absolute monarchs, for plenty of oriental despots had been mild-mannered and ineffectual persons, but rather of analysing the system of government as such. One might have expected him to develop the point by discussing Muscovite Russia's lack of autonomous institutions comparable with, say, the Tudor parliaments or the Anglican church; but he evidently felt that he had exposed himself enough already, and so took refuge in the excuse that such juridical matters lay outside the limits of the discussion.

On the second question the liberals came up against the Marxist axiom that absolutism, like any other 'superstructural' phenomenon, had emerged from a clash of social forces. Engels had spoken of a temporary equilibrium between the declining nobility and the rising bourgeoisie which absolute monarchs had supposedly exploited to

[14] A. M. Sakharov, 'Istoricheskiye faktory obrazovaniya russkogo absolyutizma', *Istoriya SSSR* (No. 1, 1971), pp. 114, 119, 126.

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establish their power. But this theory did not rest on any close examination of the historical evidence, and it was left vague how long this balance of forces had lasted—and whether it was pertinent to every absolutist state. Characteristically, conservative Soviet historians tried to turn this almost casual thought into a dogma. After Stalin had laid it down that Russia had undergone essentially the same process of development as Western European states, many scholars embarked upon a desperate search for a Russian bourgeoisie, equivalent to that in the West, which they could counterpose to the dominant 'feudal' gentry (even though Pokrovsky and his school had been condemned for similar errors). This led to much straining of the evidence: for example, much was made of sporadic revolts among townspeople in seventeenth-century Muscovy, or of the emergence among the enserfed peasantry of an entrepreneurial group employing hired labour. Some enthusiasts discovered a nascent Russian capitalism as early as the sixteenth century. This extreme view was discountenanced; however, it became the accepted wisdom to date its genesis from the next century—a judgment which rested to a large extent upon some scattered (and far from original) observations by the young Lenin about the formation of a 'nationwide market' at that time. Some other historians, without exceeding the bounds of orthodoxy, had taken a different tack. Justifiably unimpressed by the claims made for the early Russian bourgeoisie, they had argued that in Russia the class contradictions on which the absolute monarchy had played were between different sections of *the same* class: aristocratic boyars and lower-grade serving gentry. This certainly fitted some of the facts a little better, although it was clearly illogical, since in terms of the Marxist conception of history only fully-fledged social classes could have generated the profound antagonism necessary to produce such epochal political results. Nor was it clear when and why this alleged equilibrium between different sections of the nobility had given way to straightforward noble dominance over the state ('the gentry monarchy', in Soviet parlance).

PERHAPS because they were aware of these loopholes, a third group of orthodox historians devised a still more ingenious solution by substituting for the missing noble/burgher antagonism the all too evident class conflict between the noble landlords and their serfs. This fitted even more of the facts, and it could with some plausibility be argued that fear of violence from below had propelled the gentry into the embrace of the autocratic power. But were the wretched serfs representatives of social progress? This version of the theory required them to be portrayed as such. Hundreds of historians raked the archives for evidence about peasant revolts—not only those led by Razin or Pugachov, whose import was undeniable, but quite minor cases of disobedience or flight, which could be magnified into acts of class struggle.

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V. V. Mavrodin, an authority on the eighteenth-century 'Pugachovshchina', even developed a solemn, all-encompassing classification of movements of popular protest, in which so-called 'peasant wars' occupied the highest category and day-to-day disorders the lowest, even the latter being viewed as a major threat to the social order.

In this debate the liberals launched a general offensive against all these artificial constructs. Avrekh was particularly scathing about 'the hunt for the Russian bourgeoisie'. He quoted with relish the contorted and contradictory formulae to be found in Soviet historical textbooks and designed to bolster the theory that Russian absolutism had stemmed from the growth of capitalism. Once again Lenin was brought into service. It appeared that he had not thought the bourgeoisie had exerted any influence upon government policy until the 'great reforms' of the 1860s. Even after that its conservatism and insubstantiality had been a commonplace of politics: how then could it be held to have played a decisive role in earlier periods? As for the antagonism between peasants and landowners, the conservatives had discredited the whole argument by their exaggerations. If even modern proletarians often found it hard to develop a sense of class solidarity, how could this be attributed to the benighted and cruelly oppressed serfs? It had become a cliché that the peasant revolts had 'undermined the feudal order', yet little concrete evidence had been adduced to show how they had actually done so. On the contrary, they had resulted in increased oppression in the short term, and their long-term effect had been to create egalitarian utopian illusions among both the peasants and the Populist (agrarian socialist) intellectuals who had identified with them.

At this point Avrekh had to take refuge in obscurity. He could not state openly what would have seemed obvious to any Marxist before 1917 (and to many up to 1929), namely that the revolts had been primitive upheavals characteristic of the pre-capitalist era, spontaneous and ill-organized, qualitatively different from the class-conscious mass movements of modern times. For this would have meant portraying the Russian peasants as possessing an archaic world-outlook even at those moments when they had shaken off their customary inertia and become politically active, and as incapable of leading the country very far along the road to (capitalist) progress. This was precisely what the liberal argument implied; and naturally it was strongly resented by the conservatives, who clung to the maxim that 'the masses are the creators of history'—in 'feudal' Russia as anywhere else. Thus A. A. Preobrazhensky, while admitting that the peasant rebels had for a long time retained their trust in a 'just tsar', claimed that 'the monarchism of the masses was often a form taken by anti-absolutist movements'[15]—which could only mean that they had opposed the monarchy without realizing the fact.

[15] A. A. Preobrazhensky, 'O nekotorykh spornykh voprosakh nachalnogo etapa genezisa absolyutizma v Rossii', ibid. (No. 2, 1971), p. 109.

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AN impartial observer must conclude that Avrekh and his friends succeeded in demolishing the idea that Russian absolutism was shaped in any fundamental way by the actions of any social force. But on Marxist premises, if this state was not the product of society, then surely the society must be the product of the state? In Russia, at any rate, the 'superstructure' must have determined the 'base', and not the other way about. Heresy indeed! True, even Stalin and the Stalinist historians had been prepared (following Engels) to acknowledge that the absolutist state enjoyed a certain independence of social forces; but this admission had always been played down, as it was hard to reconcile with the general Marxist theory of the state and the materialist conception of history.

Now the liberals pulled out this organ-stop as far as they could. They argued that when the Russian autocracy had promoted the country's economic development, it had done so not because it was obliged to act by bourgeois or other pressure, but in order to promote national ends, or at the very least to further its own purposes. As N. I. Pavlenko put it (borrowing a phrase from Marx), 'absolutism . . . was concerned to develop trade and industry because it needed both for its own glory.'[16] The relationship between such a state and the class whence it drew its main support was not the simple one-way affair that conservatives assumed, for even while fulfilling the 'behests' of that class the state intervened actively to manufacture and manipulate the support it needed. The activities and attitudes of the Russian landowning nobles were shaped by their obligations as servants of the state. Moreover, the political power projected itself as defender of the interests of the nation as a whole; and especially in earlier centuries, when Russia was fighting for survival against powerful external enemies (Tatars, Poles), the claim had some objective validity. Later, when the tsarist state turned to oppressive and aggressive colonial and foreign policies, this claim had become more fraudulent, yet it had been widely accepted, by the masses as well as by the upper classes.

A related and somewhat less controversial point they made was that the policies of an absolutist regime were bound to be influenced by those of its neighbours whom it was driven to emulate. The most striking example of this was precisely eighteenth-century Russia, when much had been borrowed from the more enlightened Western monarchies. Stalinist historians had traditionally minimized this debt, not only for 'patriotic' reasons but also because it implied that 'superstructural' phenomena were decisive in determining the country's evolution.

This brings us to the third question: how is one to assess the impact of absolutism on Russian history? The liberals complained that their opponents showed much less interest in the nature of the absolutist state than in the process whereby it arose and declined; and they dropped

[16] N. I. Pavlenko, 'K voprosu o genezise absolyutizma v Rossii', *Istoriya SSSR* (No. 4, 1970), p. 65.

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some transparent hints about the underlying political reason for such neglect. They themselves made up for it by compiling eloquent if unoriginal denunciations of the iniquities of tsardom: it had shown itself indifferent or hostile to the people's needs and wishes; it had pursued its interests with ruthless, barbaric cruelty; in economic and social matters it had opted for the course least advantageous to the country's development. The last of these propositions is worth closer attention.

Around 1907 Lenin had suggested that the tsarist regime had a choice between two options in tackling the problem of economic development (and more specifically the agrarian question), which he termed the 'Prussian' and 'American' paths. Avrekh, here in familiar territory, seized on this idea and projected it backwards to earlier centuries, suggesting that the Russian state had always faced choices of this kind. All too frequently it had chosen wrongly, and in consequence Russia's progress had been slower and more painful than it need have been. He also made it plain that the more 'progressive' course would have been one that emulated more closely the pattern of development in advanced Western lands or allowed greater scope for Western influences in Russia. The underlying assumption here was that 'progress' and 'reaction' were not diametrically opposed categories but merely alternatives situated at different points on one and the same continuum (see below, p. 17).[17]

Moreover, it was not just a matter of economics: the same choices were operative in regard to the country's political development. Everyone agreed, after all, that there had been some progress in government during the period of absolute rule. Nicholas I had been a less arbitrary ruler than Peter I. To take one specific fact: Catherine II's well-known Instruction for the deputies to the Legislative Commission of 1767 was not just an act of demagogy, as Soviet textbooks tended to suggest, but a praiseworthy if half-hearted effort to introduce greater respect for legality and human rights. The liberals even found some kind words for the Russian grandees who at various junctures in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had tried to limit the autocratic sovereign's powers: these men were not just self-interested oligarchs, as was usually thought, but opponents of tyranny. Thanks in part to these reformist tendencies, Russia had evolved from an 'oriental despotism' to a 'bourgeois monarchy'.

IT is scarcely surprising that Avrekh should have been suspected by some critics of sympathy for the views of P. N. Milyukov (Russia's best-known liberal historian and political leader before 1917)—or that he should have denied the validity of such a loaded compliment. For

[17] To give a simple analogy: one can say that white and black are opposites, but equally that white contains less black than grey does and even less black than black does.

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here he was hitting upon a very sensitive nerve indeed. Was Russia at any time in her history an 'oriental despotism'? Marx and Engels had suggested as much in some of their polemical journalism, but it was uncertain whether these works formed part of their 'canonical' writings. Before 1917 the Russian Marxist thinker (and Menshevik) G. V. Plekhanov had emphasized the despotic nature of the Russian state tradition and had warned against its possible resurgence if the Bolsheviks should seize power before the objective prerequisites for socialism had matured. In the 1920s, when Soviet historians broached the problem, Stalin had abruptly terminated the debate. Putting it crudely, he was keen to prevent his Trotskyist critics from drawing awkward parallels between the actions of past oriental despots and his own policy of 'socialism in one country first', which involved a vast extension of state power, the total mobilization of society, and Russia's insulation from external influences. Over the next quarter-century many Western Marxist critics of Stalinism frequently made such analogies; in the USSR itself the issue was of course unmentionable. When Plekhanov was partially rehabilitated after Stalin's death, little or nothing was said of his historiosophical views.

This brief sketch of the background to the question of 'oriental despotism' may explain the explosive potential of the concluding passages in Avrekh's initial contribution, which are worth quoting:

> Absolutism is a despotic [kind of] regime. It maintains and cultivates despotism by its very nature, even though it declares war on it. . . . In Russia, by comparison with European countries, the power of absolute monarchy attained extreme dimensions. [Bourgeois historians had falsely exaggerated the state's role in Russian history past and present. But Soviet historians had been reluctant to tackle the issue.] The 'State school' [of nineteenth-century conservative historians], who made the state the demiurge of our national history, and Plekhanov, who equated tsarism with eastern despotism, were of course wrong, but were they right in their point of departure—the realization that Russian absolutism wielded enormous power? In our view they were right. V. I. Lenin frequently noted the vast power of the autocracy . . . [Quotations] . . . Lenin characterized tsarist autocracy as one of the most Asiatic and barbaric.[18]

Connoisseurs of 'Aesopian language' might conclude that Avrekh is invoking Lenin's authority to shield his respect for Plekhanov. They might also wish to ponder the implications of the following phrase in his concluding remarks: 'It is an absolutely axiomatic truth that a completely similar political superstructure, in the formal juridical sense, can arise upon different socio-economic foundations.'[19] In fact such an idea is far from axiomatic among Soviet historians. Ostensibly he is

[18] A. Ya. Avrekh, 'Russkii absolyutizm i ego rol v utverzhdenii kapitalizma v Rossii', *Istoriya SSSR* (No. 2, 1968), pp. 103–4.

[19] Idem, 'Utrachennoye "ravnovesiye"', ibid. (No. 4, 1971), p. 64.

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referring here to 'feudal' and 'bourgeois' monarchy, but the implications are much broader.

Let us take the liberty of summarizing the liberal case, dotting the i's and crossing the t's where necessary. Absolutism or despotism may arise in any society at any level of development. It has little to do with class conflict, but much with the state's own conception of its needs, which it enforces upon others. It is most harmful to the moral and material wellbeing of the people, who are all but impotent to oppose it. It is particularly prevalent in eastern countries with strong bureaucratic traditions and little concern for popular rights. Western notions of constitutional legality and pluralism can help to hold it in check—in the present as in the past.

As an eighteenth-century courtier once remarked to Catherine the Great, 'these are axioms which could cause walls to crumble'.

History and contemporary problems

Our second example relates to modern (post-1855) Russian history and involves a discussion of the other type mentioned above, an *obsuzhdeniye*. This was held in February 1971 in the Bureau of the Academy of Sciences' Historical Section. It was attended by specialists in Party history and ideological questions as well as representatives of the historical profession in general. The purpose of the meeting was to condemn a volume entitled *History and Contemporary Problems*,[19a] published in 1969 under the imprimatur of the Academy's prestigious Institute of History. The editor, M. Ya. Gefter, is a candidate of historical science and a specialist in pre-revolutionary Russian economic history; the contributors included such luminaries as A. M. Pankratova and B. F. Porshnev. It contained eight essays (four on aspects of the Russian revolution, three on Western historiography, and one on American radicalism), as well as the proceedings of four conferences of Soviet historians held as long ago as 1964–66. To Western readers it is certainly one of the more interesting works of its kind to have appeared in recent years. The book's reception in the Soviet press was uneven. It earned several critical reviews, and early in 1971 was the target of an article in the Party's own historical journal, evidently designed to set the tone for the forthcoming conference. At this gathering 'the case for the prosecution' was presented by Academician I. I. Mints and corresponding member M. P. Kim, supported by spokesmen for military history (P. A. Zhilin), ideology (G. E. Glezerman) and Party history (G. N. Golikov, P. N. Pospelov). The published record does not state what arguments were employed by the offending contributors, not all of whom seem to have been present. We are told that four of them adopted

[19a] *Istoricheskaya nauka i nekotoriye problemy sovremennosti: stati i obsuzhdeniya*, Moscow, 1969. For a brief note, see K. Marko, *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* (No. 4, 1970), pp. 623–24. For a report of the meeting, see G. P. Sharbovany, 'Obsuzhdeniye nekotorykh problem metodologii istorii', *Voprosy istorii* (No. 10, 1971), pp. 159–66.

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'an extremely negative position in regard to all the critical remarks levelled against them', and that two of them 'defended their right to [free] scholarly inquiry and debate, which none of those who took part in the discussion of course denied'. One man admitted his mistakes. But E. N. Gorodetsky, a leading authority on the Russian revolution, spoke up on behalf of the contributors—an act which must have demanded considerable civic courage. It remains to be seen whether any action is taken against the miscreants.

One oddity is that they were not charged with 'revisionism', although this term (in its politically neutral sense) would best convey what they had in mind: the updating of doctrine at many points to take account of changes in the contemporary world, so making it more relevant and meaningful in the eyes of communists and sympathizers abroad.

In his foreword Gefter pointed out that many of his colleagues had become dissatisfied with the relationship between sociology (i.e. ideology) and history in the USSR:

> The need was felt to bridge the gap between the formulae of the general laws governing historical development, repeated with variations in textbooks and popular works on historical materialism, and concrete research, which in recent years has come to be based on a vastly increased store of new information, on facts which are continually changing.[20]

The ideologists had falsely opposed their general 'laws' to concrete 'facts' and had dismissed as 'factomania' the efforts of historians and other scholars to take this information into account. They had chosen to regard these new phenomena as manifestations of the laws to which they were committed, instead of testing and verifying these laws by empirical observation of the facts.

This was nothing less than a demand that Soviet Marxism should cease to be an ideology and become a philosophy—that is to say, should concern itself with the search for truth in a spirit of detachment and humility, recognizing that final answers are seldom possible. This attitude was incompatible with Party-mindedness (*partiynost*) as traditionally understood. Gefter was careful to profess allegiance to this principle, but only after he had diluted it; for him it meant no more than 'interest in finding out the truth and serving progress'.[21] Hence his critics had a point when they charged him with advocating 'a critical revision (*peresmotr*) of the fundamental, original principles of the Marxist-Leninist conception of history'; however, they were inhibited from considering frankly his objections to the dogmatization which these 'original principles' had undergone during their evolution from science to myth. Implicit here is the question of whether historians, in formulating their judgments, should follow the methodological rules of their own discipline or should be subjected to constraints from outside.

[20] *Istoricheskaya nauka* . . . , p. 7.

[21] Ibid. p. 10.

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TWO contributions to the Gefter volume particularly angered the Party's ideological chiefs: the editor's article on Lenin's debt to the Populists and the 1966 debate on the nature of social revolution in the modern world.

Gefter drew an unusually sensitive, nuanced picture of the well-known controversies among Russian socialists at the turn of the century. Instead of dismissing the Populists as intellectually sterile and as irreconcilable opponents of the Marxists—a view attributed to Stalin, the only occasion that the latter was directly mentioned in the whole volume—he argued that there had been ambiguities and modifications in Lenin's attitude to them. At first the Bolshevik leader had condemned the Populists as reactionary utopians. This corresponded to his view that capitalism had penetrated deeply into the Russian village and had polarized the 'petty-bourgeois' peasantry into the antagonistic classes of capitalist society. But in 1905 he had come to realize that Populist agitation had helped to stimulate a great revolt in the countryside, in which even the supposedly capitalistic peasants had sometimes joined, against the landowners and the state; and that the Social Democrats should support this movement in order to promote an urban-based 'bourgeois-democratic' revolution, even if this obliged them to make temporary concessions to the peasants' proprietorial instincts.

Gefter's reasoning might seem quite unobjectionable—even painfully obvious—to Western historians of the period. But to the guardians of Soviet orthodoxy it was shocking on several counts. First, it gave a vivid and credible picture of Lenin, as a theorist and practical politician, that was utterly at variance with the icon-like model of perfection worshipped by devotees of the Lenin cult. He was portrayed here as a leader who experienced normal doubts and hesitations, who changed his mind and policies to fit changing realities. Second, Gefter gave a powerful critique of the Marxist doctrinaires who had failed to appreciate the implications of Lenin's initiative and had blindly clung to outdated formulae. Thus Plekhanov, an otherwise gifted leader who had grown rigid with age, had argued that Lenin's programme of support for peasant violence and land nationalization contravened the objective laws governing social development. He had not seen the need to modify these laws according to the specific situation of Russia at that time, or to provide the active leadership which alone could ensure success. The implication of this indictment was plain: that Russia needed a new Lenin who could lead the country out of the impasse to which it had been brought by doctrinaire policies; that the Party should seek fresh inspiration by returning to the source of its ideas, so emulating its founder, who had leaped back beyond his teacher, the determinist Plekhanov, to the older voluntaristic Populist tradition, and had isolated its healthy revolutionary core from the fallacious theories which encapsulated it.

Thirdly, Gefter hinted that this innovation required a return to more international ways of thinking. 'The concept of "europeanization" was

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close to Lenin too.'[22] He had envisaged the Russian revolution as a continuation of its seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Western forerunners, and had urged the merits of an 'American path' of economic development which would rapidly sweep away all the obstacles to progress. As we have seen, Avrekh had also made use of this concept, and both men shared the more sophisticated view of progress that it embodied. This represented a fourth error in the eyes of the orthodox, for their outlook on the matter was simplistic and mechanical: progress and reaction were opposites, and in any given situation there was only one correct way forward. In the liberal view revolutionary leaders, like any others, were confronted by a spectrum of choices, more than one of which may be beneficial to their cause; there is no unerring guide to success.

Lastly, Gefter took a line which in Stalin's day would surely have aroused suspicion of Trotskyite sympathies. His emphasis on leadership implied that the masses were (and are?) politically inert. For not only the Populists but also the Marxists who succeeded them as leaders of the Russian left had found it hard to decide 'how to act *from without* upon the still somnolent masses, to turn their hidden dissatisfaction with their living conditions into open insurrection'; they had combined 'faith in the people with scepticism about its capacity for the creative business of liberating [itself]'.[23] Again, this contradicts the accepted image, which Soviet historians have for many years endeavoured to build up, of a self-reliant, militant and inherently pro-Bolshevik populace, as much in the countryside as in the industrial centres. It was a matter of the Party having first to awaken the masses from their inertia and then, when the crisis had broken, to prevent their elemental violence from sweeping the revolution off course. The Bolsheviks had stressed organization and discipline in an effort to prevent the penetration of 'petty-bourgeois' ideas from below into the workers' vanguard. The impression Gefter leaves is that this danger was *not* entirely averted, and that consequently the Russian revolution had gone astray. Lenin is quoted as warning (in 1906) that the only guarantee against its ending in a new despotism lay in the victory of the Western proletariat.[24] Not a word was said about the possibilities of 'socialism in one country', the ideological formula on which Stalinist and post-Stalinist Russia rests.

THE same point was made still more forcibly in the 1966 discussion on modern social revolution. The *rapporteur*, Ya. S. Drabkin, noted that Lenin had given only a very tentative formulation of this doctrine, and that he had instead always emphasized the need for world revolution. With mock innocence Drabkin remarked: 'Less and less was said about this after the late 1920s, and those passages in Lenin's works

[22] Ibid. p. 34.
[23] Ibid. p. 39 (author's italics).
[24] Ibid. p. 35n.

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where he speaks unambiguously and directly about international world-wide revolution almost disappeared from the history books.'[25] Matters had improved somewhat since 'the mid-fifties' (a cautious euphemism for the 20th Party Congress, now much in vogue), but there was still a mistaken tendency to play down the difficulties inherent in the problem of building socialism in a single isolated and relatively backward country.

Prominent among these difficulties was that of the low cultural standards of the working class. Although this had been recognized at the time by Lenin, present-day Soviet writers 'often give an idealized picture, portraying the working class as extremely mature and ignoring its necessarily low cultural level . . . ; sometimes all its failings are attributed to petty-bourgeois influence, and its degree of consciousness is confused with that attained by its ideologists'.[26] Yet this immaturity had led to excesses during the revolution which had threatened to lead to a counter-revolutionary 'Thermidor', and this had only been averted by timely reforms in the shape of NEP. Soviet historians had also tended, for the same reason, to avoid the question of the social cost of revolution. This laid them open to the charge of hypocrisy; they ought to ask themselves how far the Red terror had been objectively necessary. Even if much of the blame lay with the counter-revolutionaries who had threatened Soviet power, this was not the whole story.

The burden of Drabkin's argument was that the whole Soviet model of revolution-making was seriously at fault. The Bolsheviks, he suggested, had sought to apply the model of the Paris Commune, with its anarchic and ultra-democratic overtones, to a very different and unsuitable environment. It was an open question whether the fault lay in 'objective circumstances' or in 'the subjective mistakes of past decades' (the phrasing was no doubt deliberately nebulous). 'The question of the [various] forms of proletarian dictatorship, and their evolution in the context of concrete circumstances and historical traditions, needs some deep rethinking (*osmysleniye*), bearing in mind the experience of other socialist countries.'[27]

IN suggesting that Soviet experience was less than perfect, that the revolution might have been carried out differently, Drabkin was questioning the legitimacy of the Soviet claim to hegemony within the communist bloc. In Czechoslovakia under Dubcek such views might be tolerated; in the USSR they were rank heresy, especially after 'the events of 1968'. Indeed it might be thought that in the circumstances the authorities' reaction has been relatively dilatory and mild. For the debates on Drabkin's report showed that several of the Soviet participants were attracted by reformist ideas

[25] Ya. S. Drabkin, 'Nereshenniye problemy izucheniya sotsialnykh revolyutsii', ibid. pp. 231–2.
[26] Ibid. p. 224.
[27] Ibid. p. 231.

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such as those which inspired Dubcek's 'socialism with a human face'. The boldest speaker, K. L. Maydanik, was to be singled out for particularly harsh criticism. He took the line that Drabkin had been too cautious. A 'frontal attack' needed to be launched on the theoretical questions which 'certain universal dogmas of earlier decades' had left unsolved. It was unhelpful to categorize revolutions according to the type of social order they overthrew (anti-feudal, anti-capitalist, etc.), or according to the class which led them, which in practice was usually decided by theoreticians after the event.[28] It was equally impractical to take as criterion the socio-economic formation to which the revolution gave rise, since similar historical processes might have a totally different outcome.

The only meaningful typology, Maydanik argued, was that based on the level of development reached by the society that was overthrown. He distinguished between four such developmental phases, from pre-capitalist (e.g. France in 1789) to 'state-monopoly capitalist' (the advanced industrialized countries at the present time). The Russian revolution had broken out in a society at the second stage of development, where nascent capitalism had been intertwined with relics of feudalism. This was the stage when a revolution was most likely to occur and to take the extreme form of a class dictatorship exercised through a single political party. It also presented the victors with the problem of overcoming the country's historic backwardness as well as building socialism, which encouraged bureaucratic distortions (i.e. Stalin). Maydanik was less convincing in his analysis of revolutions in mature capitalist societies, such as Marx had predicted; not surprisingly, he had difficulty in finding appropriate historical examples, but seemed to suggest that Czechoslovakia in 1948 might fit the bill—if not in the manner of the transfer of power, at least in that country's developmental level, which made possible a relatively non-violent advance to socialism. As for the 'state-monopoly capitalist' societies of today, he noted their relative stability but placed his trust in the long-term social effects of automation and other technological advances, as more likely to lead to revolution than mass political action.

This analysis was all the more formidable for being expressed in the authentic language of Marxism. It offended the Leninist-Stalinist canon at almost every point. Not only did it fail to distinguish between the 'bourgeois-democratic' and 'proletarian-socialist' types of revolution and allot 'Great October' a fairly modest place in the historical scheme; it rejected the idea of unilinear progress in favour of a more diversified concept which made allowance for the element of chance in human affairs. It was also an attempt to provide a scientific underpinning for the concept of 'different paths to socialism' which Khrushchev had accepted for reasons of expediency during the post-

[28] Ibid. p. 274. He quoted an irreverent Russian jingle: *myatezh ne mozhet konchitsya udachei/v protivnom sluchaye ego zovut inache*.

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Stalin 'thaw', but which had never been properly explored by theoreticians, so delicate was the problem it raised. For, as Maydanik pointed out, the present schism in the communist world derived in part from an attempt (by the USSR) to impose the 'regularities' appropriate to a society in one developmental phase upon those which were at higher (Czechoslovakia) or lower (China) phases. The very notion of world-wide historical 'regularities' needed to be refined in order to allow for disparities between national societies at varying stages of growth.

THE two discussions we have examined indicate that a fair degree of scepticism exists among Soviet historians about fundamental methodological and ideological principles, as well as about their application to specific historical problems. These doubts are perceived by the Party leaders, not without reason, as posing a potential threat to their monopoly of political power. (They are also worried by the impact on Soviet historiography of the still unsolved nationalities problem, which we cannot examine here.) Yet, as was pointed out in the introduction to this article, they are unwilling to impose their authority by resorting to the wholesale coercion of the Stalin era, and seek to win over the historians, like other intellectuals, by more subtle means.

Can this policy be effective? Predictions are notoriously unreliable, for in the last resort the outcome depends on such imponderables as the overall trend of evolution in Soviet society and the balance of international power. One can, however, point to two factors that are likely to prove decisive. First, a mythology can only exercise a firm hold so long as its credibility has not been undermined, and in the post-Stalin years Khrushchev delivered some powerful salvos against the traditional system of belief. His successors have tried to patch up this theoretical structure, in the hope that its inconsistencies and implausibilities will go unnoticed; they have yet to construct vital new myths which could supersede the old ones which time and experience have discredited. For this would require more power, imagination and self-assurance than they at present possess. Second, the Soviet 'scholarly intelligentsia' is no longer so pliable as it was 40 years ago, in the formative years of Stalinist totalitarianism. It no longer consists of plebeian provincials willing to sacrifice their individual consciences to the Party for careerist reasons or from simple ideological fervour. It now comprises men who are more knowledgeable, more professional, and more aware of the universal problems of our age, not least the perils for mankind inherent in a system of total power. It remains to be seen whether these new 'public men' can succeed in the task, accomplished in far easier circumstances by their pre-revolutionary forebears, of moderating the pretensions of a bureaucratic regime which, while no longer despotic as under Stalin, manifests a continued determination to have everything its own way.

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Vekhi and the *Vekhi* Dispute

Jeffrey Brooks

IN Moscow in 1909, a group of self-styled ex-*intelligenty* joined together to publish the *Vekhi* (*Landmarks*) symposium. They billed their book as a critique of the spiritual world of the intelligentsia; a *mea culpa* by those who had seen the light. The names of the authors are familiar to students of Russian culture. The editor was M. O. Gershenzon, a neo-Slavophile literary historian with a penchant for mysticism. The others were P. B. Struve, a well known liberal politician, A. S. Izgoyev, a liberal journalist, Simon Frank and Nicholas Berdyayev, literary critics who later made their names in the West as philosophers, and two professors, Simon Bulgakov and B. A. Kistyakovsky.

The stated purpose of the book was the transformation of values in educated Russia. At a time when the repression which followed the 1905 revolution seemed to have succeeded in stilling opposition, and when liberal hopes for a moderate reform of the autocratic system appeared utopian, the authors urged educated Russians to re-evaluate their beliefs and turn from political struggle to constructive intellectual work. The seven essays discussed the intelligentsia's world view: its attitudes towards religion, philosophy, law, revolution, ethics, home and school life, and finally its psychological make-up. The authors held seemingly contradictory views about what the intelligentsia was, but in its very vagueness the book presented a compelling image of the *intelligent* as an archetypical social deviant warped by an unnatural preoccupation with the ills of society. Almost immediately after publication, it became the apparent object of numerous articles, and the topic for meetings and discussions of intellectuals from all bands of the political spectrum. *Vekhi* and the *Vekhi* dispute, as the controversy around the book is often called, have exerted a powerful influence on those interested in the character of the pre-revolutionary Russian intellectual scene.

THE reinterpretation of a literary artifact as controversial and as thoroughly misunderstood as the *Vekhi* symposium requires care in the elucidation of its content as well as its causality. It must be read within its contemporary historical context with close attention to the process of its intellectual gestation. At the core of *Vekhi* was one central idea, a political concept of culture, from which most other aspects of the symposium naturally stemmed. It was an idea developed in the minds of the contributors over the course of nearly a decade. During that time many of the *Vekhi* authors were loosely associated with each other as a result of common concerns, joint participation in

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a number of publications, and similarities in intellectual development. In this way they constituted an informal group not unlike the traditional circle or *kruzhok,* which provided the main organizational framework for the educational and propaganda activities of the radical intelligentsia in the nineteenth century. The most regular members were Struve, Frank, Bulgakov, Berdyayev, and Kistyakovsky, all of whom had been associated, early in their careers, with the legal Marxist movement of the 1890s, which had popularized Marx's works in Russia. Struve was most influential in the group's political leadership, though Frank was more responsible for its philosophical tenor.

Problems of Idealism

The first stage in the development of the *Vekhi* idea came at the turn of the century when the five future contributors to *Vekhi* rejected Marxism in favour of neo-Kantian idealism, a philosophical approach which became the vogue in some Russian intellectual circles at that time. In a 1902 symposium entitled *Problems of Idealism,* together with others of like views, they criticized Marxism and positivism from a variety of perspectives. The year in which the symposium was published saw a revival of political opposition and an upsurge in optimism about the possibility of a political transformation of the country. *Problems of Idealism* fully reflected this optimism. The authors moved away from positivism and Marxism to gather the ideals they believed formed an essential part of man's nature, and weld them into a workable personal social ethic.

Peter Struve, in his essay on the populist critic Mikhailovsky, questioned that writer's social determination because it failed to provide for the ideal of moral duty.[1] E. N. Trubetskoy, later editor of the periodical *Moskovskii ezhenedelnik* (*Moscow Weekly*), which figured in the *Vekhi* dispute, attacked Marxism for its attempt to explain, in a materialist fashion, the truth which he believed was 'liberating human thought from delusion'.[2] B. A. Kistyakovsky explained that positivism got into trouble when it went beyond natural science and led to the denial of the 'highest values in human life—moral duty and the ideal'.[3] The majority of the articles went well beyond this critique. Whether the authors followed Nietzsche like Simon Frank, Christianity like Bulgakov, or a personal route like Berdyayev, the result was the same: an individual credo emphasizing the moral necessity of taking part in social struggle. Berdyayev defined morality as primarily 'the internal relation of the person to himself'—'the relation of man to man is ethically derived from the relation of man to himself'.[4] Just as one struggled for one's own rights, he found it morally imperative to struggle for the oppressed and exploited, specifically the working class.[5] Bulgakov

1 *Problemy idealizma* (Moscow, 1902), p. 81.
2 Ibid. p. 4.
3 Ibid. p. 301.
4 Ibid. p. 106.
5 Ibid. p. 118.

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similarly found the ideal of the development of the personality to be a 'moral axiom', and argued that participation in the social struggle would be motivated not by egotistical class interests, but by 'the absolute order of moral law, the command of God'.[6]

The command to struggle for the working masses showed the radical politics of *Problems of Idealism*, but the rejection of materialism and the establishment of a purely idealistic justification for human action marked a decisive step away from political action and towards *Vekhi*. The germ of what became the *Vekhi* idea of culture can be found in Frank's *Problems of Idealism* essay 'Fr. Nietzsche and the Ethic of the Love for the Faraway'. Frank posited a polarity between two basic moral systems: love for the nearby or mundane, and love for the faraway or spiritual. He sought to synthesize the two. Whereas Nietzsche implied that a choice was necessary between compassion for the immediate needs of mankind and pursuit of distant ideals, Frank held that some humanitarian values were spiritual and so were encompassed in the love for the faraway. The ideals he mentioned were truth, equality, independence, and human worth.[7] These were personified, together with all other ideals or 'signs', in the image of the superman, which expressed 'the supreme moral value of the cultural perfection of man'.[8] Frank's ultimate ideal combined individual fulfilment and social responsibility in a notion of 'cultural progress', which he defined as the 'moral and intellectual completion of man and society'. It had absolute value, he suggested, 'outside of all relation to the collective happiness provided by this progress'.[9] This double apotheosis of individual perfection and social responsibility, with the obvious tension between the two, was characteristic of many of the essays and both Berdyayev and Bulgakov echoed the idea that cultural progress or perfection and the path to it held independent supreme value.

Polar Star

In *Problems of Idealism* the affirmation of superhuman spiritual and cultural values was a radical political statement of personal commitment. By the onset of 1905 the incipient *Vekhi* group had abandoned its radicalism and become deeply involved in a revived liberal movement. In the three years preceding the Revolution Struve had become a leading liberal publicist and the loyalties of the others had shifted in a similar direction. During the course of the revolutionary experience a cultural and spiritual idealism of a different sort crystallized as the political programme of a journal called *Polyarnaya zvezda* (*Polar Star*), edited by Struve at the end of 1905 with the close participation of Frank and Berdyayev.

Polyarnaya zvezda issued a new cultural programme in December 1905, as the Revolution moved into its most militant phase, lasting

[6] Ibid. p. 46.
[7] Ibid. p. 181.
[8] Ibid. p. 185.
[9] Ibid. p. 185.

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from the St Petersburg postal and telegraph strike in November to the suppression of the Moscow rising and general strike at the end of the year. Government punitive expeditions were sent out to quell agrarian uprisings and revolts of minorities. The publication of the 1905 October Manifesto, with its promises of basic civic freedoms and a representative body with real powers, began the disintegration of the broad opposition coalition which characterized the first phase of the Revolution. The political position of the new liberal party, the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets), in which all of the later participants in *Vekhi* except Gershenzon were involved,[10] showed the divisions among the opposition. *Polyarnaya zvezda* rang a cultural alarm: 'absence of authority', 'tradition of Russian nihilism', 'denial of cultural values'.[11] For *Polyarnaya zvezda* these were the implications of the Revolution; the values to defend were grouped under the rubric 'culture'.

In the first issue Frank appealed that it was 'time to speak about ideas and culture over the whistle of bullets and the moans of victims'.[12] In the second and third issues (22 and 30 December 1905), Struve and Frank jointly signed two 'Essays on the Philosophy of Culture'. They differentiated their idea of culture from traditional views: 'the naive respect for education', 'the liberal idea of victorious institutions in a cultural milieu', 'the Marxist preoccupation with material culture', and 'the concern of progressives of all shades with the enlightenment of the people'.[13] They believed that the true understanding of culture was 'alien or almost alien to Russian self-consciousness'. They defined culture:

> Culture is the totality of absolute values created and being created by humanity and composing its social and spiritual life. In the consciousness of humanity are present a number of eternal ideals: truth, goodness, beauty, holiness, which move it towards scientific, artistic, moral, and religious creation. The fruits of this creativity, all the spiritual acquisitions which are replacing one another in the work of generations, make up the living ambience of conscious being, the gradual embodiment of an absolute ideal in the collective life of humanity.[14]

THE definition illustrated a dramatic rupture with the idealism of *Problems of Idealism*. Individual development and self-perfection were withdrawn from the social context and from the strictures of moral duty towards fellow men so important in the earlier essays. Frank's 1902 synthesis of the love for the faraway and the love for the nearby had fractured. In the new definition of culture the known moral signs —truth, equality, human worth, independence—were entirely supplanted

[10] Though Berdyayev considered himself an anarchist and never joined the Cadets he was closely associated with liberals and the liberal press.
[11] *Polyarnaya zvezda*, 15 December 1905, p. 10; 22 December 1905, p. 115; 22 December 1905, p. 151.
[12] *Polyarnaya zvezda*, 15 December 1905, p. 19.
[13] *Polyarnaya zvezda*, 22 December 1905, pp 106–107.
[14] Ibid. p. 108.

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by the 'eternal ideals' of truth, goodness, beauty, holiness. Cultural progress was now defined as 'spiritual completion, the development of science, art, religion, for their own sake, for their own inherent greatness and holiness'.[15] Social commitment was becoming secondary.

Struve and Frank considered themselves liberal democrats and the second part of the culture essays contained an argument, developed first by Frank in an essay published two weeks before, linking culture to democracy.[16] Since culture could exist only in the human personality, Struve and Frank reasoned that the personality was of central importance to culture. It needed to be free from all restrictions to utilize its potential, and therefore they considered freedom of the individual 'the first and essential condition of culture'.[17] But culture was first in their minds and this severely restricted the libertarian and egalitarian implications of their argument. Though they accepted the 'moral equality' of all individuals based on the belief that 'every human existence is a shell or physical appearance of the highest transcendental principle', they recognized a profound cultural inequality. The key word in their definition of culture was 'conscious'. On the basis of consciousness the authors distinguished between 'the instinctively worked out' world view of the masses of the people and the 'freely developed' conscious one of the 'spiritual advance guard', the intelligentsia.[18] There was a separation between the whole of humanity and 'those people who more or less consciously take part in the spiritual creativity of history'.[19] Along with this went a tendency to do away with the idea of popular culture altogether. The intelligentsia was the bearer of the European tradition and culture was advanced by that group in relative isolation from the masses. It was the fruit of work 'in the depths of the individual consciousness' and not of changes in the 'external conditions of life'.[20] To underline this they pointed to Nietzsche: 'the world noiselessly surrounds those who are discovering new values'; 'the greatest ideas and thoughts' are born 'only in the solitary thoughts of wise men'.[21]

Though Struve and Frank acknowledged the 'unconditional right of each personality to create an ideal and act in its name' they felt that systematic cultural creation required 'a certain degree of order and discipline'.[22] While the idea of a 'rational social life' was an anti-cultural idea, they felt that the state had to protect culture. They visualized 'the balance between social organization and freedom of the individual' in Western European democracies as the ideal solution. They called their 'humanistic individualism' a middle path between 'enlightened despotism' and 'democratic despotism', neither of which

15 Ibid. p. 107.
16 Frank, 'Politika i idei', *Polyarnaya zvezda*, 15 December 1905.
17 *Polyarnaya zvezda*, 30 December 1905, p. 171.
18 *Polyarnaya zvezda*, 22 December 1905, p. 104.
19 Ibid. p. 109.
20 *Polyarnaya zvezda*, 30 December 1905, p. 170.
21 Ibid. p. 171.
22 Ibid. p. 179.

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maintained a correct balance between society and the individual.[23] They felt they had found a compromise between the individual and society, freedom and order, but their theory was impracticable in the actual political environment of Russia. Even a liberal struggle to establish a balance of freedom and order in the future was certain to threaten order in the present. By placing absolute value on the activities of an elite group, the creators of culture, Struve and Frank had outlined a rationale for a complete rejection of their earlier commitment to the interests of the masses of the people. The moral equality of individuals evaporated in the face of their cultural inequality. It was no accident that they rejected 'the socialist ideal of democratic despotism' with the rejoinder that 'if it is necessary to organize humanity in order to realize cultural progress' then it 'ought to be admitted that the single advisable system is not democratic but aristocratic despotism' which would place power in the hands of the cultured segment of society.[24] The path to *Vekhi* was clearly laid, with one significant detour ahead.

Freedom and Culture

The elitist cultural ideals of *Polyarnaya zvezda* were built on a fear of conflict between the masses and the educated minority which the Cadet election victory in the spring of 1906 momentarily dispelled. Both freedom and order suddenly seemed attainable. This hope was expressed in the successor to *Polyarnaya zvezda, Svoboda i kultura* (*Freedom and Culture*), which was edited by Frank. There he proclaimed the 'great cultural overturn' of the Revolution and the election success as the victory of the 'ideals of the intelligentsia and of the thought of the liberation movement'.[25] For the earlier idealists, cultural progress meant moral progress and could not be detached from social demands and political struggle. Frank reiterated this idea in *Svoboda i kultura.* He found 'all anti-democratic tendencies in the social political sphere' 'anti-cultural' and argued that contemporary democracy was strong only in unity with 'the thinking work of the spirit'.[26]

At about the same time Struve attempted to establish a big daily paper called *Duma.* Like *Svoboda i kultura,* it emphasized the theme that the Revolution was a cultural as well as a political success since the masses were following the liberals. 'Is not the feeling and the faith of the people with us?' the programme statement of the first issue (27 April 1906) asked rhetorically. 'Is not the unified voice of the country really for us?' Struve assumed that the Cadets would carry out their programme and that it would satisfy the masses.[27] This momentarily obscured the cultural programme of *Polyarnaya zvezda.* For both Struve and Frank, the Duma was going to provide order by giving the

[23] Ibid. pp. 176–77.
[24] Ibid. p. 177.
[25] *Svoboda i kultura*, 10 April 1906, p. 67.
[26] Ibid. p. 73.
[27] *Duma*, 27 April 1906, p. 1.

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liberation movement a 'binding centre', 'an authoritative and powerful spokesman'; it would end the unpleasant 'discord between the people and authority'.[28] When this hope was crushed, Struve and those who joined with him fell back on the elitist idealism of *Polyarnaya zvezda* which eventually appeared in *Vekhi*, stripped of its democratic wrapping, as an appeal to the self-interest of middle class intellectuals.

The *Vekhi* Symposium

The years between 1905 and the publication of *Vekhi* in the spring of 1909 were disillusioning ones for the Russian liberal movement. The Cadet Party had staked its hopes on using parliamentary politics to expand the few substantive concessions won by the Revolution into a general reform of the state system. However, the dismissal of the First and Second Dumas and the June 1907 *coup d'état* which effectively disenfranchized the vast majority of Russians and ensured a conservative majority, made the Duma an unlikely vehicle for reform. From the beginning of 1908, the effectiveness of the autocracy in limiting party activity, its blatantly anti-constitutional stance, and the character of the Third Duma all highlighted the futility of moderate reformism.

THE dilemma faced by Russian liberals at this juncture was the classic one of moderates in a time of reaction: either to take the risks of outright opposition or to abandon active politics altogether. Most liberals attempted a compromise, affirming the principle of opposition but avoiding an actual confrontation with the autocracy. The course advocated in 1909 by the *Vekhi* group was somewhat different. In effect, they urged moderates to abandon the principle of political reformism and concentrate on spiritual ideals. While much in the symposium pertained to the radical intelligentsia, the authors' target was actually liberal educated society as a whole. They attempted not only an exposé of revolutionary ideology for the benefit of an audience of disenchanted moderates; they decried the extent to which radical attitudes were accepted by the great majority of literate Russians, particularly the liberals. Struve, for example, in his article blamed all Russian liberalism for wearing what he called 'the intelligentsia uniform', a set of values foreign to its nature.[29] All the contributors pointed to the failure of the Revolution of 1905 to produce the reforms the liberals expected. Gershenzon called the Revolution 'a test' of the intelligentsia values the authors intended to analyse.[30] Bulgakov referred to the 'verdict' of history, Kistyakovsky to 'the bitter sentence', Frank to the 'wreck of the social movement with its many promises', Struve to the fact that the intelligentsia had made the Revolution badly, and Berdyayev to the impossibility of the intelligentsia achieving freedom in its present state.[31]

[28] Ibid. p. 2.
[29] *Vekhi*, 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1909), p. 164.
[30] Ibid. p. I.
[31] Ibid. pp. 22, 24, 155, 175, 170.

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Vekhi, like *Problems of Idealism* and the *Polyarnaya zvezda* essays on culture, sprang from the immediate political concerns of the authors.

The *Vekhi* group attacked educated Russian society on two fronts: political and cultural. Politically they pointed to the failure of the Revolution and the moderates' association with radicalism. They suggested that this political defeat stemmed from a more fundamental cultural fault. In his preface, Gershenzon explained that from the standpoint of the authors' belief in the primacy of spiritual life, the ideology of the intelligentsia was—

> . . . inherently erroneous and in practice futile; i.e. it both contradicts the nature of the human spirit and is incapable of reaching the goal the intelligentsia has set for itself: the emancipation of the people.[32]

The authors felt that only spiritual ideals were proper for the intelligentsia. Berdyayev wrote of the Deity, Bulgakov of the 'city of God', Gershenzon of God's truth, Struve of the 'kingdom of God within you', and Frank of culture. Even Kistyakovsky and Izgoyev, whose essays did not actually delve deeply into spiritual questions, acknowledged the primacy of spiritual ideals.

As the authors outlined the approaches to these goals they echoed the 1905 *Polyarnaya zvezda* definition of culture. In *Vekhi*, Berdyayev's love for God was expressed by love for absolute values and truth. To Bulgakov, history was spiritual completion and the city of God was sought through individual religious cultivation and 'national cultural creativity'. In Gershenzon's essay, God's truth was attained through 'self-consciousness and the self-education of the personality'. Struve's 'kingdom of God within you' was attained by the 'positive work of man on himself'. Finally, Frank urged 'cultural creativity' as the 'completion of human nature and the incarnation of ideal values in life'.

IT was from this platform of cultural elitism that the *Vekhi* authors launched their critique of intelligentsia attitudes, and in their reasoning, time and time again, they returned to the hierarchy of values established for the first time in *Polyarnaya zvezda*. Frank stigmatized the intelligentsia's utilitarianism in seeking the greatest good for the majority as a 'love for the earth', an 'anti-cultural' egalitarianism which sought to 'turn all people into workers' and bring down the highest needs to the minimum.[33] Cultural progress depended on the production of 'spiritual wealth' and not its distribution or the spread of enlightenment. The intelligentsia was therefore guilty of nihilism in its denial of the absolute values which were the guiding signs for such progress. Struve found the intelligentsia's effort to lead the masses against the autocracy also anti-cultural, a 'moral mistake', because it rested on the principle of the 'external building of social life' instead of the internal 'self-

[32] Ibid. p. II.
[33] Ibid. pp. 181, 188.

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completion of man '.[34] Berdyayev found the reason why Russia lacked a philosophical tradition to be the intelligentsia's ' man-worship ', which he believed paralyzed the love for truth and perverted the spirit.[35] Bulgakov identified a heroic striving to save humanity as the basic essence of the intelligentsia's world view.[36] It was insufficient because it was based on a love for man, not God or a proper ideal, and because it aimed at changing society by external means.[37]

For Gershenzon, who saw the individual consciousness as a telegraph pole monitoring the signals of God's truth, the intelligentsia's concentration on social issues had made it incapable of receiving the divine message. Therefore, he argued, to the Russian peasant the *intelligent* was a ' human-like monster ', a ' person without God ', and in Russia, unlike Western Europe, there was a ' metaphysical discord ' between the educated and the masses.[38]

Kistyakovsky, in his critique of the intelligentsia's lawlessness, suggested that the law created the individual and social discipline necessary for spiritual culture and played a great role in that culture, even though it could not be equated with absolute spiritual values since it was created in part by changing economic and social conditions. Yet instead of identifying the intelligentsia's insufficient legal consciousness as a product of the absence of legality in Russia he posited the reverse. Legal consciousness was a cultural value formed chiefly by the conscious exercise of the will and intellect. The intelligentsia's weakness in this area was a spiritual failure caused by a habitual misunderstanding of legal norms, indifference, and a lack of internal discipline.[39] ' It is impossible to blame only political conditions ', he wrote, ' we are guilty in this ourselves '.[40]

Only Izgoyev did not fully share these philosophic assumptions, though concern for spiritual progress loomed large in his essay on intelligentsia youth. He found that the rationalist parent lacked spiritual influence with his children and could not give the nation cultural leaders. Russian students degenerated because they were unwilling to look into their souls. Yet he saw the ' spiritual physiognomy of the Russian intelligentsia ' as the consequence of absolutist rule.[41] His continued belief in moderate reformism also set him apart from the other authors, and he stressed his differences with them in a note attached to his essay and in subsequent newspaper articles.[42]

THE image of the intelligentsia in *Vekhi* was one of a supremely important social group whose misguided devotion to social causes

[34] Ibid. pp. 170, 171.
[35] Ibid. pp. 8, 22.
[36] Ibid. p. 37.
[37] Ibid. p. 42.
[38] Ibid. p. 88.
[39] Ibid. pp. 130–32, 133, 148.
[40] Ibid. p. 154.
[41] Ibid. p. 120.
[42] Ibid. p. 124; *Rech*, 26 and 29 March 1909.

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had put Russia in great danger. For the authors, with the partial exception of Izgoyev, the intelligentsia's problems and Russia's problems were largely the same, and the mandatory cure was a change in the intelligentsia's spiritual world. They believed that this had already begun. It was in that sense that they titled their symposium 'Landmarks' or 'Signposts', indicating that something had been reached or even passed. They felt that this process was receiving some support from external conditions. First was the lesson of the Revolution. In addition, Struve argued that the economic development of the country was effecting an '*embourgeoisement*' of the intelligentsia, which would eventually reconcile it to the state and draw it into the existing social structure, ending its existence as a 'special cultural category'.[43] However, he explained that such external phenomena could not make a 'spiritual revolution', which demanded 'persistent work on culture'.[44]

Gershenzon also felt that some sort of irreversible process was aiding the transformation. For him it was the 'nature of the human spirit' which was naturally reversing the 'ruinous onesidedness' of the *intelligent's* personality. He believed that all social movements were comprehended by the collective soul and the separate consciousness of individual men and appealed to the latter to speed the metamorphosis.[45]

The other authors felt Russia's only hope was for the intelligentsia to heal itself. 'Only the consciousness of our culpability', wrote Berdyayev, 'can lead us to a new life'.[46] Bulgakov recognized that Russia needed new workers in all fields and that the intelligentsia would have to fill this need, but he felt that the *intelligent* could only be prepared for this role by a sojourn in a religious incubator: the 'slow and difficult path of the re-education of the personality'.[47] Kistyakovsky advised the intelligentsia 'to go off into its own internal world to grasp in it that which would freshen it and make it healthy'; this he felt would awaken its legal consciousness.[48]

SO the authors of *Vekhi* explained that Russia was in a terrible fix and the intelligentsia could rescue it by thinking; thinking of itself, its own personality, its problems, values, religion. They presented their ideals as practical alternatives to the types of social, political, and even cultural change sought by liberals and radicals alike. If there was much material work to be done in Russia, the spiritual transformation had to precede it and make a path for it. The political implications of this position went well beyond a denial of the possibility of revolutionary change and even beyond a rejection of liberal politics. In reply to the dilemmas faced by Russian liberals in the time of reaction, the *Vekhi*

[43] *Vekhi*, 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1909), p. 173.
[44] Ibid. pp. 173–74.
[45] Ibid. p. 96.
[46] Ibid. p. 22.
[47] Ibid. p. 59.
[48] Ibid. p. 155.

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group offered the promise of a cultural revolution already under way; a revolution which, without risk and without sacrifice on their part, would lead Russia out of the morass of repressive backwardness and somehow to a better future. On one level this can be read as a simple appeal to the self-interest of liberal intellectuals who watched the continuing autocratic violence from the sidelines with an uneasy conscience and yet did not feel their own lives threatened. It offered an ethical rationale for non-involvement and pursuit of one's own affairs. On another plane it represented the conversion of the experience of alienation into a political programme based on the assumption that intellectuals had no immediate stake in the daily life of society as a whole and that their interests were not endangered by the policies of the tsarist regime.

The Social Roots of *Vekhi*

Concepts of culture had a large place in nineteenth-century Russian social thought and one can argue that such ideas run centrally throughout the course of modern Russian intellectual history. The Russian preoccupation with culture (*kultura*), like the German with *Kultur,* was in some ways a response to the experience of backwardness by intellectuals forced to look out with injured pride on countries more civilized and flourishing than their own. In Russia, the effect of the acculturation of the educated minority to the learning and arts of more advanced countries was alienation from the native social milieu, and an ambivalence towards foreign cultures.

There were two natural solutions to this predicament. Either the elite could affirm the cosmopolitan nature of all true culture, thereby proclaiming its own place in a universal world culture and disassociating itself from the backwardness of its national culture, or it could turn with renewed emphasis to the distinctive aspects of the indigenous culture and from there to a culturally based nationalism. In the one case intellectuals might feel a crusading wish to share the fruits of cosmopolitan culture with the deprived native society, and in the other an equally strong emotional desire to quicken the growth of national culture. One can identify many varieties and combinations of these two basic responses in Russian history, some of which depended on a conception of culture as completely spiritual, as in *Vekhi,* and others which saw it as involving interdependently all aspects of national life, the more common occurrence.

THE political idea of culture which reached maturity in the *Vekhi* symposium developed against the backdrop of a traditional liberal preoccupation with culture. In the long years of reaction which followed the great reforms of the 1860s Russian liberals developed an ideology which emphasized the importance of small cultural changes, progress through piecemeal improvement in the lives of the peasants and the spread of education and enlightenment. This *Kulturträger*

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liberalism stressed the diffusion of intelligentsia culture, understood in a cosmopolitan sense, and association with Europeanization and industrialization. Culture here was seen as embracing all spheres of human activity and Russian historical development was envisaged as a struggle for universal civilization. This attitude was reinforced by peculiarities in Russian economic development which created, in the second half of the nineteenth century, in place of the business and commercial communities of Western Europe, a middle stratum of technical and professional workers. These people, who made up a great part of the liberal constituency, often considered their occupations 'cultural work'. The response of the majority of liberals to the post-1905 reaction was a re-emphasis on the traditional conception of cultural progress as the necessary basis for the transformation of Russia into a liberal society. The *Vekhi* group, though it broke with the traditional all-embracing view of culture as both material and spiritual, reacted in a similar fashion by replacing political activity with its own notion of cultural progress and cultural work as the *sine qua non* for all other advances. Just as the more common liberal idea of culture reflected the social base of Russian liberalism, the *Vekhi* idea showed the nature of the *Vekhi* group: intellectuals primarily concerned with spiritual culture.

Nationalism

Whereas most liberals of the period took a cosmopolitan view of culture, as the *Vekhi* group developed it moved towards a nationalist conception. Struve played the leading role in this but some of the others were not far behind. Struve's national pride was deep-seated. In the early part of the 1905 Revolution his most militant statements were provoked by Russian defeats in the war with Japan, rather than the internal policies of the autocracy or the growing strength of the opposition. When the Russian fortress of Port Arthur surrendered he wrote: 'The Russian autocracy has finally gone bankrupt as a system'.[49] In the December essays on culture he complained, together with Frank, about the difficulty in confronting Europe.

> Before Western European culture the Russian man feels himself in the position of a schoolboy and ignoramus; even when he hates it as something foreign and antipathetic to him, he cannot avoid valuing it and feeling ashamed before it.[50]

Although one can identify nationalism as an emotional source of the *Vekhi* group's obsession with culture, intellectually their spiritual idealism left little room for its political expression. During 1908, Struve attempted to bind nationalism and culture together in a variety of articles published, for the most part, in his magazine *Russkaya mysl* (*Russian Thought*). The first issue for that year contained his essay 'Great Russia', in which he appealed for recognition of the historical and

[49] *Osvobozhdeniye*, 31 May 1905.
[50] *Polyarnaya zvezda*, 22 December 1905, p. 106.

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cultural traditions of the Russian state. The article, a curious jumble of romantic ideas of the state and old fashioned Pan-Slavism, baffled many contemporaries and produced an outcry in the liberal press. He defined the state as an 'organism', with its own law of being, which demands 'health and strength'. Strength, he explained, meant external power, and he condemned radicals and conservatives alike for subordinating the foreign power of the state to its domestic well-being.[51] In order to increase the external power of Russia, he suggested, as he had as early as 1903, there was only one path: to direct all forces into the territory accessible to the influence of Russian culture, 'the entire Black Sea basin'.[52]

What was the state's internal relation to culture? Struve answered in the same article: in the name of *culture*, the state 'subordinates the life of the people to the principle of *discipline*, based on conditions of state power'.[53] 'Discipline is tied to culture', he elaborated in a Moscow newspaper during the same month, 'as closely as order is to the state'.[54] Discipline, culture, order, and the state connected for Struve like the sides of a square. Discipline meant the maximum authority 'over the crowd'. For the masses it was steady work and 'disciplined labour'.[55] For the intelligentsia, discipline meant the recognition of state power. 'The ideal of state power and the ideal of disciplined popular labour', he wrote in 'Great Russia', together with ideas of law and rights, 'ought to form the iron stock of this new political and cultural knowledge of the Russian man'.[56]

On the eve of the publication of *Vekhi* in the spring of 1909 Struve's nationalism took a new turn and was directed at Russia's Jewish minority. The occasion was a literary dispute between a Jewish writer, Shlom Asch, and a Great Russian one, Evgeny Chirikov. The incident, insignificant in itself, served as an opening for several journalists who wished to raise the Jewish question in the liberal press. Struve's article was entitled 'The Intelligentsia and the National Face'.[57] At a time when Jews suffered acutely from tsarist persecution, Struve condemned the Russian intelligentsia for not stressing its ethnic Russian (*Russkii*) nature. Instead, he complained, it considered itself only territorially Russian or Russian in the sense of citizenship (*Rossiiskii*) and had 'decolourized itself', concealing its 'national face'.

True nationality was for Struve a cultural attribute. He categorized it as 'narrower' and 'more unquestionable' than race, which he defined as the 'colour of the skin, the width of the nose, "the nose indicator".' 'There was no need for anthropological devices or genealogical searches', he suggested; nationality was 'spiritual attraction and revul-

51 *Russkaya mysl*, January 1908, p. 149.
52 Ibid. p. 146.
53 Ibid. p. 147.
54 Reprinted in *Patriotika* (SPB, 1911), p. 144.
55 Ibid. p. 144.
56 *Russkaya mysl*, January 1908, p. 148.
57 *Slovo*, 10 March 1909.

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sion'. On the basis of these feelings, which 'live and palpitate in the soul', he claimed the Russian painter of Jewish extraction, I. I. Levitan, as an ethnic Russian (*Russkii*) artist. He added that the same feeling Levitan stirred in his soul caused his repulsion from Shlom Asch, 'with whose productions I am, however, completely unfamiliar'.

The liberal Cadet Party to which Struve belonged had in its platform a strong equal rights plank for minorities. In his 'national face' article, Struve came close to suggesting that this was a political mistake because large sections of the Russian population were anti-semitic. He explained that although he supported the principle of 'state equality', the 'attraction and revulsion belong to us; they are our property'. He reminded Jews that 'the conscious initiative of revulsion from Russian culture' belonged to the Zionist movement and that it was not the Russian intelligentsia which had rejected the Jews. To underline this point in a subsequent article he warned Jews that it was 'quite useless for them to indulge in the illusion' that the national face only belonged to anti-semitic fanatics; it was 'the honest and good face of Russian nationality'.[58]

Vekhi was published at the height of the controversy which developed around Struve's 'national face' article. Though he was the main advocate of nationalism, most of the others followed his lead, despite the fact that Izgoyev, Frank and Gershenzon were Jews. Bulgakov was closest to Struve in this regard. During the Chirikov-Asch controversy he welcomed the new 'national sensitivity' as a cure for the 'old enlightenment cosmopolitanism' of the intelligentsia and a challenge to the reactionaries' 'monopoly of patriotism'.[59] Struve, he recalled, had led the way from the time of the Revolution in trying to make patriotism 'the cry of the opposition'. In *Vekhi*, Bulgakov repeated these pleas, and Struve again accused the intelligentsia of repudiating the state's 'mystique'.[60] Izgoyev pointed to the then successful Young Turk Revolution as a lesson to the intelligentsia of the 'moral might' of a small group 'animated by its national state idea'.[61] Frank found room for 'state power or national dignity' alongside 'theoretical scientific truth', 'artistic beauty', and the 'object of religious faith' in his list of the objective values which guide humanity.[62] He also accused the intelligentsia of lacking a sense of the state, of being enclosed in a territorially Russian (*Rossiiskii*) spiritual monastery.[63] The distance they had travelled from the universal values of *Problems of Idealism* was considerable. Perhaps nothing indicates this more sharply than the fact that Berdyayev, who still considered himself an anarchist, pleaded for a 'realistic attitude towards life' that could lead to the birth of a 'national philosophical tradition'.[64]

58 *Slovo*, 12 March 1909.
59 *Slovo*, 19 March 1909.
60 *Vekhi*, pp. 62, 160.
61 Ibid. p. 124.
62 Ibid. p. 182.
63 Ibid. p. 204.
64 Ibid. p. 19.

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There was nothing inherent in the idealism of *Problems of Idealism* which led to chauvinism, but by the time of *Vekhi*, the personal nationalism of some of the authors, particularly Struve, had permeated the *Vekhi* group. It added a dimension to their appeal for a cultural resurgence in Russia, and can be read as an attempt to escape from the social isolation inherent in their philosophy of cultural elitism. Because the *Vekhi* authors were associated with nationalism, the nationalist strain in the symposium was more discernible to a contemporary audience than it is to a modern one.

Fear of the Masses and Rejection of Mass Society

The central moving concerns which activated the *Vekhi* group sprang from both the specific historical situation of the 1905 Revolution and the broader social conditions of the early twentieth century. The crucial separation of culture from society in the *Polyarnaya zvezda* definition of culture coincided exactly with the most radical phase of the 1905 Revolution, the December rising in Moscow. Struve and those who joined with him were deeply disturbed by the violence of the revolutionary months. In 1910, Bulgakov recalled a spiritual atmosphere which 'breathed flaming and unadulterated despotism', a population 'demoralized by demagogy, by frenzied burning class hatred'.[65]

Struve's experience was similar. While still in Paris in May, 1905, he was already worried about the peasant's traditional hostility for the lord, the dark class instinct of the masses.[66] After he returned to Russia, he appealed in the first issues of *Polyarnaya zvezda* for a return to authority.[67] The whole country he felt was threatened by the 'unculturedness of the masses of the people'.[68] Frank's initial attitude in *Polyarnaya zvezda* was more sanguine, but soon he too feared a new Pugachov *Jacquerie*.[69] Berdyayev warned of 'an ocean of barbarism and savagery'.[70] These worries were echoed in the pages of *Vekhi*, particularly in the essays of Struve, Gershenzon and Bulgakov.

The cultural idealism of 1905 provided a justification for leaving the masses alone. It outlined a new role for the intelligentsia to replace the old one of the cultural and material uplifting of the people. *Problems of Idealism* enshrined the concept of the intelligentsia's debt to the people. The *Polyarnaya zvezda* essays on culture rejected the debt along with the utilitarian idea of culture, but they preserved the intelligentsia's heroic role in Russian society. By making spiritual culture supreme and giving the intelligentsia a monopoly over it they produced a social justification for the intelligentsia itself and left the transformation of Russia, which would first have to be spiritual, safely in its hands. Even Bul-

65 *Moskovskii ezhenedelnik*, 26 February 1910, p. 24.
66 *Osvobozhdeniye*, 31 May 1905.
67 *Polyarnaya zvezda*, 15 and 30 December 1905.
68 *Polyarnaya zvezda*, 30 December 1905, p. 223.
69 *Polyarnaya zvezda*, 22 December 1905, p. 130.
70 Ibid. p. 147.

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gakov, who dwelt at length in *Vekhi* on the folly of intelligentsia heroism, had no doubt that the fate of Russia depended on its spiritual health.

The intellectual role formulated by the *Vekhi* group was a highly exclusive one which separated an intelligentsia elite from the bulk of educated Russia—the school teachers, agronomists, middle echelon technicians in government and industry, the medical personnel, who filled the ranks of the intelligentsia in ever increasing numbers at the turn of the century. These people were, in many cases, deeply involved in the 'cultural work' the *Vekhi* group found so irrelevant. Enjoying the social mobility which accompanied the growth of education and industry, this expanding intelligentsia could easily be felt as a threat to the hegemony of highly cultivated intellectuals of the *Vekhi* type. Berdyayev, at least, found these new people incurably philistine.[71]

The Revolution of 1905 brought the masses into the street and changed the format of political activity. The time of the *kruzhok* was gone; liberal politicians suddenly needed the ability to face a crowd. Some were able to make this transition and others had difficulty. Struve and Berdyayev fell into this latter group. A. Tyrkova, a childhood friend of Struve's, describes him in her memoirs as a 'soft man' who became flustered before policemen.[72] Facing a large crowd he lost his nerve; as a delegate to the Second Duma he was unable to read a speech.[73] Berdyayev also appears to have been a shy, retiring person at this time. He described himself in his memoirs as 'over-delicate and sensitive, both physically and morally'; a man who went through life 'with half-closed eyes and holding my nose'.[74] Neither Struve nor Berdyayev was likely to enjoy street meetings or parliamentary politics.

A Reaction to Materialism and Industrialization

The spectre of the masses in the streets was the main prod which drove the *Vekhi* group to abandon the idea of enlightenment, with its mandatory emphasis on mingling with the people. The driving force behind the new masses, as behind the new intelligentsia, was rapid industrialization which created stresses and tensions in all social classes. The affirmation of spiritual culture, of absolute values, can be read as a reaction to the materialism, utilitarianism, and rationalism of the new capitalistic world growing up around the *Vekhi* authors. While all the authors, with the exception of Berdyayev and perhaps Frank, considered themselves proponents of the new industrialized society, they felt deeply ambivalent towards industrialization, and the way in which they conceived of the new economic order clearly revealed their ambivalence.

Struve generally treated economic development as a means to other ends during this period. The same reasons which early in 1905 caused

[71] He was attacked for this in *Rech*, 8 November 1907.
[72] Tyrkova-Williams, *Na putyakh svobode* (New York, 1952), p. 356.
[73] Ibid. pp. 355–56.
[74] Berdyayev, *Dream and Reality* (New York, 1951), pp. 20–21.

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him to advocate a liberal programme—fear of the masses, a desire for order, insulted national pride—also led him at various times to advocate industrialization. Of course, the great Russia he dreamed of was a Western industrialized Russia, but he saw this more in terms of Western spiritual culture and national power than economic strength.[75] The materialism which he thoroughly opposed was a characteristic feature of Western liberal capitalistic societies. The order and authority he sought were not.

Bulgakov was perhaps the most concerned about the apparent conflict between capitalism and spiritual values. In *Vekhi* he tried to show the religious roots of Western bourgeois society. Soon afterwards he published a long two-part article called 'The National Economy and the Religious Person'.[76] In it he used Max Weber's recent work to argue that capitalism was religious. He suggested that the national economy was a spiritual phenomenon, and religion was an economic necessity. 'Dominant utilitarianism', he wrote, threatened 'to undermine economic development'; the national economy demanded 'a spiritually healthy people'.[77] The true character of these arguments was revealed in the second part of the article when he explained the further advantages of a religious attitude. Intelligentsia views, which emphasized hostile class interests, were 'in the highest degree disadvantageous' for the 'social education' of workers.[78] A religious attitude emphasized that—

> Every class has its place in the productive process, its duty and its social responsibility, from which it cannot and ought not to liberate itself in the name of its interests.[79]

In the place of class conflict Bulgakov demanded 'ethical' and religious values, 'moral responsibility in the sphere of professional labour'.

For Frank and Berdyayev the issue was clearer. Frank remained close to the original *Polyarnaya zvezda* position. In 1910, he conceded that 'the development of internal spiritual culture' could accompany the development of 'external, material culture', but the danger was that 'faith in material culture' could lead 'to the triumph of practical materialism, to a blindness to the internal, spiritual, and personal values for the sake of external, material ones'.[80] Frank treated capitalism as a weapon, valuable if used for the advancement of spiritual culture, destructive as an end in itself. He felt that the justification for capitalism had to rest on a 'religio-philosophical idea of culture'; otherwise the risk was 'Americanism', or what Herzen had called 'Genghis Khan with a telegraph'.[81]

75 Richard Pipes, *Struve, Liberal on the Left* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), p. 127.
76 *Moskovskii ezhenedelnik*, 13 and 20 June 1909.
77 *Moskovskii ezhenedelnik*, 20 June 1909, p. 26.
78 Ibid. p. 30.
79 Ibid. p. 30.
80 *Moskovskii ezhenedelnik*, 17 April 1910, pp. 39–40.
81 Ibid. p. 40.

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Berdyayev remained philosophically an anarchist. He feared the Revolution as a threat to culture, but he was equally wary of the state and the bourgeoisie. For him there was only one answer to the 'deep antinomy between democracy and culture, between human good and superhuman good': a religious unity, an aesthetic *sobornost* or collectiveness encompassing the whole society. He refused to join the Cadet Party despite his sympathy for it because it was 'bourgeois'.[82] Industrialization, he wrote in 1906, was at best a 'neutral human medium'; the productive economic process 'liberates man from the primitive power of nature' and 'creates the soil on which culture grows', but it can easily become 'a weapon of the devil'.[83]

THE *Vekhi* authors offered individual solutions to the social and political anguish of early twentieth-century Russia: industrialization and mass society, revolution and reaction. Like generations of Russian intellectuals before them they went shopping for ideas in Europe. Russia was a backward country, socially, economically, and politically. Only in the realm of ideas could she keep up with Europe. The ideas which accompanied the European experience of industrialization were available to Russian intellectuals before Russia began to industrialize. When industrialization began, positivism, utilitarianism, and materialism were the accepted attitudes among educated Russians. The *Vekhi* group in attacking these took part in a general European critique of modern bourgeois society. Since this critique was largely based on the triumph of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of liberal democracy and an industrial state, it was bound to have only a minor appeal in Russia.

Vekhi in Soviet and Western Perspective

THE *Vekhi* symposium was the literary homily of a small circle of pre-revolutionary intellectuals, detailing their peculiar reaction to a precise constellation of social and historical circumstances. It would be only an historical oddity but for the importance it has had in colouring both Western and Soviet views of the intellectual and political landscape of early twentieth-century Russia. Proponents of a number of familiar historical interpretations of the period have used the *Vekhi* symposium to support their views, and even general surveys and literary histories of modern Russia often include a page or two on the subject.

Soviet historians have frequently read *Vekhi* as a landmark in the liberal intelligentsia's abandonment of opposition to the tsarist regime and an indication of the Russian bourgeoisie's unwillingness to fulfil its historic task.[84] Recent Soviet studies of the period have treated the *Vekhi* group as representative of the mainstream of Russian liberalism. One historian found in the *Vekhi* group the expression of a new cultural

[82] Berdyayev, *Sub Specie Aeternitatis* (SPb., 1907), p. 411.
[83] Ibid. pp. 405–406.
[84] L. K. Erman, *Intelligentsiya v pervoi russkoi revolyutsii* (Moscow, 1966), p. 363.

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nationalism which was to unify the Russian bourgeoisie.[85] Another considered it the manifesto of bourgeois liberals who sought to form a coalition with the ruling gentry.[86] In Soviet literary surveys *Vekhi* has often appeared as the 'ideological-aesthetic essence' of modernist decadent and symbolist literature[87]; the reactionary face beneath the mask of aestheticism and a sign of the demoralization of the intelligentsia.[88]

Like their Soviet counterparts, Western historians have frequently pointed to *Vekhi* as evidence of the liberal intelligentsia's withdrawal from the revolutionary movement.[89] The alienation of the intelligentsia was decreasing[90]; a new professional non-revolutionary was developing.[91] The symposium seemed to show a movement of intellectuals away from social utilitarianism,[92] an end to the old atheistic civic morality and indifference to religion[93]; it was the harbinger of a new religious renaissance.[94] While most Western comment on *Vekhi* has been similar to the Soviet (with a different political viewpoint), some Western historians have argued, on the contrary, that the isolation of the *Vekhi* group revealed the persistent radicalism of the liberal intelligentsia.[95] The *Vekhi* view of Russian liberals as radicals, whose unwillingness to compromise with the autocracy was destroying the chances for real liberalism in Russia, has had wide currency.[96]

In the West *Vekhi* has also been taken at face value as providing significant descriptive evidence about the characteristics of the *intelligent*. For example, Helen Muchnic used Gershenzon's image of the *intelligent* as emotionally deformed by an unnatural concentration on social issues as the motif for her interpretation of Russian literature in *From Gorky to Pasternak*. She divided Russian writers between those who fell into a one-sided concentration on the 'public world' like Gorky, Leonov, and Sholokhov, and those who, like Pasternak, did not. *Vekhi* also stands in the background of Vladimir Weidle's influential essay *Russia Absent and Present*. A whole series of ideas from *Vekhi* appear there ranging from

85 A. Ia. Avrekh, *Stolypin i tretya Duma* (Moscow, 1968), pp. 30–43, 456–57.
86 E. D. Chermensky, *Burzhuaziya i tsarism v pervoi russkoi revolyutsii* (Moscow, 1970), pp. 417–18.
87 N. E. Krutikova and I. T. Kruka, *Russkaya literatura XX veka* (Kiev, 1970), pp. 10–11, 62.
88 A. A. Volkov, *Russkaya literatura XX veka* (Moscow, 1970), pp. 393–94.
89 Gleb Struve, 'The Cultural Renaissance', in T. G. Stavrou, *Russia Under the Last Tsar* (Minnesota, 1969), p. 184.
90 Martin Malia, 'What is the Intelligentsia?' in Richard Pipes, ed., *The Russian Intelligentsia* (New York, 1961), p. 17.
91 Richard Pipes, 'The Historical Evolution of the Russian Intelligentsia', in Richard Pipes, ed., *The Russian Intelligentsia*, p. 48.
92 Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire 1801–1917* (Oxford, 1967), pp. 643–44.
93 Donald Treadgold, *20th Century Russia*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1964), p. 91.
94 Nicholas Zernov, *The Russian Religious Renaissance of the 20th Century* (New York, 1963), pp. 111–31.
95 Leonard Schapiro, 'The Vekhi Group and the Mystique of Revolution', *Slavonic and East European Review*, December 1955.
96 Stuart R. Tompkins, *The Russian Intelligentsia* (Norman, 1957), p. 248.

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the intelligentsia's inability to respect 'the virtues of creation and command' to the effacement of personality.

For evidence of the importance of *Vekhi*, many historians have pointed to the polemics, discussions, and meetings which the symposium seemed to provoke.[97] The contemporary response to *Vekhi* was significant, although not as remarkable as some have suggested. The widespread controversy which seemed to develop around *Vekhi* was fed by several subsurface sources, which offer an explanation for the *Vekhi* dispute.

Vekhi and the Crisis of Russian Liberalism

Vekhi appeared at a time when Russian liberals, and the upper crust of Russian educated society, were in the midst of a deep political and psychological crisis. Among liberals during the Revolution of 1905 and the first years following it, an interest in practical political questions replaced traditional concern for culture, and politics provided a new way of explaining the significance of their lives and a new social identity. A considerable number of them abandoned their previous professions or restricted them in order to participate in liberal reformist politics as local party workers, politicians in and out of the Duma, and political journalists. While the political situation following Stolypin's June 1907 *coup* against the Duma contained all the necessary ingredients to upset liberal expectations, disillusionment came upon them gradually and it was only in 1909 that they confronted the unmistakable failure of parliamentary politics and struggled with the psychological confusion of abandoning their self-image as political reformers.[98]

Throughout 1909 the Cadet Party was in serious political trouble. The leaders increased their verbal militancy, but in actuality they seemed to be doing nothing. There were significant defections and even the traditional *Vestnik Evropy* (*Messenger of Europe*) became critical.[99] In its May issue, the unsigned social chronicle pointed to the disintegration of the party, and charged that 'on the spot there is no organization'.[1] The Cadet leader, Milyukov, complained towards the end of the year that the struggle had taken on a 'prolonged character' and that the 'circle of active participants has been reduced almost to the limits of formal members of party committees and provincial sections'.[2]

The Cadet leaders thought of their party as the party of the intelligentsia. In an article written just before the *Vekhi* symposium, a Cadet politician from the right wing of the party, N. A. Gredeskul, sketched the outlines of the liberals' psychological crisis from the standpoint of a city

[97] See N. Poltoratsky, 'The Significance of *Vekhi*', *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, No. 1, 1967, and Schapiro, op. cit.
[98] A. Ia. Avrekh, 'III Duma i nachalo krizisa treteyunskoi sistemy 1908–1909', *AN SSSR Istoricheskiye zapiski*, 53, 1955.
[99] See *Rech*, 26 August, 4 September, 16 September 1909.
[1] *Vestnik Evropy* (5, 1909), pp. 435–40.
[2] Quoted in *Sovremennyi mir* (12, 1909), p. 109.

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politician. The intelligentsia, he suggested, 'has hardly ever lived through an historical moment so troubled and distressing for it'.[3]

> We do not see any kind of exit, any kind of hope for ourselves in the future. It seems that everything which was done has been irretrievably lost; that the struggle for Russian freedom must—is it easy to say it?—be begun from the beginning.[4]

The result, as he saw it, was political indifference, and a turning towards 'apolitical' aesthetic and philosophical questions in order to 'drown our political failure in them'.[5] The provincial intelligentsia experienced similar psychological stress from this crisis.[6]

In response to this difficult situation, the Cadets and the liberal press in general re-emphasized the importance of traditional cultural work among the masses and focused on non-political cultural progress as the path to a liberal society. As Milyukov explained in November 1909, the gradual enlightenment of the masses, their growing consciousness of new needs 'in culture, on the soil of educational institutions, in economics, on the group of cooperatives and professional organizations, administration of the economy, on the soil of local self-government', would eventually produce reform.[7] The most pressing problem liberal political leaders faced was the maintenance of a visible opposition stance before Russian educated society, and this they did by emphasizing the intelligentsia tradition and the idea of a general democratic opposition to official Russia. Attacking the *Vekhi* symposium provided them with an attractive opportunity to do this.

The *Vekhi* Group and Liberal Politics

The polemical fortunes of *Vekhi* were closely linked with the personal political prestige of Peter Struve. During 1908 and 1909 Struve, still nominally a member of the Cadet central committee, was involved in an unsuccessful attempt to create a moderate constitutionalist bloc to oppose both the extreme right and left of the political spectrum.[8] The failure of Struve's project, together with the unfavourable reception which met his form of nationalism, created a distinctly prejudicial atmosphere for *Vekhi*. His 'Great Russia' article won only scattered support from the right wing of the Cadet Party. The Cadet daily *Rech* attacked the article and even Struve's defenders were confused by the contradictions between his nationalism and his spiritual idealism.[9] Berdyayev dismissed it as a publicist experiment written 'out of the spirit of contrariness'.[10]

[3] In *Zarnitsy*, 2 (SPb., 1909), p. 1.
[4] Ibid. p. 1.
[5] Ibid. p. 5.
[6] See artices by I. Zhilkin, in *Vestnik Evropy*, Nos. 2, 4, 8, 1909.
[7] *Rech*, 25 November 1909.
[8] D. N. Shipov, *Vospominaniya i dumy o perezhitom* (Moscow, 1918), pp. 526–27.
[9] *Moskovskii ezhenedelnik*, 11 March 1908, and *Slovo*, 11 July 1908.
[10] Berdyayev in *Slovo*, 11 July 1908.

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Struve's 'national face' article got a worse press than 'Great Russia'. The two most important liberal newspapers equated it with 'that clamorous cheap patriotism which serves as an advertisement for various types of political gangs'.[11] As Milyukov put it: 'The constitutional and democratic elements of Russian society known to me personally would prefer, in the great majority, to deny the "national face" revealed by P. B. Struve'.[12] For liberals more sympathetic to nationalism, Struve's suggestions were 'a big tactical mistake', coming as they did during the Bosnian crisis when Russia needed unity before the Germans.[13] Even the right liberal paper *Slovo*, which had published Struve's 'national face' article, found it necessary to distinguish between 'state-building nationalism' and Struve's 'psychological nationalism'.[14]

Struve himself seemed aware of the effect the 'national face' article was likely to have on the reception of *Vekhi*, and tried to halt the earlier polemic before the symposium reached the bookstalls.[15] Struve's political difficulties and the chauvinist undertones of *Vekhi* contributed to the hostility with which liberals greeted the symposium.

Why There Was a *Vekhi* Dispute

Vekhi contained something to please almost every political disposition, and the publication of the symposium opened a forum for 'replies' in which *Vekhi* served as ammunition for the already heated political battles of the period. The reactionaries welcomed *Vekhi* as a sign that intellectuals were leaving the revolutionary camp. A right-wing archbishop used it as an occasion to call on Russian educated society to repent and make its peace with the state and the church.[16] On the left the issue was more complicated. Lenin attacked *Vekhi* as the 'essence of Cadetism' in order to tar those social democrats who wanted to join with liberals in a united front.[17] In his book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* he used *Vekhi* to damn the 'idealism' of the straying Bolsheviks Gorky, Lunacharsky, and Bogdanov. Plekhanov applied himself to *Vekhi* in much the same way, equating Lunacharsky, Bogdanov, and Gorky with the *Vekhi* group.[18] For others on the left, *Vekhi* was used to make a point in a continuing polemic about whether the intelligentsia was a social class with specific class interests or not.[19] The symposium also offered a cover for political arguments otherwise complicated by the censorship. Except for these political purposes, the left had little reason to concern itself with *Vekhi*.

11 *Russkiya vedomosti*, 18 March 1909.
12 *Rech*, 13 March 1909.
13 *Vestnik Evropy* (5, 1909), p. 375.
14 *Slovo*, 15 March, 17 March 1909.
15 Reprinted in *Patriotika* (SPb., 1911), pp. 219–20.
16 *Slovo*, 10 May 1909.
17 Lenin, *Sobranniye sochineniya*, 5th ed. (Moscow, 1961), Vol. 19, p. 167.
18 *Sovremennyi mir* (No. 9, 1909), pp. 182–216, No. 10, pp. 164–200, No. 12, pp. 167–202.
19 See V. M. Friche, *Ot Chernyshevskago k Vekham* (Moscow, 1910), and Ivanov-Razumnik, 'Chto takoe kayuschyesiya raznochintsy', in *Ob intelligentsii* (SPb., 1910).

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Vekhi's impact on the artistic and literary intelligentsia of the time was much slighter than later commentaries would lead one to suppose. Intellectuals who abhorred the politicization of culture were likely to feel uncomfortable with the traditional utilitarian slant to *Vekhi*. The neo-Leibnitzian philosopher, N. O. Lossky, rejected an invitation from Bulgakov to participate in the symposium because he found it impossible to mix his philosophical work with social questions.[20] There were few writers uninvolved with politics who commented on *Vekhi*. Lev Tolstoy made some unpublished notes on it from a religious angle.[21] The symbolist poet and novelist, Andrei Bely, devoted a favourable article to it in one of the last issues of Bryusov's *Vesy* (*Scales*) which closed at the end of 1909 for lack of financial support.[22] Unlike Lossky, Bely read in *Vekhi* a much needed criticism of the intelligentsia's utilitarian demands on culture.[23] In his memoirs, written in the Soviet period, he explained that Gershenzon wanted 'to say "no" to Cadet social consciousness' and the whole *Kulturträger* idea.[24] Nikolai Valentinov, who knew Bely in 1909, suggests in his memoirs that Gershenzon convinced Bely of his understanding of the *Vekhi* 'pure art' position just before *Vekhi* was published.[25] The same year Bely dedicated his book, *Ashes*, to Nekrasov (1821–78), whose poems on the suffering of the peasants were also favourites of Lenin's. Bely, like many other writers in the period, was swinging back and forth between ideas of pure art and art with some form of popular mission.[26] He, too, used *Vekhi* to support ideas he was developing independently of the symposium.

Vekhi was of central importance only to the liberals. To make full use of it they needed to associate the symposium with the tsarist reaction. Struve's 'national face' article and the echoes of nationalism in *Vekhi* provided some basis for the association. The reactionary shading of *Vekhi* was deepened by an exchange between Struve and Berdyayev and the right-wing Archbishop Antonii of Volyn, only a few months after *Vekhi* was published, at a time when there were new revelations of the church's involvement with the protofascist 'Black Hundreds' Union of the Russian People.[27] Antonii welcomed *Vekhi* as a 'great and beautiful feat'.[28] The replies of Struve, and less so Berdyayev, were far from hostile. Struve, while criticizing the church's involvement in politics, explained that the Archbishop's letter pleased him and that the 'liberation of our spirit' allowed the *Vekhi* group to speak the truth.[29]

20 N. O. Lossky, *Vospominaniya* (Munich, 1968), pp. 148.
21 N. Poltoratzky, 'Lev Tolstoy and *Vekhi*', *Slavonic and East European Review*, June 1964.
22 V. Bryusov, *Dnevniki*, p. 141.
23 Bely in *Vesy* (No. 3, 1909), pp. 65–68.
24 Bely, *Mezhdu dvukh revolyutsii* (Leningrad, 1934), pp. 286–87.
25 N. Valentinov, *Dva goda s simvolistami* (1966), pp. 212–14.
26 Bely, *Simvolism* (Moscow, 1910), pp. 1–10.
27 *Rech*, 13, 14, 15, 28 May and 3 June 1909.
28 *Slovo*, 10 May 1909.
29 Ibid.

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Berdyayev, though more critical of the church, complimented himself on exposing the lie 'our intelligentsia is living'.[30] As a critic in *Rech* indicated, the Archbishop's involvement with one of the propaganda sheets of the Union of the Russian People was commonly known, and this, he suggested, changed *Vekhi* in the eyes of many 'from a purely literary phenomenon into some kind of criminal act'.[31]

The *Vekhi* Dispute—An Exercise in Liberal Politics

Vekhi was published in March 1909, and liberal comment on it continued sporadically into 1910, when the Cadets published *The Intelligentsia in Russia* with articles by Milyukov and others.[32] There were two other collections of liberal articles about *Vekhi*: *On Vekhi*, which gathered comments about the 'national face' controversy and linked them to *Vekhi*, and *In Defence of the Intelligentsia*, which contained speeches on the symposium from various liberal gatherings, and reprints of newspaper and magazine commentaries.[33] The liberal reviews of *Vekhi* were almost uniformly hostile, but the reviewers made the symposium sound so spectacularly bad that interest in *Vekhi* soared. The novelist and modernist critic, Dmitri Merezhkovsky, who wrote regularly for *Rech* in this period, celebrated the perniciousness of *Vekhi* in an article entitled 'The Seven Meek Men'.[34] He compared the authors' attacks on the intelligentsia to the horse-beating of Raskolnikov's dream in *Crime and Punishment*.

> When you read *Vekhi*, you remember that dream of Raskolnikov: the cart is Russia; the little horse is the Russian intelligentsia.
> 'Populist obscurantism', Berdyayev begins to whip.
> 'Sectarian fanaticism', Frank picks up the tune.
> 'Social hysteria', continues Bulgakov.
> 'A wretched legal consciousness'—Kistyakovsky.
> 'Unfathomable frivolousness'—Struve.
> 'A frightened herd. . . . A crowd of sick people'—Gershenzon.
> 'Onanism. . . . Sex life from the age of 17'—Izgoyev.
> 'Filth, poverty, disorder. . . . A real abomination of desolation'—Gershenzon.
> Suddenly the horse kicks: the Russian intelligentsia asserts that she has a totally pure light—liberation. Then they begin to beat not with whips but with the shaft.
> 'Heroic hypocrisy . . . self-deification'—Bulgakov.

So it went. By attacking *Vekhi* the liberals seemed to be attacking the reaction and defending the intelligentsia. In Struve's *Russkaya mysl*, co-editor Kizevetter found much truth in the descriptions of the 'symptoms' of the intelligentsia's illness, but not in the 'diagnosis' or the

[30] *Moskovskii ezhenedelnik*, 15 August 1909.
[31] *Rech*, 17 May 1909.
[32] *Intelligentsiya v Rossii* (SPb. 1910).
[33] *Po Vekham* (Moscow, 1909); *V zashchitu intelligentsii* (Moscow, 1909).
[34] *Rech*, 26 April 1909; reprinted in his *Bolnoye Rossii* (SPb., 1909), p. 96.

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'remedies'.[35] His was perhaps the gentlest reply. Raising 'sharp questions', he suggested, was the 'publicizing service of the authors of the symposium'.[36] Another, more hostile article in *Russkaya mysl*, found 'posing the problem of the intelligentsia' to be 'the large but unfortunately the only service of *Vekhi*'.[37]

Again and again liberal articles welcomed *Vekhi*. K. K. Arsenev, editor of *Vestnik Evropy*, wrote in his magazine: 'To agree with it is impossible, but it is necessary to consider it'.[38] And two critics wrote in the publishing magnate Sytin's Moscow paper *Russkoye slovo* (*Russian Word*): 'their great service' was 'in posing the question about self-criticism'; 'it is possible to inveigh against the *Vekhi* symposium and one is bound to inveigh against it, but it is all the same necessary to read it through'.[39] The right Cadet, N. A. Gredeskul, summed up this approach when he explained in *The Intelligentsia in Russia* that the Cadets were presenting their 're-examination of the question of the "historical situation" in which the crisis of the intelligentsia is taking place' in conjunction with *Vekhi*, since the symposium 'presents a great convenience' because 'the path to the question has, in some fashion, already been blazed in the consciousness of a wide public'.[40] *Vekhi* raised the main question the liberals were concerned with: the proper role of the intelligentsia in Russia, and specifically their own role. The force and style of the liberal commentary pressed sales of the symposium through five editions.

How the Liberals Criticized *Vekhi*

Liberals were not primarily interested in disputing *Vekhi*, and a number of articles ostensibly about it did no more than mention the symposium.[41] Those that discussed it generally found fault with it on one or more of four grounds: its reactionary character, its hypocrisy and inconsistency, its brand of religion, and its tactical political implications. Not surprisingly, one of the most common points was the first. F. Muskatblit, who wrote the introduction to *On Vekhi*, saw Struve's 'national face' behind 'the psychic changes' sought by the *Vekhi* group.[42] 'A mixture of the ideas of Tolstoy and Pobedonostsev', said a speaker at the St Petersburg Literary Society.[43] Others linked *Vekhi* to the ideas of Uvarov, Nicholas I's famous minister of education, 'orthodoxy, autocracy, nationalism'.[44] Milyukov found in it 'the ideological slogan of all reaction', and others made similar charges.[45]

35 *Russkaya mysl* (5, 1909), p. 131.
36 Ibid. p. 127.
37 *Russkaya mysl* (5, 1909), p. 39.
38 *V zashchitu intelligentsii*, p. 15.
39 Ibid. pp. 117–18, 129.
40 *Intelligentsiya v Rossii*, p. 12.
41 Articles by Kovalevsky and Slavinsky in *Intelligentsiya v Rossii*.
42 *Po Vekham*, p. 5.
43 *Rech*, 24 May 1909.
44 *V zashchitu intelligentsii*, p. 138.
45 *Intelligentsiya v Rossii*, p. 105.

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Liberal critics decried several types of inconsistency in *Vekhi*. They pointed to the contrast between spiritual values sought for their own sake and the promises and warnings of the symposium. Muskatblit, this time in the preface to *In Defence of the Intelligentsia*, called it 'preaching non-utilitarianism with a utilitarian aim, "disinterestedness" for the sake of "profit"'.[46] I. Ignatiyev, editor of *Russkiya vedomosti* (*Russian Register*), found the *Vekhi* authors to be saying: 'You are unhappy in the vale of life?—Pray, and God will help you win two hundred thousand.'[47] Tugan-Baranovsky, another legal Marxist turned liberal, found the contradiction between the primacy of the inner life of the personality and Struve's hope for an '*embourgeoisement*' of the intelligentsia.[48] K. K. Arsenev asked in *Vestnik Evropy* if Gershenzon's charge of a 'monstrous inconsistency in relation to the red and black terror', could 'really be levelled against the whole intelligentsia?'[49] 'Who exactly is the intelligentsia about which the authors of *Vekhi* did not cease to speak for the whole length of the symposium?' asked one *Rech* critic, referring to the disparate uses of the term 'intelligentsia' throughout the *Vekhi* symposium.[50]

The self-proclaimed religiosity of the *Vekhi* group struck a number of liberal critics. The first article on *Vekhi* in *Rech* found the authors pretentious in pointing out the religious path for the Russian intelligentsia, and found the path itself 'some kind of cross-breed between medieval scholasticism and the latest Voltaireanism'.[51] S. Lurye in *Russkaya mysl* saw religion as the unifying factor, but confessed confusion as to what it meant to the *Vekhi* group.[52] I. Bikman, at the St Petersburg Literary Society, suggested that if the *Vekhi* authors were actually concerned with 'basic questions of life, of religion', as Struve had replied to a critic, then *Vekhi* was insufficient proof of it, since it lacked philosophical depth.[53] Milyukov pointed out in *The Intelligentsia in Russia* that while the *Vekhi* group seemed a circle (*kruzhok*) of people primarily interested in '"internal life", religion, philosophy, aesthetics, ethics', they were actually playing politics.[54] Liberals were unwilling to accept the authenticity of *Vekhi's* professed religion, and Merezhkovsky spoke for many religiously inclined intellectuals when he wrote, in 'The Seven Meek Men', that *Vekhi's* ideal of 'the internal life of the personality' as 'the sole creative force' was not Christian, since Christianity affirmed that the creative force of the personality was not the sole thing.[55]

46 *V zashchitu intelligentsii*, p. 13.
47 Ibid. p. 96.
48 *Intelligentsiya v Rossii*, p. 247.
49 *V zashchitu intelligentsii*, p. 29.
50 *Rech*, 24 May 1909.
51 *Rech*, 25 March 1909.
52 *Russkaya mysl* (5, 1909), p. 146.
53 *V zashchitu intelligentsii*, p. 51.
54 *Intelligentsiya v Rossii*, p. 109.
55 The article was based on a talk given at the Religious Philosophical Society in St Petersburg. This group, which had begun in 1901–03 with meetings between the Church hierarchy and religiously minded intellectuals, was heavily committed to the liberals at this time. Merezhkovsky and D. Filosofov were on its governing committee. See *Rech*, 3 February 1909 and *Novoye vremiya* (11,800, 1909).

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Finally, many found fault with the tactical implications of *Vekhi's* politics; its instructions on 'what is to be done in 1909', as D. Filosofov put it at the Religious Philosophical Society.[56] However, since the liberals had no real alternative political activity to propose, they criticized gingerly. In the words of one critic, *Vekhi's* slogan, 'not the external building of social life but the internal self-completion of man', was like telling people standing 'in a muddy quagmire' to 'close their eyes and occupy themselves with self-completion'.[57] In *Russkaya mysl* both Lurye and Kizevetter attacked *Vekhi's* inward focus as self-destructive for the intelligentsia because it would separate them from the rest of Russian society and its pressing problems.[58] Others, like K. K. Arsenev and I. Ignatiyev, found *Vekhi's* programme impossible because 'the self-completion to which they have attributed such tremendous significance', required 'not only internal but also external freedom'.[59] Ignatiyev wrote that what the intelligentsia really needed was: 'first reform, then making peace, first an improvement in the conditions of social life, then the improved, pacific, more complete man'.[60]

Vekhi appealed to liberals of all sorts as an occasion for discussing the question of the intelligentsia. The *Vekhi* group, by accusing the liberals of being too radical, too socially committed; by criticizing all political commitment as inherently misguided; by positing the idea of a totally disengaged intelligentsia seeking spiritual culture for its own sake, gave the liberals a platform from which to affirm the degree of social commitment they wanted, starting as if from zero. It provided them with a pretext to criticize existing apathy, and prescribe their own medicine for the prevailing despair.

The Disintegration of the *Vekhi* Group

Vekhi was a commercial success, but politically it was a disaster for the *Vekhi* group and the publications associated with them. *Russkaya mysl* took a neutral position on the symposium. Struve and Frank defended it; Kizevetter, still officially a joint editor, and the journalist S. Lurye criticized it.[61] If Kizevetter's comments were moderate in comparison with other liberals, Lurye's were as harsh as any. The case of E. N. Trubetskoy's *Moskovskii ezhenedelnik* (*Moscow Weekly*) and M. M. Fedorov's *Slovo* was different. Trubetskoy wrote a passionate defence of *Vekhi*. In his view its criticism was levelled at the 'typical *intelligent*' who 'actively participated in the Revolution of 1905 or prepared for it'.[62] Despite occasional contradictions and a few 'unfortunate' phrases he supported the symposium as a statement in favour

56 *V zashchitu intelligentsii*, p. 160.
57 Ibid. p. 149.
58 In *Russkaya mysl* (5, 1909), pp. 143, 137.
59 *V zashchitu intelligentsii*, p. 20.
60 Ibid. p. 97.
61 *Russkaya mysl*, 5, 1909
62 *Moskovskii ezhenedelnik*, 13 June 1909, p. 11.

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of 'peaceful progress' as opposed to 'revolution and reaction'.[63] He found no conflict between the *Vekhi* affirmation of the primacy of the individual spiritual life and a concern for the outside world.

Slovo also defended *Vekhi* and gave the contributors a place to answer their critics.[64] Because of the 'national face' controversy, *Slovo* was most clearly identified with the *Vekhi* position, and it came under attack from all sides.[65] A few weeks after *Vekhi* appeared, Fedorov replied to critics that *Slovo* was raising important questions, and that by urging Russian national consciousness to 'wake up' they were not opposing equal rights for all nationalities.[66] This explanation proved insufficient. *Slovo* failed within a few months, apparently due to a lack of readers and the absence of a backer to make up the financial deficit.[67] In the last issue Fedorov blamed the paper's inability to find that 'wide support which would have allowed the publication to stand on its own feet' on both the 'psychological atmosphere' created by the autocracy and the unpopularity of *Slovo's* views.[68] 'From all over', he wrote, 'they demanded apologies from us'.[69]

The contributors themselves were in a similar position. Gershenzon and Kistyakovsky let the dispute take its course with little comment.[70] Berdyayev and Bulgakov continued their critique of the intelligentsia but attacked the autocracy at the same time. Struve, Frank, and Izgoyev replied to critics by either defending the symposium or attempting to dissociate themselves from it. Izgoyev's position was the most delicate.[71] He was on the staff of both *Rech* and *Russkaya mysl*, and his participation in *Vekhi* had been qualified. His answers to critics wavered between disavowal of all responsibility for the symposium and a complete reinterpretation of it to fit his own views.[72]

Frank attempted a more serious defence of *Vekhi*, and his arguments echoed his *Vekhi* article. The time had come, he said, to 'examine and evaluate the order and morals of our spiritual fatherland, the intelligentsia'.[73] Those who objected to *Vekhi* he found guilty of dogmatism, chauvinism, and conservatism.[74] He claimed that the symposium had no political bias; the authors were searching 'for a new path' which went neither to the right nor the left.[75] However, in response to criticism, he began to question the cultural elitism so central to *Vekhi*. In July 1909,

63 Ibid. p. 5.
64 See *Slovo*, 26 May, 13 June 1909.
65 *Slovo*, 13 April 1909.
66 Ibid.
67 See editorial, *Slovo*, 5 July 1909.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Gershenzon collected a partial bibliography on *Vekhi* and Kistyakovsky did publish a letter in *Russkiya vedomosti*, 17 April 1909.
71 See p. 29.
72 *Rech*, 26, 29 March, 19 May 1909 and 9 March 1910; *Russkoye obshchestvo i revolyutsiya* (Moscow, 1910), p. 7.
73 *Slovo*, 1 April 1909.
74 Ibid.
75 *Slovo* 28 April 1909.

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he explained that it was not 'spiritualism' to believe in the primary nature of the 'reality of the spirit in comparison with the material'; the *Vekhi* authors were interested not in a 'hermit-like "saving of souls"' but in 'the limitless process of the self-education of the collective spirit as well as the objective result of this process.'[76] He wrote that 'the supremacy of the personal principle' did not quite mean that 'it is possible to complete the personality in a vacuum.'[77] He increasingly qualified the proposition that the growth of culture depended on the intelligentsia alone, and his later concerns about the relationship between capitalism and culture raised the same issue.[78]

Struve was quick to react to *Vekhi's* hostile reception. He found himself attacked with a special bitterness because of the 'national face' article. On the eve of *Vekhi* he tried to terminate the other dispute, arguing that it was too serious for newspaper polemics.[79] Nevertheless, the two issues overlapped. He complained that critics treated him as a social pariah and refused to have an open argument with him.[80] He tried to dissociate himself from those parts of *Vekhi* he found least congenial. He rejected as 'uncharacteristic' a statement by Gershenzon that the intelligentsia 'ought to bless the punitive power which still protects us with its bayonets and prisons from the people's hatred.'[81] He explained that in his view the punitive power protected only the government and the governing classes.[82] Critics, he complained, were overstressing the 'ideological unity' of the symposium; Kistyakovsky, Izgoyev, Frank, and himself were 'Westernizers,' he suggested, while Gershenzon, Bulgakov, and Berdyayev were 'Slavophiles.'[83] What held them together was a recognition of 'the basic significance of the religious principle for life.'[84]

In the period following *Vekhi,* Struve's publicist programme evaporated in a cloud of contradictory assertions. One week he complained that critics of *Vekhi* disagreed with him only on 'political tactics'; the next the problem was philosophical, and about political matters there was no argument.[85] In the face of the changing political situation in Russia, as well as attacks on him as a 'reactionary,' he abandoned the two extremes of his earlier stand, the ideal of the existing state and the primacy of the individual spiritual life. By early 1910 he recognized the primacy of the external forms of society and found the state to be, in theory, the main educative factor. Applying his new arguments, he pointed to the autocracy as the main obstacle to Russian cultural progress and to the growth of 'national conscious-

[76] *Russkaya mysl* (7, 1909), p. 152.
[77] Ibid. p. 152.
[78] See pp. 24–25.
[79] *Patriotika*, pp. 219–20.
[80] *Slovo*, 29 March 1909.
[81] *Slovo*, 25 April 1909.
[82] Ibid.
[83] *Russkaya mysl* (5, 1909), p. 114.
[84] Ibid. p. 114.
[85] *Slovo*, 7 May 1909, 25 April 1909.

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ness.'[86] At the same time he discovered that the 'external power' of the state had to be based on 'internal' power and reform.[87] Through confusing twists and turns he seemed to be making his way back towards traditional liberal reformism. His new politics did not stir the same publicist energy as the old ones, but they did mark the effective end of the cultural politics which had developed out of *Polyarnaya zvezda.* The political position of *Vekhi* was no longer tenable even for a number of the contributors themselves. Even on the right wing of Russian liberalism, *Vekhi* ideas never won more than a limited following.[88] In the summer of 1910 Trubetskoy's *Moskovskii ezhenedelnik* ceased publication, probably because of difficulties analogous to those of *Slovo.*[89] By this time E. N. Trubetskoy himself was apparently having second thoughts about the politics of *Vekhi.* He urged 'proponents of a renewal of social consciousness' to 'flee two separate disastrous extremes: the political apathy which avoids *all* politics, and that doctrinaire political chicanery which sees *only* politics in *all* questions and is interested in that alone.'[90]

AS the stir around *Vekhi* disappeared, the political interests of the contributors faded. Frank, Berdyayev, and Bulgakov turned gradually back towards serious philosophical work.[91] Struve remained involved in political questions. In 1910, he again became deeply concerned with economics, and tried to interest Russian industrialists in joining the liberal opposition.[92] These efforts met with little success and before long Struve found time to return to academic work. The *Vekhi* group's unlikely marriage of politics and cultural elitism had ended in divorce.

[86] *Moskovskii ezhenedelnik*, 13 March 1910, p. 7.
[87] *Russkaya mysl* (2, 1910).
[88] Even right Cadets like Gredeskul joined the 'anti-*Vekhi*' liberal journal, *Zaprosy zhisni*, which was begun at this time.
[89] *Moskovskii ezhenedelnik*, 21 August 1910, p. 1, and 28 August 1910, p. 1.
[90] *Moskovskii ezhenedelnik*, 7 August 1910, p. 6.
[91] Both Berdyayev and Frank began their major philosophical work after *Vekhi*. See V. V. Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy* (New York, 1953), Vol. II, p. 852; S. L. Frank, *Biografiya P. B. Struve* (New York, 1956), p. 95; D. A. Lowrie, *Rebellious Prophet* (New York, 1960), pp. 132–36; and Zernov, *The Russian Religious Renaissance of the 20th Century*, p. 140.
[92] See P. A. Buryshkin, *Moskva kupecheskaya* (New York, 1954), pp. 194–95, and P. A. Berlin, *Russkaya burzhuaziya v staroye i novoye vremya* (Moscow, 1922), p. 196.

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The Resurgence of Russian Nationalism in *Samizdat*

Dimitry Pospielovsky

Background

The violence with which Khrushchev, from about 1959,[1] began his campaign against the religions of the USSR gave rise to suspicions that this Party wrath must have been caused by a significant growth of interest on the part of certain sections of Soviet society in religion.[2] When Khrushchev fell and it became possible to some extent to assess the anti-religious campaign in the official press, it was practically admitted that the campaign had failed, that the forced closure of churches had produced a type of underground church in its place, that the persecuted believers began to attract the sympathies of the non-believers, and that general interest in religion was enhanced by the campaign.[3]

Naturally, the post-Khrushchev leadership did not go so far as to permit a mass reopening of the churches or an open defence of the Church. But it must have realized that one of the causes of interest in religion, particularly in the Orthodox Church in Russian society (*obshchestvennost*), was the ideological vacuum created by the virtual destruction of the premises of the official ideology in the course of the de-Stalinization campaign [4] and it began to tolerate an active interest in the churches as historic monuments, relics of Russian culture, a source of national secular inspiration.

1 Between 1959 and 1964 the number of active Orthodox churches was reduced by force from about 22,000 to 9,000, the number of seminaries from eight to three, and about half the monasteries were shut. A similar fate befell other religions. See Robert Conquest, *Religion in the USSR* (New York, 1968), p. 58; Nikita Struve, *Christians in Contemporary Russia* (London, 1967), p. 300; Letters of Frs. N. Eshliman and G. Yakunin, *Grani* (Frankfurt/Main), No. 61.

2 Nikita Struve, op. cit. quotes from *Voprosy filosofii* (No. 5, 1958), from a speech of the philosopher M. B. Mitin, published there, in which he admitted that 'in many places there is an increase in the number of believers. . . . Girls and youths are falling under the influence of religion . . .'. (p. 293).

3 There are many articles to this effect, in particular G. Kelt in *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 15 August 1965; attacks on Trubnikova for having acted as a spy among the believers and thus discredited the atheists in the eyes of the believers, and for having vulgarized the believers and their motives in her crude attacks on them in *Oktyabr*—for the attacks on her, see *Nauka i religiya* (No. 3, 1965); Conquest, op. cit. pp. 53–55; D. Ushinin's article on religious policies in the first post-Khrushchev years, *Grani*, No. 60; 'On the Causes and Conditions of Viability of Religious Survivals', *Voprosy filosofii* (No. 6, 1967).

4 Vladimir Osipov, one of the organizers of 'heretical' poetry readings and eventually ideological discussions of youth in the Mayakovsky Square in 1958–61, writes that all these young people had been Stalinists, while 'Khrushchev's speech and the 20th Congress destroyed our faith, having torn out the core of the *Weltanschauung*; this core was Stalin, for such had been the propaganda of Marxism in the past 25 years. . . .' 'The Mayakovsky Square, Article 70', *Grani* (No. 80, 1971), p. 110.

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In 1964 a students' society, *Rodina* (the Motherland), was founded in Moscow after a group of students had made a pilgrimage to the ancient Russian towns of Zagorsk, Suzdal, and Vladimir, 'and had discovered for themselves the world of antiquity.' By the end of 1965 the group had 500 members: students of literature, physics, architecture, plus a few workers and high-school students. Among their supporters were the painter Korin and the sculptor Konenkov, both now deceased, the cosmonaut Aleksei Leonov, the aeroplane constructor Antonov, and the Bolshoi Theatre soloist Ivan Kozlovsky. The purpose of the club was 'to promote the study of historical monuments, to study ancient art and history . . . [the members] are in touch with historical and archaeological museums, organize exhibitions and lectures in the rural areas and workers' clubs'. The chairman of the club was Alexander Sadov, a student of the Moscow Physics-Technological Institute. The club began to collect voluntary contributions and to engage in church restoration work on a voluntary basis.[5] In Soviet conditions such a club could not function without active support not only from the Komsomol, but also from the government through some help from the planning agencies, for (apart from other reasons) it could not get material to restore churches without a centralized allocation (the black market would be the only other solution).[6]

The following year an *All-Russian Society for the Protection of Historical Monuments* was founded with the aim of stopping the destruction of such monuments, i.e. predominantly, old churches, and of restoring them and keeping them in proper order. A letter signed by several dozen outstanding Soviet scientists, artists, musicians, and writers, active members of the new organization, complained that the list of the Moscow group of the organizational committee for the preparation and formation of the constituent congress of the All-Russian Society . . . 'confirmed by the Executive Committee of the Moscow City Council contained 26 bureaucrats from various departments who had nothing to do with the society, out of the total number of 29'. The letter stated that such a bureaucratic make-up of the administration of the voluntary society would be unworthy of the aims set it by the Soviet government, and that all these bureaucrats, including architects of the city architectural department, had so far distinguished themselves by destroying churches rather than protecting them.[7]

The Society was finally officially inaugurated in June 1966. V. I. Kochemasov, a deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, was elected Chairman of the Society.[8] A little later a 'Fund for the

[5] See a TASS despatch to this effect of 2 December 1965.

[6] Andrei Amalrik in *Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?* wrote of this club that it arose as a result of spontaneous action, just like the whole ideology of Neo-Slavophilism. The regime was from the very beginning suspicious but tolerant (*Survey*, No. 73, Autumn 1969, p. 64).

[7] Among the signatories were the writers E. Dorosh and V. Soloukhin, the sculptor Konenkov, the pianist S. Rikhter, the Academician Nesmeyanov, etc. The letter appeared in the *Literary Gazette*, 30 October 1965.

[8] *Pravda*, 10 June 1966.

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Protection of Monuments of History and Culture' was created, to be made up of voluntary contributions.[9] On 9 June 1967, TASS reported that the Society's membership had reached three million and that it was entrusted with the planning and supervision of the restoration of entire old towns as well.

All this shows that the government gave support to this initiative. Apparently it hoped to channel the intelligentsia's hunger for ideas in the patriotic-historical direction, hoping that it could divorce this trend from religion and religious thinking (at least in some cases). But this hope was not fulfilled.

SOON literary works appeared which were full of such praise for ancient Russian religious culture that their authors could justly be suspected of a more than purely artistic interest in the subject-matter.[10] No wonder that the dogmatic Kochetov, in his anti-intelligentsia novel, *And What Do You Want?*, when representing in an antagonistic way one of these writers, Vladimir Soloukhin, as the poet Bogoroditsky [11] (from *Bogoroditsa,* 'The Mother of God,' the title of one of Soloukhin's poems), shows him as a practising Christian, although officially in his published writings Soloukhin on several occasions has claimed to be an atheist.

The other indication that the interest in cultural monuments and antiquity has wider implications was the debate on Slavophilism which was conducted in 1968–69 on the pages of *Molodaya gvardiya,* the Komsomol literary monthly of a nationalist, even chauvinist colour, and *Voprosy literatury,* the organ of the Institute of Literature of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Strangely enough the strictly historical journals kept aloof from the discussion. And it is only recently that *Voprosy istorii,* the official monthly of the History Institute of the Academy of Sciences, has at last published an article on the Slavophiles by a historian—a sign, no doubt, of the depressed state of Soviet historiography. In fact, the author of the article herself, E. A. Dudzinskaya, expressed 'surprise' that Soviet historians have done so little research into the Slavophile movement and that practically no new historical works on Slavophilism have appeared since 1941. In that year S. S. Dmitriyev published an article maintaining that the Slavophiles' insistence on freedom of expression of opinion and their appeal for *Zemski Sobor* would, if realized, have resulted in a 'bourgeois-liberal'

[9] Ibid. 30 June 1966.

[10] In particular V. Soloukhin's 'Letters from the Russian Museum', *Molodaya gvardiya* (Nos. 9 and 10, 1966); his 'Black Boards', *Moskva* (No. 1, 1969); E. Dorosh's 'Meditations in Zagorsk', *Novy mir,* May 1967, which could be called the first life of a saint ever written by a member of the CPSU: it is a study of St Sergius of Radonezh, whom and whose like Dorosh calls 'leaders of spiritual armies', the spiritual armies being the monks. The essay is part of a book *Antiquity Is Next To Us,* prevented from publication by the censorship. His *Zhivoye derevo iskusstva* (*The Living Tree of Art*), published in Moscow in 1967, is also relevant to the subject.

[11] *Oktyabr* (No. 9, 1969), p. 52.

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state with the usual liberties, and for this he was subsequently attacked for 'exaggerating the progressive traits of the Slavophiles.' [12]

In the 1968–69 debate most of the writers on national and Slavophile themes in *Molodaya gvardiya* demonstrated a rather extreme nationalism together with a rather bad knowledge of Russian history [13]; the *Voprosy literatury* debate, on the other hand, concentrated on Slavophilism *per se* and was of a higher academic level.

Probably the sole exception in the *Molodaya gvardiya* articles, as far as the level of erudition was concerned, was that of Yu. Ivanov, who in his article on Pushkin demonstrated serious scholarship, though his nationalist thesis could be questioned. He argued that the Decembrists were doomed to failure because they were under the harmful influence of 'foreign ideologies' and tried to subordinate life to a theoretical idea. Possibly hinting at Marxist dogmatism, Ivanov argued that all Russian geniuses considered that ideas existed for life and that Pushkin really achieved greatness only after he had broken with Western influences and with 'the scepticism and lack of faith' resulting from them. Consequently, Ivanov wrote, under the rays of Pushkin's poetry everything that is isolated from the national soil will fade away but that which is solidly rooted in it will flourish.[14]

The discussion on the Slavophiles in *Voprosy literatury* was opened by A. Yanov, who criticized the official taboo on genuine research on the Slavophiles and stated that they remained a blank spot in the study of Russian thought in the Soviet Union. He approved the Slavophiles' thesis that it is necessary for a nation to evolve a national self-consciousness. Yanov concluded that it was high time to begin a serious study of the Slavophiles, to determine whether the Slavophile positions were wrong.[15] The official position is, of course, condemnatory, in accordance with Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, and particularly Plekhanov. Dudzinskaya, however, in order to 'rehabilitate' the Slavophiles in the context of the above authorities, cited N. A. Dobrolyubov's statement that the Slavophile agricultural journal of the late 1850s, *Selskoye blagoustroistvo*, was 'a most humane and business-like publication on the peasant question,' and refers to Chernyshevsky's approval of articles by A. I. Koshelev, the Slavophile expert on agriculture and industry, who in the 1850s

[12] S. S. Dmitriyev, 'Slavyanofily i slavyanofilstvo', *Istorik-Marxist* (No. 1, 1941), pp. 95, 97–100; as quoted by Dudzinskaya, 'Burzhuazniye tendentsii v teorii i praktike Slavyanofilov', *Voprosy istorii* (No. 1, 1972), p. 50. Of 14 historians who participated in the debate on Dmitriyev's article only E. Morokhovets and B. Syroyechkovsky dared support him.

[13] See particularly the extremely nationalistic but non-erudite articles of V. Chalmayev and A. Lanshchikov, *Molodaya gvardiya* (Nos. 3 and 9, 1968, and No. 2, 1969), respectively. For an attack on Chalmayev see A. Dementyev's article in *Novy mir* (No. 4, 1969).

[14] 'An Echo of the Russian People', *Molodaya gvardiya* (No. 6, 1969). The right-wing *samizdat* journal *Veche*, No. 2, reports that this Ivanov was sacked from his lecturership in Russian literature at the Moscow University for his 1960 articles in *Molodaya gvardiya*.

[15] 'The Puzzle of the Slavophile Critique', *Voprosy literatury* (No. 5, 1969).

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advocated industrialization of Russia and the development of commercial agriculture and communications.[16]

Yanov's call for the revival of studies on Slavophilism was supported in the same journal by A. Ivanov, V. Kozhinov and L. Frizman. Frizman even went so far as to state that the Slavophiles' populism and their violently negative attitude to serfdom originated from their moral teachings, their belief that serfdom was incompatible with the teachings of Christ; therefore 'their devotional Orthodoxy sharpened their hostility to serfdom'.[17]

It may be noted that the oldest of these pro-Slavophiles was born in 1926, the youngest in 1936; while all the anti-Slavophiles in the discussion that ensued belonged to the old generation, and their arguments against the Slavophiles were orthodox Marxist-Plekhanovist. All these anti-Slavophiles, except S. Mashinsky, claimed that everything about the Slavophiles was clear, that they had been reactionaries, representatives of the exploiting class who were engaged in devising ways of saving themselves and their feudal civilization. Only Mashinsky in the antagonistic camp agreed that much was still unclear about the Slavophiles and that serious research was still necessary.[18] The fact that so little has appeared on the subject since indicates that there is official pressure against such a discussion.

Neo-Slavophile and religio-nationally oriented thought has recently been repeatedly attacked.[19] The Soviet leadership's attitude seems to be that although many aspects of Russian nationalism can be useful to them, permission of a discussion on the nationalistic legacy could raise too many controversial issues embarrassing to official ideology and practice.

Consequently, the questions of Slavophilism, of the Russian national culture, and of Russian nationalism, like other controversial subjects and opinions, have found their way into *samizdat*. The discussion and the concern of the *samizdat* discussants for religion, and for Orthodoxy in particular, also indicate an interest in the whole range of Russian spiritual thought from St Sergius of Radonezh and St Nil of Sorka to Khomyakov, Dostoyevsky, Vl. Solovyov, N. Berdyayev, etc. Many

[16] Dudzinskaya, loc. cit. pp. 55 and 57.

[17] A. Ivanov, 'A negative dignity'; V. Kozhinov, 'The Main Legacy of the Slavophiles'; L. Frizman, 'For a Scholarly Objectivity'—all in *Voprosy literatury* (Nos. 7, 10 and again 7), respectively.

[18] S. Pokrovsky, 'An Imaginary Puzzle'; V. Kuleshov, 'Slavophilism as It Is'; S. Mashinsky, 'Slavophilism and Its Interpreters'—all in *Voprosy literatury* (Nos. 5, 10, 12, 1969), respectively. Also, A. Dementyev, loc. cit. For detailed analyses of the debate see (1) L. Bek, 'Debate on Slavophilism and on National Patriotism' and 'Some Conclusions Concerning the Polemic on Slavophilism and the Slavophiles', *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (Russian edition), 6 August 1969, and 11 March 1970, respectively; and (2) V. Pavlov, 'Debates on Slavophilism and Russian Patriotism in Soviet Scholarly Literature, 1967–1970', *Grani* (No. 82, December 1971).

[19] For instance M. Yovchuk, the Director of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, attacked the intellectuals who demonstrated interest in religion and the religious legacy. *Kommunist* (No. 15, 1971).

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different schools of thought can be perceived in the national or patriotic (or right-wing, if you will) Russian thinking in *samizdat,* but all of them tie their concepts to Christianity, to the historical Russian form of Christianity, i.e. Orthodoxy, although it can be argued that, say, the authors of *A Nation Speaks,*[20] which will be discussed later, may be much more interested in a revitalized national centralized dictatorship, a sort of national Bolshevism of the Ustryalov type, than in Christianity *per se.* Their attitude to the Church may be purely instrumental, their view of it as an institution being of the Pobedonostsev type.[21]

IN the past nationalist and national *samizdat* came mainly from the Ukraine and from the Jewish Zionist movement. It seems that the Russians, as the central and the largest nation of the USSR, must have felt the responsibility not only for Russian national interests, but for the whole Soviet Union, for the problem of freedom in the whole state. Hence the non-national character of the greater part of Russian-language *samizdat.*

Furthermore, there has been an element of *mea culpa* in much Russian dissident writing, a feeling that the Russian nation as the major nation of the Soviet Union is more responsible for the crimes of the regime than the other nationalities.

Soviet propaganda often praises 'the great Russian people' as the first people to have embraced socialism. This results in official historiography's search for those unique qualities in the Russian people and its history which are supposed to have led the nation to the 'choice' of socialism. In reaction to this, the dissidents begin to look for negative characteristics in the Russian people in which they might find explanations for the negative phenomena of the Soviet system. The authors of *samizdat* documents bear witness at the same time to the moral degradation of their people resulting from the destruction of the village by the Soviet regime through collectivization and enforced atheism, which destroyed traditional morality.[22] This moral degradation is then often projected by the authors on to the whole Russian nation at all historical periods. It is this intellectual climate that gives birth to such statements as:

[20] Called 'A Word to the Nation' in the *Survey* (No. 80, Summer 1971, pp. 191–99) translation. This author feels that 'A Nation Speaks' more correctly conveys the Russian title 'Slovo natsii'. All quotations are from the Russian original.

[21] This is how 'A Nation Speaks' and its authors were described by a leading member of the Democratic Movement in Russia, recently arrived in the West. According to him the authors of the document are extreme anti-semitic nationalists and non-believers who view the Church in terms of a convenient institution commanded by people of the Pobedonostsev type and serving a chauvinist state. The editor of *Veche*, Osipov, is also a right-wing nationalist, but a sincere religious believer and a truth-seeking individual.

[22] For this view, see G. Pomerants (1) 'Quadrillion', *Grani* (No. 64, 1967), and (2) 'Man without an Adjective', *Grani* (No. 77, 1970). In this he continues the line of the Slavophiles that *narod* is the repository of national moral values. Pomerants argues that the disintegration of the village following collectivization brought about a moral disintegration of the nation.

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—the historical road of Russia is a road towards slavery; [23]
—Russia is a country without beliefs, without traditions, without culture or the skill to do a job [24];

or the many anti-Russian statements of the *samizdat Programme of the Democratic Movement.*[25]

Two documents recently received from *samizdat* sources show that these derogatory views of the nation do not remain unchallenged. The two documents differ from each other as to their types of national thinking, but Russian patriotism is a sentiment shared by both. One document, *Slovo natsii* (*A Nation Speaks*), represents extreme nationalist views with an admixture of racism; the other document, *Veche,* represents a modernized version of traditional Russian Slavophilism, linking it with the early liberal Slavophiles, Khomyakov, Kireyevsky, etc., rather than with the later ones marked by greater conservatism, or even reactionary nationalism of a pan-Slavist character.[26]

Characterizing these early Slavophiles, the Russian philosopher Nicholas Berdyayev wrote:

> Slavophilism is our first try at self-consciousness, our first independent ideology. . . . In this process of engendering self-consciousness next to them [the Slavophiles] can be placed only Chaadayev, as his spiritual suffering for Russia was the birthpang of Russian self-consciousness. His Westernism was as much a national exploit as the Slavophilism of Kireyevsky and Khomyakov . . .[27]

IN this respect the situation today is similar to that of the period of the early Slavophiles and Chaadayev. After the victory in the second world war the frustrations caused by Stalinism, the collectivization of agriculture, and comparisons made by Russian soldiers and officers between the situation in Western countries and that at home, are similar to the frustrations of the period following Russia's victory over Napoleon. It is interesting that the time-span between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the appearance of the Slavophile-Westernizers controversy is roughly equivalent to the time-span between the end of the second world war and the re-emergence of the controversy now. Furthermore, early nineteenth-century Russia, denationalized by Peter's reforms, dispossessed of national pride, apeing Europe and particularly France, needed after the victory over France (and Napoleon's continental Europe) a national ideology, a national self-consciousness, a knowledge of its history and of its cultural legacy. The government offered it instead an empty bureaucratic system with a hypocritical, unconvincing ideology of

[23] V. Grossman, *Vsyo techyot* (*Forever Flowing*), (Frankfurt/Main, 1970), p. 178.
[24] Andrei Amalrik, op. cit. p. 74.
[25] *Programma Demokraticheskogo Dvizheniya* (Amsterdam, 1970).
[26] *Radio Liberty Register* number for *A Nation Speaks* is No. 590; *Veche* No. 1 is No. 1013, No. 2 is No. 1020.
[27] N. Berdyayev, *A. S. Khomyakov* (Moscow, 1912), p. 2; as quoted in An-V's letter to the editors of *Veche* (*Veche*, No. 2).

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'Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and the People'. The Slavophiles as well as the Westernizers rejected this official ideology, the Westernizers, because they were 'to the left' of the official political system, the Slavophiles, because they maintained that the genuine Orthodox Church should be independent of the tsar and that the monarchy itself should include a consultative, if only advisory, element. Autocracy to them meant a close cooperation of the tsar with the people, freedom of the press and public assembly, wide personal freedom, close consultation of the tsar with the social body (*obshchestvennyi element*), autonomous local social activity and eventually the abolition of class privileges. The reality offered instead a bureaucratic absolutism isolated from any relationship with public opinion, strict censorship, and serfdom. Similarly, after the second world war, fought and won on national patriotic slogans and not those of international communism which proved a dead letter for the people, the nation needed a self-consciousness, an assertion of national pride after such a hard-won victory. The Stalinist period of total terror prevented these cravings from coming to the surface; besides, there were still some vestiges of ideology having some command over youth: Stalin, his very person, was the ideology, the myth, for many a young man.[28] Khrushchev's de-Stalinization created an ideological vacuum in Soviet society which some have been filling with vodka and debauchery,[29] others by re-importing Western liberal ideas, or pulling them out of a rather limited Russian liberal legacy; still others, neo-Slavophiles of all shades and nationalists, are trying to fill the vacuum

[28] One of the originators of the literary-political meetings of youth in the Mayakovsky Square in Moscow in 1958–61, which had turned out to be the cradle of that which is now known as the 'democratic movement', Vladimir Osipov, now the editor of *Veche*, wrote: 'All of us, the future heretics, in the prime of our youth were Stalinists.' ('*Ploshchad Mayakovskogo, Statya 70*' ('The Mayakovsky Square, Article 70), *Grani*, No. 80, 1971, p. 110). Similar ideas on the ideological myth of Stalin and on the death of ideology with Stalin's death are to be found in A. Sinyavsky's essay, *What Is Socialist Realism?*

[29] Here we are not concerned with the Philistine majority, although among them drinking is very heavy as well; but with the searching elements, and alcoholism is very often the result of ideational frustrations. *Veche*, No. 2 contains a letter by an Orthodox priest in the Soviet Union, who writes: 'I see in fear how many are ceaselessly drinking, how lewdness has spread like a great wave, how family ties have disintegrated and there are more and more people without any direction in life, consumers of life who do not believe in anything, hooligans and bandits.

. . . a solution has to be found to the situation before it is too late.

. . . intelligent people are already sounding the alarm; very many writers write about the moral structure of society, about education, upbringing, morality. . . .

But newspaper articles do not help, no compulsory methods of suppression are very effective either.

. . . Ethics and morals are not created out of things temporary; eternal values are what we need. Only eternal values can restrain from crime.

These eternal values are religion; for our country it is Orthodoxy.

Happily, the nation is beginning to show interest in these eternal values.'

And then the priest criticizes the unchanging hostile attitude of the authorities to religion, and assures us that if religion ceased to be persecuted, if all churches were reopened, if religious instruction and free publication of religious books and journals were allowed, in 10 years the Russian would not be recognized.

A character in a recent *samizdat* novel, *Seven Days of Creation*, by a prominent Soviet writer, V. Maksimov, says the following in his drunken voice (he is an

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by looking for solutions in the main Russian national cultural legacy, looking for the roots, as it were, and these are inevitably inseparable from the Orthodox Church and Russian religio-philosophic thought, from Khomyakov to Berdyayev, from Kireyevsky to Dostoyevsky and Vladimir Solovyov; but also from Pogodin to Shevyryov and Katkov, nationalists of a more extreme type.[30]

A Nation Speaks—A Manifesto of Russian Patriots[31]

This document is extremely nationalist in character. To summarize briefly: it opposes the Marxist thesis of antagonism as the basis of all progress and replaces it by the solidarity of nations, at least of the Aryan nations taken in a wide context (it accuses Hitler of misinterpreting the Aryan concept by limiting it to the German nation alone). In particular, a close cooperation between Russia, the USA and India is declared essential to save the white race from the onslaught of the yellow, but, to a lesser degree, also to protect white civilization from the black race. It is stated that the African ex-colonies have proved their inability to govern themselves, that the civilized white nations have also a historical responsibility to preserve peace and order and to protect the black from drowning each other in blood, and that, therefore, Russia and the Western powers should set up a sort of police control over the African nations with the right to interfere in their internal affairs to protect the rights of man there, to prevent the repetition of Biafras, Nigerias, etc.

Democracy for the authors is a product of social degeneration and they denounce what they claim to be the democratic quality of treating all individuals, whether they be decent people or criminals, in the same manner. They reject the concept of a *Rechtsstaat* on the grounds that it does not specify what rights are to be given to whom. Instead they proclaim an aristocratic system with a privileged stratum; and the quality of a social system depends, the authors say, on the quality of

ex-poet, turned alcoholic): 'Do you understand . . . we are paying for something. . . . For some very heavy sin. It is all empty inside us. And this emptiness cannot be filled with alcohol, or with active hatred. We are suffocating within ourselves. That's why we fail in everything. . . . So, we engage in "sublimation", in whatever way each of us can. Someone is busy with love-affairs, another fusses over "social activities", still another sends reports to the KGB.' ('*Chetverg*' ('Thursday'), *Grani* No. 80, p. 40.

[30] Khomyakov, Kireyevsky, and K. Aksakov were the founding fathers of Slavophilism. Dostoyevsky is considered to be the main spokesman of *pochvennichestvo* (or the soil-bound school) which was a later development of Slavophilism, without the extreme anti-Westernism of the latter, but preaching a close devotion to one's roots, to one's country. Berdyayev and Solovyov were both quite close to the soil-bound school, although in his temporary enthusiasm for Roman Catholicism Solovyov broke with all Slavophile or soil-bound traditions. Pogodin, Shevyryov and the later Katkov were much more extreme nationalists than the Slavophiles and supported official nationalism as preached by the monarchy (particularly Katkov and Shevyryov), to which the Slavophiles stood in opposition for reasons discussed above.

[31] A more detailed review of this 'Manifesto' by the present author appeared in the Russian-language *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, No. 38 (29 September 1971), CRD288/71.

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this stratum: 'a true aristocracy will never regard its privileges, particularly the material ones, as an aim in itself'. The main thing is that the state is headed by a strong centralized power; this implies that the Soviet power is not strong since it becomes hysterical over each smallest manifestation of dissent—'uses cannons to shoot sparrows'. A genuinely strong power knows when and to what extent to use its power.

They proclaim the nation as the basis of all things; it is claimed to be 'a special spiritual community, whose distinctiveness has a deep mystical sense'. The determining factor of a nation is 'a racial type'. They realize that it is absurd to speak of a pure racial type today, especially in reference to such a mixed nation as Russia; so the document claims that one racial type can prevail even in blood mixtures and that an end should be put to further 'disorderly hybridization' of nations. How this is to be done they do not say, and in another part of the document they talk about the importance of tolerance and about the diabolical origin of all intolerance, thereby implicitly rejecting the use of force to regulate personal tastes, opinions, etc.

Although they reject the idea of regarding the individual as an absolute, an idea which they attribute to democracy, the authors do not reject the value of the individual out of hand nor do they mechanistically subordinate it to the group as Marxism does. They say: 'We proclaim the priority of the all-human over the national, of social over personal, although the all-human outside of the national and the social outside the personal are empty abstractions', i.e. at the basis of things is placed an interaction of the individual and society. This shows a certain influence of the Slavophile personalist *sobornost* concepts on the group who signed the document as 'Russian patriots'.

In conformity with the above concept of the individual human being is their concept of 'national revolution', which should begin with the individual person, bring about 'an ideational reorientation of the dictatorship' and 'conclude with the appearance of a mighty national state, which would serve as a centre of gravity for the healthy elements of all fraternal countries. In this state the Russian people . . . must become the dominating nation'.

The 'Russian patriots' claim that the Russian nation is the most underprivileged national unit in the USSR, and that, owing to the fact that the Russian republic alone among all the other republics has no separate communist party of its own, it plays a disproportionately small role in the Soviet Union. At its expense there is 'a disproportionate strengthening of the mightiest of the regional groupings, the Ukrainian one'.

Their treatment of the national issue in the USSR is also curious. The document does not exclude the possibility of various nations opting for separatism and independence. But for the independent Ukrainians, for instance, it leaves only Western Ukraine and a part of the central Ukraine, merging Southern, Eastern, and North-Eastern Ukraine with

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Russia on the grounds that there are great numbers of Russians there and that many Ukrainians in these areas have been Russified. Moldavia is declared 'our territory'. The Byelorussians are not taken seriously on the grounds that their language is 'but a collection of West-Russian dialects'. The 'Russian patriots' reject federalism, declare a 'Unified and Undivided Russia' with a 'territorial unity of the state', but with a 'full development of the culture of all the nations inhabiting our country. . . . The nations of Russia are equal masters in their joint home'. One wonders how the authors of the Manifesto hope to prevent 'disorderly hybridization' if all peoples and nations are to have equal rights in their Russia. And what are the guarantees that the equality of rights of all nations in such a multi-national Russia would be observed and that the major nation, the Russians, would not usurp the rights of the smaller nations, if the latter are not given some form of autonomy, and particularly since the Russian people 'must become the dominating nation' anyhow? No answer to any of these questions and contradictions is to be found in the Manifesto.

SINCE 'the Russian patriots' reject formal democracy as the Slavophiles did, would they together with the Slavophiles say, as Konstantin Aksakov did some 120 years earlier: 'There is no need for any guarantees! Every guarantee is evil. Where it exists there can be no virtue. It were better that life in which there is no virtue should collapse than that it should be shored up with the aid of evil.'? [32]

For the Slavophiles, formal guarantees, like formal law, were signs and personifications of human sin, reflections of the evil nature of human organization, of the given social organism. A virtuous society needs no formal law, no guarantees, because it is based on love and love is above law, above guarantees. So strong was their yearning for a righteous society that they rejected the compromises on which a democratic society is necessarily based. They believed that a return to Orthodoxy, to a society where the Orthodox Church in a purified form would become the spiritual leader of the social organism, where there would be no state bureaucracy and the state would function in a close though informal cooperation with the people, would bring genuine freedom, justice and absence of oppression, for love would rule supreme. And only such a society is worthy of human dignity.

Were 'the Russian patriots' guided by the same type of reasoning in rejecting formal democracy and the question of guarantees? One pointer in this direction is that they also talk about the necessity to return to Christianity, to Orthodoxy. They maintain that each country's religious belief reflects national character and national traditions. The religion of the Russian national character is Orthodoxy and therefore in the national Russian state 'the traditional Russian religion should occupy an honourable position appropriate to its dignity'. But they

[32] Quoted in Leonard Schapiro's *Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth Century Political Thought* (New Haven, 1967), p. 70.

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add that there are many roads to God and therefore religious tolerance is proclaimed.

But it would seem that their rejection of formal guarantees has its roots in more immediate circumstances. The Soviet Constitution has all formal guarantees, plus the entire apparatus for their ' implementation '—the Supreme Soviet, the Supreme Court, local Soviets, etc.—yet all the constitutional guarantees are abused and not a single case has been recorded in the history of the Supreme Soviet when a member rose to defend civil liberties or to oppose an official bill.[33] On the other hand, there is likely to be further disappointment with formal democracy now that all the disruptive and anarchic activities of the New Left or the ' New Right ' are apparent in Western democracies. In this respect the contemptuous attitude to democracy evident in the document is similar to the trends in the Russian émigré youth movements of the 1930s, when the fascist and semi-fascist regimes of Europe were seen as the only effective force against communism, while the deep economic, and consequently social, depression was viewed as a harbinger of the coming extinction of democracy. Similarly, ' the Russian patriots ', in their search for a means by which to overcome the iniquities of the Soviet regime, or even, probably, to overthrow it, find democratic means too feeble. They ridicule the hopes of the *Programme of the Democratic Movement* of changing the Soviet system through peaceful pressure by the masses, and maintain that the masses will never join a democratic movement. They furthermore attack the Russian liberals of 1917 for having made the victory of the Bolsheviks possible, for having been so weak as not to be able to hold power when they had it in the Provisional Government.

In this accusation against the liberals they show themselves as opponents of the October Revolution, i.e. of Bolshevism-Communism, from beginning to end. But at the same time their insistence on the necessity of a strong centralized government, their acceptance of dictatorship as a system of government, their elitism, are such that it becomes difficult to see in what essentials they oppose the Soviet system. It seems that they would settle for a change of personalities (what matters is the individual personalities constituting a regime, not whether it is a dictatorship or a democracy, they say), plus a more privileged position for the religions, particularly the Orthodox Church. The only reassuring element is the insistence on tolerance, but even this can become an empty phrase if all that is to be achieved is a reorientation of the dictatorship. What the group may be heading for is a type of neo-Bolshevism, without Marx and Lenin, but with the Church as a moral instrument in the hands of a nationalist state.[34]

[33] *Memorandum Demokratov Verkhovnomu Sovetu SSSR* (A Memorandum of the Democrats to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR), *samizdat*, *Radio Liberty Register* No. 602, pp. 25–28.

[34] It is very similar to the ' Change of Landmarks ' group of national Bolshevism headed by the historian Ustryalov in the 1920s.

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THE most unpleasant part of the document is its racist and anti-semitic overtones. Talking about religion as the reflection of national character, the Manifesto says that 'it is precisely because of this that God in the conception of the Jews was so malicious, intolerant. And it was during the reign of the most cruel god on earth that, to overcome him, was sent the True Son of God, Jesus Christ.' The authors do not make clear whether they are speaking only of the Jews of the Old Testament or of all Jews at any time; nor does the fact that Christ came to the Jews seem to mean anything to them.

But there is also an anti-semitic reference in a modern context. At present, the document says, 'a schism exists between the servants of God and of Satan'. Satan carries on 'his corrupting activity . . . preaching egalitarianism and cosmopolitanism—an ideology of the Jewish diaspora —thereby aggravating the process of universal blood-mixing and degradation'. This racist twist is totally alien to the original Slavophiles and brings the document into uncomfortable proximity to the pogromist 'Union of the Russian People', or even to the fascists.

The document may be purely theoretical but the primitive racist overtones are contagious, particularly in such an embittered society as the Soviet one. The theoretical discussions on the evil character of 'the Jewish God' can in practice lead to pogroms. Alas, it should be admitted that their statement that the masses will not follow a democratic movement may be all too true. And in any turmoil a more 'down-to-earth', nationalist, and radical (right-wing radical in this case) group like the 'Russian patriots' is more likely to have a mass following than an intellectualizing, moderate 'democratic movement'.

The elitism of *A Nation Speaks* and its opposition to egalitarianism, accusing Western democracies of unqualified acceptance of the importance of the individual—all these elements, absent in Slavophilism, bring the Manifesto into kinship with Konstantin Leontyev, a late nineteenth century Russian mystic of right-wing nationalist views. *A Nation Speaks* calls democracy a state of ageing and decay. Leontyev viewed the development of social organisms, of nations, as an evolution from original simplicity to blossoming complexity; after this ageing leads to a second simplification when egalitarianizing blending (inter-class and inter-racial) takes place, leading the nation to death. He saw such an egalitarian blending in the democratizing processes of contemporary Europe.[35] Another resemblance to the Manifesto is evident in Leontyev's support of absolutism and of a strict, authoritative, centralized system of government. In its theoretical premises, therefore, the document is much closer to Leontyev than to the original Slavophiles, while in its implications it may be not far from the 'Union of the Russian People'. With the Slavophiles it shares only the emphasis on religion and the low estimate of the importance of the individual in historical processes.

[35] Rev. V. Zenkovsky, *Istoriya russkoi filosofii* (Paris, 1948), Vol. I, pp. 453–55; S. V. Utechin, *Russian Political Thought* (London, 1963), p. 165.

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Veche

This *samizdat* publication, edited by V. Osipov,[36] is much closer to the spirit of the Slavophiles, particularly the early ones. The articles are centred on Russia, there is a considerable emphasis on Russian history and evidence of love of the country, but no attempt to either belittle or subordinate other nations. It is indeed hard to compare *A Nation Speaks* with *Veche* because the former is primarily a political document, whereas the latter sets itself apart from direct politics and in general sticks to this position.

But *Veche's* social awareness is demonstrated in the editorial 'statement of policy' on the very first page of the first issue of *Veche* dated January 1971. The statement deserves to be quoted here almost in its entirety:

> . . . In quest of personal material wellbeing people have become indifferent to the spiritual treasures of past centuries. This is equally true of us and of the West. But we are naturally primarily concerned with Russia, our mother, our pain, and our hope.
>
> . . . An epidemic of drunkenness. Disintegration of the family. A remarkable growth of caddishness and banality. Loss of elementary appreciation of beauty. . . . Envy and denunciations. Attitude of complete indifference to work. Stealing. Cult of bribery. Double-dealing as the method of social behaviour. . . . Could this really be the great nation that produced saints, zealots and heroes in great abundance? Have we got the right to call ourselves *Russians*? . . .
>
> Nevertheless there are still Russians to be found. It is not too late to turn our faces towards Russia . . . towards the mother-earth, towards the legacy of the forefathers. The ethical is always national. Amoralism has no nation. [Our aim is] to revive and preserve the national culture, the moral and intellectual capital of our ancestors; to continue the guiding line of the Slavophiles and of Dostoyevsky.
>
> The work ahead of us is great and hard. We are isolated from each other. Our thoughts have been confined to their shells, lacking exchange and debate. Let us expose them to the Russian *veche*. Let the opinions contradict each other, let one dispute the views of another. All our debates must have a single aim: the happiness of Russia. It is with this aim in mind that we are setting ourselves to the publication of a RUSSIAN PATRIOTIC JOURNAL, after a prolonged silence. We are appealing to all Russian patriots to participate in our journal. Let us be blessed by the pure unfading image of Russia.
>
> To the *veche*!

[36] Vladimir Osipov, born in 1939, was ousted from Moscow University in 1959 for protesting against the arrest of a student. In 1960 he 'published' *Bumerang*, one of the first *samizdat* journals. He was active in organizing public poetry readings and debates at the Mayakovsky Square in Moscow between 1958 and 1961, when he was arrested, charged with anti-Soviet activities, and sentenced to seven years in hard labour camps. He was released in 1968 and now resides in Aleksandrov, just over 100 kilometres from Moscow.

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And the journal remains true to this spirit of free exchange of opinion, concentrating, however, on the issue of Russia: its history, its meaning, its role and purpose, its mission in the world, its ethical and ideational foundations. The journal invites a serious debate on these issues and herein lies *Veche's* unique role and value among *samizdat* publications.

IN an uncensored journal which has set among its aims the study of the Russian cultural and ideational legacy, the subject of Slavophilism naturally occupies a central position. It is a pity that the main work on the Slavophiles in the journal, a lengthy study under the title, 'Teachings of the Slavophiles: the Acme of Russian National Consciousness in the Pre-Lenin Period', which appears in instalments concluding in the third issue of the journal, is a muddled mixture of Slavophilism and idealized Leninism coming from the pen of a Russian neo-fascist, architect M. Antonov.[37] He sets forth Khomyakov's main ideas quite accurately, but his conclusions are bizarre to say the least. According to him, Khomyakov was anti-revolutionary because he had known only bourgeois revolutions. Had he lived to see Lenin's revolution he would have supported it. Antonov idealizes Nicholas I and considers him to have been a genuine admirer of Khomyakov, who could not give his full support to the Slavophiles because of his entourage without kith or kin, for whom Russia was an empty word and whom Antonov calls the *Lumpen* element, referring presumably to the foreign background of many of Nicholas's statesmen. He sees as the main danger to Russia the formalist rationalist thought of the West to which he also attributes Marxism, for which he shows no sympathy whatsoever. Leninism, on the other hand, he sees as a genuinely Russian development (just like Slavophilism); and its faults, he thinks, are due to the fact that Lenin had started the revolution too hastily before having purified his doctrine from its formalist Western, presumably Marxist, influences and elements. It is because of these influences that elements 'without kith or kin' had played such a role in the revolution, had brought the country to a bloody civil war and the subsequent destruction of the churches, of Russia's cultural legacy,

[37] *Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 2 (7), April 1969, writes that M. Antonov, an architect, is a close associate of A. Fetisov, an economist and the leader of an extreme nationalist, chauvinist group which contained several architects. The group was arrested in 1968. Shortly before his arrest Fetisov left the Party accusing it of anti-Stalinism. Fetisov maintained in his writings that the whole historical process consists of a struggle between order and chaos. The Jews had been at the head of chaos for 2,000 years until the orderly spirit of the Germans and Slavs as personified in the figures of Stalin and Hitler appeared. He considers it a tragedy that a war occurred between the two leaders and that their achievements have been disintegrating so quickly after their deaths. Their programme includes the de-urbanization and de-industrialization of European Russia, transposing industry to Siberia while setting European Russia on the foundations of a communal, patriarchal, rural system. Fetisov considered that Sinyavsky and Daniel, for instance, should have been shot (*Radio Liberty Register* No. 196, pp. 17–18). It may be noted that on this issue his views are shared by the Soviet communist writer M. Sholokhov (see his statement at the 23rd Party Congress).

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etc. The work concludes in *Veche*, No. 3 with the thesis that the future salvation of Russia lies in a synthesis of Orthodoxy and Leninism (!).

The first instalment is preceded by an article on the Slavophiles by A. Skuratov of a completely different character from that of Antonov, followed by a critical comment on the Antonov theses by A. S. (probably the same Skuratov), and an editorial note stating that the editors do not agree with many opinions of the author and that the purpose of publishing the work is to provoke a discussion on the issue. 'A. S.' criticizes the Fetisovites for their naive 'traditional peasant' belief that there was a good tsar surrounded by bad guys. He points out that the agricultural commune proved its complete inefficiency in Russia after 1861 and that Lenin in Fetisovite writings is credited with ideas which he had never even dreamt about.[38]

In his article on the Slavophiles A. Skuratov stresses their deep democratism, their refusal (particularly in Kireyevsky's writings) to ascribe any supreme rights to a mortal human being; he points to Aksakov's emphasis on the necessity of free public opinion and its free expression in society, and Khomyakov's critical attitude to Russia and his rejection of Aksakov's view (supported by Kireyevsky) that the history of Russia was the only 'history of a Christian nation'. Khomyakov stated that there was no nation deserving such honour. Finally Skuratov points to the Slavophiles' intrinsic anti-revolutionism, springing from their deep conviction that the use of force is evil and unconstructive. He also criticizes some modern Soviet neo-Slavophiles for trying to accept the Slavophiles but without religion, and points out that Slavophilism and Christian Orthodoxy are inseparable.[39]

On the latter point mention should be made of the rather naive and very youthful 'Notes by a Russian Christian' in the same issue of the journal. His main thesis is that the Russians, being a 'God-bearing people' (*narod-bogonosets*), have turned even atheism into a religion, and now, having woken up to this fact, are turning back again to genuine religion: 'An astonishing thing: communists' sons are becoming Christians.'

He writes further that the religious issue is the most topical issue in Russia today. Orthodoxy has given Russia everything: its culture, its history, its meaning, a sense of purpose and victories. But 'What has atheism given us? What it has given, I don't know; what it has taken away is obvious to all . . .: history, culture. Is it possible to build anything on atheism? Is it possible to build a family on atheism? The only thing that atheism has done is that it has rendered the Russian woman naked and seduced her.'[40]

The second issue of *Veche*, while continuing the publication of Antonov's study, contains a statement signed by the editor, Osipov,

[38] *Veche*, No. 1, p. 36.
[39] Ibid. pp. 5–15. Thus he refutes the main 'pro-Leninist' argument of Antonov.
[40] Ibid. pp. 38–41.

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indicating disagreement with Antonov and inviting debate. This issue opens with the editor's restatement of the purpose of the journal, in response to allegations by Western correspondents that the journal was chauvinist and anti-semitic. The editor rejects this: '... We are far from any form of chauvinism. We are wholly against any belittling of other nations. We wish only one thing: the strengthening of Russian national culture and patriotic traditions in the spirit of the Slavophiles and Dostoyevsky. . . . As to political problems, they are not a part of the themes of our journal.' [41]

Later on the ideas and 'personality' of *Veche* are elaborated in a collection of reflections which appeared in the journal under the title 'Thoughts-Projectors'.[42] The document discussed above, *A Nation Speaks,* stated that the Great Russians were the most under-privileged nation in the USSR. *Veche* offers a reflection on what it considers to be a strange paradox:

> Why is it that the creation of Israel is being hailed throughout the world, and we also say that the Jews should have their state, because the state of being in diaspora is hard for them, an exile if he has not lost his virtues in foreign lands, craves for his fatherland—but why then are our love for Russia, our Russian ideas, bitterly labelled chauvinist and are not tolerated?

What this passage seems to imply is that a dominant nation in a multi-national state is denied by 'public opinion' (*obshchestvennost*) the right to its own patriotism, and it is often taken for granted that writings in Russian have to be 'lingua franca' documents, as it were, taking care of all the nationalities of the Soviet Union and their interests. Thus the *samizdat Chronicle of Current Events* and other documents of the 'democratic movement' speak as much for the Tatars, the Ukrainian movements of opposition, etc., as for happenings in Russia proper, and they have no national colour, unlike, say, the *Ukrainian Herald,* which is concerned with matters Ukrainian alone. Documents like *Veche* are in fact fighting for the right of Russian dissidents to have Russian-proper journals, paralleling movements in the national republics. And their attitude to these other republics and nations is shown in the following passage from *Veche*, an attitude much friendlier and more sympathetic than that of *A Nation Speaks*:

> We wish no harm to anyone. We only learn to love the whole of humanity through the love of our own kin.
>
> We consider that those who do not love their own, do not love humanity.
>
> Love of one's people does not restrain others. It is evil that asserts itself at the expense of others, not virtue.
>
> He who asserts himself at the expense of others does not love his own.

41 *Veche*, No. 2, 19 May 1971, p. 2.
42 Ibid. pp. 28–32.

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THUS, there is here little of that desire to subdue and dominate other nations which is obvious in *A Nation Speaks*. There is however a similar belief in an organic hierarchical scale of social kinship—first one's neighbour, then one's nation, and eventually the world—whose roots are in Slavophilism and which is ultimately akin to the evangelical dictum that the one who says he loves God but hates his brother, is a liar. The emphasis on the relationship with humanity as a whole and the final devotion to it through one's nation, one's soil, brings *Veche* into direct kinship with the soil-bound school and in particular with Dostoyevsky, who said in his famous Pushkin speech that to be a Russian is to be wholly European.

On personality *Veche* says that the human personality can develop only on one's own soil, only then 'can it also make use of the foreign'.

The following passage seems to be aimed against Marxist internationalism: 'Those who tear out patriotic feelings corrupt the nation . . . pursue their dishonest self-interested aims, for it is easy to construct all sorts of mad plans with those whose only aim is to be provided with a "feeding-bottle" and who have nothing autochthonous.'

There is an acute feeling of national oppression, which may be a reflection of, on the one hand, a growth of national antagonisms on the part of non-Russian nationalities vis-à-vis the Russians, and on the other hand, a reaction to the constant pejorative use of the word 'Russian' in the Western press and publications when 'Soviet' or 'communist' is meant:

> We, the Russians, must have tremendous self-control. We are being irritated and tortured, provoked, in order to find our weakest spot and then strike us down.
>
> We must have Christian patience, and we must carry on with our job in quietness, modesty, and simplicity. . . . To get angry, irritated, even more so, to become embittered and to revenge—all this would be to squander one's gifts on trifles, to lose one's sense of direction in them and to perish.

This Christian response is furthermore strengthened by a messianic faith in Russia based on the Christian Orthodox belief in the power of suffering:

> Russia is hated, it is covered with accusations, ruin is predicted for it. . . .[43] But the main thing is that Russia fails to be understood. All judgements regarding her are human conjectures.
>
> Russia is the greatest sufferer, slandered, and crucified.
>
> Russia will be resurrected contrary to everything and all. After all, the sufferings must count for something!
>
> Christ vanquished through suffering. Sufferings are salutary, and the more suffering, the closer the rescue.

[43] This is probably a direct response to Amalrik who on the very first page of his *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* says that he was prevented from completing his 'research into the beginnings of the Russian State, but now I hope as a historian to be gratified a hundred-fold by becoming a witness of its end', i.e. of the end of the historical Russian state, not of the Soviet political system.

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> This is our belief. And outside belief there is nothing, and nothing else is needed. Truly said: Russia can be only believed in! [44]

Veche is not alone in the belief in the power and necessity of suffering. In the *Seven Days of Creation* one character, a young Soviet producer of German origin, Mark Kreps, tells how, when as a boy he had been mistaken for a Jew and went to ask his father if he were one, the father said that he was. Only much later, when the child grew up, the father said that he had deliberately misled him: 'You had to go through that in order to become a man. A Man, do you understand?' And Mark says that it was then that he understood that in order not to become a pig a human being has to develop in himself the feeling of personal guilt before others. Mark is one of the most positive figures in the novel.[45]

Another aphorism in the 'Thoughts-Projectors' deals with Russian history, and is probably a reply to such authors as Andrei Amalrik, Vasilii Grossman or the writers of *Programme of the Democratic Movement*, who see Russian history exclusively in shades of black, or grey at best. *Veche* says: 'Russian history has shed no more blood than any other, but attention is being focused on Russian history and the conclusion drawn that it consists entirely of crimes. Not only Russian history, but the whole history [of humanity] is made up of crimes; the difference is that there is a penitent thief in Russian history.' And another passage stresses the sufferings of Russia, talks about its crimes, but insists that the blood of millions shot and tortured cannot have been shed in vain and that eventually God will save Russia and its Orthodox Church. And a messianic belief in the special role of Russia is expressed, a belief based on sufferings through which, it is claimed, Russia has come to see and understand things which others, not having suffered, do not see or understand.

The author or authors of the aphorisms have a much stronger sense of evil than the Slavophiles had: 'Both virtue and evil are simultaneously concentrating in the world. The concentration of evil is its ruin, the concentration of virtue, its salvation.'

THE common element in the thought of the Slavophiles, *Veche* and *A Nation Speaks* is the concept of the interrelationship of religion and nationality.

> Religion must be perceived through national feelings; only then will it be an organic phenomenon.

[44] This is a citation from a poem by the great Slavophile poet Tyutchev.

[45] Everything in this passage is very significant. First, the recognition that to be a Jew in Soviet society is to feel guilty. Secondly, the belief in the necessity of suffering and of guilt-feeling in order to become a proper moral being: Mark is a convinced religious believer and his concept of the theatre is similar to that of Gogol—a channel for the Christian message to reform and revive the man.

Mark Kreps may be a cover-name for Evgenii Shiffers, a young Leningrad producer and religious mystic. See my '*The Monk*—a New Samizdat Manuscript' CRD 17/70, *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, No. 84, 28 January 1970. *The Monk* is Shiffers' *samizdat* manuscript on religio-philosophic themes.

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> Nationality, *Volkstum*, distinctiveness—[possession of these is to be] a normally developed human organism. Like every individual, every nation has its own unrepeatable qualities, and these should be exposed and cultivated.
>
> The one who attempts to destroy these, makes an attempt on human personality, on human freedom. This is a terrible sin.

This latter expression of the belief that individual human freedom is of basic importance and that its suppression is a sin reveals the difference between the theories of *A Nation Speaks* and *Veche*, and the direct relation between the latter and the early Slavophiles.

Veche's critical attitude to cosmopolitanism has similarities with that of *A Nation Speaks*; but in contrast to the latter, there is no anti-semitic sting in *Veche's* statement on cosmopolitanism, which follows logically from the journal's stand on the religio-national question:

> Cosmopolitanism is spiritual slavery. The universal man is a lie. Only God, Jesus Christ, can be the Universal Man; but man as a universal is an idol, which puts itself in place of God.
>
> It is Antichrist who arises out of cosmopolitanism, who promises freedom to all but enslaves everybody.
>
> Cosmopolitanism is the preparation of the road for Antichrist.

Again their insistence on human freedom and its importance puts them apart from *A Nation Speaks* and shows the direct influence of Berdyayev, who wrote that it is God himself who demands that we be free. *Veche* says on this: 'Christ only gives freedom, and He takes into consideration every human person, even saving man with man's permission.'

The aphorisms conclude with a statement on the unification of humanity, which is again very different from the aggressive suggestion of *A Nation Speaks* that some nations should be left at the mercy of others. *Veche* sees the process quite differently:

> Consolidation of all peoples can take place only with consideration of national feelings. Then members with equal rights would enter the huge family of nations, where every nation makes its own contribution and all will be enriched therefrom.
>
> When consolidation takes place with contempt for national feelings, the result is an agglomeration of dummy-like pawns in the field of Antichrist.
>
> So far this has not taken place. Individual voices can still be heard, and we, the Russians, contribute our voice. Our voice is the protest against the Antichrist who has not yet come.

Among other interesting materials in the two issues of *Veche* are the following:

a review of a *samizdat* book, *On the Specifics of Russian History* by L. Rendel, a moderate, patriotically inclined Marxist.[46] The review is

[46] Rendel is a former student of history who in 1957 was sentenced to 10 years' hard labour for membership in a 'Union of Patriots of Russia', a Marxist-revisionist group. Osipov met him in the camp. See *Grani*, No. 80, p. 146.

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sympathetically critical, and the second issue of *Veche* contains Rendel's answer to it, welcoming the appearance of the journal as a forum of exchange of opinion on Russia, its past, present and future;

a highly critical article on the poet Voznesensky (without mentioning his name) which calls him 'a bard of the sexual revolution', a man without morals or any high purpose in life or poetry;

an article on the writings of Kerensky which shows total contempt for the ex-premier.

By now the third, fourth, and fifth issues of *Veche* have also appeared, of which we possess only No. 3 so far. Its format and style remain on the whole the same as in the first two issues. The key article of No. 3 is a 50-page, highly professional piece on ecology with a very pessimistic message about the gradual suicide of humanity through pollution. No. 4 was reported to contain a detailed study of the real state of the Soviet economy, incomes and wages, again reaching very pessimistic conclusions. And No. 5 was reported to contain several chapters from a book of memoirs of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's first wife. Hence, *Veche's* role as a '*tolstyi zhurnal*' (No. 5 was reported to contain over 300 pages, the others are between 120 and 170 pages long) becomes obvious.

Its bias towards at least some nationalist religio-racism remains evident, particularly in No. 3. There among the various documents addressed by various Russian Orthodox priests and laymen to the Church Sobor of 1971 is also to be found an ominous letter signed by a Moscow priest, Petukhov, a deacon-monk and student of the Moscow Theological Academy, Varsonofii Khaibulin, and layman Fomin, a senior research fellow. The letter blames all socio-ethical and moral problems, the persecution of the Church in the Soviet Union, the world secularization and liquidation of the positive social role of religions, on 'world Zionism-Satanism'.[47]

Perhaps it was to rationalize his editorial bias that Vladimir Osipov made the following statement in one of his *samizdat* essays:

> Everybody should have the right to freedom of opinion. Believers and atheists, nationalists and democrats, Zionists and anti-semites, conservatives and communists—all should have the right to express their opinions. I am saying this not out of love for freedom. Freedom of certain opinions is disgusting to me personally. But it must exist FOR THE SAKE OF LIFE. . . . It is possible to agree that

[47] As reported by a recent arrival in the West, Mr. Nikita Krivoshein, this deacon-monk Varsonofii Khaibulin, a tatar, was formerly a Moscow University Komsomol secretary and an ideological instructor of the Moscow City Komsomol Committee. As such he had also been a member of the clandestine Marxist-revisionist group led by Krasnopevtsev. This group was discovered and its members sentenced to 10 years each in concentration camps in 1958. Only Krasnopevtsev and his friend Menshikov left the camp as they had entered: hard-core Marxists. In fact they repented and returned to the communist fold, recognizing the legitimacy of the General Line. Other members of the group either turned into liberal dissidents without particular religious affiliations or joined the Orthodox Church. Among the latter was Khaibulin, who was converted to Orthodoxy while in concentration camp and embraced its right-wing 'Probedonostevite' brand.

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freedom to rule belongs but to a few. But the freedom to think and to argue belongs to everybody.[48]

SUCH, in brief summary, is the profile of this new *samizdat* publication. According to *Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 22, Osipov's friends had already been warned by the KGB that he would be arrested because of his journal, and the third issue of *Veche* contains an appeal by Osipov that publication be continued if he is arrested. This shows that *Veche's* type of Russian patriotism is not to the liking of the authorities, although it has declared avoidance of directly political themes, and has not touched on the issues of legal guarantees of individual freedom in society. In fact it could not do so if it religiously followed the teachings of the Slavophiles, for they insisted that freedom can only be guaranteed by love and rejected freedom introduced by legislative guarantees, as such guarantees presuppose the solution of human relations by means of force, which the Slavophiles considered to be a corruption of human nature. They believed somehow that gradually and informally the tsar would liberalize his regime, give more freedoms, and his thankful subjects would give him advice which he would heed. But this patriarchal family-like solution of social problems could be taken seriously only by people with a basically optimistic view of human nature. It could not have been seriously cherished after the frustrations of the epoch of Alexander II: frustrations, on the one hand, over the fact that the tsar, despite his reformism, continued to rule the country bureaucratically, continually putting off the issue of popular representation, mistrusting public initiative even within the *zemstvos* created by him and punishing *zemstvo*-activists for such initiative [49]; and frustration, on the other hand, with the reaction of a certain section of the public to a relative liberalization of the regime, i.e. the growth of destructive revolutionary parties with such amoral theories as those of Nechayev, for instance, and the appearance and growth of terrorism. It is no coincidence, therefore, that a considerable sector of Slavophilism began to degenerate from the 1860s onwards into reactionary pan-Slavism, practically merging with official nationalism (another sector evolved into the soil-bound school, which through its influence on Solovyov had an impact on the liberal religio-philosophic revival of the early twentieth century): after the experience of the 1860s and 1870s there was no more room for idyllic hopes of a patriarchal solution of social problems along the lines

[48] '*Novosti samizdata*', *Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 24, 5 March 1972, AS 1100, p. 28. Despite his belief in the universal right to freedom, Osipov probably retains an anti-Judaic and anti-Zionist *Weltanschauung*. Does he not realize that in view of very recent historical experience any strong racial or religious bias in philosophical outlook can easily be transformed in the mind of the masses into support for genocide —witness the murder of the Jews by the Nazis and of the Serbs by the Croat *Ustashi*? Can he not see that in a society like Soviet society today this is a very real danger?

[49] See the excellent article by James A. Malloy, Jr., 'Russian Liberalism and the Closing of the 1867 St Petersburg *Zemstvo*', *Canadian Slavic Studies*, IV, 4, 1970.

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of the Slavophile conciliar theories. The choice had to be made. Some chose society, social activities, i.e. oppositional politics of one form or another, eventually evolving into such parties as the Octobrists; others chose to be with the government, i.e. the camp of Shevyryov, Katkov, Pobedonostsev. A revival of the early Slavophile idyllic hopes is even more unlikely now, and indeed, as I have already mentioned, the sense of evil in human nature and society is keener in *Veche* than in the early Slavophile writings.

Nevertheless, as a forum for all these issues, *Veche* cannot be considered an entirely successful journal. One has only to look at Antonov's work on the Slavophiles. Its weaknesses and the lack of comprehension of the essence of Slavophilism shown in the claiming of kinship with Leninism are obvious. Yet, although the editors note that they do not agree with all his views, they devote practically one third of each of the first three issues of the journal to this essay. Furthermore, they call Fetisov, the head of the 'Russian Party' to which Antonov belongs, 'one of the outstanding Russian scholars and public figures'.[50] They do not find it necessary to dissociate themselves from the racist and anti-semitic views of either Fetisov or Antonov; the latter is known to have been the author of a letter addressed to Larissa Daniel and circulated, inter alia, in the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry where Antonov and his associates had been for a time. They were accused in accordance with Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, and eventually sent to the psycho-prison of Kazan. In essence the letter stated: 'Don't you Jews join in our struggle against communism. You helped to set up the Soviet system yourself. You poisoned the Russian soul with the poison of materialism, you have continually polluted the waters of the whole world. Today, having sensed the inevitable and rapid crash of the socialist system, the unpopularity of Marxist teachings, you have moved to this side of the barricades. You want once again to come out clean from the water and warm your hands in Russian blood, to become, as it were, a guiding force of peoples, to win for yourselves again the leading place of the chosen nation. Not this time, again! Larissa Daniel, you won't succeed! We shall win freedom for ourselves on our own! . . .'[51]

At the beginning of this article I compared the effect of Chaadayev on the awakening of Slavophile and nationalist thought in Russia with the present effect of such highly self-critical works as those of Amalrik, Grossman and others on the reawakening of neo-Slavophilism and neo-nationalism in Russian *samizdat*. In view of the intellectual limitations and racist overtones, i.e. in the final analysis, intolerance of these nationalist and Slavophile publications the comparison may appear somewhat far-fetched. The Slavophiles, particularly the early ones, were characterized by great erudition, great culture, extreme tolerance and liberality of thought and opinion. This is certainly untrue of *A Nation*

[50] *Veche*, No. 1, p. 36.
[51] A. Petrov-Agatov, '*Arestantskiye vstrechi*', *Grani*, No. 82, pp. 113–14.

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Speaks, and it is true of *Veche* only to the extent to which it invites open discussion on all issues relating to Russia's past and present and to the spiritual legacy of Russia; but the editors' attitude to Fetisov and Antonov is indicative of different characteristics and sympathies.

With all its limitations, however, *Veche* is an important phenomenon in the dissident movement as the first *samizdat* journal devoted entirely to Russian national issues, and those of Russian historical and cultural experience. The necessity for a forum for these issues, given the acute interest in national self-consciousness and the historico-ideational meaning of one's country, is self-evident, given the taboos of official historiography. Against the background of the present ideological vacuum on the official level, Russian society is again, like some 130 years ago, bursting at the seams with the vital question: whither Russia? Will Russia follow the path of the current philistinism camouflaged by petrified dogma? Or the path of extreme nationalism and Pobedonostsev-like Orthdoxy towards pogroms and semi-fascism? Or will it move with the enlightened Christian universalism of Vladimir Solovyov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn towards a spiritual and cultural revival?

RELIGIO-NATIONAL thought in Russia today is a many-faceted phenomenon, ranging from the narrow chauvinism of *A Nation Speaks* through the somewhat broader attitudes of *Veche* (which, however, are still confined to ideas of Russian national messianism) to the liberal Christianity of Gorsky, Denisov, and others, which rejects any such messianism and condemns it as a doctrine which eventually gives a comfortable excuse for aggression. All these documents and all these shades of opinion indicate, however, a growing national awareness and a search for a new road for the future of the nation, based on its historical and cultural legacy, rejecting the Soviet system and its path. (The sole, and partial, exception is Antonov who, in the *Veche* article mentioned earlier, tries to justify the October Revolution in a Slavophile context.) A major ideological article in *Kommunist* by the Director of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, shows, in its condemnation of nationalist and religious trends in Soviet society,[52] as well as of all the other forms of dissent, that the authorities are worried by these schools of thought at least as much as by the democratic movement, non-Russian nationalisms and other forms of opinion divergent from the General Line.

[52] M. Yovchuk, 'Sovremenniye problemy ideologicheskoi borby', *Kommunist*, No. 15, 1971, pp. 105–7.

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Samizdat
Background to Dissent

Yuri Glazov*

IN the 1960s the problem of the generations became a topic of vigorous debate; moreover, the term 'generation' proved an extremely difficult one to define. During these years the discovery was made that one generation might be clearly dissimilar to another: the whole life-style and behaviour of the rising generation were manifestly different from everything to which more elderly or experienced people had become accustomed. There was a sharp distinction in attitudes to people, to the family, to love, to labour and leisure, to the West, and to Russia's past. The mid-sixties revealed as many as four generations interacting within society, each one endowed with specific characteristics.

THE average age of the most senior generation, the generation that had substantially influenced the course of [Soviet] life, was somewhere in the region of 55 to 60. Most of their predecessors had already rotted away in either retirement or the grave. But it was the members of this generation who had spent the best years of their lives in the thick of historical events. It was a generation that had taken shape after the October revolution and it bore vivid traces of those turbulent times within itself. It had seemed ridiculous in the heat of the twenties to plunge into philosophical jungles: what had been needed in those days had been men of action—creators, reformers. Only partial account could be taken of a man's psychology, and anyway, how was one to take account of it at all if one had to 'sink or swim with the five-year plan'?

The general background bred a generation of men who had to know how to subordinate themselves to the higher will of the state, and how to subordinate to themselves people who stood on the hierarchy's lower rungs. The milksops perished, as Andrei Platonov wrote in 'The Trench' and many of his short stories. Bourgeois Western culture was being swept aside, religious Russia was disintegrating and the old mode of life inevitably being destroyed. What did people want with foreign languages, with the philosophy of a Count Tolstoy or a Prince Evgeny Trubetskoy? A new world was under construction, and the Yury Andreyevich Zhivagos were to abandon themselves to drink and forget to pay their union dues. The finest mentors of this generation were Mikhail Gordon, and Nikolai Dudorov who managed to re-educate himself though he provoked only despair in the unfortunate Zhivago. But the reason why Zhivago himself departed this life was because he had no

* This is an excerpt from a book, *Narrow Gates*, which Mr. Glazov wrote for *samizdat* while still in the Soviet Union.

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strength left to resist its pressure; and with him died the old Russian intelligentsia.

A considerable proportion of the first generation to which I am referring was filled with faith in social reconstruction, and no one is justified in asserting that the enthusiasm born of the times was ill-rooted or unfounded: it was the disintegration of old Russia, and she had surely demonstrated her rottenness if the majority of her population were resolved to break her up. The people of that first generation were to turn a blind eye to a great many things as they demolished, constructed, erected, refashioned and forcibly cultivated, until the year 1937 finally shook them into sobriety. That fateful year made even the most hardened materialists turn to fatalism; for what other explanation could there be, if not fate, for the fact that the nocturnal visitors came for one's neighbour and not for oneself? Horror too bound these people together. Broken by the uncertainty of their fate, they stifled their feelings of terror with frantic work: labour came to be the supreme meaning of life—as long as a man worked or simply occupied himself with production, nothing would happen to him. The effect this had upon him and his family is hard to judge; but things were not always so bad, and these people possessed an enviable integrity of character: they had been brought up to be loyal to the official ideology, and had borne the brunt of the restoration period of the twenties, the upheavals and cataclysms of the thirties, the unimaginable strains and mortal dangers of the forties, the abrupt changes of atmosphere in the fifties, and the developments—utterly incomprehensible to them—of the sixties. For the moment this was the generation that held Russia together.

THE second generation was about 45 at the time. It was a pensive generation. It had seen too much. The years of famine when collectivization was at its height; high schools in that same year of 1937, when portraits of marshals were ripped out of textbooks; when children's parents disappeared although they had done absolutely nothing suspicious, and one was forbidden to speak to one's friend of only yesterday because it had turned out that his parents were English spies; when myriads of people vanished and the rest remained at liberty only to whisper in an undertone. And then the approach of war, which only a totally blind person could have failed to observe, for it was constantly on the lips of the old women in market-places and village yards. And the bloody carnage of war, when our lads fought under close-range fire. And the German prisoner-of-war camps, where the Russian soldiers did not receive a single packet of the food they craved from the Red Cross; and the terrible order of '42—' stay where you are ', with the show executions reminding one of Marcus Crassus' decimation, when he had conquered the panic of the Roman troops in the fight against Spartacus; and the back-breaking wartime work in the munitions factories; and the informers swarming around one and reporting one's every move to the powers that be; and science, when one had to begin every article with

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a panegyric to the great gardener and architect; and the poetic sublimity of lines like 'Comrade Stalin, do you hear us, surely you hear us, we know it, not mother nor son but Thee do we recall first of all, in this terrible hour'; and the post-war camps, where one's feet got frostbitten and one's kidneys were ruined, where the philosophy was one of 'your turn today, mine tomorrow', where the people's court sent you a statement from your wife requesting a divorce and the leering lieutenant summoned the convict and laughed: 'So she's gone on the streets, has she, your old whore?' while you had spent many a long evening thinking obsessively of her and she was a solace to you during your sojourn in that ninth circle of hell along with thieves, foul-tongued pederasts and murderers, Vlasovites, Balts, professors, brilliant engineers, saintly Catholic priests and kind-natured pastors—no, I can find no fault with that wretched generation; I sing the praises of their intelligent and de-ideologized existentialism, their supreme love of life, and the searing coals of their eyes that remember all they have witnessed and shrink from the memory.

One cannot, however, fail to observe that it was this generation which, back from the war and labour fronts, swelled the ranks of our executive workers, and it was noticeable even then that they had a good understanding of life's problems and of its seamier sides. This generation had received a better education, though it had neither the time nor the spiritual energy to apply itself seriously. Its attitude to the West was one of greater tolerance and interest than were merited. But I fear that its knowledge of its native Russian cultural tradition is poor. On the heels of this generation, the bearer of such a crippling burden, came the younger generations.

BY the sixties the third generation was aged about 35. It was a generation that had not been broken by war nor, for the most part, had any experience of the camps. It was a generation of people too young in 1937 to comprehend the full extent of the tragedy that had overtaken the country. It was a generation of orphans, for the fathers had perished either before or during the war, or else had drunk their cup of bitterness afterwards. It was a generation of people moulded during the final years of the war with Hitler, and in the difficult post-war years. War had brought out their patriotism and their one desire was to even the score with Hitler as soon as they could. The years of war, and post-war life had taught them the spirit of restraint and economy.

This was the first generation since the Soviet seizure of power to receive a more or less normal education amounting to rather more than workers' schools and the two or three years required to gain a diploma. The role of the mothers of this fatherless generation as educators was negligible, since these mothers were out at work from morning until late evening. It was the schools, institutes and factories that had a greater influence on members of this age group. Now they might gain a fair knowledge of foreign languages and have occasional conversation

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practice with foreigners, a single brief encounter with whom might have had troublesome consequences in Stalin's day. Drop by drop they absorbed their culture, which cannot be gulped down by the tankard but has to be acquired as bees gather honey. Their attitude to what was going on around them was reserved, sceptical, nihilistic; and they took careful note of everything. They were not required, as the previous generation had been, to pay such a terrible price for their lives, and they grew up perfectly 'bilingual': in public the members of this generation conducted themselves in a manner befitting Soviet citizens, not butting in or picking quarrels, while amongst their friends they tried with more or less sincerity to discuss the basic problems of life.

The complex psychological world of the senior generation had been almost completely crushed, or rather, had remained in embryo and simply never developed. The psychological world of the second generation, which had experienced the war, was seriously deformed and traumatized. That of the third generation had been flattened and split, but there was a very real hope that it could be straightened out. The third generation began to make its presence felt in the world of culture and learning by more or less serious creative work. It was better acquainted with the West and did not shut its eyes to Russia's past. But there was a tremendous wariness about it: its thought, feelings and actions were under the control of an inner censorship. It had mastered the grammar of its 'bilingualism' splendidly and settled into a narrow existence, placidly vegetating and hoping for better times and for saviours who might appear from across the seven seas, descend from on high or rise up from the bowels of the earth. Social awareness and passivity intermingled with elements of demonological mysticism.

THEN there was the fourth generation, aged about 25. Unlike the generation that preceded it, this one was unafraid. It had not known the war, and regarded the camps as a kind of fantastic nightmare that bore no direct relation to itself. Reared by fathers from the first and second generations, it had grown up in normal homes where televisions, radios, record players, tape recorders, the Conservatoire, the cinema and subtitles were commonplace and tedious. It was incapable of understanding why its parents' friends would lower their voices to a whisper at the mention of Stalin, or why criticism of the regime would make them raise their eyes to the cornices, where they were certain listening devices were concealed. This generation was in the habit of referring to its parents as 'ancestors' and increasingly its members would, at the mention of them, put their index fingers against their temples, giving them a demonstrative twist to indicate their parents' mental condition. The most intelligent representatives of this generation, who rarely have any spiritual, cultural or even scientific contact with their elders, cannot comprehend how it was possible to reject the Christian culture, by which mankind had lived for two millenia. But this generation suffers from a certain unconcern, an infantilism, a lack of independence, qualities

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entirely absent in previous generations, for such virtues could have led any member of the older generations into deadlock or simply to catastrophe. In the sixties contact between people became more profound and argument brought to light ever more apparent differences between the generations. The incompatibility of the generations was reflected to a considerable degree in the composition of circles of friends.

IN [Soviet] atheist society a circle of friends has extremely important functions. Through it a person is brought into contact with all spheres of life—spiritual, intellectual, political, industrial, recreational. Wearied by his work, and by accumulated impressions, a man craves the company of friends.

This circle of friends is not necessarily a closed one; equally it may consist of several sub-circles functioning simultaneously. The circle of intellectuals in any town, even a large one, is not so extensive, and if an intellectual's connexions are sufficiently wide, everyone worth knowing in the town will be acquainted with his acquaintances, or with his friends' acquaintances. The circle is a part of a single system and the name of any intellectual of merit, however slight, will soon be on the lips of his friends' friends.

Before mid-1965 circles of friends within the intelligentsia functioned on an extremely large scale; it was, to a considerable extent, they who prepared the ground for the epistolary campaign, which was to base itself on purely humanitarian principles. A friend was duty bound to stand up for his friends or his friends' friends.

A circle of friends forms in various ways. It is created chiefly on the basis of community of professional interests, followed by that of intellectual and spiritual interests. At a certain stage intellectual and professional interests may come to predominate over the interests of business or friendship arising from long-standing geographical proximity.

During Stalin's time and for some years after his death conditions were not too favourable for circles of friends. Stalin knew that where you found one good man, there would be another not too far away, like a family of white mushrooms. They put out subterranean feelers with nothing to show above ground; rather like the white mushroom, in fact, which does not stand out particularly, hiding away in the long grass and visible only to the experienced eye. Yet can it be compared, this unobtrusive yet fleshy white mushroom, with the thin-stemmed toadstool that proclaims its presence to each and every passer-by?

In Stalin's day there was a dearth of white mushrooms: they needed sun, shade and moisture. People did not trust one another. If they thought they had said too much at a party with friends they would live in expectation of unpleasant consequences for several days afterwards although they knew the people with whom they had spent the evening very well. Suppose someone informed on them? After all, Rabinovich was put inside through his own laziness, according to the joke—after

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talking to a friend he'd been too lazy to go and inform on him straight away and had put off visiting the KGB until next morning, but that night he himself was taken away, for his rather more efficient friend had informed on *him*. In Stalin's day one's friends were the people with whom one was linked by long years of studying, working or candid conversation, but still that conversation was never absolutely sincere; people were incapable of carrying their thoughts through to the end or expressing themselves completely. General faith in the all-seeing and all-hearing leader was so great that one was either fearful of stepping beyond a certain radius, or thought it blasphemous to do so. People with loose tongues were declared SOEs—socially dangerous elements [*sotsialno-opasnye elementy*]. The SOE's rightful place was the camp. Until mid-1965 circles of friends were completely closed and admission to a new circle was by a complex system of recommendation by one's friends; so great was the fear of *stukachi*—stool-pigeons.

TO my mind there ought not to be anything particularly secret about the activities of people who are striving to democratize our society, with the exception of the names of their friends, whom nobody has the right to betray. If any person whose goal is the revitalization of society adopts the principle of secrecy, the intelligent man should, I believe, be on his guard. *La porte ouverte garde la maison.* Fear of the KGB and of *stukachi* is indicative of a person's profound duality, his 'bilingualism': in one place he speaks the official language, in another his own, intimate one; fear of the *stukach* is fear of the man who fulfils the function of translator from one language to the other. One must gradually rid oneself of this fear (of the KGB and of *stukachi*) by endeavouring to express oneself judiciously and with reserve. There is nothing more dangerous than the mirages and nightmares born of uncertainty or mythical fantasies. We all of us live in a society, the details of whose structure we do not fully comprehend. Some people view it with a loathing they make no attempt to understand: feeding upon their hatred they conceal the serpent in their bosom and grow petrified with the years in the consciousness of their own powerlessness and the hopelessness of their situation. Others may praise society assiduously whether in the course of their duties or for personal reasons, but they do not try even partially to understand the complex structure that determines our whole way of life. Some have a splendid field base but lack the scientific training necessary to make observations and draw conclusions; still others possess a more or less adequate scientific training but are too distant from the field base and are steeped in a mass of prejudices that prevent them from drawing fair conclusions. All of them, and those upon whom they depend for the publication of their findings, are permeated with a fear of they know not what. There is nothing more dangerous than living in an atmosphere of terror which one constantly engenders within oneself. Those responsible for the deliberate generation of mass psychosis or terror should be made to answer for their crime,

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which one might just as well term the deliberate inoculation of human beings with rabies. Though the only person really to blame for the present state of affairs is oneself. And the first step on the road to self-regeneration is liberation from one's own hypertrophied and pandemic fears.

FROM 1956 onwards, that is, three years after Stalin's death, the structure of the circles of friends I have described began to alter. The pathological fear of every newcomer to one's orbit, who might trip one up, started to evaporate. But the residual cloud of this fear hung on ever more heavily and sometimes reached saturation point thanks to the tales of people who had been sent to the camps by a friend's denunciation and were maimed for life: having regained their freedom now, how could they freely confide in the first person they met or even in an apparently sympathetic colleague? Pathological fear of the KGB also clung on, partially dispelled only among those people who had had occasion to meet employees of the KGB in the course of their early troubles and be persuaded that they did not guillotine one on the spot.

The more intellectual and spiritual a circle of friends, the tighter were the restrictions placed on membership. There is nothing easier than being 'third man' in a drinking group; a ruble in hand will make any inveterate drunkard your best friend for all of an hour; he will lay bare his soul to you and by next day will have forgotten who it was he propped up the gatepost with. For acceptance into a highly intellectual circle, a complex system of recommendation and even a probationary period were required. When you became a member of this kind of circle you realized that you had entered into an esoteric clan where everything was divided into 'us' and 'them'. The gatherings of this esoteric clan, whose size might expand or contract, took the form of parties arranged to celebrate the birthdays of its members. They consisted in the lavish imbibing of alcohol, the exchange of news, earnest improvisations by the group's leader on topics chosen at random, praise of 'us' and censure of 'them'. Structurally the circle of friends was distinctly conical. At the head of the circle there was the leader, and, attached to him, two or three people who could deputize for him if necessary and who supported his ideas at all times. Being a member of such a circle meant sharing its leader's ideas: over-frequent arguments with the leader were justifiable only if their aim was that of provoking an interesting conversation at the end of which the disputant was obliged to agree politely with the basic ideas of his leader or to make a show of admitting his own error; under no circumstances was he to insist on upholding any ideas of his own which tended to refute his leader's arguments. Then there was the silent, yet essential body of the circle—its *corps de ballet*. Next in the hierarchy came the fringe members, who were invited only irregularly to the circle's parties. The absence of a member from any gathering was a serious dereliction of duty for which he might receive a reprimand from the high priest or priestess of the esoteric clan, and

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several failures to attend parties might lead to the ostracism of the negligent member and the end of his participation in the group.

But there is one significant feature of these circles of friends. The *sine qua non* of integrity demanded of each member of the circle imposes restrictions not only upon his behaviour inside the circle, but upon his conduct outside it, that is, in society. The less intellectual and spiritual the circle, the fewer demands it makes upon its members' behaviour outside: the members of a voluntary 'drinking trio' are not interested in how a member of their ephemeral collective behaves beyond its confines. Members of an intellectual circle are solemnly required to conduct themselves honourably in all spheres of life. It was probably circles of friends like these that were the origin of the intolerance with which members of the intelligentsia have come to look upon what they call 'the scum'. . . .

* * *

[After the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, and still more after the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial] . . . a Brownian motion was set up amongst the intelligentsia of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Novosibirsk. They rose in excited swarms. They wrote one collective letter after another.

Not for a long time had the intelligentsia seen such glorious days. They learned all the news not from their own Soviet papers and radio broadcasts, but from abroad. Many talked of nothing but the trial and its repercussions, while our press and radio ignored the subject and continued their usual reporting on the achievements of steel workers.

Pavel Litvinov was treading the land a free man, inspiring the broken spirits of people with hope and optimism. He must himself have thought at first that he would be picked up at any moment, but then he realized that his arrest was being postponed. Twice he was summoned to the KGB on some undoubtedly important business, but, feverishly occupied with editing his letters and meeting people, Litvinov could not find the time to call in at the KGB reception office on the Kuznetsky Most where he was awaited.

Amongst the heap of letters that Litvinov had received were messages from people who welcomed his appeal. For some reason they had all addressed their appeals to Litvinov. They wrote from various towns. Scientists in Leningrad wrote that the time had come to put an end to our vegetative existence. A worker wrote that wherever a man went he always came up against a brick wall he could not breach. A priest wrote that the modern Christian was the man who behaved in a Christian fashion and not the man who proclaimed a truth to which he did not adhere in practice. A worker from Tashkent, with considerable literary flair, sent an astonishing epistle: 'Dost thou know whither to lead us, Pavel, us who crave the truth and a true cause?'

As usual, letters were sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU, to the government, and to the Procurator-General, but they elicited no

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replies. People wrote letters not so much because they believed in the possibility that the verdict might be reviewed, but because to remain silent was an impossibility. The letters were signed by academicians, corresponding members, doctors of sciences, architects, composers, artists, chemists, physicists, mathematicians, linguists, biologists, writers, poets, physicians, economists and workers. Amongst the 'signers'—and how rapidly the term [*podpisant*] came into usage—there were no servicemen, party-appointed workers, members of the KGB, or peasants. Most of the letters were couched in extremely restrained terms, but all had a magnetic, emotional quality.

PEOPLE gave these letters to their friends and to anyone they trusted, to sign. The signing of such a letter was an act of integrity, an act of solidarity with persons to whom one was bound by long-standing friendship or with whom one had spent many an evening. Prior to the letter campaign, all who were inimical to Stalinism and the camps were one's friends. But now there arose a certain dichotomy depending upon whether or not a person was approachable for his signature. There were surprises—men would either agree to put their signature to the letter or would turn deathly pale and beat a hasty retreat. In point of fact these letters were eventually left lying on tables for all to see, and anyone who wished to sign one knew where to go.

The number of *podpisanty* had grown and stood almost at a thousand. A thousand people who had consented to put their signatures to letters protesting against a verdict carried by the authorities was an impressive figure. But still it seemed very small. The feeling was that every decent man ought to sign. But there were scenes, each one more distressing than the last. Some people went sick so as to avoid having to put in an appearance at work during this time. Others tried to avoid talking to or approaching anyone who might offer them a slice of the dangerous cake. Still others were willing to sign but permission was not forthcoming at home, where they were subjected to a torrent of threats up to and including divorce. Still others hovered about the letter like a cat stalking a saucer of hot milk. Some put their signature but then panicked several days later and the signature had to be withdrawn. Others, after signing, came to the horrified conclusion that the letters were the work of the KGB and the whole enterprise some gigantic provocation, and that their days of freedom were numbered. Still others claimed that they would never have signed the document at all if their best friend had not forced them to it. Some felt that the time had come to express their opinion and they no longer cared about the consequences. Others did not believe there would be any consequences, signed the letter and continued to go about their business. Others, seeing the lid gradually being forced off the cauldron of public ferment, pondered earnestly how they might suitably express their own feelings on the subject. There were those whose signatures dropped like ripe raspberries into the berry-picker's bowl. There were those whose signatures had to be forcibly

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dragged from them and fell into the bowl reluctant as an unripe berry in the harvester's hand. There were those whom a sense of moral obligation impelled to sign. There were those who thought by signing to please the influential persons of this world. There were those who signed out of courage. There were those who signed out of fear. There were those who signed because they overcame their fear and found the courage. There were those whom nothing in the world would induce to sign. There were the publicans who signed in defence of their comrades in the awareness of their own unworthiness and guilt. There were the pharisees who lent their signatures in self-conceit and the awareness of their high rank in the social elite.

There was the ringing letter of the 81 intellectuals. [Foreign] radio-stations broadcast the letter of the 24 writers. Pyotr Grigorenko and Pyotr Yakir were warned by the KGB that they would be arrested if they continued with their anti-social activities. Mathematician Alexander Esenin-Volpin and poetess Natalya Gorbanevskaya were confined to psychiatric hospitals. Anatoly Marchenko, by then released from his camp, was living in difficult conditions. His book *My Testimony* had begun to circulate [in *samizdat*] and made very gloomy reading. It had come out at a time when the labour-camp epic and the exaltation of people who had spent years in the camps was reaching its apogee. Meanwhile news from the camps told of the distressing situation of political prisoners. At the end of February radio-stations [abroad] transmitted the letter of the twelve, which emphasized the need to respect the rights of the individual. This letter had been sent to the Consultative Conference of Communist Parties in Budapest, and was reprinted by all the leading Western papers; US Ambassador to the United Nations Goldberg read it out to the Commission on Human Rights. It was the last but one in a series of letters that came just before the epistolary campaign was smashed, and the repressions encountered by its signatories were particularly harsh. It was followed by another letter, with about 225 signatures, which was sent to the government. The atmosphere was no less electric.

At this juncture there occurred the March [1968] events in Poland. Striking and demonstrating students were roughly dispersed by Gomulka and the Jews were accused of all the deadly sins. *Pravda* published Gomulka's speech in which he thirsted to see the guilty get their deserts. The Jews were ordered out of Poland immediately. Now the leadership in our country had always paid attention to what Gomulka had to say. The idea of punishing the letter-signers, amongst whom were considerable numbers of Jews, was indeed tempting. Spring was bursting out all over in Prague, and it seemed wise to discourage certain of our compatriots who might wish to see something similar happen in our country. In mid-March a plenum of the Moscow Party Committee passed a resolution to 'educate' the letter-signers. The measures selected were those of extra-judicial persecution: job sackings and administrative transfers.

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Those were hard times. Talented scientists, and workers in cultural and artistic spheres began to be summoned to appear before commissions of a mixed McCarthyite-Red Guard persuasion. There were dismissals and expulsions. The reprisals seemed harsh and unjustified.

CONSIDERING all the complications with which the signing of letters was fraught, one has to admit that they were signed by the finest section of the intelligentsia. First of all, merely to take the decision to sign these letters one had to rid oneself of the terrible fear so typical of the majority of people, who did not attempt to weigh all the pros and cons. Clearly only a few of the signatories signed in the absolute certainty that they would be put inside for it: those who believed that people in Russia always had been and always would be put inside tended to remain aloof from the epistolary campaign. But those who did sign acted on the assumption that *some* kind of repression would be visited upon them: therefore the reaction of wife or husband had to be weighed in advance, and sources of income necessarily considered in case of dismissal from one's job. Dismissal was regarded by the signer as a real threat, and the more sober-minded people ruled out the likelihood of collective prosecutions for the signing of a petition.

The idea of collective letter-writing was a clever move in itself and a revival of the custom of petitioning prevalent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The tsars feared petitions like the plague. One need only recall the petitions that were presented at the time of the 1682 mutiny of the *streltsy*, when Ivan Naryshkin was first tortured and then cut to pieces by schismatic *streltsy* after being handed over to them by the terrified Sofia. Petitions too had incited the whole of Moscow to revolt during the disturbances that marked the start of Alexei Mikhailovich's reign. An eloquent petition was capable of arousing the schismatic *streltsy* to great feats of arms. On the eve of the rebellion led by the brothers Khovansky, Savva Romanov, a former lay brother, composed a petition that astounded the *streltsy* who were dissatisfied with the reforms of [Patriarch] Nikon: 'From the day of our birth we have never heard a like word. . . . It behoves us, brethren, to rise in defence of our old faith and shed our blood for the light of Christ; we would have laid down our lives for the corruptible, therefore why not die for the light of Christ?'

Naturally, none of the signatories hoped by their letters to instigate rebellion. They were attempting to find a peaceful way to settle their differences, and their letters revealed a desire to persuade the leadership to heed the voice of the intelligentsia. The blatant endeavours of certain circles within the leadership to rehabilitate Stalin were not the least of the factors which sparked off the signers' campaign. It was against this rehabilitation of Stalin that the triple appeal of Ilya Gabai, Yuli Kim and Pyotr Yakir had been directed.

Of course, a man in a professionally secure position might well decide to add his signature to the campaign; any pretext was sufficient

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for a letter-signer to be given the sack, not necessarily that of his civic activities. Chief among the complex tangle of feelings that might induce a man to sign were, naturally, his ordinary sense of integrity and his sympathy for the victims.

THE leadership showed no desire to enter into a dialogue. Leaving the letters unanswered, it declared the signatories renegades. They were not actually branded as enemies of the people; but in all other respects the situation reminded people of the thirties and forties. The epoch of the upsurge of the letter-campaign, and its defeat, merit serious analysis for the edification of posterity.

To some it was clear that history would not repeat itself. But these were the people who listened regularly to [foreign] radio broadcasts, read *samizdat* and had wide-ranging contact with well-read and well-informed people; these were people whose *Weltanschauung* required them to participate in the cause of social reform. Sometimes it was painfully apparent that progress would be made only if every person, without exception, contributed his share. But people suffered from mental inertia; they automatically carried the spirit of 30 years ago into the present, were unwilling to cross the frontiers of their narrow mode of existence, and simply, were too sluggish; and all these factors created a situation where, 15 years after Stalin's death, the protest-signers, whose letters had expressed only a hundredth part of the indignation that was choking the ordinary citizen in his own home, found themselves if not utterly isolated then at least in the peculiar position of 'hunted men', men who had dared to cross the forbidden boundary.

The leadership decided to punish financially those who had entertained the notion of asserting their integrity. In principle it argued thus: 'You assert your right to spiritual purity, well then, assert it by material suffering!' And it began expelling people from the party, depriving them of half their pay, or simply dismissing them from their main work, transferring them to less agreeable duties and expelling them from the creative unions—though not a single person was as yet expelled from the Writers' Union. And although about one thousand of the finest representatives of the intelligentsia had signed petitions demanding that the rights of the individual be respected, and although the majority of them were able to give a reasoned account of why they had decided to sign, the drastic measures taken by the authorities soon restored order of a sort in the camp of the intelligentsia. At first it had seemed that dismissal from one's workplace was not as stringent a measure as prison conviction. But dismissals like these could still frequently be traumatic.

Society in the metropolis was in the grip of fear. It was unclear whether the government would rest content with these half-measures. Former inmates of labour-camps were saying that the atmosphere in which the letter-signers were being interrogated and persecuted was identical to that of, for instance, the forties. The hunted men included many who occupied lucrative posts: dismissal reduced them to the

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position of paupers. One can imagine the scenes with discontented wives, and the feelings that children in need of attention might provoke in these situations. One source of disappointment was the many medium and high-ranking public workers and party members who had only recently played the role of liberals. Certain hopes had been placed on these people. It was they who in private talks with persons in positions of trust had said that much of Marxism was obsolete and needed reform; they who had permitted expressions of discontent to creep into their conversation and had ventured to voice quite strongly-worded opinions of the leadership. It was they who had vowed their loyalty to the renascent intelligentsia. It was they who, in articles published in important journals, had expatiated on the spiritual duty of modern man and his responsibility to society. Two or three years ago it had been they who had presented the people now under fire with their books and articles, touchingly inscribed: 'To dear X, a fighter for justice, from his faithful comrade-in-arms.' Now they either lived in mortal fear that someone would remind them of their friendship with persons who might at any moment be declared enemies of the people, or they pursued a complicated dual policy, at meetings voting for party expulsions and job dismissals, but flaunting themselves as champions of justice in the lobbies. However, they were soon exposed, and fell upon hard times, for it was then that public opinion revealed itself as a ruthless terrorizer.

THE punishment meted out to the letter-signers was more than a little reminiscent of the scenes of the first Christian martyrs who met their death at the jaws of the ravenous beasts loosed upon them, while in the amphitheatre the public gazed intently as one youth after another perished in the ring.

Despite the evasiveness of their replies under questioning, the letter-signers behaved honourably: they had nothing to repent of. Withdrawal of their signatures—for that is exactly what was demanded of them—would mean disgrace in the eyes of the silent body of the intelligentsia which, though outwardly somewhat apathetic, viewed the treatment meted out to its most conscientious and honourable spokesmen with mixed feelings. The intelligentsia demanded that its self-appointed martyrs, who had asserted rights they shared with the public in the amphitheatre, should die a fitting death at the predators' jaws. A roar of disapproval swept through the audience if one of them repudiated his destiny as a martyr. The public was dissatisfied: once a man had volunteered to die he should die an honourable death and not cry for mercy. But if only the public had been freely admitted to the theatre of death! No, the audience was chosen by the organizers of the spectacle from amongst their own confederates, and those who sympathized with the martyrs had to make do with conflicting rumours.

Any comparison must be unsatisfactory; none of the self-appointed martyrs for the rights of the individual died in the ring. They died later—in hospital, like Valery Pavlinchuk, the young physicist from

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Obninsk, and Alexei Kosterin, the old Bolshevik expelled from the Writers' Union and the party. It should be noted that the alternatives facing the letter-signers were: either to preserve their material privileges but relinquish their fidelity to moral values and condemn themselves to disgrace in the uncompromising eyes of the intelligentsia, or to preserve their moral authority and retain the esteem of the intelligentsia but relinquish beloved or profitable work. There were those who showed a high degree of resourcefulness and struck costly bargains with their conscience, though not abandoning themselves to total degradation. These people retained their posts but fell heavily in the estimation of their former friends, and I say former, because by this time substantial changes had already begun to occur in the composition of circles of friends. Other people lay down, bared their backs and were duly stabbed. They suffered themselves to be expelled from the party, they gritted their teeth when dismissed from their jobs; and when their employer refused to sign a contract or to place an order, alluding to certain difficulties that had unexpectedly occurred, they walked away with a withering and all-comprehending gaze.

The role of the ravenous beasts was played by the Stalinists, and they needed no encouragement. They sensed that this was to be their last chance, and they made every effort to tear their victims to shreds. But they did not get very far. They were not allowed to tear their victims to shreds. They were instructed to frighten them and scratch them, but not to finish them off; and anyway, the fangs of these Stalinists were no longer what they had been—years of inactivity had blunted and broken them. As they fell upon their victims they sensed no sympathy either on the part of their masters who had granted them the role of tormentors, or, for that matter, on the part of the public. And as they pounced, they looked warily about them, fearing that someone more powerful might pounce on themselves and tear *them* to pieces.

Bosses from the second and third generation lowered their eyes when they had to fire staff. At such times they either tried to hide away somewhere or entrusted the disagreeable task of investigation and dismissal to their deputies. Bosses and deputies alike would indicate by an upward movement of the finger that the order for dismissal had come either from the Holy Ghost Himself or from the rulers of this earth. No one was willing to accept the responsibility for firing a man from his job: higher echelons of management washed their hands of it and claimed that it was the business of the lower levels, while bosses lower down the scale pointed to those at the top. And they all, every one of them, lived in an atmosphere of terror, and themselves created this atmosphere of terror. Even the man who sacked people began to believe that the next wave would sweep him away too: he was well aware of the possibility, either because of his own memories or because of the tales of his elders; and when people like him voted for the expulsion of men whom they inwardly respected and valued (or, as it is now customary to say, 'whom they personally had nothing against'), they

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were already resigned to the thought that they too, like sheep, would fall victim to this wolf who had by then begun to sink its teeth into honest men and force them to steer yet another victim into its jaws. In point of fact there was no wolf; it was the product of diseased imagination and fear. The leadership was obviously disturbed by the scale of the letter-campaign, but as time has shown, the action it took was relatively moderate and not overhasty. It had the information it needed at its disposal and it considered the measures it had taken perfectly adequate to chasten the alarmed intelligentsia.

Interviews between letter-signers and their interrogators at this time were each one more picturesque than the last. When a young doctor of sciences was pressurized to withdraw his signature and allusion was made to the fact that his letter had found its way to the West and become the property of our enemies, the Doctor answered: 'You're crazy—the whole idea of the campaign was publicity!'

'You know, Comrade X', said the director of an institute to a venerable scientist, 'you'll have to have a hard think about whether you want to be near Moscow. . . .' 'I'm 60 years old already', the latter replied. 'It's nearness to God and the truth I should be thinking about, not my nearness to Moscow.'

At another institute the party organizer was trying to induce a research assistant to write a letter of recantation, and when the assistant remarked sadly to himself that he had put so much spiritual energy into the enterprise and it all seemed to have been spent in vain, since it was now merely a question of withdrawing his signature, the party organizer whispered to him: 'No, no, it wasn't in vain, it will still be of great significance, but do write us something or we'll get no peace.' This was one way of conducting an investigation that was all bark and no bite. At another institute a senior research assistant bent on saving his party card beat his breast and lamented: 'I am a criminal. I ought to be shot. I had no right to sign that letter, no right; I'm a criminal. I'll sign a recantation, of course I will. Who was it who gave me the letter? Let me think now . . . some young woman, a blonde, in a green coat. Yes, yes, a green coat . . . young, fair-haired. But I've no idea what her name was or where she worked. Can't imagine why she came up to me. I'm a criminal. . . . I had no right as a communist to sign the letter, and now there it is in the hands of our worst enemies. Whoever *did* give me that letter? Young, about 32, lightish hair, green coat.' In yet another establishment a beautiful young lady whom any one of the McCarthyite-Red Guard commission would have considered it an honour to take out said sharply: 'I'm not a child and I remember that all my life there have been trials at which people have been accused of all the deadly sins. And then time passed and it turned out that the accusations were unfounded. It happened in '37, it happened with those scandalous trials in the forties, and it happened again in the case of the Jewish doctors. I want to ascertain for myself, I want a clear answer—what are these people accused of?'

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One of our writers, upon his expulsion from the party, spoke these words from the rostrum: 'I was in command of a whole regiment at the front, and when the fascists bore down on us I was not afraid. But now I am afraid. It seems to me that the enemy is not ahead of me but behind my back, here amongst my own people.'

A well-known academician, when asked who was the author of a letter that bore his signature, among others, promptly replied: 'I am'.

A middle-aged scholar was summoned to appear before the commission and asked in the presence of the director to explain his motivation in signing a letter that had ended up in the West. 'Let us start far back in the bloody days of collectivization', the scholar began his answer, and after he had indulged in a ten-minute philippic the director discharged him with the words: 'You certainly are a colourful individual!' There was no sense in arguing; but no order for his dismissal was received.

The letter-signers who had been sacked from their jobs were to meet with disillusionment. Although many decent people had risked their careers to protect them from administrative repression, nobody stood up for them in earnest. The academicians maintained a silence. Great hopes had been placed upon them, but evidently they were just as prone to intimidation as anyone else. Apart from Academician Sakharov who came out with his famous treatise on intellectual freedom, nobody spoke up in defence of the people who had been sent to prison or deprived of their beloved work.

THIS silence disheartened the victims. The first clear division of opinion had occurred within the petition-signing intelligentsia. Something inconceivable had happened among the letter-signers and amongst the intelligentsia as a whole. Opponents of the letter-campaign exulted in their victory—and what a victory it was; everybody had been frightened to death; the KGB was pursuing an extremely clever policy.

First of all the signatories had been divided into groups: most dangerous, middling and harmless, the latter having supposedly fallen into the clutches of deceit and delusion. The dangerous included Pavel Litvinov, Larissa Bogoraz, Pyotr Grigorenko, Pyotr Yakir and Ilya Gabai. The middle group comprised party members who had signed the 'letter of the 81', which had been couched in a multitude of rhetorical questions and expressed clear indignation at the authorities' refusal to heed the voice of reason. The harmless, who might more aptly be termed victims of a dirty trick that had resulted in a letter destined for a Moscow address supposedly finding its way into the hands of the CIA and its web of intrigue, included all the rest—academicians, corresponding members, doctors of sciences, artists, writers, poets, bricklayers and mothers of six children. A good half of these signers were deliberately not taken to task, in order to avoid provoking a mood of widespread indignation in the ranks of the intelligentsia. All those who were not branded as signers quietly thanked their lucky stars that their signatures had passed unnoticed. Of course, it was the height of naiveté to think that there was not a man in the

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KGB who could in the course of a single day's work compile a card-index of the letter-signers, and their occupations, which almost all of them had given in their open letters. In many cases these people thought it unwise to defend those of their co-signers who were now in the danger zone. Thankful that they had been categorized as ' harmless ', they made an effort to spend rather less time in the company of their friends in the ' middling ' category, and to avoid altogether the most dangerous group who were obviously condemned men. Those who had been classified as ' middling ' realized that as long as they behaved reasonably and did not have any contact with people whom the regime regarded as a maximum threat, there was no danger of their being imprisoned.

As for the most dangerous, there was nothing for them to do but associate with one another, although they were a very varied group, with differing backgrounds, family circumstances, temperaments and habits. What united them was the impossibility of going back on their word or even of lying low together for a time. They were the ones to speak out frankly on a whole range of important problems including man's right to freedom of personal belief and to proper conditions in places of confinement; the right to publish abroad if one could not be published here [in Russia]; the right of the Crimean Tatars to return to Gurzuf and Bakhchisarai; and the right to assert all rights granted by law.

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Werner G. Hahn

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Werner G. Hahn is an analyst of Soviet affairs for the United States Government.

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Samizdat

The Dual Consciousness of the Intelligentsia and Pseudo-culture

O. A. Altayev *

'Boris, I do not like the intelligentsia, and I do not regard myself as a member of it'.

Marina Tsvetayeva to Pasternak (Correspondence)

I

THE problem of the intelligentsia is a key one in Russian history. At the turn of the century Russian society appeared to have conquered its habitual tendency to 'worship the people' [*narodopoklonstvo*] and to have become conscious of the problem. This consciousness undoubtedly reached its acme in *Vekhi* [*Landmarks*], an anthology of articles concerned with the Russian intelligentsia, the influence and significance of which has, thanks to its choice of theme, extended far beyond the bounds of this theme, and far beyond its immediate impact as an erstwhile sensational best-seller. Outwardly unrecognized and repudiated, and even now known to the majority of people only by its title, *Vekhi* has all this time been a hidden force affecting the whole spiritual development of Russian society. It was indeed a landmark on Russia's path; for wherever she goes now she will have to measure her distance from that point and take it as a basis for reckoning. I repeat, *Vekhi* was more than simply a scathingly critical anthology; thanks to its choice of theme it was able to plumb the very depths of Russian life—the life that preceded it, the life that was to develop in the 60 years that followed it, and the life that is only now dawning.

We are led to believe that the intelligentsia has declined in importance since the seventeenth century. But this view is a mistaken one. It is maliciously propagated by the regime, seized upon by the mob and partially supported by the intelligentsia itself in its desire to disclaim responsibility for the events of the past. We shall attempt to demonstrate this later. For the moment suffice it to say merely that, be that

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as it may, the intelligentsia today once again indubitably holds the fate of Russia, and with it that of the whole world, in its hands. Consequently, in devoting our article to the intelligentsia and its problems, we may, modest though our present-day powers be, hope once more to extend our radius beyond the bounds purely of the phenomenology of the intelligentsia and to touch upon, if not reveal, the very essence of the historical processes occurring in our midst.

LET us compare the intelligentsia of *Vekhi* as presented by S. N. Bulgakov, for instance, in his article 'Heroism and Devotion', with the intelligentsia of today. According to Bulgakov's view, which Berdyayev supports in his book *The Sources and Meaning of Russian Communism*, and which is generally accepted today, the unique character of the Russian intelligentsia developed through a peculiar perversion of personal religious principles overlaid with elements from orthodox culture and the Church. 'Otherworldliness, eschatological dreams of the City of God and the Kingdom of truth to come (under various socialist pseudonyms), and the aspiration to save mankind if not from its sins then at least from its sufferings', wrote Bulgakov, 'are, as we know, immutable and distinctive characteristics of the Russian intelligentsia.' These words can be seen as a précis of the message of the whole of Russian literature of that period, without exception: Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Turgenev, Chekhov, Blok and a multitude of 'lesser' writers whose testimonies have since become part and parcel of our very existence. Consequently we need hardly analyse the Russian intellectual at the turn of the century: nihilist, populist, social-revolutionary terrorist or social democrat. The bourgeois mode, by then firmly established, was alien to him; he feared the daily round and despised culture, whether his own or that of others; he was tormented by his guilt before the people at whose expense he ate and drank. This otherworldliness was due in part to idle arrogance—but only in part. It also undoubtedly concealed an asceticism of a kind, or, as Bulgakov writes, 'an unconscious modicum of pious aversion to the religion of the bourgeoisie, the "kingdom of this world" with its smug complacency'. The Russian intellectual was of course also an ardent atheist who deified scientific knowledge and denied his faith. This is a well-known fact; but Bulgakov maintains that this much-vaunted atheism was far from being a 'conscious denial, or the fruit of complex and agonizing labour of mind, heart and will, the summation of the intellectual's personal life. No, it is taken on trust and retains the characteristics of a naive religious faith, only inside-out'. All these distinguishing features taken together enabled Berdyayev to say in his *Sources* . . . that by its very life-style and mode of existence the intelligentsia resembled nothing so much as a religious order. Admittedly Bulgakov had qualified this, asserting that the further removed the intelligentsia became from Christianity, the more it lost the qualities implanted by Christian culture, which were atavistic by nature.

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If we take a look at the intelligentsia of today, bearing this brief sketch in mind, the one difference that strikes us first of all is that of its 'bourgeois-ness'—in manners, in dress, in its taste in interior decoration, and in its opinions. Asceticism, previously a basic characteristic, has now vanished virtually without trace. The exceptions are extremely rare. The intelligentsia of the present day aspires to material security and wellbeing and no longer sees anything wrong with the good life. On the contrary, it is distressed when its tranquillity and measured way of life are rudely disturbed. His apartment, his opportunities for promotion, his thesis—there we have the necessary minimum without which the intellectual of today cannot imagine his existence. And he regards those conditions as entirely natural. His ideal life-style is that of his American or European colleague, the free man and well-paid specialist who, though compelled to work under considerably greater pressure than his intellectual counterpart in Russia, has his own car, a private house, a family of four and a non-working wife, and can travel anywhere in the world. The present-day Russian intellectual also desires to travel, not only because he wishes to purchase some rather more decent clothes abroad and bring back one or two knick-knacks for his wife and daughter, but because he now values culture. No longer does he believe that 'a pair of boots is worth more than Pushkin'; somehow he has discovered that Pushkin is good also, and so are many other things; now he is 'interested in art' in general, and claims to understand, or to know a thing or two about works of art and to be *au courant* with events in the world of art. Now he wants to be a 'harmonious person', a person of 'all-round culture'; no more is he drawn to suffering or to another's tragedy but to the beautiful, which he regards as aesthetically and hedonistically meaningful inasmuch as he can derive pleasure from it.

However, it would be unfair promptly and categorically to condemn this change in the intellectual, this 'bourgeois-ness', or to despise him for his metamorphosis, as Western hippies do, throwing down a challenge and shocking him by deliberate display of *déclassé* attitudes, and so on. After all, the intellectual of today has done nothing to deserve such treatment. He will not be stunned by a show of rags; he is too familiar with real poverty, desperate, mind-bending poverty. Ashamed of living so well in the peaceful 1900s, how could he have imagined that he would soon be in such straits as to render any shame superfluous?

Indeed, he has been poorer than a church mouse, dragged to the lower depths of society, and humiliated as few have been. Whether or not he himself is to blame for it is unimportant. But he has undoubtedly endured so much that one can, I believe, take a sympathetic view of his present bourgeois mentality as the fully understandable desire of an unhappy and exhausted man to live his last few days in peace without fear for the morrow. And if today he no longer feels guilty before the people, then let us thank God for that—in the fifty-second year of Soviet power they have reached quits, and it might not be such a bad thing if the

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people themselves felt some guilt of their own before the intelligentsia. And if the intellectual today craves after culture, that too is a blessing. The only important thing is that the feeling should be powerful and genuine, not a superficial attraction; that the intellectual should not regard culture as a consumer commodity, merely a means of embellishing his life-style, overtaking other people on the social ladder or maintaining the mental equilibrium of his own organism. . . . All this is indubitably so, but we shall refrain for the moment from making any definitive appraisal of all the pluses and minuses of the metamorphosis.

LET us now examine another important and characteristic feature of the intelligentsia—its transferred piety. Here we must point out that if, 60 years ago, the religious principle of the Russian intellectual was transformed into an inverted faith, the situation at the present time is even more complicated. One cannot assert that the Russian intellectual of today is a fanatical atheist. No, there is a subtle difference: today he does not have to be fanatical, and the reason for this is that, as far as he is concerned, the problem has been, as it were, 'eliminated'. There is no one for him to prove his case to, no one to argue with and no one to refute. The Church, in the intellectual's view, is nothing more than a historical structure. A few dozen churches in the capital and scattered about the provinces are still living out their days, bearing silent witness to the extinction of this ancient sphere of being. It was all necessary once but now it has drained itself dry. There are the ancient monuments and of course they must be protected and even loved, but the so-called Revelation belongs to the realm of mythology and nothing more.

True; and even science is no longer the trump card today. Science, you see, offers no grounds for faith; it simply provides one more confirmation of what the intellectual knows perfectly well without it: he needs no science to tell him that there is no God—his own experience has convinced him of that!

Because if God did exist He would not have permitted all the horrors the intellectual has been fated to endure in the past 50 years. Such is the dialectic of the Russian atheist. He cannot accept theodicy: for if the thought of God ever does flash through his consciousness it is followed immediately by the painful and malevolent sensation that if there is a God, how could He have abandoned us in this terrible world? A world in which sinister relaxation of morals is punctuated at intervals by unprecedented outbreaks of evil, and even technological development, unquestionably, one might think, a progressive phenomenon, suddenly threatens a stunned mankind with annihilation. That is why the intellectual no longer believes, as he once did, in progress; at most he grants that there is a chance that possibly all will end well and people will still come to their senses eventually. But it is only a hope, a timid hope to which he would rather not give free rein; and he

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counterbalances all these illusions and delusions with mental sobriety and with what he believes to be an honest appraisal of the flow of events. He finds the thought of this distressing. Fortunately, however, he now has a natural disposition towards irrationalism—just as he was formerly a rationalist heart and soul—and he has convinced himself in advance that the human intellect at its present stage of development cannot resolve its contradictions, try as it may, and that therefore there is no point in thinking about it. When, nevertheless, he does rise above his workaday consciousness and tries to place, as it were, a theoretical interpretation upon his awareness of the universal and to identify himself with some school of thought, the result is more often than not a variety of spiritualism which we might even term existential spiritualism. It is an eclecticism of a kind, always sceptical, an ingenious *mélange* of Buddhism and left-wing Hegelianism in which stoicism and the *naturphilosophie* concept of the neosphere exist side by side. Matter is not negated but the intelligent thinker does not have a very high opinion of it. Nor does he have a particularly high opinion of history or of life in general. 'Life is a veil of Maya', he says, echoing ancient Hinduism. He also agrees that 'birth is suffering, old age is suffering'—and so on—even that 'love of one's country is suffering'. However, because for some reason the Russian intellectual cannot accept the paths of salvation Buddha offers him, either conjointly or separately—and for some reason he does not even try to do so—he carries on living his life as before, reserving the 'realm of the spirit' for himself and trying simply to ensure that his life is such that it does not impede his activity in that realm. Moreover, he still hopes that the fruits of this activity will have some semblance of immortality, because he would like to think that information, of all things, is surely indestructible.

Thus the spiritualism of the intellectual is the complete antithesis of his old materialism, just as his 'bourgeois-ness' is the antithesis of his former ideal of poverty, and his present-day *kulturphilosophie* that of classical nihilism. In the face of this triple juxtaposition one may well wonder if there remain any traces of *any* generic qualities of the intelligentsia which we have so far failed to mention, or if there is anything at all common to both the old and the new intelligentsia.

AT this juncture we should (or at least may) question the very fact of the existence of an intelligentsia today. For indeed it is by no means self-evident. It is not difficult to demonstrate that in many respects we have taken the concept 'intelligentsia' and wrongly extended its application to entirely inappropriate spheres. We talk of the 'Soviet intelligentsia', 'technological intelligentsia', 'creative intelligentsia', and we even find, in one book, the 'Byzantine intelligentsia'. The term is nowadays applied indiscriminately to all the members of an educated stratum, all persons engaged in brainwork as opposed to manual labour. This is a misnomer: we have distorted the original meaning of the word. Initially the concept was an extremely narrow one intended to

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designate a unique historical event: the apparition, in a precise spatial and temporal context, of an utterly unique category of people who, apart from possessing the above-mentioned qualities, were endowed also with a certain moral introspectiveness which they directed towards overcoming the deep inner rift that had arisen between themselves and their own nation, themselves and their own state. The intelligentsia in this sense of the word has never existed in any other country. There are and always have been enlightened or semi-enlightened critics of state policy; there are and always have been open, even dangerous dissenters; there are and always have been political exiles and conspirators; there are and always have been *déclassé* elements, Bohemians who audaciously challenge social prejudices and norms. Lastly, there are and always have been simply the educated people—teachers, doctors, engineers, or people in the arts world.

But none of them has ever experienced as high a degree of estrangement as has the Russian intellectual, from his country or his state; none of them has ever been as aware of his alienation—not from other men, or from society, or from God, but from his own land, his own people, his own regime. It was the experience of this most typical sensation that filled the mind and soul of the educated Russian in the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries; this very consciousness of collective estrangement that made him a member of the intelligentsia. No other social stratum in any other country at any other time in history has undergone this suffering. Consequently we can say that only in Russia has there ever been an intelligentsia.[1]

Thus this last of the generic features of the intelligentsia we have described is in essence synonymous with its definition. And by virtue of that definition we must accept the empirical observation that in spite of all the transformations that have swept over the face of Russia and its educated stratum in the last 60 amazing years, the basic characteristic of this stratum remains unaltered, and it is still an intelligentsia in the only true sense of the word.

THE uniqueness of this fact, this immutability, has somehow faded from our consciousness. In the first place, as I have just noted, by falsely manipulating the concept of 'intelligentsia' we have grown accustomed to believe that the intelligentsia as a whole is always in opposition to the regime; and this is what the regime too believes at heart. It is, however, completely untrue. Naturally, critics of state policy have always and everywhere been recruited from among the enlightened strata. But in the case of the intelligentsia, whether previous or present-day, we are not talking exactly of political opposition, or of the tactics of such opposition, or even of its long-term strategies

[1] Which is why, incidentally, the assertion is correct that many talented Russians, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, and Marina Tsvetayeva herself among them, were not members of the intelligentsia; though they did, of course, possess certain elements of *intelligentshchina*.

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with their aim of achieving certain definite advantages; we are talking of an actual life-style, the existential essence of a phenomenon. In the second place, the uniqueness (and I stress, uniqueness) of the fact of the existence of an alienated intelligentsia is commonly denied, particularly by the most left-wing intellectuals, because these people regard it as self-evident that the intelligentsia cannot be reconciled to a totalitarian, communist regime which is the personification of evil and has placed falsehood on a pedestal. They feel that in the circumstances the natural reaction of all honourable men must be to repudiate this evil, to reject and inwardly refuse to concur with its falsehood. This is true in a certain albeit rather limited sense.

It is only true in a limited sense because an 'intelligent man' is by no means synonymous with an 'honourable man'. True, the intelligent man is characterized by a certain subtlety of feelings, a certain gentleness, but to say that he cannot tolerate falsehood as a matter of principle, or that he is always opposed to evil, would be an exaggeration. The intelligentsia falls only too frequently into this error. Therefore we have to lay continual stress on the fact that the intelligentsia does not develop on the basis of principles of integrity or of the repudiation of untruth, but as a result of a particular perception of the world in which priority is accorded to specific attitudes which may possibly (but only very indirectly) be somehow linked with notions of Goodness. In point of fact the intelligentsia has its own ethics, its own system of norms in which non-acceptance of evil is not necessarily an imperative. Consequently one cannot prove that the intelligentsia 'will not accept Soviet power, since it does not accept evil' without overstepping the bounds of logic. The intelligentsia's attitude to Soviet power may seem surprising and irrational, all the more so since Bolshevism itself unquestionably emanated from the intelligentsia and the structure of the society that first engendered the intelligentsia appears to bear very little resemblance to that of present-day society. Historically speaking, the first point needs no proof; it is generally acknowledged, even by Bolsheviks themselves. We shall examine the second point in more detail.

WHEN the intelligentsia first appeared in the historical arena, in the forties and fifties of the last century, Russian society might be divided roughly as follows: (1) *the nobility,* who might in their turn be divided into (2) the *bureaucracy* and (3) the *zemstvo;* then came (4) *the intelligentsia proper,* formed from *déclassé* noblemen and *raznochintsy,* (5) *the clergy,* and lastly (6) *the incipient capitalist stratum.* Lack of space prevents us from supplying a more detailed enumeration, but even from this brief list we can see what a wealth those upper strata of society constituted! They were all fairly well-defined, though not entirely closed groups, accessible to persons of differing social origin, but all had their own firmly-established traditions, their own distinct life-styles and in many cases their own mutually complemen-

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tary sub-culture. . . . In the 100 years which have elapsed since then, it has been this upper class, rather than the lower classes, that has been affected by the social transformations which have taken place.

The nobility has vanished into liquidation, the clergy has virtually ceased to exist as an estate; the effect of the worldwide process of streamlining and centralization which is impoverishing society is further aggravated here in Russia by the fact that one of the most important and widest spheres of human activity, individual enterprise, is being artificially strangled. The result is a striking monotony within the elite. We can no longer speak of 'doing things in a big way like a merchant', 'gentlemanly nobility' or even '*raznochintsy* maximalism'. There is no 'big way', no nobility, not even any maximalism. Potential merchants and noblemen, unable to find any satisfactory sphere of application for their talents, are forced willy-nilly to join the 'intellectuals'. Persons with the mentality of commercial travellers are doing scientific work, *manqué* proprietors of gambling-dens are knocked into academicians, and would-be evangelists write articles in scholarly journals. On the whole, any person with higher education automatically enters the ranks of the intelligentsia. And strange though this may seem, it is as it should be, because all of them have roughly the same, loosely differentiated culture, the same extraordinarily wretched life-style; all of them are, juridically speaking, in the same boat—deprived of their rights, and slaves of a totalitarian state. I repeat, it is truly a marvel that this motley crew has indeed inherited the most essential generic feature of the old intelligentsia—its sense, in varying degrees, of its own collective alienation from the state.

One group commonly singled out from this amorphous mass is the party bureaucracy or, as Djilas has it, the 'new class'. This may well be a meaningful differentiation but it should not be forgotten that the bureaucracy is, to a considerable extent, indistinguishable from the intelligentsia. Unlike the former nobility, clergy or merchant class, the bureaucracy is not endowed with its own clearly articulated culture, its own creative talent. The creative talent of the bureaucracy is that of the intelligentsia in a modified form, and in this respect we can say that the party bureaucracy is a polarization of the intelligentsia. . . . If we examine the constituent components of the intelligentsia more closely we see, of course, not only the party bureaucracy at one pole, but also the fact that the entire medium which we had earlier termed amorphous is not as homogeneous as we might think; it has other poles too. This is particularly evident if we analyse the dynamics of its formation.

Until 60 years ago the intelligentsia was unquestionably a heterogeneous body: at one time a large proportion of it consisted of, for instance, so-called *déclassés*; and its behaviour was equally diverse. We shall come back to this point later and try to account for the historical development of the intelligentsia after the revolution. For the moment, however, what interests us chiefly is, so to speak, the '*aktiv*' of the

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intelligentsia, that is, what makes it an intelligentsia in the original sense of the word, as we have described it.

And here we repeat that illogical though it may seem, it remains a fact that at all times, and throughout all ages, the educated stratum of Russians has subconsciously retained the specific feature of the intelligentsia: having engendered and nourished Bolshevism, the intelligentsia had barely congealed from a phantom, an ethereal emanation into a concrete body, a reality, a power, when it immediately wished to discard Bolshevism, immediately sensed Bolshevism's incompatibility with itself, immediately realized that Bolshevism had not solved its problems and that it was once again doomed to be tormented by its own estrangement from a land which had apparently accepted that same Bolshevism. All-consuming introspectiveness on themes of power is still an inalienable element of the intellectual's consciousness. He still finds it perfectly natural to speak in terms of ' us ' and ' them '—' the regime and us ', ' the people and us ', ' us and Russia '. Concepts of ' disintegration ', ' collapse ' and ' turmoil ' are still objects of intellectual meditation. The words ' will begin soon ' and ' has begun ' still have a magical fascination for him. He still lives as a ' social animal ' and does not think of himself as set apart from other people; he still dreams of mass movements and uses the language of ' revolutionary situations '. As an individual he is still a nonentity. He does not believe in the individual, in the capacity of the individual—in this case, himself—to achieve anything. That is to say, he values himself, naturally, and, as always, he understands a great deal about himself, but viewed objectively he is weak-willed, spineless and reluctant to accept responsibility. His personal, individual principles of chivalry are stifled, or totally non-existent.

Here, however, we must make two points. Firstly, if the old Russian intelligentsia was the heir to Orthodoxy and the Church, and derived from them some of its most essential characteristics, above all, as we have observed, its otherworldliness, its subsequent development was to promote the further destruction of these characteristics, already then deemed atavistic, until they were almost totally eliminated; so that new generations are the direct heirs not of Orthodoxy but of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia itself. That is not only entirely natural, but has been facilitated by two external factors: first, the forcible and almost total eradication of Orthodoxy, and second—and equally important—the particular nature of Bolshevik historiosophy which centres on questions of the struggle for power. Thus we have a curious kind of vicious circle. On the one hand, communist ideology itself is the work of the intelligentsia. On the other, this ideology, as one forcibly propagated, constantly directs the attention of the intelligentsia to these ' vexed questions ' and does not allow it to forget them. After the continuity of the Christian religious tradition had been destroyed and the dream of a future kingdom of righteousness had all but vanished, analysis of problems of power assumed paramount importance in the intellectual's psychology, becoming virtually a religion. This is the first point.

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The second is equally vital. It is that this gulf between the intelligentsia and the regime which has existed ever since the beginning of communist rule has remained latent and never developed into an overt rupture. We cannot regard terror alone as the reason for this. Of course, the role of terror in Soviet history has been an exceptional one. But to attribute the intelligentsia's attitude solely to terror is to overestimate the intelligentsia. It has not dared to speak out under Soviet power, not merely because it has not been allowed to do so, but first and foremost because it has never had anything to say. Communism was its own child. The ideas that led the intelligentsia to communism were, and still are, its own concepts, and have not by any means become obsolete. And they include the notion of terror, class terror. The intelligentsia has had nothing with which to counter communism because the principles in its consciousness are essentially no different from the principles implemented by the communist regime. Supposing that the communist terror were suddenly to be lifted and the intelligentsia were free to announce its pleasure; we can be virtually certain that its movement at liberty would soon end in some new form of totalitarianism, chauvinist or national socialist, for instance, to which the Russian intelligentsia of the present day is particularly inclined. Even now, after more than 50 years, the intelligentsia still has nothing of especial relevance to say, and many intellectuals remain convinced that the ideas 'with which they made revolution are basically sound, but have been perverted'. Is it any wonder, therefore, that intellectuals so easily turn into party ideologues or the faithful assistants of party ideologues?!

In this respect party policy has always been and continues to be substantiated by the ideas of the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia is predisposed to forget about its 'party connexions' or at least to pretend to forget, whereas in fact this relationship is crucial. Because of it, everything else that might have been the seed of something genuinely new in modern Russia, including non-acceptance of the regime, has so far existed only on the level of the emotions, as a vague attraction to conscious protest. The intelligentsia both rejects the regime and at the same time is afraid of admitting this to itself, of allowing its feelings to creep into its conscious mind and assume a distinct shape. For then it would have to confess publicly to being the initiator of all the country's misfortunes throughout the entire history of the Soviet regime, would have to answer for literally every step taken by the regime as though it were a step taken by itself. It would, moreover, have to look into the future, and there too it would see nothing but calamities provoked by itself. This the intelligentsia knows, and it has a guilty conscience. It has developed a real 'complex' about the Soviet regime. It is tormented not only by fear of a harsh punishment but by a far greater fear—that of admitting its guilt. It would prefer to think of the Soviet regime as something external, a disaster provoked by a third party, but it cannot logically follow this thought through, however hard it tries to posit the view. The intelligentsia, then, is inwardly unfree, an accessory to evil,

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to a crime, and this, more than anything else, is what prevents it from rearing its head.

II

AND so the entire being of the intelligentsia is pervaded by a deep-rooted dichotomy. The intelligentsia does not accept Soviet power, is antagonized by it and at times detests it; on the other hand, there exists between them a symbiosis—the one tends, fosters and nourishes the other. The intelligentsia awaits the collapse of Soviet power and hopes that this collapse will sooner or later come to pass; meanwhile, though, it collaborates with it. The intelligentsia suffers because it is compelled to live under Soviet power, but at the same time it strives after happiness. There thus occurs a fusion of incompatibles. It cannot be dismissed as conformism—conformism is the entirely legitimate reconciliation of interests by way of mutual concessions and is acceptable to human society everywhere. It is unsatisfactory also to brand the intelligentsia as time-servers. This would be a one-sided interpretation. Time-serving is the product of much more deeply-rooted processes. And if it is servility, it is no ordinary servility but an eccentric servility, servility with suffering, servility with a touch of Dostoyevskian unnaturalness about it. There is a combined horror and a delight in degradation; no conformism, no complaisance knows such refined torments. The intelligentsia itself finds its existence painful, irrational, schizoid.

THEORETICALLY speaking all these phenomena fall within a single unified category, a new concept which we shall term the principle of dual consciousness.[2] Duality of consciousness is a state of mind in which a dual ethos combining mutually contradictory and exclusive elements is adhered to, in which a systematized interpretation of current events, history and society is given, based on a principle that denies the validity of the system itself. We are dealing here with a dualism, but a dualism of a rare type. It is not the dualism of ego and id, not the dualism of two opposing principles in the id, in nature or in the world, principles of good and evil, spirit and matter, but dualism of the cognitive ego itself; the ego itself, its ethos, is divided. Consequently the term 'schizoid' used above is inappropriate, being too emotionally loaded and too presumptive of pathology. Whereas, though the dichotomy within the intelligentsia is the cause of incalculable suffering and appreciably blights the personality, it does not as a rule drive the ego beyond the bounds of normality, and is not regarded as a clinical condition. The explanation for this undoubtedly lies first and foremost

[2] We have taken the concept of the 'principle of duality of consciousness' from George Orwell's fantasy *1984*, in which the essence of the principle is illuminated by the following three slogans of the ruling Party: 'Peace is war', 'Freedom is slavery' and 'Love is hate'. The entire novel is constructed around this theme: the people both know and do not know the truth. [Transl. note: Altayev has misquoted Orwell here. In fact the slogans run 'War is Peace. Freedom is Slavery. Ignorance is Strength.']

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in the fact that duality of consciousness is a characteristic feature of a whole social stratum, is common to a wide group, and is not an exclusively individual perception. As a result, though the gulf remains intellectually unbridged it is crossed existentially by a particular kind of sceptical or cynical behaviour involving successive switches of consciousness from one plane to another, and by the extra-intensive erasing of undesirable memories. The psyche thus becomes extremely mobile; the ego is continually on the move from one dimension to another and dual consciousness becomes the gnosiological norm.

In the general form in which we have described the principle of dual consciousness here, it is fairly obvious that it derives from the Kantian transcendental dialectic, which examines the antinomies arrived at by human reason in its striving towards the limits of the perceptible world. The Kantian antinomies are, as we know, a system of four pairs of mutually conflicting assertions, each of which can be neither proved nor disproved conclusively by experience, each of which is *per se* free of contradictions, and each of which—in both the thesis and the antithesis of the antinomy—has equally weighty and necessary bases in its support. Furthermore these antinomies are not abstract concepts but cardinal problems relating to the central focus of being—the existence of God, human freedom, and immortality—problems the human reason cannot avoid. Now, when describing the condition of man in the process of perceiving these acute problems, Kant himself, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, uses the words ' fluctuation ', ' disharmony ' and ' disturbances '. His antinomies, to use his own words, ' disclose a dialectical battlefield in which the side that is permitted to open the attack is invariably victorious, and the side that is constrained to act on the defensive is always defeated. Accordingly, the vigorous fighter, no matter whether he supports *a good or a bad cause* [Altayev's italics—transl.] can be assured of victory only if he contrives to secure the privilege of striking the final blow . . .' (Kant, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 141).

The Kantian doctrine is extremely difficult to disprove. It has become a permanent constituent of our thought. Modern man, it appears, is unknowingly and spontaneously something of a Kantian in his ' private ' philosophy. The paradox here, however, is that its irrefutability does not make this doctrine any truer. It is justified in a single, determinate sphere—that of reason, pure and isolated from ' things in themselves '. This reason always operates only on this plane; it is incapable of penetrating the essence of things, locked as it is in its own data system, in the superficial world of phenomena. Kant does not admit the possibility of transcending it and entering the noumenal world, or the possibility of extra-sensory intuition of the real nature of being. In other words, we have here a consciousness that is in principle non-religious.

THE doctrine of the antinomies of pure, atheistic reason is thus common to all mankind inasmuch as mankind is withdrawing from its

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religious sources and adopting instead the principles of so-called scientific knowledge. The question of why this doctrine was to have such unexpected and explosive results in Russia in particular is undoubtedly one for special study. But the connexion with the history of Russian atheism is patently clear. The Russian people (led by the Russian intelligentsia) carried their atheism further than did any other nation, even the most unthinking ones. The atheism of the Russian intelligentsia was indeed inverted faith. Converted to Kant, the Russian intellectual decided that now he could easily do without God. However, if we enlarge upon our earlier remark regarding the servility of the intelligentsia, and its 'Dostoyevskian quality', we shall find it quite easy to understand the logic of subsequent developments. Addicted to atheism, the Russian intelligentsia, for all the world like Smerdyakov, decided that 'if there is no infinite God then there is no virtue either, and what is more, there's absolutely no need for it at all!' The consequences of this Smerdyakovian deduction by the intelligentsia are only too well known—they were the blood of millions, the terror, the destruction of Russian culture.

If the intelligentsia of today does not entirely reject the notion of virtue that is simply because it knows by experience that virtuous men are better than rogues, safer to live among, and that consequently it is unprofitable to call for anarchy and arbitrary rule—though of course virtue can always be waived if necessary. Thus arbitrary rule is detested not for its immorality but because people have already had a surfeit of it. In point of fact there are no hard and fast moral principles. There is no distinction between good and evil; in the opinion of the Russian intelligentsia everything is 'relative'. Familiar with himself and his foibles, the Russian intellectual of today is willing to 'understand and forgive' anything and everything. He justifies betrayal and denunciation, libellous newspaper articles by his acquaintances, and publicly proclaimed falsehoods. Fulminating against the apostates at official meetings, the intellectual comes home and, within his own four walls, finds compensation in mocking the people with whom he was only lately in concert but whom he considers less intelligent than himself. He himself has joined the party because 'it is essential to increase the percentage of decent people in the party'. But in his heart of hearts he questions whether the party ought not to be judged as Hitler's party was. But then, how can he judge all those people with their open countenances, those model husbands and hospitable hosts? And apart from that, 'if they do not join, someone else will in their place, someone less intelligent and less decent!' His party card burns a hole in the intellectual's pocket but he cannot think how to escape from the vicious circle.

The problem does indeed often appear insoluble. The very formulation of the categorical imperative—'act as though the principle governing your action might, by your own volition, become a universal law'—in the conditions of the present day permits any ambivalent interpretation of any action. Here the psychologism of our age removes any possible impediments, for each man is convinced that his own intentions

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are in all circumstances the best, and that if everyone were like himself and were motivated by similar intentions the overall result would indeed be an excellent one. But this is precisely what gives rise to the practice of the dual consciousness. In the face of this *a priori* the problem of choice between good and evil appears insoluble in general if the act of choice is preceded by events in the past, especially the extra-individual, historical past. A classic instance of this way of thinking is provided by Yury Zhivago in Pasternak's novel, who says: 'I have said *a*, but I will not say *b*. Yes, I admit that Russia would have perished were it not for you, but you shed so much blood that all your fine dreams . . .' and so on. This he does say, but later on, by the purest of all logics, the logic of the artistic work of genius, it turns out that whoever has said *a* is in effect obliged also to say *b*; and that he who does not wish to do so must pass away from this life. Even if other people say *a* for him, he is expected to make some show of saying *b*. In other words, history, that is, preceding acts of choice, restrict, as it were, one's next choice, setting the individual certain limitations whereby he is forced to choose but only from an incomplete set of alternatives; moreover, values are entirely relative. Consequently man cannot establish and does not know what is good and what is bad. 'No, the Bolsheviks are no good; but on the other hand Russia would have perished anyway even without them. So, there must have been some logic in their appearance, and that being so, . . .'

This, it would seem, is precisely what complicates our analysis: division has to be made, not into direct categories of good and evil but into categories of 'freedom' and 'necessity'. Naturally, the aim is ultimately to reach [a definition of] good and evil. This holds good inasmuch as what has happened in Russia—and, seemingly, is well on the way to happening throughout the world, or at least, threatens to happen—is the tragedy of voluntary denial of freedom. The tragedy foretold by the 'Grand Inquisitor'.

When man rejects God and hence freedom—for 'where the Spirit of the Lord is, there shall Freedom be also'—he elects necessity his principle. He becomes an advocate, or what is in this instance the same thing, a slave of necessity. And then it is precisely this necessity that spares him the need to choose between good and evil, relieves him of his responsibility, and of his guilt for what he does. Now it is not he who chooses, but necessity; he is simply obliged to obey necessity, confronted with necessity and with these conditions. In renouncing his freedom man also renounces his own individuality, ceases to set any independent value upon himself and—whatever he may think!—becomes nothing more than a link in a generic chain, a bridge for succeeding generations, an element, admittedly necessary but still only an element, in a system.

Hence the philosophy of service to the general good, of the ideal functioning of the element in the system (particularly in its special intellectual variant, the 'cult of enlightenment').

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THE notion of the general good has become a favourite topic of discussion for the Russian intellectual. He uses it to quiet his conscience when the latter is troubled by a routine compromise. With its assistance he is able to turn a second visage to the world, temporarily abandoning his pessimism and forcing himself to believe in the ultimate triumph of reason. Meanwhile the true, mercenary motives behind his behaviour are perfectly masked, and his real strivings speedily and totally forgotten. The situation is exactly analogous to that of the study of sexual attraction. Objections, or attempts to paint the true picture, evoke energetic protest, aggressive reaction, and the desire to contradict; people take offence. Naturally, whoever fails to understand the necessity of this behaviour or its usefulness to society, and its wisdom, is called an 'extremist', a 'blatant Bolshevik', or a 'person of no great intelligence anyway'. He wants everything to happen all over again, he is a hindrance, a bloodless creature. . . . He does not realize that the only possibility now is slow improvement, an improvement first and foremost by means of the dissemination of knowledge, the gradual enlightenment of people who live in an insufficiently informed society.

From the time of Peter the Great, many miracles have been worked in Russia in the name of enlightenment. At the present time the 'cult of enlightenment' in its pure form is especially in evidence in the arts and the humanities. It is in the name of enlightenment that all those amazing works, outwardly true to the letter of communist ideology, are written in which the attentive eye may descry one or two meagre, stunted thoughts behind the mountains of verbal lumber. Their simple-hearted authors are convinced that in deceiving the censor by their multiple eulogies they are performing a civic feat; they hope that these 'clandestine' ideas of theirs will be the seeds of long-awaited enlightenment. Hence it is considered a brilliant achievement to contrive to use the name of a banned philosopher in any—even the most abusive!—context, or to expound, under the guise of criticism, some unorthodox notion. Unfortunately, this is more often than not all self-deception. The sedition involved is usually negligible. To pick out nuances of opinion differing only slightly from the official line is well-nigh impossible. An apparently brilliant article or book couched in a precise, polished language, is 'unreadable' and has an oppressive quality. Likewise any play, film or poem. Creative energies, deprived of any outlet for real incarnation, are spent on the achievement of formal effects: works that are formally irreproachable but emasculated and void of content. Capabilities are impoverished and talent wanes at this sterile occupation. After some years the artist or thinker, often when he has achieved outward success and amassed a professional knowledge that is frequently outstanding even by world-class standards, finds that he is incapable of saying anything original or significant of his own, and that he is doomed to live the rest of his life speaking this language, primitive for all its brilliance, chewing over other people's ideas and popularizing other people's discoveries.

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There is one feature that is noteworthy in the contemporary intelligentsia's ideas on enlightenment. Previous movements of enlightenment have been from the top. The elite in the person of the sovereign himself and his retainers educated the nation; the intelligentsia educated the people. The modern intellectual either educates his own associates, intellectuals like himself whom he has somehow managed to overtake, or flatters himself that he may even educate the state authorities themselves, the leadership! He imagines them actually sitting there at the top waiting to hear his words and have their eyes opened; he believes that this is all they need. He hopes to ennoble them, surreptitiously to introduce new ideas into their practice, above all notions of law, legality, and other possible styles of government. The notion of enlightening the people has receded into the background although it is not openly rejected. Thus this cult of enlightenment is a movement upwards. The intelligentsia has become like the peasant who believed his master was a good man but that the bailiff was deceiving him, and that all that was needed was that he should learn the truth.

The above-mentioned violation of the normal order of things reveals one important detail usually obscured by any cult of enlightenment, and one that is of especial relevance to that of the present time. A cult of enlightenment usually assumes the garb of disinterested concern for one's neighbour. A man who possesses an abundance of knowledge is, as it were, magnanimous enough to share it with his neighbours, his younger brethren, to make them a present of it. But his disinterestedness is only apparent. Any cult of enlightenment is very closely connected with notions of moral betterment, even with notions of salvation through moral betterment. Behind its philosophy there always lurks secularized man's hope that abstract knowledge will save the world from chaos. And with this hope goes an icy horror at the chaotic, bestial nature of fallen man. The cult of enlightenment is thus no more than an elegant screen hiding this loathsome fear, an incantation, a system of magic ciphers enabling one to avoid confronting or having to name the monster that lurks behind the screen. There is little genuine light in enlightenment; were we more honest we should find another name for this complex of affects. The neutral German '*Kulturträger*' would be more appropriate.

And the Russian intelligentsia should ask itself in the first place whence comes its certainty that this in particular is the path to salvation. After all, it would seem obvious that enlightenment can only be considered an additional factor, since it merely distributes already extant blessings, creating no new ones. The cult of enlightenment solves the distribution problem. Faith in it reminds one of the naive faith of the communists that the housing problem could easily be solved by taking over private houses and apartments and evicting their relatively few former owners. 'There are already', wrote Engels, 'enough residential blocks in the large towns to enable the real hardship in the housing situation to be relieved immediately if the buildings are put to rational

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use. Of course, this can only be done by dispossessing their present owners and allocating their houses to the homeless workers who now live in overcrowded flats. And once the proletariat gains political control a measure like this, dictated in the interests of the public good, will be just as feasible as any other expropriations and occupations of flats by a modern state' (cited from Lenin's *The State and Revolution*, 1952 ed., p. 53).

Expropriate and allocate! The whole nightmare of Soviet communal apartments and the Soviet life-style rests on this idea, in accordance with which a mere handful of residential blocks have been constructed over the last 40 years, while the overcrowding of flats has undoubtedly surpassed the wildest dreams of Engels' workers. All our present-day 'enlighteners' have been through this experience. One might think they would have drawn their own conclusions. But no, the same pathetic idea is handed down from generation to generation, the fond hope of poor-spirited and shallow people. Their energies have somehow been dissipated and they find it easier to indulge in educational egalitarianism than to press forward and explore the higher reaches. They do not want to have the responsibility of saying something new, something original, the responsibility of building; they lie to themselves, evade the issue and feign modesty. They live in a hazy mirage of 'modest' hopes and cheap, sub-Soviet temptations.

The entire history of the intelligentsia over the last half-century can be seen as a continuous series of such temptations, or rather, a modification of one single temptation, the temptation to believe that moral betterment has at last come about, that the face of Soviet Power has begun to alter, that its essential inhumanity has changed. All these years, from the very beginning, the intelligentsia has lived not by reason or by will but in this daydream, this delusion. And every time, harsh reality punished it mercilessly, hurling it to the ground and dragging it through the mire; and the force of its disillusionment was such that it seemed unlikely ever to recover, ever again to allow itself to become the victim of a deception. But time passed and the intelligentsia rose to its feet once more, still its old unchanging thoughtless and credulous self; it had learned nothing from its sufferings.

FOR completeness' sake we must begin our description of the historical course of the intelligentsia under the Soviet regime with the temptation of revolution, the temptation of the elemental, of struggle, of the collapse of the old order, the temptation of the 'music of revolution'. 'With all your heart, with all your body, with all your consciousness—listen to the music of revolution', as Blok wrote. The price of this music was, as we know, paid in blood, rivers of blood. The intelligentsia did not realize what a terrible mistake it had made until the last drop of blood had been drained and there was no one left to play to and no one to listen.

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Hard on the heels of revolution, towards 1920, came the hope that after the carnage—which seemed already to be abating—had ceased, the regime itself would become quiescent. This was the hope of a volte-face that relied on a 'Thermidorean' regeneration, so to speak, of Bolshevism. During the French Revolution, the Convention Terror was followed by a moderate republican rule which brought in law and order. The feeling was that the Soviet regime would undergo a similar evolution. The suppression of the Kronstadt uprising was seen as the first step in this direction. Closely linked to it in time was the period of NEP, which we shall therefore not deal with separately. When NEP came to an abrupt end in or about 1927, the intelligentsia was deeply disappointed, though it still did not foresee the threat that lay in store.

After some decline caused by the uncertainty of the situation, the year 1930 or thereabouts, which marked the beginning of industrialization and collectivization, saw the emergence of a new temptation. The intelligentsia tried to believe that the blood, the slaughter, the starvation and the chaos of destruction had not been in vain, that in the new Russia, purified by her sufferings, happiness and reason would finally come to reign. The intelligentsia wanted to believe that the people were once again right, that the Bolsheviks had been right all along to lead the country defiantly along the path they alone knew; but as always, the intelligentsia was mistaken. This we can call the *temptation of socialism*. Although in the deserted countryside people starved and hordes of beggars wandered through the land, and although the population was not increasing, and the camps were filling with the first few million convicts, the higher echelons of the intelligentsia were growing fat, and the intelligentsia, always cowardly, closed their eyes to the truth and tried to persuade themselves that very soon the whole country would be living in similar style. 'O distant prospect of socialism, thou art near at hand!' was the rapturous cry of the poet, who subsequently spent the rest of his life striving to wash away the shame of those lines, and it is fairly typical of the philosophy of the intelligentsia at that time. On this occasion the delusion was shattered by the terrible year of 1937. Every living thing was destroyed and the nation became once more a nation of slaves. Man, driven to a brutish state, could neither speak nor feel. He was possessed by fear alone, animal fear. Man felt himself a worm and crawled into his hole; having squeezed the last drops of humanity out of himself, he became lower than the lowest blackguard. The fear was unbearable. It seemed impossible to endure it any longer; the very earth seemingly could bear no more. Nonetheless the tension continued virtually without slackening right up until June 1941 when war broke out.

The intelligentsia greeted the war with relief and gladness. Even now the intellectual takes pleasure in the recollection. His awareness of the tragedy of nations only intensifies and lends weight to his feelings. Naturally, he will speak of the grief of mothers, the sufferings of wives, the material loss. But behind it all the enthusiasm and gaiety of those

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years are clearly discernible. Once again the intellectual was in action, once again his country needed him, and he was with his people. It was of no matter who governed the people, or whose name his lips would frame as he went out to die; none of his moral problems were of any matter, he could have a clear conscience, and he need not think about anything. The evil was once again somewhere without, and once again the intellectual saw as his purpose the destruction of that evil; once again he had become the saviour of mankind. Armed, he felt courageous, strong and free for the first time after all his degradations. He hoped this feeling would remain with him even after his return from the war, and that the Soviet state, which had once more fully reinstated him as its citizen, would, after the holocaust of war, and with heroic achievements to its credit, undergo a transformation. . . .

The [state's] reply was Stalin's triumphant Byzantinism, the struggle against cosmopolitanism and new waves of arrests. The mechanism had been set in motion. The slave-owning state had to restore and develop its economy. Although theory denied the economics of slave-labour, there still appeared to be some advantages in freely-given labour. The contingents of German prisoners of war and Russians who had returned from captivity could not keep pace with industry's growing demands. Accustomed to feed off human flesh, the system could not tolerate any other food. Appetites increased. . . . It was then that the intelligentsia, not as a body but in the person of its finest representatives, first conquered its fear and began to reflect. In the camps, and the slums of communal apartments, there was ample opportunity for thinking.

However, in the conditions of Stalinist, totalitarian terror, the intelligentsia could scarcely have put its ideas into practice. Time, though, came to its assistance. Following the death of Stalin the system was shaken through and through as if it had been held together solely by him and must now inevitably disintegrate. The intelligentsia exulted. It was the beginning of the thaw. Once again, for the *n*th time, the intelligentsia forgot who it was and where it was and believed that spring and summer were round the corner. Once again it refused to assess the situation soberly and be prepared for a long hard fight; once again it expected everything to come about of its own accord. True, most likely it would have been incapable of fighting anyway. Over 30-odd years it had lost the habit of working, grown a little dull and become more of a herd than a united body. . . . Not surprisingly it was once more doomed to feel first mere hope and then the lash. The finale of the thaw, for the intelligentsia, was played out in October 1956 in Hungary. Lastly, Khrushchev's cultural pogroms left the intelligentsia in its present form.

The necessary minimum of freedom the regime granted the intelligentsia during those years had a favourable effect. The intelligentsia began to acquire a healthy glow and grew a little stronger. It partially repaired its omissions and eliminated some of the yawning gaps in its education. It revived certain cultural traditions. It grew bold to the

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extent of occasionally raising its voice, rejecting prescribed 'norms' and, in one or two instances, even speaking out openly against the regime. Nowadays the intelligentsia knows what the Soviet regime ought to be like, and hopes to instil this knowledge into the leaders of the regime themselves. It has sensed a respect for itself, and, as always, has fallen immediate prey to its usual illusions. We are living now at a time when a new temptation has reached its peak. It is the *temptation of education*, of which we have already spoken, or—since it is also the ideology of the technical and scientific intelligentsia—the *temptation of technocracy*. It is not the old 'sacred' faith in progress, but the hope that evil may be halted with the aid of scientific managerial methods, planning, organization and control. Freedom is necessary because the suppression of freedom hampers the development of productive forces, which is in its turn essential in order to save an ever-swelling mass of humanity from starvation, and, in the final analysis, self-destruction. Prosperity will come with the introduction of cybernetics and scientific methods into the economy. The modern state is a super-system: in order for it to function normally, equally complex systems of management and control are required. Those, briefly, are the slogans of modern technocracy. . . .

ALTOGETHER, then, since 1909 there have been six temptations: revolution, volte-face, socialism, war, the thaw, and finally the temptation of technocracy or the cult of enlightenment. These have been the guideways of the intelligentsia's perverted spirituality.

Here we must make one important point. There is nothing reprehensible about any of the actual aspirations which form the rational basis of these temptations. Movements towards democracy and legality are a good thing, patriotism is perfectly unexceptionable, and the cult of enlightenment is essential, as is the introduction of scientific methods and efficient control into economic management. These aspirations only become temptations as long as people use them to seek facile solutions, avoid complications and deceive themselves. And one should not suppose that the temptations as such have been overcome by the intelligentsia. No, they have merely been put into the background because times have changed. Their inner falsity still has not been realized; it lives still, and as soon as a suitable occasion arises it will show its power again. Consequently, apart from the chronological analysis we have given of these temptations, one could also describe them as coexisting simultaneously. In this case we should distribute them as follows: (1) *The temptation of the 'music of revolution'*. This still exists in its primordial form. Aside from the fact that the intelligentsia romanticizes the past, and the heroic spirit of the civil war and the campaigns, it is still not indifferent, as we said earlier, to phrases like 'disintegration', 'collapse', and 'it will soon begin', to which it continues to attach a symbolic significance. If it did not do so, it would cease to be the intelligentsia. (2) *The temptation of volte-face*. This is the present-day 'temptation of democracy', that is, the belief that Russia

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has at last become conscious of the concept of law and that it will now be comparatively easy to put this concept into practice. (3) *The temptation of socialism.* This is constantly experienced by the intelligentsia in the form of the temptation to believe that the past was necessary. (4) The so-called *temptation of war.* This appears in the complex circumstances of modern life as the temptation of jingoism, and as such, has a close connexion with the temptations of national-socialism and Russian imperialism. (5) *The temptation of the thaw.* Like the temptation of revolution this lives on in the innermost recesses of the intellectual consciousness in the shape of hope for change. By comparison with the temptation of revolution, it is more timorous and sentimental. The present-day intellectual, when all is said and done, fears collapse; but he is impatient for change and waits with bated breath, anxiously scanning the horizon for anything which appears to herald the long-awaited changes. Finally there is (6), *the temptation of technocracy,* which, for the time being, also remains in its original form.

This last passion, the temptation of technocracy, is, I repeat, conclusive evidence that the intelligentsia is still a long way from true insight. At the moment it sees one thing only: that the technocratic idea shows possibilities of succeeding, that the party and the regime appear to be meeting it half-way by approving plans for reforms. The regime too has swallowed the bait, so to speak, of this routine dream of utopia. And both of them have a rose-coloured vision of a state in which arbitrary rule and 'libertarianism' have been eliminated, a state that operates as a perfectly regulated mechanism. The one thing that the intelligentsia refuses to see is that Evil does not necessarily come clad in the filthy rags of anarchy alone. It may make its appearance also on the gleaming surface of the well-organized fascist reich. It does not die of its own accord with the introduction of disciplined order into the workings of a gigantic bureaucratic machine. The use of computers will not make the machine any more human. On the contrary: it will be able to enslave its subjects even more coolly and inexorably, to oppress other nations even more absolutely, to hold the world even more firmly in the grip of fear. Evil never dies of its own accord. It may assume the most subtle and refined forms, civilize itself and resort to any concessions one may care to imagine. But it will never lose its identity with itself or allow itself to step outside the pale and become human. The events in Czechoslovakia were, I believe, a clear demonstration of this. One cannot idly and feeble-mindedly leave one's own salvation to chance. One cannot hope to vanquish Evil merely by superficial, technical means. One cannot hope to make progress without releasing the brake. One cannot seriously hope for convergence.

WHAT will the Russian intelligentsia devise next? What means will it seek next for the amusement of the Devil? To complete the circle, there still appears to be one last, single temptation left. More than another one the earth will not endure. She will not tolerate such

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dishonour. Will it be a new Russian messianism of the German national-socialist type, will technocracy triumph, or shall we be fated to witness a fresh outbreak of orthodox, Stalinist communism? Whatever it may be, its collapse will be dire. For as Saint Luke wrote long ago: 'It is impossible but that offences will come: but woe unto him through whom they come.' (*Luke*, Ch. 17, v. I.)*

* The quotation from St. Luke contains, in the original Russian, a play on the word *soblazn—temptation*, translated in the Authorized Version as *offence*.

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Samizdat

An Attempt to Understand the Meaning of O. Altayev's Article 'The Dual Consciousness of the Intelligentsia and Pseudo-culture'

Anonymous *

THE author begins by clarifying, in great detail, what the intelligentsia is and which people belong to it. The range is made extremely narrow:

> The concept was initially a very narrow one intended to designate a unique historical event: the apparition, in a precise spatial [Russian] and temporal [mid-nineteenth century] context of an utterly unique category of people who . . . were endowed with a certain moral introspectiveness which they directed towards overcoming the deep inner rift that had arisen between themselves . . . and their own state. The intelligentsia in this sense of the word has never existed in any other country. . . . [Although] . . . there are and always have been enlightened or semi-enlightened critics of state policy; there are and always have been . . . political exiles and conspirators; there are and always have been *déclassé* elements, people who audaciously challenge social prejudices and norms. Lastly, there are and always have been simply the educated people—teachers, doctors, engineers, and people in the arts . . .

Consequently, the characteristics listed above—education, faculty for critical thought, and opposition to the regime, even revolutionariness—do not constitute a definition of the intelligentsia. Its chief characteristic is the following:

> . . . otherworldliness, eschatological dreams of . . . a kingdom of truth to come . . . and the aspiration to save mankind if not from its sins then at least from its sufferings . . . naive atheism and a religious faith in progress. . . . The bourgeois mode, by then firmly established, was alien to him; he feared the daily round and despised culture, whether his own or that of others; he was tormented by his guilt before the people at whose expense he ate and drank. This otherworldliness was due partly to idle arrogance—but only partly. . . .

* This is a polemical article which appeared in *samizdat* in reply to O. Altayev's article printed on pages 92–113. There are occasional minor discrepancies between Altayev's original article and the text as quoted here; these variations have been retained in our translation.

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Indeed, utopianism, naiveté, self-reproach for its parasitism were typical characteristics of the nineteenth-century intelligentsia. We shall not touch upon the very debatable claim that these were exclusively Russian attributes. Let us ask ourselves instead whether such 'intellectuals' exist *today*—people whose chief characteristics are utopianism, naiveté and self-reproach for their guilt before the people.

Referring to 'empirically observed facts' the author expresses the view that the intelligentsia has preserved its chief characteristics over the past 60 years. But is this so? A little earlier in his article the author himself describes the character of the present-day intelligentsia as follows:

> . . . the one difference that strikes us first of all is that of its 'bourgeoisness'—in manners, in dress, in its taste in interior decoration, and in its opinions. Asceticism, previously a basic characteristic, has now vanished virtually without trace. Exceptions are extremely rare. The intelligentsia of the present day aspires to material security and wellbeing and no longer sees anything wrong with the good life. On the contrary, it is distressed when its tranquillity and measured way of life are rudely disturbed. His [cooperative] apartment, his opportunities for promotion, his thesis—there we have the necessary minimum without which the intellectual of today cannot imagine his existence. And he regards those conditions as entirely natural. His ideal life-style is that of his American or European colleague, the free man and well-paid specialist who, though compelled to work under considerably greater pressure than his intellectual counterpart in Russia, has his own car, a private house, a family of four and a non-working wife, and can travel anywhere in the world. The present-day Russian intellectual also desires to travel . . . he wants to be a 'harmonious person', a person of 'all-round culture'; no more is he drawn to suffering or to another's tragedy but to the beautiful, which he regards as aesthetically and hedonistically meaningful. . . . He will not be stunned by a show of rags; he is too familiar with real poverty, desperate, mind-bending poverty. Ashamed of living so well in the peaceful 1900s, how could he have imagined that he would soon be in such straits as to render any shame superfluous? Indeed, he has been poorer than a church mouse, dragged to the lower depths of society, humiliated as few have been. Whether or not he himself is to blame for it is unimportant. But he has undoubtedly endured so much that one can, I believe, take a sympathetic view of his present bourgeois mentality as the fully understandable desire of an unhappy and exhausted man to live his last few days in peace without fear for the morrow. And if today he no longer feels guilty before the people, then let us thank God for that—in the 54th year of Soviet power they have reached quits, and it might not be such a bad thing if the people themselves felt some guilt of their own before the intelligentsia. . . .

Thus, the empirical picture the article paints indicates that there is no otherworldliness, no self-reproach, no estrangement from people or

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country, and so on, in the modern intelligentsia. Moreover, the only feature which apparently unites the intelligentsia's past and present reality—their alienation from the state, i.e. their opposition to the regime—is unexpectedly and fiercely denied by the author. He claims that the intelligentsia has a direct relationship with the regime (for it was the first cause of the upheavals of revolution), a 'guilty conscience as an accessory to evil, to crimes', and is 'to blame for all the country's misfortunes', etc. The author goes on to heap one accusation after another upon the head of the intelligentsia, forgetting that he himself has just pointed out the unreal, illusionist nature of the intelligentsia, otherworldly, estranged, self-reproachful, nihilist, revolutionary, utopian, etc. etc., an intelligentsia for the most part long since dead.

HERE we must pause to marvel at the skill and mastery with which the author refutes himself and fails to notice the fact, and reconstructs history and present-day reality in accordance with his utterly unintelligible (perhaps religio-monarchical?) aims. A typical feature of his style is the absolute, categorical nature of the assertions he makes. In the first place, he attributes to the intelligentsia, a comparatively small category of people, an inordinately great and openly satanic significance: '. . . be that as it may, the intelligentsia today once again indubitably holds the fate of Russia, and with it that of the whole world, in its hands. . . .'

But the intelligentsia never held the fate of Russia in its hands. That was always in the hands of the regime. And the regime always had the backing of armed force, the army. And the army could only be steadfastly obedient with the silent assent of the overwhelming majority of the nation's people. The political role of the intelligentsia (apart from that of protecting its own interests as a class of brain-workers) boils down to that of merely reflecting and expressing the interests of other classes and groups of people, being a mouthpiece of public opinion, a spontaneous and unenfranchized parliament. And that is all.

Of course, if one includes the country's leadership in the category of the intelligentsia then the phrase about 'our fate in their hands' may be justified; but the author does not do this. True, in all societies everywhere the leadership, the government and its *apparat* have always been drawn from educated people, the intelligentsia. But the two social groups have never intermingled, because of the enormous differences in their socio-economic status and roles. It is natural that the Bolshevik Party leadership, for example, consisted mainly of intellectuals, and that when it came to power it immediately and drastically altered its relationship with other groups within the Russian intelligentsia. One has only to recall a very typical volte-face in Lenin's policy with respect to one of the intelligentsia's basic professional demands and a condition for its normal existence—freedom of the press: from the defence of complete and unrestricted freedom of the press in September 1917 to the banning by 1918 of all opposition publications.

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However, regardless of who held the reins of power, the revolutionary intellectual Lenin, the democratic intellectual Kerensky, or the monarchist intellectual Kolchak, the final choice of one or another regime or doctrine was made by the grass roots of the populace—not, unfortunately, in the debates of intellectuals, but on the battlefields of civil war by the peasants and workers of Russia. This is clear, as is the fact that the subsequent Stalinist terror was much more the misfortune than the fault of the intelligentsia; if anyone was to blame then it was not only the intelligentsia but the entire nation, which suffered the regime in silence.

Secondly, the author absolutizes the importance and exclusiveness of his psychological portrait of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia, whom he condenses into varieties: 'nihilist, populist, social-revolutionary terrorist and social democrat'. The latter certainly played their part in history. But there was also another kind of intelligentsia. Quite a different kind. True, the author denies the applicability of the description 'member of the intelligentsia' to persons such as Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky. He would probably also exclude liberals, members of *zemstvos*, engineers, doctors and Cadets [Constitutional Democrats—transl.]. In fact the majority of educated people in pre-revolutionary Russia would be unacceptable according to his definition (although when referring to the modern intelligentsia the author makes no such exceptions). But why? Of course, if our quarrel is merely with the fairness of his initial concept of 'intelligentsia' then so be it—all right then, Chekhov was not a member of the intelligentsia. But in expounding this interpretation the author is doing far more than stretching a point—he greatly complicates matters; for, having declared the 'revolutionary extremist' cast of mind generic and typical of the intelligentsia, he carries this over to all educated people at the present time, calls them 'intellectuals of the same kind' and then proceeds to attack them sharply for fawning on the illusions and temptations of collaboration with the regime. It sometimes appears as though the duality which the author sees in the modern intelligentsia's thought is more than a little in evidence in his own.

There is unquestionably some truth in the assertion that the contemporary intelligentsia—an aggregate of educated people—is bourgeois, liberal and law-abiding to the highest degree. The past half-century has witnessed the destruction of the nobility and the noble intelligentsia, and with it its natural appendage, the revolutionary intelligentsia—those former gentlemen-landowners whose sleek hands suddenly became an embarrassment to them but who sought, not ordinary, vulgar, bourgeois work, but to render Russia and the world happy at a stroke. Even in his revolutionary aspect the gentleman remained a gentleman: he did not support himself by working, but went on living at other people's expense. The only difference was that the dangerous obligation of military service had been replaced by an even more dangerous and chivalrous one—

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the revolutionary obligation. But it is not the past we are concerned with.

The present-day intelligentsia is 'of the people' through and through, and therefore any guilt complex before its own 'common' parents is totally inconceivable. The present-day intelligentsia cannot feel an alienation from the land or the people because it is part of the people (the 'mob', to use the author's expression); it is just as imbued with 'philistinism' and 'bourgeois-ness' as the rest of the people.

The modern intelligentsia goes to work and plays a very important part in overall production. It knows its worth and sees its spiritual origins not in the revolutionary intelligentsia but in the scientists, engineers, doctors, lawyers, writers and artists of Russia, that is, the large numbers of the pre-revolutionary working intelligentsia who, where politics was concerned, were, as a rule, moderate liberals, and Cadets.

I make these simple, not to say primitive points because they need to be reiterated when one encounters essays such as Altayev's.

No, we can paint neither our past nor our present wholly in black. No, normal, productive work, aspirations towards normal, free living and consumer standards, bourgeois modes of thought and lifestyles, are not a 'betrayal', nor a contradiction, but a necessary condition for social and economic progress in this country, the very basis upon which democratization can become *possible* and *essential.*

The author concludes his treatise by listing the main illusions to which the Soviet intelligentsia has successively fallen a prey. They are: (1) The temptation of revolution, (2) the temptation of the 'volte-face' (NEP), (3) the temptation of socialism (the years of industrialization), (4) the temptation of patriotism (the war years), (5) the temptation of the thaw (the spirit of the 20th Party Congress) and (6) the temptation of education or technocracy.

It is easy to see that here again the author has confused the various strands of the intelligentsia: those who succumbed to the temptations of revolution and socialism were for the most part intellectuals of the revolutionary-minded nobility; while it was the liberal, bourgeois intelligentsia who were destined to fall victim to the temptations of NEP, the thaw and the cult of enlightenment. It is also evident that whereas NEP was welcomed by the few remaining old liberals who had not yet been ground into the dust, the aspirations of the 'thaw' and the 'cult of enlightenment' so prevalent today are professed by wide sections of a Soviet intelligentsia that is truly 'of the people'. And therein lies their strength, and their prospects for the future.

But let us listen to what the author has to say:

> Here we must make one important point. There is nothing reprehensible about any of the actual aspirations which form the rational basis of these temptations. Movements towards democracy and legality are a good thing, patriotism is perfectly unexceptionable, and the cult of enlightenment is essential, as is the introduction of scientific methods and efficient control into economic manage-

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> ment. These aspirations only become temptations as long as people use them to seek *facile* solutions, avoid complications and deceive themselves.

Fine words. One cannot but agree with the author that excessive reliance upon facility of solution, upon, let us say, the spontaneous development of a 'good' leadership, will not lead to democratization or progress in the country, and that, apart from being concerned with its routine professional work, the intelligentsia must think also of the general interest, by, for example, supporting the democratic movement. But in pursuance of some undeclared ideals of his own, the author expends most of his energies on denying the usefulness of the work the intelligentsia does today. This, in short, is the meaning of his criticism of the temptations of 'enlightenment' and 'technocracy'.

It seems to me that his criticism is totally unfounded. As applied to the 'cult of enlightenment' an attitude of such utter negation is too embarrassing even to discuss, but with respect to his criticism of the 'temptations of technocracy' some discussion is possible:

> At the moment the intelligentsia sees only one thing: that the technocratic idea shows possibilities of succeeding, that the party and the regime appear to be meeting it half-way by approving plans for reforms. The regime too has swallowed the bait . . . of this routine dream of utopia. And both the intelligentsia and the regime have a rose-coloured vision of a state in which arbitrary rule and 'libertarianism' have been eliminated, a state that operates as a perfectly regulated mechanism, The one thing the intelligentsia refuses to see is that Evil does not necessarily come clad in the filthy rags of anarchy alone. It may make its appearance also on the gleaming surface of the well-organized fascist reich. It does not die of its own accord with the introduction of disciplined order into the workings of a gigantic bureaucratic machine. The use of computers will not make the machine any more human. On the contrary: it will be able to enslave its subjects even more coolly and inexorably, to oppress other nations even more absolutely, to hold the world even more firmly in the grip of fear. . . .

Let us interrupt our quotation for a moment to remark that there does indeed exist a technocratic illusion that it is possible, with the aid of computers, to create a perfect and effective bureaucratic system of administration. However, it is chiefly the non-scientific intelligentsia and the authorities who adhere to this illusion. The technical intelligentsia is convinced by experience that machines *per se*, at least in this day and age, cannot efficiently administer the country and its economy; on the contrary, as a prime condition for their efficient operation they require an efficient system of economic control and incentives. In the conditions of the present time, the introduction of machines is virtually synonymous with its prerequisite—the reorganization, decentralization and democratization of the extant clumsy administrative system. And the more perfect the computer becomes, the more essential will such a reorganization be.

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> . . . Evil never dies of its own accord. It may assume the most subtle and refined forms, civilize itself and resort to any compromises one may care to imagine. *But it will never lose its identity with itself or permit itself to step outside the pale and become human.* The events in Czechoslovakia were, I believe, a clear demonstration of this. One cannot idly and feeble-mindedly leave one's own salvation to chance. One cannot hope to vanquish Evil merely by superficial, technical means. One cannot hope to make progress without releasing the brake. One cannot seriously hope for a convergence.

This extract evidently contains the core of the entire treatise. The author rejects the possibility of evolution. Or rather, he does not reject it (' the regime may assume any form and resort to any compromise you may care to name '), but does not value or accept it. Thinking in abstract categories of Good and Evil, he dreams of seeing Evil totally transformed into Good. What does he mean by the Good? We do not know. But certainly not the ordinary bourgeois democratic state with its police-force and its ' money-is-power ' mentality. Orthodox monarchy, perhaps? The author maintains a discreet silence on this score and simultaneously tries to manoeuvre us into performing a mental leap and coming to some conclusion of the kind.

However, the real people and the real intelligentsia clearly need not some abstract, incomprehensible notion of ' Good ' but real changes in their real lives and their freedom. They know that authority is necessary and that it cannot always be totally good and totally just, that it will always be a combination of the Good and the Evil. As it is now. We can only talk of tipping the balance in favour of the Good, that is, freedom, at the expense of the Evil (to use the author's own terminology). And I am convinced that both the professional energies of the intelligentsia and the public activities of its democratic spokesmen are directed towards precisely this end.

While disagreeing with the basic thesis of the essay in question, one has to pay tribute to the pungency with which the author presents an important problem. It is the following: ' The intelligentsia is succumbing to the temptation of quiet and placid work, contenting itself merely with cowardly opportunism at home. This will lead to its ruin.' So say people of our author's ilk. There is also the opposite view: that any disturbance of law and order, of the natural course of things, any protests and demonstrations, or breaking of traditions, are quixotry and extremism, and as such, unhealthy phenomena.

LASTLY, there is a third point of view and one which seems to me to be the soundest: *that each man must do what he can, and act according to the promptings of his conscience and his reason.* True, sometimes a person who puts forward this well-known argument is at heart a believer in the first point of view, but has already been convinced by experience that civic zeal cannot be aroused by reproaches

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or appeals to conscience, and for that reason alone he says: 'every man is free to act as he thinks fit'.

However, it is possible to vindicate this attitude in principle (as we shall try to demonstrate):

(1) Indeed, experience throughout the ages has shown that the majority of people cannot participate in any mass social movement. Except in revolutionary situations, only an insignificant minority of the general populace is publicly active. The rest simply carry on *living and working* and their part in social movements is merely to sympathize, or, on the contrary, to show hostility. And there has not been a single mass movement that has not been reconciled to this passive majority; far from holding it against them, gratitude has been expressed for their sympathy, support or understanding.

(2) The old communist-peasant psychology of the masses demanded wide participation in the '*mir*' [village community], unity in collective life and decision-making, and constant public-spirited activity.

People today have quite a different psychology—rising standards of living and economic development require of every man intensive work, not so much in the physical as in the intellectual and mental sense. Production today demands qualified and creative work, individual knowledge and culture, the use of one's capabilities to the full, and self-sacrifice. If, of course, we are talking of real work.

Now suppose we imagine for a moment that the entire intelligentsia rid itself of its inborn cowardice and became publicly active. Where would this lead us? It is no secret that participation in the democratic movement today inevitably leads to repressions of one kind or another and to 'excommunication' from normal, creative work in the field of one's aptitude. Since these repressions are fairly localized at the moment, they do little harm to mass production. Mass repression would greatly delay economic, and consequently social development, until the authorities found more appropriate means. Another possible consequence of an assumed rise in the activity level of the intelligentsia could be that the government would simply be unable to govern as before, i.e. it would be obliged to resign. That is, there would be another revolution, with all the chaos and destruction that entails; it would in fact be a move backwards.

The real success of the democratic movement will come about solely in the course of evolution. It is foolish, of course, to try to educate the regime by appealing to it. But there is nothing foolish in the certainty that the very logic of economic development, the logic of personal interest and the interests of the country, will nudge the regime in the direction of further reforms. And the farther, the more likely. The more developed our economy, the higher people's standards of culture, the more essential must freedom of thought and action be, the more clearly will the regime see the benefits of democratization, and the less will be its fear and misgivings.

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(3) Now let us imagine yet another possibility: that there are no people to be found in society who have the heroic and self-sacrificing character of the public figure, the fighter; that there is a total absence of active people, capable of forming a democratic movement, of openly expressing the true interests of the 'silent majority' and defending them in the face of the regime, at the cost of attacks and repressions. It is easy to see that a situation like this is equivalent to social stagnation. For the regime is always extremely reluctant to undertake any reorganization of habitual or traditional methods of administration. Without strong pressure from below, influenced only by notions of technological competition with the West, it will not make progressive changes. The more so because there will be no audible demands from below. (The conservatism which is a noticeable feature of Soviet public life at the present time is precisely the consequence of the weakness of the democratic movement and the domination of the average conservative organ of administration.)

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The Ideology of Croatian Nationalism

George Schöpflin

PERHAPS the main problem of the Croatian nation is that it has always been fated to play second fiddle in whatever state it had been incorporated. Croatia was united with the Hungarian crown in 1102 and remained associated with Hungary, in one way or another, until 1918, so that the historical experience of the Croats was that of attempting to gain the maximum advantage for themselves from Budapest through legalistic bargaining and of fighting off encroachments by the Hungarians on Croatian rights. During the late nineteenth century, Croatia's relations with Hungary were governed by the Hungarian-Croatian equivalent of the Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich*, called the Nagodba of 1868.

In the Croatian nationalist mythology, the pre-1914 period is regarded as one in which the Croatian nation suffered oppression by Budapest, which denied the Croats their right to nationhood and tried instead to Magyarize them. There is an element of truth in this, as there is in every East European nationalist myth, but Magyarization was never as unremitting in Croatia as it was in other parts of (pre-1918) Hungary (e.g. Slovakia). The Croats retained their own legislature, the Sabor, under the Nagodba and exercised considerable powers of self-government, albeit under a Hungarian-appointed governor. Inevitably, the Croats of the time were dissatisfied with their limited autonomy and demanded more.[1]

There were, in effect, two trends of thought in the Croatian nationalist ideology of the time. The first was South Slav in orientation, looking back to the short-lived Illyrian Provinces when Croatia proper, Dalmatia and Slovenia were united in one political unit under French rule (1809–13); it was mapped out by Ljudevit Gaj in the 1840s and Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer in the latter half of the nineteenth century. This South Slav orientation favoured a single state, possibly federal, in which Croats would be united with Serbs, and one practical application of the idea was Serbo-Croatian unity in the face of Hungarian nationalism in 1848, when the Croats of Croatia-Slavonia joined with the Serbs of the Vojvodina in fighting Kossuth. The second trend, represented by Ante Starcevic in the late nineteenth century, known as *pravastvo*, was exclusivist, Catholic in inspiration and demanded the establishment of a Croatian unit directly under Vienna (or preferably complete independence). This trend became more and more anti-Serbian and isolationist.

[1] Ivo J. Lederer, 'Nationalism and the Yugoslavs' in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (eds.), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle and London, 1969), p. 396.

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THUS in 1918, when Yugoslavia came into being, the Croats had two possible political philosophies to follow: the South Slav one, which had wide support in the immediate post-war period until the murder of Stjepan Radic, and the isolationist, Croatia-alone trend, which bore fruit ultimately in Ante Pavelic's Ustasa state of the second world war, the NDH.[2] The problem in establishing a working relationship between Serbs and Croats in the newly-established Yugoslavia was two-fold. On the one hand, the political attitudes and skills of the Croats were informed by their experiences under dualism, which boiled down to resisting pressure from the centre. Had Yugoslavia been constituted on a genuinely federal basis, granting real powers to Croatia, it is possible that Croatian politics might have been directed into less destructive channels, and that the Croatian nation would not have felt itself frustrated in its aim of control over its own destiny. Unfortunately, the other half of the equation, Serbia, had a historical experience precisely the opposite of Croatia's, having been the nucleus to which other territories were added as a result of military conquest or liberation.[3]

Consequently, there was a strong tendency in Serbia after 1918 to regard Yugoslavia as Serbia writ large, and the accession of Croatia and other areas to the new state as the liberation of territories privileged to be associated with the Kingdom of Serbia. This view was reinforced by the fact that in 1918–19 the only South Slav army was Serbian, and it was that army that marched into Croatia and Slovenia. It did have the genuine objective of resisting Italian expansion, and thus provided the semblance of a liberation.

This made a clash between Croats and Serbs inevitable, as the Croats began to regard Belgrade in much the same way as they had regarded Budapest, as the source of all their troubles. The threat of Magyarization was replaced by the fear of Serb hegemony, which was seen as being all the more insidious because there is no decisive differentiation of language between Croats and Serbs, only those of religion and culture.

An essential objective of the Croatian nationalist ideology was the speedy unification of all lands inhabited by Croats into a Croatian state. First and foremost, in 1918 and before, this meant Dalmatia and the Littoral, which were not finally incorporated into Yugoslavia until 1945, since the Italians had insisted on annexing Istria, some of the islands and the town of Zadar (Zara). This source of resentment disappeared, therefore, after the frontier changes following the second world war. The Croat-Italian issue was relatively straightforward and easily settled, but the question of the Vojvodina posed a more serious problem, even after 1945. The Vojvodina is inhabited predominantly by Serbs, but, in addition to half a million Hungarians, it also has a number of Croats, some of whom, the Bunjevci, do not necessarily regard themselves as Croatian anyway. On the strength of these semi-Croats and

[2] *Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska*—the Independent State of Croatia.
[3] Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia* (London, 1971), pp. 57–8.

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of an implicit assumption that within Yugoslavia, Croatia was the rightful successor to (pre-1918) Hungary (to which the areas comprising the Vojvodina had belonged until 1918) and thus entitled to the Vojvodina, the Croats pressed for some or all of it to be made part of Croatia, rather than Serbia.[4] In the Serbian view, the Vojvodina had played a major part in sustaining Serbian culture in the nineteenth century—Novi Sad was known as the Serbian Athens. Since in addition the majority of the population of the Vojvodina was Serbian, particularly after the resettlement of the lands vacated by the Germans by for the most part Serbs from Serbia proper and Montenegrins, it was under no circumstances to be ceded to Croatia. All Croatia received was the western part of Syrmia (Srijem) and the Yugoslav corner of the Baranja.

The most intricate and emotionally explosive problem was that of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an area inhabited by Croats, Serbs and South Slav Moslems. Both Serbs and Croats have laid claim to Bosnia on ethno-linguistic and historical grounds and under the NDH the inevitable conflict turned into ruthless inter-communal butchery, the Serbs suffering particularly during the war and the Croats afterwards. The NDH classified the Moslems as 'Croats of the Moslem faith', for which there had been some justification, many of the Moslem leaders of the inter-war period having given their nationality as Croat. Some Moslems had opted for Serbian nationality and it was only with the creation of a separate national category in the 1961 census that a measure of national stability—a vital element in the situation—was introduced. The 1971 census showed a dramatic increase in the number of ethnic Moslems (from 973,000 to 1·73 million), now the largest national group in Bosnia; this indicated that a substantial number of them had opted out of Serbian or Croatian nationality in favour of something more stable. But the Bosnian issue continues to be a most intense emotional focus of the Croatian national ideology, playing the role of a more or less classical *irredenta*, which found strong public expression in the 1971 upsurge.

The creation of the new South Slav state in 1918 had been so sudden that very little thought had been given to its internal structure, and this uncertainty clearly served to exacerbate Croatian national feeling. In a sense, the long and sterile debates in the 1920s on the nature of a proposed Yugoslav federation were the re-emergence of the traditional Croatian response to what was regarded as an assault on the integrity of the nation—legalistic argument with the centre. The Croatian question effectively poisoned the entire body politic of Royal Yugoslavia and opinions became polarized as the issue dragged on, year after year. The murder of Stjepan Radic, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, not only inflamed Croatian opinion against the Serbs, but also removed from the political scene the one man who might just have been able to stem the drift towards right extremism that gained ground increasingly in Croatia in the 1930s.

[4] Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (1968), p. 117.

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The establishment of the NDH under Nazi tutelage satisfied Croatian aspirations, initially at least, but gradually even nationalists grew sickened at the wholesale massacres of the Serbs of Croatia, so that there there was a renewal of support for the Yugoslav ideal. This was encouraged by the communists, whose policy laid down the complete national equality of all the nations of Yugoslavia and a strict ban on nationalist reprisals after the war (which was breached in some areas). Communist policy was based on the traditional Marxist principle that nationalism would soon wither away, once its economic foundations had been eliminated. Hence the communists established Yugoslavia on a federal basis, which they expected would be without any serious nationalist content. There were six constituent republics, each more or less based on a national group, which could then act as legitimate channels for cultural activities and other permissible manifestations of national identity. This had one major consequence. The communists had unwittingly laid down the infrastructure—republican institutions—on which the nationalisms of the 1960s came to be built, once the political control of the party had loosened.

The initial expression of nationalism was economic. Croatia and Slovenia became increasingly dissatisfied with a political and economic system that seemed to pour their hard-earned resources into the bottomless pit of the poor south of Yugoslavia without any tangible benefits. At the same time, it was argued in Croatia, there was not enough money to help Croatia's own underdeveloped regions. Pressure from the political leaders of Croatia, notably Vladimir Bakaric, came increasingly to base itself on popular aspirations by the mid-1960s. And predictably, pressure for the devolution of economic power was followed by demands for the devolution of political power as well.

The fall of Rankovic in 1966 appeared to have been a major victory for the liberals against the centralists, but it brought no immediate changes. The view that Croatia was getting a raw deal out of the federation grew apace after 1966 and culminated in the crisis of 1971, which came close to shattering the country. The constitutional amendments of 1968 gave the republics considerable control over their own affairs at the expense of the federal authorities, but the system as it then operated until 1971 turned out to be a recipe for stalemate. The republics were strong enough to prevent the federal government from taking any step that might infringe republican interests through the Chamber of Nationalities, but on the other hand the federal government retained enough of its power through its control of the country's finances to block any republican initiatives.

In the end, the situation was resolved by the constitutional amendments of 1971, outlined by Edvard Kardelj in September 1970. These amendments wholly reversed the theory on which the Yugoslav federation was based. Hitherto, powers had devolved onto the republics from the centre; under the amendments, the republics were declared sovereign

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and it was their powers which devolved onto a much weaker federal government, now controlling only matters regarded as being of common interest to the whole of Yugoslavia, e.g. foreign policy, national security and the underdeveloped regions. These reforms had the support in principle of all the republican leaders, but the problem of their implementation became the subject of the most bitter and violent debate in Yugoslavia since the war.

The Croatian leadership was determined that Croatian statehood was to be a reality. It therefore raised no serious obstacles to the public expression of Croatian nationalism in order to demonstrate the popular support it enjoyed on this issue. In fact, Croatian communists, by identifying themselves with Croatian national aspirations—and to some extent even adopting the nationalist ideology—ruled by consent and thereby greatly strengthened their own legitimacy. Inevitably, once a wave of emotional nationalism is loosed, as happened in 1970–71, there are bound to be excesses, and equally unavoidably, the public expression of nationalism in Croatia found a ready echo in a similarly intense Serbian nationalism. The two then fed on one another.

The aims of these two movements were outlined by Stipe Suvar, one of the speakers at the Fourth Conference of the League of Communists of Croatia.[5] He criticized the party for having failed to demystify national tradition and suggested that communists were now paying for this omission. Party ideology, incapable of distinguishing essentials from inessentials, had banned the lot, and because it had not clarified its own concept of nationalism in Marxist terms, the party had itself succumbed to 'classic nationalist tricks'. It was against this background that Croatian nationalism was to be assessed. Croatian nationalism, according to Suvar, put forward the thesis that Serbian nationalism had established a hegemony in post-war just as much as in pre-war Yugoslavia and this had placed the Croatian nation in a particularly difficult position, since it is the main sufferer from Serbian hegemony. Croatia, according to this thesis, is exploited economically and there is pronounced Serbian pressure on Croatian culture. The Serbs had even penetrated into ethnically Croatian areas and as an overall result of this pressure, the very existence of the Croatian nation was threatened. The Serbian ideology, also sketched by Suvar, was that the Serbian nation had been fragmented, that many Serbs lived outside Serbia proper (in Croatia, Macedonia, the Kosovo, Bosnia and the Vojvodina); that the Serbs were maltreated in Yugoslavia; that they were held responsible 'for sins which were shared or were the result of a plot by members of other nations'; that Croatian nationalism was on the offensive, so that the time had come for all Serbs to close ranks.

The fields in which this nationalist ideology has operated may usefully be considered under four main headings: economics; history; language; and the nature of political power, the state and the nation.

[5] Reported by Tanjug, 12 July 1971.

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ECONOMIC nationalism in Yugoslavia is primarily a post-war phenomenon. There were grievances nursed by the regions against the centre in Royal Yugoslavia, but these were seldom conceived of as something distinct from the political question.[6] It was the communists, it might be said, who were responsible for introducing economic nationalism, unwittingly but ineradicably, by proclaiming that the national question would solve itself once the economic inequalities between the various regions of Yugoslavia were levelled out. Simultaneously, they created the infrastructure for the growth of economic nationalism by establishing local power centres in the republic which initially were hardly more than empty shells—decisions continued to be taken centrally—but which did raise expectations. Furthermore, once decentralization began, it tended to affect economic decisions rather than directly political ones and as a result, republican bureaucracies gained a vested interest in their republics, so that in a given situation it was often difficult to determine where economic interests ended and national ones began.

Economic nationalism in Yugoslavia arose gradually during the 1950s. It developed, in the main, out of three related issues. The first was the problem of the financing of the underdeveloped south by the industrializing north. The northern republics, Croatia and Slovenia, accepted a certain obligation towards the poorer areas of the country, but began to resent what they considered the misallocation of resources in the southern republics, resources which they had contributed and felt that they could have used more profitably. Secondly, there was a gradual increase in competition among the republics, both for the available resources and in achievements. And finally, the northern republics came to favour radical economic reforms, that would devolve economic decision-making to the republican level and would eliminate political influence in economics. They were successful in this in 1965–66, with the introduction of the economic reform and the fall of Rankovic.

The growth of economic nationalism—initially, perhaps, no more than regionalism—can be traced back to the early 1950s. Local bureaucracies attempted, often successfully, to protect local economic interests against the other republics. At the same time, each republic tried as far as possible to make itself self-sufficient. Particular stress was placed on the building of prestige projects, such as steel mills. A clear example of this sort of rivalry emerges from the examination of Yugoslavia's port facilities. Rijeka in Croatia has been the country's principal port, handling about two-thirds of foreign trade, as well as serving Hungary and Czechoslovakia to some extent. However, despite the proximity of Rijeka, the Slovenes pressed ahead with the building up of Koper, which is less than 30 miles from the major port in the region, Trieste. Similarly, Ploce had been promoted as the port for Bosnia,

[6] ' Special indignation was caused by the fact that taxation was higher in Croatia than in Serbia.' Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars* (3rd edition, 1962), p. 226.

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whilst Bar has become the port for Montenegro, even if the output of Montenegro hardly justified the additional facilities. The projected Bar-Belgrade railway carried this a step further.[7]

The problem with this kind of ' republic-oriented ' economic decision-making was that economic questions could be very easily transformed into issues of national honour. A further exacerbation of the problem was that many of the local bureaucrats tended to think in rather primitive economic terms and placed emphasis on the acquisition of prestige projects, the clearly visible symbols of economic progress, a trend that was made worse, if anything, by the general tendency to measure everything in terms of extensive industrial development.[8]

A very clear analysis of the phenomenon of economic nationalism in the early 1960s was provided by Vladimir Bakaric.

> One finds, *inter alia*, examples of antagonism, of unscrupulous struggles for investment tinged by nationalism; . . . cases occur where the presentation of conditions is distorted and inexact indices are used in order to prove that ' our nation ' is ' plundered ', that it is ' threatened '. . . . In the race for money—which must be obtained from somewhere—arguments in private rapidly become nationalistic. In this way ' fear ' and unfounded ' concern ', as a rule about being left behind, . . . become a kind of obsession, an *idée fixe*, and in certain circles, even a political platform.[9]

A particular target of the decentralizers from Croatia (and Slovenia) was the considerable funds controlled by the federal government. The contribution made by the northern republics to these funds, used for aiding the poor south, was far greater than what came back into Croatia. Furthermore, productivity per worker was far higher in Croatia than in the south, with the result that Croats came to feel, with some justification, that they were being penalized for working harder. Miko Tripalo, possibly the most articulate spokesman of the Croatian interest, offered the following definition of the situation:

> The key question is giving back the immense centralized funds to the economy. What we need is modernization of existing capacities and not the building of vast new projects. . . . We have a central fund, budgetary subsidies, a favoured rate of interest for credits, etc. But we must put an end to parasitism. Those who are able to earn cannot be penalized all the time. . . . As to nationalism, the only solution is that our multi-national Yugoslavia must be based on the full equality of each nation and not on some being more equal than others.[10]

[7] Orme Wilson, Jr., ' The Belgrade-Bar Railroad ' and the comments on this paper by Guido G. Weigend in George W. Hoffman (ed.), *Eastern Europe: essays in geographical problems* (London, 1971).

[8] Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (New York and London, 1968), p. 248.

[9] *Komunist*, 5 November 1964.

[10] Quoted by Paul Lendvai, *Eagles in Cobwebs* (London, 1970), pp. 140–41.

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The conflict over the role of the federal government and its powers vis-à-vis the republics continued throughout the second half of the 1960s and was only ended with the 1971 constitutional amendments. But a further, though related, economic issue arose towards the end of the decade, one which again brought Croatia into conflict with the centre. This concerned Croatia's foreign export earnings and the claim that Croatia was not receiving anything like enough of its foreign currency because of the activities of the so-called re-exporters. The essence of the problem was that because the dinar was not convertible, all foreign exchange was considered as a national resource, which had to be converted into dinars through the Yugoslav National Bank. The banks and exporting houses, with the right to handle foreign currency, acquired considerable economic power as a result, for which they were not really accountable to anyone.[11] The Croats considered that they were particularly hard hit by this arrangement, as Croatia had three sources of foreign currency. These were industrial exports, the remittances of Croatian workers abroad and revenue from tourism, in which the Dalmatian coast was the principal factor. Croatian enterprises complained bitterly throughout 1970 and 1971 that the terms of credit granted to them by the central banks were so harsh and the premium payable on foreign exchange so high, that the banks and re-exporters were exploiting the Croatian economy.[12] The direct consequence of this, it was argued, was that there was never enough money to invest in Croatia, especially in Dalmatia (whose tourist, and thereby foreign exchange potential, were diminished thereby) and this led, in turn, to a high rate of labour migration from Croatia, a higher rate than from any other republic.[13] And this was then followed up by dark hints that the departed Croats were being replaced by an influx of Serbs or Montenegrins, willing to work for lower wages. In this way, ran the nationalist thesis, Croatia was being deliberately impoverished by the Serbs (i.e. Belgrade) and the Croat nation was being deliberately diluted by Serbian incomers.

Once again it was Tripalo who was most outspoken on this subject. He led the campaign to have the banks and re-exporters 'nationalized', meaning brought under republican control. The strike of students at Zagreb University and other institutions of higher education in Croatia in November 1971 was aimed directly at bringing pressure on the federal government to speed up action on this issue. The students' strike, although it was directly in line with the policy of the Croatian party leadership, was a major embarrassment, as it took the initiative out of the hands of the party.

11 Dan Morgan in *The Guardian*, 29 November 1971.
12 *Le Monde*, 11 September 1970.
13 Official Yugoslav statistics released in July 1971 showed that out of a total of 671,702 Yugoslavs working abroad, 224,722 were from Croatia (thus including Serbs from the Croatian Republic), *Magyar Szo* (Novi Sad), 28 July 1971. In fact, these figures were clearly too low and unofficial estimates have put the number of Yugoslavs abroad as not far short of a million.

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Some of the solutions advocated by the nationalists included outright expropriation of the investments made by the 'Belgrade bankers' in Croatia. The case against the re-exporters was underpinned by the neat ideological argument that investment in Croatia by Belgrade-controlled funds was a negation of the principles of self-management, as it really became rather irrelevant what was decided by the workers' council, when the policy decisions that mattered were being taken in Belgrade.

The Belgrade bankers attempted to argue back, as for example at the Second Congress of Self-Managers at Sarajevo in May 1971. The President of the Belgrade Jugobanka, Djordje Zecevic, strongly attacked demands for the 'nationalization' of the finance houses. These attacks, he stated, had caused untold harm to Yugoslavia, by creating uncertainty about the stability of Yugoslav banks abroad—thus demonstrating that bankers have the same worries under whatever social system they happen to be operating. For his pains, Zecevic was attacked in turn by a Zagreb medical student, Dinko Podrug, who described the banker's contribution to the discussion as 'reactionary' and expressed his surprise at the applause it had received from the delegates. Podrug argued that the banks and re-exporters were exploiting the workers and that all they could say in their own defence was to complain that criticism of their activities caused them harm abroad.[14]

The foreign exchange issue continued to dominate economic discussions at the federal level as well. It was revealed by the party weekly *Komunist* that the question had formed an important factor in the debates on the draft development plan.[15] Croatia was the only republic to propose amendments to the draft on the question of foreign exchange and its proposals were in line with earlier demands—essentially, that those enterprises which earn foreign exchange should have the right to dispose of it as well.[16]

Basically, as far as economic nationalism was concerned, the Croats pressed for a very far-reaching devolution of economic power, without which, it was felt, the devolution of political power would have been rather meaningless. In their campaign, the Croats felt that they could put up a strong case, given their apparently logical argument over foreign exchange earnings, that they could demand a greater share of resources by pointing to their own underdeveloped areas and by using the ideology of self-management to support what was essentially a nationalist thesis.

14 *Magyar Szo*, 8 May 1971.

15 Bozidar Bogdanovic in *Kommunista* (Hungarian edition), 13 November 1971.

16 *Borba*, 26 October 1971, carried two relevant items from Zagreb. When the Praesidium of the Sabor discussed Croatia's contribution to the underdeveloped regions of Yugoslavia under the 1971–75 plan, it was stated that 'it was impossible to accept commitments to the underdeveloped regions beyond those already agreed'. The sum so far agreed was 6,026 million dinars. Secondly, banks from Zagreb, Rijeka, Split and Osijek had agreed to found an Associated Bank of Croatia, with a capital of 35,000 million dinars. This bank, which was expected to start trading in 1972, would have good international connexions and would be a match for the Belgrade Bank. It represented about four-fifths of Croatia's credit potential.

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In their drive for control over all areas of Croatia's economy, the Croatian leadership—before December 1971—had been ready to ignore competing all-Yugoslav claims on scarce foreign currency resources. It was hardly a matter for surprise that critics of the Croatian position should have suggested that it was incompatible with the maintenance of Yugoslavia as one state. After the crack-down on the nationalist movement in Croatia, a new regime was instituted for the distribution of foreign exchange earnings, whereby enterprises could keep 20 per cent of foreign revenue from commodity exports and 45 per cent from tourist income.[17]

THE writing of history in Eastern Europe has tended to have a political role since the nineteenth century, and Croatian nationalism has found expression in this area also. The nationally conscious elites of the last century sought to redefine the history of their society in national terms, in order to underpin their political legitimacy vis-à-vis the ruling empires and other potential competitors for power. Croatia was no exception to this general trend and it produced its quota of historical writing which had the general objective of demonstrating the historical continuity of the Croat state and the validity of Croatian state rights.[18] This kind of legalistic writing, as already suggested, was one of the techniques inherited from the Hungarians, who were attempting to define the rights of the Kingdom of Hungary in relation to Vienna.[19] This approach to the history of the Croat nation was continued during the inter-war period.

After 1945 the communists introduced their own version of history and a whole range of Croatian national heroes were expelled from the pantheon. The communist approach had two main planks: excluded, partly or wholly, were those national heroes whose activities could not be reconciled with a class-determined view of history (Zrinjski, Jelacic and Stjepan Radic) and also those who had created the 'Croatia alone' type of nationalism, which was anti-Serb (Starcevic, the Frankovci and other adherents of *pravastvo*). In their place, the communists established as exemplars for national emulation the leading figures of Yugoslavism—quite legitimately—and the representatives of class-inspired movements (Matija Gubec, the leader of the 1573 peasant rising).[20] The example most worthy of national emulation and which contributed most to

17 *Politika*, 29 December 1971.

18 The historical novel should probably be included under this category as well. An official publication of the Office of Information of the Sabor in English, *Cultural History of Croatia*, includes this passage on the nineteenth-century novelist August Senoa: '[he was] the first modern Croatian author to demand that literature should outline the historical destiny of the people and that the writer should write in such a way as to attract the masses to reading' (p. 324). The book *Cultural History of Croatia* (Zagreb, 1962) was written by Zvane Crnja.

19 Ivo Lederer, op. cit. p. 412 says: 'By the end of the eighteenth century, the southern Slavs still had not produced national histories as such, though they had embarked on that road.' Under the influence of Strossmayer, however, and especially thanks to the writings of Canon Franjo Racki, this shortcoming was made up by the end of the nineteenth century.

20 Matija Gubec is given the full treatment in *Cultural History of Croatia*, pp. 248–55.

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Croatian nationhood was, of course, the 1941–45 Partisan movement. Professional historians gradually reassessed the history of Croatia and rehabilitated many of the figures formerly condemned (or at least placed them in a new and less hostile perspective), although reservations remained, especially about *pravastvo*. The initial impact of this reassessment was limited and it had its effect on popular nationalism only in the late 1960s. In 1971 it became part and parcel of the campaign for the complete rehabilitation of the entire Croatian national pantheon.

This public expression of nationalism in 1971 had two aims: one was to return to the nation the whole of its history[21] and the other was to demonstrate the historical continuity of the Croatian state. Neither of these objectives had anything radically new about it, but the intensity with which the campaign was pressed was evidently the symptom of years of frustration.[22] A meeting of scientific workers, teachers and writers of school textbooks in summer 1971 demanded a substantial revision of school history books, because national history as a subject had been neglected and burdened by centralist and unitarist concepts. Demands of this kind were raised at numerous meetings in Croatia, notably at the Croatian Philological Society and the Skolska Knjiga Publishing House. The widely expressed view was that at least two-thirds of the teaching time allotted to history should be devoted to national, that is Croatian, history. The subject should be restored to the reputation it once enjoyed—a reference which clearly includes the propagation of the national ideology. Furthermore, it was stated, the continuity of the Croat state should be particularly stressed. There was also criticism of the current and officially sanctioned approach to history teaching on the ground that it ' abounds with defeatist attitudes regarding the past of the Croatian people '.[23] It was emphasized that the time had come for another revival, which would have to start from ' Illyrian and Yugoslav times to arrive at everything that is Croat, that is of lasting significance and that adds to our determination to rectify errors '. There were specific demands for the reassessment of the roles played by Zrinjski[24] and

21 However, I have come across no attempt to rehabilitate Pavelic and the NDH.

22 Walter Kolarz, *Myths and Realities in Eastern Europe* (London, 1946), p. 200 ff., and Oscar Jaszi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago, 1964), p. 360 ff., deal extensively with the role of state rights in Croatian nationalism.

23 *Politika*, 8 June 1971.

24 The *Cultural History of Croatia* is a veritable goldmine of minor nationalist distortions. The following passage is not uncharacteristic; it deals with Nikola Zrinjski, the poet, who ' spent most of his time at Cakovec, formally enmeshed in Hungarian culture, writing in Hungarian, but feeling a Croat, as is well shown by the patriotic character of his works. In the scanty Hungarian literature [sic], Nikola Zrinjski is the first writer of importance ' (p. 275). National feeling in the modern sense was quite irrelevant when Zrinjski (known in Hungarian as Miklos Zrinyi) lived, so that the expression ' formally enmeshed in Hungarian culture ' is quite meaningless. He was an aristocrat and his opposition to Vienna was not based on either Croatian or Hungarian nationalism. ' Feeling a Croat ' is equally irrelevant. And the judgment that Zrinjski/Zrinyi was the first Hungarian writer of importance is questionable to say the least, although it does manage to leave the impression that Hungarian literature is indebted to Croatia.

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Frankepan, Starcevic and Kvaternik, Supilo, and Radic. An interesting addition to this list was the demand that there be adequate treatment of the Croatian contribution to the Spanish Civil War and the National Liberation Struggle. Clearly, the Croats wanted a good pedigree in communist as well as in nationalist terms.

The intensity of the campaign for the rehabilitation of the whole of Croatia's national history evidently aroused a good deal of unease elsewhere in Yugoslavia, both on communist and national grounds. Tripalo dealt with this in one of his many public statements in summer 1971. In an interview given to *Omladinski Tjednik* he declared that hostile reactions to the reassessment of Croatian history should not be exaggerated and explained that the insistence in Croatia on reclaiming Zrinjski or Kvaternik or Radic for the nation's history was 'the result of the neglect of Croatian history in the past'.[25]

It is likely that it was the desire for the public expression and for the public commemoration of Croatia's national history that aroused much of the hostility. The case of the Jelacic statue indicates that public expression is an important aspect of nationalism and, conversely, that the commemoration of one nation's heroes can readily excite apprehensions in others. Until the war, Josip Juraj Jelacic, Croatian ban in 1848 and the leader who led Croatian resistance to what was regarded as the overwhelming danger to the Croat nation from resurgent Hungarian nationalism, was held in high honour as a national hero. A statue of Jelacic used to stand in Zagreb, in what was then called 'Jelacic Square'. Unfortunately, in the communist ideology Jelacic was not a hero but a reactionary, because Marx had dubbed the Hungarian revolution of 1848 'progressive' and the resistance of Croats, Serbs, Slovaks and Rumanians to Hungarian nationalism 'reactionary', in that these nationalities actively assisted Vienna against the Hungarians. So in 1945 Jelacic was removed from Jelacic Square and the Square itself was renamed 'Republic Square'. In 1971, there was a certain amount of student agitation for the statue to be re-erected, and the initiative also had some support in academic circles.[26] At the same time, it also aroused the disapproval of certain circles, who adhered to the traditionalist view, as laid down by Marx, and were also opposed in general to public manifestations of Croatian nationalism.

THE problem of the existence or non-existence of a Croatian language emerged as one of the most explosive issues in 1971. There is a general conception in Eastern Europe that nation and language are congruent, that the mother tongue is not only the daily affirmation of nationhood, but that it is, above all, the most important repository of the qualities that differentiate one nation from another. Consequently, the building up of the national language has been one of the earliest expressions of a distinct nationhood. Added to this is the factor that

[25] *Politika*, 22 June 1971.

[26] *Magyar Szo*, I, 1 August 1971.

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for most nations language was a political weapon against external pressure —from ruling empires and from other competing nations—so that actually to speak or to write the national language has been an explicitly political act. The Croatian problem, however, is that language does not offer any means of national differentiation from their main competitors, the Serbs. Serbian and Croatian are the same language from the philological point of view—there is about as much difference between them as between British and American English. But this philological observation is quite irrelevant, in that the Croats feel that they have a national language of their own, which is not the same as Serbian. Ironically, it was a gesture of generosity on the part of the Croats that contributed to this state of affairs. In the 1840s, when Ljudevit Gaj first began his campaign for the political and cultural mobilization of the South Slavs, he consciously gave up his own dialect (*kajkavski*, spoken in northern Croatia) in favour of the dialect that was spoken by some Croats and by the Serbs (*stokavski*). As a result, *stokavski* became the basis for literary Croatian. But whereas this move contributed significantly to South Slav unity, it also diminished the separateness of Croatian culture, not least because the Serbs have felt that all speakers of *stokavski* were Serbs.

After the communist takeover, it was officially decided that Serbian and Croatian were, in fact, different variants of the same language, that it was to be called Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serb and that both the latin and the cyrillic alphabet enjoyed equal rights. This is the gist of the Novi Sad agreement of 1954 which was signed by all the cultural institutions of both Serbs and Croats. What happened in practice, according to the Croats, was that they lost out under this agreement, because it was always the Serbian variant of any particular word or expression that was used officially and Croatian was *de facto* relegated to the status of a dialect. The emotional intensity provoked by this state of affairs among Croatian intellectuals was systematically underrated by the Serbs and, one suspects, by the party as well. It was, therefore, quite a bombshell when on 17 March 1967 a group of cultural institutions and of distinguished Croatian intellectuals, including the writer Miroslav Krleza, published a 'Declaration on the Designation for and the Position of the Croatian Language'. The proposal in the Declaration was deceptively simple: it requested that Article 131 of the Constitution be amended to read 'Federal laws and other general acts of federal agencies shall be made public in the four authentic literary languages of the peoples of Yugoslavia: Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian', instead of the existing provision which reads '. . . in the authentic languages of the peoples of Yugoslavia: Serbo-Croat, i.e. Croato-Serb, Slovenian and Macedonian'.[27] Most of the Croatian signatories of the 1967 Declaration

[27] In fact, the draft 1946 Yugoslav Constitution had provided for equal rights for a Serbian and for a Croatian language. Further, hints have been dropped by the Croats that the preponderance of Serbs over Croats during the 1954 Novi Sad conference helped to bring about the agreement in the shape that it finally took.

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had also signed the Novi Sad agreement. One of them, Ljudevit Jonke, a noted Croatian philologist, expressly stated that the Serbian signatories had broken the agreement.[28]

Clearly, the problem of a separate Croatian language continued to exercise the Croatian intelligentsia as a potent focus of nationalist dissatisfaction. Matters came to a head over the preparation of a definitive dictionary of the Serbo-Croatian literary language, in which both the Matica Hrvatska and the Matica Srpska participated. In January 1969, the Matica Hrvatska announced publicly that in its view the dictionary had to display both the Serbian and the Croatian variants because the two languages were not identical or uniform. This declaration was issued after a joint meeting between the two Maticas and at that stage it was still possible for the two sides to agree to continue work on the dictionary, in which both the variants would be given prominence. The Serbs, however, refused the formulation put forward by the Croats that 'the Croato-Serb or Serbo-Croat language has two equally valid variants —the one used in Croatian, the other in Serbian literature'. Croatian anxieties were not allayed and at its annual meeting on 22 November 1970, the Matica Hrvatska resolved that no further purpose could be served by collaboration on the dictionary and that what was needed was an independent dictionary of the Croatian literary language. The Matica Hrvatska asserted that the Serbs had used the Novi Sad agreement as a cover for linguistic imperialism, by promoting the *ekavski* variant as the official literary language at all levels.

By 1971 Croatian passions on the issue of the Croatian language had become fully aroused. It was reported, for instance, that at a student meeting in March, speakers were asked 'Would the speaker be good enough to speak literary Croatian?' Several Croatian intellectuals, Jonke among them, renounced their signature of the Novi Sad agreement. Jonke explained that he had taken this step because of the lack of any scientific basis and justification for the agreement, because of the pressures exerted on the Croatian language by supporters of the agreement and because of the unprecedented attacks on those linguists who stood up for the Croatian literary language.[29] Even Vladimir Bakaric, who was eventually reckoned to be the main Croatian architect of the clampdown in December 1971, offered very cautious support for the idea of a separate Croatian literary language.[30]

During the summer of 1971, the Croats worked out a new orthography of the Croatian literary language and this was ready for publication by

[28] *Politika*, 2 April 1967. Jonke, who was expelled from the party in consequence of his standpoint, defended himself by stating that two of the Serbian signatories of the Novi Sad agreement had published textbooks 'which are completely in opposition to the agreement: in these books, the Croatian variant . . . has been proclaimed less valuable and even "provincial"!' One of the books, that of Professor Moskovljevic, was banned in March 1966.

[29] *Politika*, 7 May 1971, reporting *Hrvatski Tjednik*, 6 May 1971. Jonke's decision had been made public on 12 April.

[30] In a speech at Topusko, 30 September 1971, reported by Tanjug.

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September. However, the Croatian authorities were reluctant to approve this orthography for the schools in the republic and Dusan Dragosavac, deputy Secretary of the Educational and Cultural Committee, stated that the orthographical dictionary did not satisfy certain political criteria, in that it was intolerant towards the speech of the Serbian minority in Croatia and that it contained a great many archaisms which made it impractical. It was evident that the compilers of the dictionary rejected anything that could be called a Serbianism, with the result that it could not have been used in the Croatian school system, since to introduce it generally would have necessitated the establishment of a separate network of schools for the Serbs of Croatia. The use of archaisms and the elimination of Serbianisms showed that the Croats, having been forced to accept a linguistically inferior position, as they saw it, were determined to establish their literary language in a form as different from Serbian as possible and to underpin thereby the autonomy of Croatian nationhood.

Miroslav Krleza, writing in the Sarajevo weekly *Svjet*, put forward his own views on the language question.[31] 'Ever since I started writing, I have been writing in Croatian, just as Serbian writers write in Serbian. This is clear enough. And since it is clear, it would be advisable . . . to return to the state of affairs proposed by the 1946 draft Constitution, so that our languages would finally appear under their own names, as they really are, Croatian or Serbian.'

In the end, the campaign for the establishment and recognition of Croatian as a literary language in its own right was successful in Croatia, at least, when the Pedagogical Council decided that the school subject should no longer be called 'the Serbo-Croatian language' but 'the Croatian language', whilst the Serbs of Croatia were to have been asked what terminology they wanted to use. After the clampdown, this decision was rescinded.[32]

THE aspect of the Croatian national ideology that aroused most apprehension elsewhere in Yugoslavia was its conception of statehood. The equation of nationhood with statehood and statehood with sovereignty are the norm in Eastern Europe and the two multi-national states in the area—Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia—have found the efforts of their constituent nations to establish their statehood a permanent source of instability. Croatian statehood, however, raises certain additional problems of its own, notably the geographical dispersion of the Croat nation throughout the Balkans, with the result that Croatian national aspirations invariably come into conflict with other national ideologies, principally the Serbian.

This factor has frequently received recognition from Croatian national ideologists, who have, therefore, been willing to abandon the attributes of sovereignty—independence—in return for the satisfaction of Croatian

[31] 5 February 1971.
[32] The decision was taken on 19 November 1971; it was rescinded on 27 January 1972.

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national aspirations within a South Slav framework. This, in a nutshell, was the essence of Illyrianism in the nineteenth century. It also underlay the acceptance of the Yugoslav state in 1918–19 and the support for the re-establishment of Yugoslavia during and after the second world war. At all times, on the other hand, Croatian nationalism has expected the satisfaction of its aspirations in full within this framework, particularly with regard to Bosnia, and as these aspirations have inevitably brought the Croats into direct competition with the Serbs, who have more and more come to regard themselves as the guarantors of the continued existence of Yugoslavia, Croatian expectations have remained unfulfilled.

Illyrianism and its modern variants have not been strong enough to oust *pravastvo* entirely from the Croatian national ideology, for the two have coexisted uneasily and whenever the Illyrian impulse is seen to have failed the Croatian nation, there is a swing back to *pravastvo*. From the Croatian point of view, the two are not mutually exclusive, though they may appear so to other Yugoslav nations. In the 1960s, the implication of Croatian pronouncements on statehood and nationhood was that these were conceived of as operating within a Yugoslav framework, albeit one where the power of the centre—identified with Serbian national interests —was reduced to virtually nothing. The attempt by the Croats to define their statehood and sovereignty during the debates of 1971 came inevitably to be interpreted as separatism and given the history of Croatian separatism (especially the experience of the Serbs with the NDH), it was probably inevitable that Serbian fears should have been aroused about the future of Yugoslavia as one state. A complicating factor in the situation was that Serbian national fears reinforced and were reinforced by anxieties about the degree of political control exercised by the party in Croatia,[33] and this combination united the two most powerful political forces in the country—the power of the party and the power of the state, especially the army. That combination, backed by Tito's personal prestige and authority, proved irresistible.

At the same time, the prospects of the Croatian national movement were not helped by the emergence of the divergence between the official and popular conceptions of statehood during 1971, as represented by the party and the Matica Hrvatska respectively. Initially, it was the party that made its voice heard, as the Croatian leadership began to rely increasingly on Croatian nationalism as a source of political power in its campaign for greater devolution of power from the centre to the republics. At this stage—roughly late 1969 to early 1971—the Croatian leadership publicly committed to this policy included not only those who later became associated publicly with the national movement and were purged (Tripalo, Savka Dabcevic-Kucar), but also those who backed Tito in December 1971 (Bakaric, Jakov Blazevic). The watershed was the Zanko affair, when Milos Zanko, an elderly party veteran, was drummed

[33] In this sense, the students' strike of November 1971 was the Croatian national movement's ' 2000 words '.

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out of Croatian public life for having charged the party leadership with being over-tolerant towards nationalism.[34]

The concept of Croatian statehood put forward during this period envisaged a republic within Yugoslavia, proclaimed sovereign, with very far-reaching powers over political and economic matters. At the same time, all Croatian leaders stressed the class character of this sovereignty and the fact that it must remain based on the self-managing principle. Within this broad framework, however, there was more than enough room for the proclamation of a barely veiled nationalist ideology that in practice regarded the national interest as higher than that of class. Tripalo attempted to square the circle by suggesting that the state as an institution would be needed for a long time in order to afford protection to the area in which self-management could operate. He added that this might be described as étatism, but republican étatism was a very different animal from federal étatism, because the latter not only contained elements of class inequality, but also of national inequality.[35]

In a subsequent speech, Tripalo advanced the idea that the true defenders of the integrity of the Croatian nation had been the communists, because during the war the NDH had abandoned Dalmatia, Istria and the Medjumurje, whereas the communists had fought for and won the unity of all Croatian lands. He advocated a multi-national Yugoslavia, within which the Croats would finally realize their ancient objective—the establishment of a sovereign Croat state.[36] He rejected arguments that the mass movement in Croatia was nationalistic and anti-socialist:

> . . . The Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia [37] and the recently adopted constitutional amendments [have] exerted an influence on the renaissance, the revival and on the extension of this popular mass movement in Croatia, a movement which [already] existed at the time of our socialist revolution.[38]

Consequently, Tripalo regarded the Croatian national movement as 'an affirmation of socialism'. He dwelt specifically on his conception of statehood under the 1971 Yugoslav constitutional amendments:

> Our conception of statehood differs from all right-wing conceptions. It is a state of a special type, Croatia within the framework of Yugoslavia. It is the sovereign national state of the Croatian people and of the Serbs who live in it. Hence a state was involved and a socialist community that is based on the sovereignty of the people and on the power of the working class, in which full national equality has been established. . . .[39]

[34] In a series of five articles in *Borba*, 17–21 November 1969.
[35] *Slobodna Dalmacija*, 16 April 1971.
[36] Speech at Velika Gorica, on the twenty-sixth anniversary of the liberation. *Politika*, 11 June 1971.
[37] Which decided on the expulsion of Zanko, 15–17 January 1970.
[38] Speech at Bogomolje, 22 August 1971, on the thirtieth anniversary of the wartime rising in Croatia.
[39] Ibid.

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Bakaric emerged during 1971 as the representative of a far more cautious line towards the Croatian national state, once the Yugoslav constitutional amendments were enacted and the amendments to the Croatian constitution came up for discussion. First of all, Bakaric was reluctant to see every development in Yugoslavia in exclusively national terms. He rejected the argument—advanced by Croatian nationalists—that the centralist policy pursued by the party after 1945 had been pan-Serb domination and explained that at that time power was in the hands of a united and disciplined party which was in no way influenced by national considerations. The reason why nationalism had later emerged as a political factor was that the party and its ideology had stagnated, had not been sufficiently determined in the implementation of self-management and had thereby allowed the nationalists to establish themselves.[40] Bakaric was also distinctly uneasy about the definition of Croatia as a national state under the constitutional amendments, because of the implication that thereby Croatia was exclusively the state of the Croats and the other nationalities living there were no more than second-class citizens: 'A state does not consist of a nation, but of individual citizens; all citizens must be equal both as citizens and as ethnic groups as well.'[41] Bakaric feared that the establishment of Croatia as a national state would lead to what might be termed Croatian unitarism, which

> would drag us back to the old system of state acquisition of surplus value and state administration of surplus value. Croatian nationalism is insisting on a national state and on the disposal of surplus value by the state, but within a national framework.[42]

Bakaric specifically rejected the conception of statehood based exclusively on one nation:

> What is returning is the thesis that the basic constituting element of the nation is the state and that it is the state that wholly constitutes the nation. Therefore, considering that states are usually nation states, only one nation has the right to set up one [particular] state. As is well known, we rejected this thesis before the war.[43]

The insistence by the Croatian party leaders on the absolute equality of the Serbs of Croatia and on the necessity of having this enshrined in the Croatian constitution became the centre of gravity of the debate between the proponents of the official and the popular nationalist ideologies. The Serbs form about 15 per cent of the population of Croatia, but for historical reasons, they have played a disproportionately important role in Croatian politics since the war and were felt to be doing so by the Croats, who concluded, therefore, that 'Croatia is being run

40 Interview in *Vjesnik u Srijedu*, 21 July 1971.
41 Speech at Mostar, 1 November 1971, *Oslobodjenje*, 2 November 1971.
42 Speech at Karlovac, 8 November 1971, reported by Tanjug.
43 Speech to the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences, Zagreb, 24 November 1971, Tanjug.

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by Serbs '.[44] A very substantial proportion of the partisan army was made up of Serbian insurgents fighting for their existence against the NDH, so that the Serbs were very well represented in the post-war establishment in Croatia, playing a particularly important role in the army, the militia and the security forces. The position of the Serbian minority in Croatia rapidly became the touchstone of Croatian nationalism in 1971. The treatment of the Serbs was the yardstick by which the other nations of Yugoslavia judged the Croatian national movement, whilst among the ideologists of popular Croatian nationalism there was a marked drive towards a kind of national purity, common to most nationalist ideologies in Eastern Europe. It is also probable that for many Croats the Serbs—whether of Croatia or of Serbia proper—represented secret police rule, given that under Aleksander Rankovic the secret police was a Serbian national preserve.

The divergence of views within the Croatian party leadership on the position of the Serbs of Croatia, as represented by Bakaric and Tripalo, emerged in the apparently abstract debate on the nature of sovereignty and of the nation state. This development not only illustrated one of the recurring features of Croatian nationalism—an obsession with abstract legalisms—but it also produced two fundamentally different views on the relationship between the Croatian party and the Croatian nation. Bakaric, it would seem, was more or less prepared to jettison the national movement once the devolution of power to the republics had been enacted, whereas Tripalo was playing the far more dangerous game of attempting to rule by the consent of the national movement, the demands of which he could not satisfy in the final analysis. Tripalo firmly rejected requests from the Serbs of Croatia for a special status as a national group, which might be institutionalized. In summer 1971, the Serbs grew increasingly concerned about their future within a nationalist Croatia and put forward proposals which would have amounted to federalizing the Croatian republic. Indeed, an issue of *Prosvjeta*, the journal of the cultural association of the Serbs of Croatia, was banned because it had proposed separate representation for the Serbs in the Sabor. Finally, a meeting of the Prosvjeta society in October 1971 put forward a far-reaching and comprehensive action programme, designed to safeguard the political, cultural and national position of the Serbs of Croatia.[45] Had it been adopted, the programme would have given the Serbs of Croatia a well protected national position, which was, however, completely unacceptable from either the Croatian nationalist or communist point of view. Croatian spokesmen insisted that the best guarantee for

[44] Branko Horvat, ' Nationalism and Nation ', *Gledista*, May–June 1971. Not that this was the first instance of the phenomenon. During the final years of Austria-Hungary, the Serbs of Croatia were used by Budapest as a check on Croatian nationalists, a policy which Croats justly associate with the name of the Budapest-appointed governor Khuen-Hedervary. Hence the description of Vladimir Bakaric as ' Vladek-Hedervary ' which gained ground after December 1971.

[45] Details reported by Tanjug, 17 October 1971.

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the Serbs lay in the strengthening of the self-management system, not in special, entrenched clauses. Such privileges only strengthened the hands of both Croatian and Serbian chauvinists, it was argued.[46]

The ideology of popular nationalism was represented by the Matica Hrvatska and the weekly paper *Hrvatski Tjednik*, which the Matica began to publish in spring 1971. As the nationalists grew more and more critical of the official Croatian party line, *Hrvatski Tjednik* was correspondingly outspoken. The area where the popular nationalist ideology differed most markedly from the official line, whether that of Tripalo or of Bakaric, was that it failed to pay even lip service to the paramountcy of class over nation. The Matica line, as enunciated by spokesmen like Marko Veselica, did concern itself with social justice—indeed, one of the strongest arguments regarding the foreign exchange question was that Croatia needed more investment funds for its own backward regions—but it sought, first and foremost, the establishment of a Croatian state, within a federal Yugoslavia, in which it could provide the kind of defence that the Croat nation had never had and still needed. This was the overriding objective. Consequently, ' Croatian state sovereignty ' was a vital element of the new constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, because the institutional protection of the republican status under federal Yugoslavia —as it existed until the 1971 constitution—had been too weak against what the Croats perceived as a threat against their integrity as a nation. Under the 1971 constitutional amendments, the nationalists felt that finally they would be able to build the kind of institutional protection within Yugoslavia that other nations enjoyed in an international framework.

The proponents of the nationalist line were very much in the classic tradition of East European nationalist ideologies, with the significant exception that they were prepared to work within a kind of Yugoslav framework. The welfare of the nation was the paramount objective. Given the threats to which the nation was exposed—real or otherwise—from its competitors, it would erect the strongest barriers against the most dangerous of these competitors, the Serbs. Only when the institutional barriers were up could they then turn to look at what was needed to create the kind of society that Croatia should have, although probably no important figure among the popular nationalists seriously doubted that Croatia would continue to be governed by a Marxist ideology of some kind or another.

Veselica defined his position in the following terms:

> [The Croatian state] should protect the working class of the sovereign Croatian nation and it should also create a barrier against the penetration of concepts of economic and financial strategies opposed to global Croatian interests and to a correct Yugoslav framework. . . . The state must create a set of legal, political and police instruments, which will liquidate growths on the Croatian tissue

[46] Stjepan Ivic, President of the Republican Conference of the Socialist Alliance in Croatia, 29 September 1971, Tanjug.

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which prevent its expansion and which poison relations among the peoples of Yugoslavia.[47]

The thinking of the Matica was outlined in its submissions on the draft amendments to the Croatian constitution.[48] It was informed by substantially the same ideas. The Matica was critical of the amendments specifically on the grounds of national defence, because the draft amendments (Article 24), as they stood 'not only fail to secure the sovereignty of the Croatian people and of the Socialist Republic of Croatia in the sphere of national defence, but they also encroach upon that sovereignty to such an extent that they genuinely limit and jeopardize it, considering what is the role of the armed forces in all social systems and at all periods of time'. The submissions then made a number of specific proposals regarding the armed forces, calling for greater Croatian control over defence policy; for the establishment of Croatian as the language of command for units in Croatia (shades of Austria-Hungary); for citizens to serve in their own republics; and, if Serbian had to be the language of command for the army and air forces, then Croatian should be used in the navy, seeing that nine-tenths of the Yugoslav navy is located in Croatia.

What did not emerge with any clarity was how the Matica or other spokesmen of the popular nationalist ideology envisaged the relationship between a sovereign Croatia and the Yugoslav federation. At no point did they demand the secession of the Croatian republic from the federation, but equally they showed no real understanding of the impact of their demands on the other nations and republics of Yugoslavia, which tended to favour a more cohesively organized state than the Croats. As far as can be deduced from their definitions of the meaning of Croatian state sovereignty, the popular nationalist ideology would have been content with a fairly loose confederation of South Slav nations, in which each component would be free to pursue whatever policies it wanted, in foreign affairs and defence as well as other areas. Whether the resulting state organization would have been entitled to style itself a single state is another matter. Nonetheless, the popular nationalists seemed to have been equally determined to retain some links with the other South Slav republics, in order that Croatia might have some influence on the fate of the Croats outside the Croatian republican frontiers—in Bosnia and the Vojvodina. They also mounted or inspired a nationalist mobilization of these *Volkskroaten*, which not surprisingly became a source of very great concern to the leaderships in Bosnia and the Vojvodina.

In general, it is probably fair to say that the popular nationalists paid next to no attention to public relations in their campaign in the Yugoslav, as distinct from the Croatian, context. They failed to see that an upsurge of publicly advertised nationalism in Croatia would be regarded as a

[47] Tanjug, 19 November 1971.
[48] *Hrvatski Tjednik*, 5 November 1971.

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direct threat to the integrity of Yugoslavia by the Serbs, whose own nationalist ideology sees them in the role of the guarantors of Yugoslav unity (to say nothing of the problem of the Serbs of Croatia). As is so frequent in nationalist disputes, the Croats were blinded by what they felt were the injuries that their nation had suffered in the past and were determined to build up the strongest possible defences for the future, whatever the consequences for the rest of Yugoslavia. In this sense, the Croatian nationalist ideology, again like other East European nationalist ideologies, was inward-looking and could not see that short-term Croatian interests could not be considered in isolation from the interests of the other South Slav nations. The reasons for this introversion are clear enough—the threats to the integrity and survival of the Croat nation were perceived as so long-standing and so basic that their frustration became the first task for the defenders of Croatian nationhood.

THE consequences of the Croatian nationalist upsurge of 1971 are likely to plague Yugoslavia for many years. In the final analysis, the entire history of Yugoslavia has been dominated by the question of how the South Slav nations, having consented to unite into a single state, would arrange their mutual relations. The room for manoeuvre is limited, given the numerous areas where the Croatian and Serbian nationalist ideologies are in direct conflict, but it does exist, and if Yugoslavia is to remain a single state, its two most numerous constituent nations must somehow be given the security that they both feel has been lacking under all previous and currently existing arrangements. Consequently, sooner or later, Yugoslavia's present rulers will have to come to terms with Croatian nationalism and find a means of integrating it into a stable pattern of inter-nationality relations. Without this, its future as a single state is bound to remain in doubt, as the insecurity felt by the Croat nation will continue to act as a weakening factor. In this respect, the means used by the Yugoslav party to contain Croatian nationalism in December 1971 are highly questionable. To paraphrase Talleyrand, there are many ways of coping successfully with a nationalist movement, but sitting on it is not one of them. For the time being, Croatian nationalism has been swept under the carpet, but when it re-emerges, as it is bound to, it is likely to be markedly more intransigent as a political force, for the drive for self-protection will probably be even more desperate.

In 1971 the ideology of Croatian nationalism could still be classified as falling firmly into the category of a variant of Illyrianism rather than pure *pravastvo*, although the dividing line may have been blurred at times. Some of this Yugoslav orientation must be attributed to the memory of the NDH and the blight that it cast, even among Croats, over the political respectability of some other variants of Croatian nationalism. The chances are, however, that when Croatian nationalism re-emerges, that memory will have disappeared and it will have been overlaid by the

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mythicized view of 1971–72. Certainly, the mood in Croatia immediately after the clampdown reminded more than one correspondent of the atmosphere in Prague after the invasion, and Croatian students were reported as having explicitly identified themselves with the Czechoslovak experience.[49]

The widespread dismissals and imprisonments that followed the clampdown, which affected the intelligentsia most heavily, had left deep wounds on Croatian national self-consciousness by the autumn of 1972. Little or none of this was visible on the surface to the present author during a brief visit to Zagreb in late October. Life appeared to be completely normal and the crowds that surged through the Trg Republike seemed interested only in the daily round, rather than nationalist demonstrations. Nonetheless, probing below the surface, especially in conversation with intellectuals, a number of trends emerged.

The purge has come to be seen as something approaching an anti-Croat crusade. In general, the Croat view can be reduced to the proposition that in 1971 the Croat nation seemed at last to be within reach of the fulfilment of its age-old aspirations—the creation of a sovereign Croat state within Yugoslavia—only to have these hopes dashed at the last moment by intervention from Belgrade. Only a few intellectuals retained enough detachment to make a distinction between Belgrade as the centre of communist power and Belgrade as representing Serbian interests. For the majority, the attitude quoted by Paul Lendvai seemed typical[50]:

> It was a coup of the Serbian generals. This is a signpost for the future after Tito dies. We have lost our battle for the national cause. Perhaps we never had a chance. But now the Serbian gendarmes will come and impose law and order—just like forty years ago. . . .

By this token, feelings were one of helplessness, uncertainty about the future and a loss of confidence in the existing Yugoslav political system. This last symptom, if it should become even stronger, may well be the most serious consequence of Tito's intervention. The present Croatian leadership installed at his behest enjoys next to no popular support—though Ivo Perisin, the Croatian prime minister, is respected—and, in this sense, the Croats feel that they have no stake in the system. These feelings were shown most dramatically by the transformation of the funeral of Pero Pirker on 3 August 1972 into a mass demonstration of solidarity with the dismissed leadership of which he had been a member.[51]

Croatian reactions to the purge initiated by Tito, with the backing

[49] Bernard Margueritte in *Le Monde*, 7 January 1972 and Dan Morgan in *The Guardian* (reprinted from the *Washington Post*), 16 January 1972.

[50] Attributed to 'a young university lecturer' by Lendvai in his 'Letter from Zagreb—Yugoslavia in Crisis', *Encounter*, August 1972, p. 68.

[51] According to eyewitnesses, foreign and Yugoslav, the crowds numbered over 100,000; official spokesmen tried to play down the importance of the incident and Tanjug gave no indication of the size of the demonstration.

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of the army, of liberals in other republics, especially the ousting of Marko Nikezic from the leadership of the Serbian party, were a mixture of indifference and *Schadenfreude*, a classic East European response to the troubles of other nations. Towards the end of 1972, many Croats appeared ready to conclude from their interpretation of their national experience in 1971–72 that their national aspirations were unlikely to find satisfaction within the existing Yugoslav system and from this, it is a short step to look for the elusive goal of national satisfaction wholly outside any Yugoslav system. Consequently, it could well be that the Croatian national ideology will come to regard *pravastvo*, pure and simple, with far greater sympathy than at any time since 1941.

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Soviet-American Relations and the African Arena

Helen Desfosses Cohn *

THE claim is often made, even in this era when the focus of political analysis has allegedly gone ' beyond the Cold War ', that the goals and methods of Soviet and American foreign policy towards the Third World have been strikingly dissimilar. American scholars still decry Soviet efforts to use the developing nations as a lever for increasing world tension, while a reading of Soviet analysis provides, not surprisingly, a picture of the USSR as the peacemaker and the United States as the destabilizing force. However, an examination of Soviet and American policy towards Tropical Africa reveals a parallelism both of policy questions and policy response.

More precisely, it is instructive to compare Soviet and American policy in the sub-Saharan region in terms of the motivations for initial involvement, the nature of the activities implementing policy, the evolution of doctrine regarding the nature of the development process, and the current state of official thinking in Moscow and Washington regarding the advisability or utility of continued extensive commitment. Research along these lines highlights a very significant fact: faced with many of the same challenges in Tropical Africa, the policies of the Superpowers have been characterized by similar levels of dynamism, pragmatism and ideological concern.

THE comparative analysis of foreign policy is a valuable method of achieving cross-national generalizations. Of course, it can be argued that when one focus of inquiry is the USSR, this approach is a methodology in search of inputs. Thus, we know very little about the influence and bargaining position of Africanists within the Soviet bureaucracy, the type of information available, the nature of recruitment, etc.[1] In fact, if we accept Graham Allison's hypothesis that ' government behavior can be understood . . . less as the deliberate choices of leaders and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior ',[2] then the handicap imposed on comparative foreign policy analysts dealing with the USSR becomes all the more

* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the staff of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, in the preparation of this article.

1 See Graham Allison, ' Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis ', in Wolfram Hanreider (ed.), *Comparative Foreign Policy* (New York: McKay, 1971), pp. 345–61.

2 Ibid. p. 341. See also James R. Kurth, ' American Hegemony: A Thicket of Theories ', paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, St. John's, Newfoundland (June 1971), p. 16.

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apparent. Nevertheless, it is likely that a comparison of Soviet and American policies towards the small powers of Africa can help to elucidate the 'patterns of behavior' to which the Soviet foreign policy establishment adheres. For, as James Rosenau argued in a key article in the realm of comparative foreign policy studies, 'only by identifying similarities and differences in the external behavior of more than one national actor can analysis move beyond the particular case to higher levels of generalization'[3]—generalization regarding the questions of systemic adaptation and political process in the US and USSR.

The search for such generalizations is important not only for the clues it provides to the nature of Superpower behaviour, but also because it may call into question several hypotheses which have long dominated the analyses of many scholars and policy-makers in the United States.[4] These include the view that while the primary goal of US foreign policy is to guarantee stability, the USSR aims at maximizing world tension, the view that the Soviet policy-making establishment can better adapt to new crises and situations than the more ponderous US machine, the view that ideology influences Soviet foreign policy behaviour much more than considerations of national interest, thereby making Soviet African policy much more doctrinaire and revolutionary than its American counterpart, and finally, the view that American and Soviet goals and tactics, 'determined as they are by the character of the regimes', are qualitatively different. It is hoped that a review of a decade of Superpower interaction with the states of Tropical Africa will provide some basis for a revaluation of many of these propositions.

PRIOR to 1955, both the United States and the Soviet Union viewed the African states as potentially disruptive of their more important policy programmes elsewhere. Thus, until 1953, Stalin was largely suspicious of nationalist leaders, calling them 'bourgeois imperialist lackeys', as they were, allegedly, not truly interested in bringing about the decisive overthrow of the world colonial system. Their willingness, in many cases, to cooperate with the metropolitan power in establishing a timetable for independence did not further Stalin's interest in seeing the colonial powers diverted by revolutionary uprisings from close observation of Soviet activities in Europe.

In American government circles, this period witnessed John Foster Dulles essentially echoing the Zhdanovite thesis that 'he who is not with us is against us'. Dulles' wariness of Third World neutralism derived mainly from the preoccupation of American policy with Western Europe, and a concomitant reluctance to jeopardize good relations with anti-

[3] James Rosenau, 'Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy or Field', *International Studies Quarterly*, XII (September 1968), p. 308.

[4] Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 'US Specialists' Perceptions of Soviet Policy toward the Third World', paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois (September 1971).

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communist allies for the vague benefits of supporting non-alignment and/or independence. American intervention in colonial affairs would risk the disruption of the NATO alliance: directly, in that European partners might resent such interference, and the elimination of the colonial relationship might hamper Europe's post-war recovery[5]; indirectly, in that independent African states might encourage, or be unable to resist, communist encroachment.[6] Thus, as late as 1957, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs warned the African leaders publicly of the dangers of ' premature independence '.[7]

While American African policy remained substantially unchanged in its European orientation throughout the Eisenhower administration,[8] the Soviets were spurred by the success of the 1955 Bandung Conference of the Non-Aligned Nations to revise their calculations. They now spoke of the ability of Third World nationalism to diminish the power of the West. Furthermore, they began spending so much aid money in Africa that neutralism—nationalism's foreign policy variant—became a paying proposition. This reinforced the African ideological interest in Soviet communism with an economic one—a development which did not escape the United States and which shortly inspired them to increase the American presence on the African continent.

1960—African Independence Year (so named because it witnessed the admission of 17 new African states to the United Nations)—found the United States and the Soviet Union involved in a minor scramble for influence. Their motivations were largely the same, as were their methods: both powers used military and economic aid, as well as flattering exchange visits by Heads of State, not only to persuade the African leaders of the appropriateness of the communist or democratic development model, but to deny the African states to the rival power. From 1960–62, these goals were important enough on both sides—as was a sense of optimism that they could be realized—that the Superpowers appeared embarked on a preemptive policy of aid distribution and influence-garnering. Examples of this included the American practice of ' making aid extensions conditional upon the recipient's adoption of the US position ', and the Soviet use of propaganda and the timing of aid grants to portray the United States as uninterested in, if not inimical to, the true development of the Tropical African states.[9]

By 1962, the optimism which had characterized the African policies of both Washington and Moscow had been substantially attenuated. Four motivational strains had always been present, if not clearly defined,

5 *New York Times*, 8 May 1950.
6 *New York Times*, 16 May 1950.
7 Joseph Palmer II, ' The Problems and Prospects of Sub-Saharan Africa: A US Point of View ', *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 37 (9 December 1957), pp. 930–33; quoted in Waldemar Nielsen, *The Great Powers and Africa* (New York, 1969), p. 270.
8 Cf. Robert Walters, *American and Soviet Aid: A Comparative Analysis* (Pittsburgh, 1970), p. 10.
9 Walters, ibid. pp. 34–5.

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in these policies: (1) concern with securing foreign policy allies, (2) desire to spread one's belief-system or ideology, (3) concern with African development, and (4) expectation of economic gain; but over the next few years these became either so withered or so altered by the pressure of African realities that the result was only a minimal Superpower concern with the Tropical region under both LBJ and the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. This 'low profile' for Tropical Africa has persisted to the present day.

TO what extent has concern for securing foreign policy allies in the Cold War struggle varied as a motivational input in US and Soviet African policy? For American policy-makers interested in African development, the post-war Congressional concern with the communist threat has proved at various times both a boon and a barrier to their lobbying efforts. Throughout most of the 1950s, this concern led to an official intolerance of neutralist African states. For when the communist triumph in China and various other insurrections made it clear that the United States must become involved in a Development Assistance effort, the focus of these harried efforts was Asia and the Middle East—geographical areas apparently most threatened by the communist offensive and most vital to US security. The African colonies satisfied neither criterion. Furthermore, the few foreign policy utterances of nationalist leaders seemed to justify American lack of interest. As the American Deputy Under-Secretary of State remarked in 1950:

> the certainty of purpose which gives direction to our own outlook is not yet a characteristic of a third group of peoples—those who . . ., incredible as it may seem, are not yet committed in the struggle against Communist imperialism.[10]

The incredulity and the basic assumption of a bipolar framework in American foreign policy to which these remarks bear witness continued throughout the Eisenhower administration. Africa remained a footnote to US foreign policy efforts in the Third World, receiving only 350 million dollars in military and economic assistance during the period 1952–57, compared to 1·9 billion dollars for Latin America and 12·6 billion dollars for Asia and the Middle East.[11]

By 1960, American assistance to Africa had reached the 1 billion dollar mark, a separate Bureau for African Affairs had been established in the Department of State, and Eisenhower was appealing to the United Nations General Assembly for an end to the Cold War in Africa. However, such evidence of change was counterbalanced by several factors: (1) the 1959 American-sponsored defeat of a UN resolution on

[10] *New York Times*, 16 May 1950; quoted in Christopher Angell, 'The US and Sub-Saharan Africa 1945–1962', unpublished Honors Thesis, Harvard, 1966, p. 21.

[11] Paul Hammond, *The Cold War Years: American Foreign Policy since 1945* (New York, 1969), p. 123.

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the issue of pre-independence elections in the French Cameroon; (2) the overwhelming indications that foreign aid to Africa was dispensed to counter growing Soviet involvement; (3) the continued imbalance between assistance to Africa and to other Third World areas; (4) the reaction of the United States to Ghana's policies vis-à-vis the Congo crisis. Thus, in September 1960, when Nkrumah stated in the UN General Assembly that the UN should ' delegate its functions in the Congo to the independent African states . . . especially those . . . whose contributions in men and material made the UN effort in the Congo possible ', Secretary of State Christian Herter denounced this as an anti-American position. He interpreted this speech as evidence that Nkrumah was ' very definitely moving towards the Soviet bloc '.[12]

The inauguration of John F. Kennedy seemed to herald a departure in US African policy, a determined effort to shift its emphasis from supporting bastions of anti-communism on that continent to aiding the cause of African development. However, while it is not our purpose here—nor is it within our capabilities—to resolve the recently revived dispute over promise versus performance during the Kennedy years, JFK's record on Africa displays much of the ambivalence and imbalance of previous administrations. On the one hand, there were many signs of movement away from the Cold War mentality and from an appraisal of African countries almost entirely in terms of their role in US alliance-building efforts. Thus, in the first months of Kennedy's administration, the US refused to consider Moise Tshombe's rightist political affiliations sufficient grounds for supporting him in the Congolese leadership struggle. Furthermore, the government agreed to help Nkrumah finance construction of the Volta Dam. Then 1962 marked the first year of the Agency for International Development, an umbrella agency designed to impose some cohesion and consistency on US aid efforts.

However, appraisal of Tropical African regimes from a Cold War perspective seemed still to be the main determining factor. It can, of course, be argued that Kennedy and G. Mennen Williams (the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) fully intended to bring about a fundamental policy re-evaluation, but that their efforts to shift the emphasis of African programmes from strategic to developmental considerations were thwarted by a reluctant Congress. Nevertheless, Kennedy's vision of a world-wide Soviet-American confrontation and his ensuing policies in Cuba and Berlin meant that Africa was pushed into the background. It also meant a perhaps understandable, but still unfortunate, attempt to sell his foreign aid programme on the basis of the standard ' aid for anti-communism ' plea. In the end, the appropriation act for the so-called ' Decade of Development ' enshrined the following rather anti-developmental dictum (paraphrased from an earlier Kennedy

[12] *New York Times*, 24 September 1960; cited in W. Scott Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957–1966* (Princeton, 1969), pp. 165–6.

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speech): 'In the administration of these funds great attention and consideration should be given to those nations which share the view of the United States on the world crisis'.[13]

The March 1963 Report of the Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World took up this theme once again. This committee, headed by General Lucius Clay, had been charged by Kennedy with assessing the contribution of American aid efforts (both military and economic) to US security. It recommended that aid to Africa be reduced, for Tropical Africa, according to the group's apparent distance-from-the-USSR index, was not deemed essential to the 'frontier of freedom'.[14]

When Lyndon Johnson assumed the Presidency several months later, the sentiments expressed in the Clay Report characterized his African policy. Although the United States was still very much involved in the search for allies elsewhere in the world, Africa was not an important focus. The Johnson administration rejected the opportunity for the consolidation of influence presented by the Nigerian Civil War, apparently deeming relations sufficiently strong to withstand American non-involvement, and considering any attempt to impress other African governments to be of marginal utility. The Nixon administration recognized that the arms embargo and US relief efforts had 'seriously strained United States-Nigerian relations'. However, the fact that by 1970 Nigeria ranked as America's largest trading partner in Tropical Africa confirmed, in Secretary of State Rogers' opinion, the correctness of the non-involvement policy.[15] In relation to other Black African states, the Nixon Doctrine of urging self-reliance and self-defence has meant that the level of relative neglect has increased. The Nixon Doctrine and the dramatic summits in Moscow and Peking have shifted the primary emphasis of US foreign policy from alliance-building to bilateral or tri-partite agreements among the privileged ranks of the Superpowers.

Yet while Nixon's *tours de force* in Peking and Moscow indicate fundamental shifts in some aspects of US policy, certain academic and official analysts will entertain neither the idea that these shifts could affect US policies in Africa nor that there has been a corresponding re-evaluation of methods and goals by the USSR. However, as David Morison has written, 'the easy clue to Soviet policies in the third world, that their essential aim is the replacement of Western with Soviet influence, must at least be modified if recent voices from Moscow are to be believed'.[16]

[13] Public Law 87–329, Section 112, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, 30 September 1961; cited in Arnold Rivkin, *The African Presence in World Affairs* (New York, 1963), p. 228.

[14] See *The Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance Programs*. Report to the President of the United States from the Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1963). See also Nielsen, op. cit. pp. 288–98.

[15] *United States Foreign Policy, 1969–1970. A Report of the Secretary of State* (Washington, D.C., 1971), pp. 138–40.

[16] David Morison, 'USSR and Third World II: Questions of Foreign Policy', *Mizan*, XII, No. 2 (November 1970), p. 71.

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IT must be acknowledged that prior to 1965 the acceptance of such 'easy clues' was more or less warranted, especially regarding Soviet policy towards Tropical Africa. For Khrushchev inaugurated a policy towards nationalist movements based on a pragmatic assessment of their potential as a wedge for the expansion of Soviet national influence. The relative ease with which Moscow was able to use the sale of arms to Egypt to thwart the consolidation of the Baghdad pact indicated to Khrushchev that a power vacuum existed in the Third World—one which he might be able to exploit for Soviet goals. Furthermore, the success of the 1955 Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned Nations (to which the USSR was not invited) and the rush of African states towards independence indicated the ability of Third World nationalism to affect the course of world politics through its foreign policy variant, neutralism or non-alignment.[17]

Moscow not only appreciated the potential of the African nationalist movement somewhat earlier than Washington, but also, in the Soviet paradigm, Africa assumed a relatively significant position. The simple fact that it had not been included in the alliance efforts of the Eisenhower administration meant that to gain political *entrée* would be easier there than in other developing areas. Furthermore, the neutralist posture of certain African nationalist leaders evoked the hope that they would welcome a force (the USSR) which could balance the previously overwhelming power of the capitalist states. Finally, once a sphere of influence was established in Tropical Africa, it might lend credibility to Soviet efforts to appear as champion of the broader camp of non-aligned nations (especially vis-à-vis the People's Republic of China).

The USSR accordingly rushed to fill the vacuum left in Guinea by the precipitate departure of the French in 1958. Then in February 1961—the very month that Patrice Lumumba's assassination ended the abortive Soviet efforts to exploit the Congo crisis—Brezhnev visited Nkrumah. His sojourn seemed to indicate that specific policy disagreements would be overlooked (Nkrumah had been a vocal opponent of Russia's Congo policy) in the interest of expanding the Soviet presence in the Tropical region.[18]

However, as the author has argued elsewhere,[19] that there were limits to Soviet interest in Tropical Africa was apparent even in the early years of Soviet involvement. While Khrushchev was engaging in optimistic rhetoric, Soviet policies provided evidence of a more sober analysis. This evidence, in the interest of brevity, can be reduced to two categories: firstly, the USSR's posture in the Katanga secession crisis; and, secondly, Soviet behaviour in the broader, supra-African arena.

[17] Helen Desfosses Cohn, *Soviet Policy toward Black Africa: The Focus on National Integration* (New York; Praeger, 1972), pp. 25–26.

[18] Note, however, Thompson's remark that when Nkrumah returned the visit later that year, the Russians promised nothing concrete but the purchase of 60,000 tons of cocoa—and this they did only when the world market price was low. Thompson, op. cit. p. 177.

[19] Cohn, op. cit. pp. 258–59.

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Regarding the first, it is not improbable that the Russians might have welcomed the Congolese crisis if the USSR could have profited from it. However, they had supported Patrice Lumumba, and when he was assassinated in February 1961, they lost all hope of turning the crisis to their advantage. Equally important, the chaos surrounding the Congolese events made it apparent to the Kremlin that national instability in Black Africa would not advance the cause of socialism. Such events could be manipulated by the imperialist powers to reconsolidate their influence; in addition, the issue of 'imperialist intervention' in the Congo had intensified the split between the Monrovia and Casablanca groupings, thereby decreasing the USSR's chances of extending its influence over the continent as a whole. Finally, the Katanga secessions demonstrated that slogans regarding the right to self-determination could be manipulated by tribal interests, further hindering the tribal-national-all-proletarian progression deemed so essential to the success of Marxism-Leninism.

Soviet policy from a global perspective indicated that Africa was destined to be relegated to a secondary place in Soviet foreign policy strategy also. In 1960, Khrushchev made it clear to the United Nations General Assembly that the Soviet Union would not support the expansion of the UN Councils to admit more African members unless Communist China were represented. Furthermore, he demanded that the 'universal' issue of disarmament take precedence over the 'local' issue of colonialism. Then, in September 1961, Moscow announced its intention to resume atmospheric nuclear testing on the eve of the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, indicating that the views of Third World nations were secondary to the concerns of the Big Power struggle. Finally, the Soviet refusal to offer any but the most indirect support to colonial revolutions against the Great Powers (for example, in the Franco-Algerian conflict) demonstrated that for Moscow, as for Washington, considerations of European policy tended to be paramount. If the activities of the Tropical African states were helpful in this regard, then the views of their leaders might be accorded more serious consideration. However, in bilateral dealings, and also in the halls of the United Nations, the Soviets had found that non-alignment had little practical significance for the USSR.

> The policy of non-alignment shows itself, on the one hand, in the desire to rise above the fundamental opposition of the modern age, that between the two social and economic systems, and to smooth it over and reconcile it or to seek compromise solutions satisfying both sides. This finds its expression in the new states' support for declarations and resolutions on the problems of peace maintenance, disarmament, the rights of man, etc., usually of a broad and general character. On the other hand, the policy of non-alignment constitutes a balancing between the two groups of

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countries, and an attempt to turn their existing opposition to use and profit.[20]

THE concern of the African leaders with maximizing their advantage is understandable to both Soviet and American officials schooled in the tactics of *Realpolitik*. However, such understanding will not cause them to overlook the fact that the benefits accruing to the Superpowers from a continued close relationship with Tropical Africa—benefits of both a strategic and ideological nature—have been minimal.

This realization can be attributed, as it has been by many, to a mood of isolationism in both Washington and Moscow, or, perhaps more accurately, to a wave of cost-benefit analysis. The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, and the Johnson and Nixon administrations, have calculated that increasing domestic political and economic pressures, intra-alliance conflict, and involvement in the strategically more important areas of Vietnam and the Middle East necessitate the subjection of African policies to new scrutiny.

The process and timing of this scrutiny has been very similar in Moscow and Washington, as has its effects: Nigeria has become the dominant focus of Soviet and American involvement in Tropical Africa. Washington is impressed with Nigeria's 'democratic' orientation, and more importantly, its position as the most populous and prosperous Black African state. Similar calculations influenced the USSR's policy during the Nigerian civil war. It is true that supporting Biafra might have secured for the USSR the allegiance of dissatisfied minority groups on the African continent; however, the economic and power potential of most of these groups was even weaker than that of the Ibos. On the other hand, the advantages of supporting the Nigerian Federal government seemed more impressive. These included the possibilities of securing access to the Nigerian market, displacing the British and hopefully the Americans from their dominant position in Nigerian politics, and, finally, ensuring the identification of France with a losing cause. Furthermore, in the African arena, Soviet support for General Gowon might impress governments throughout Tropical Africa, several of which are also subject to secessionist pressures, and enable the USSR to gain broader influence among Africa's many military regimes. Finally, the USSR would increase the chances of stability prevailing on the African continent. Stability in Black Africa is essential to the USSR, as neither their economic nor their power resources can undergo further serious challenges or strains. Ideological expansionism and Cold War competition have not been compelling Soviet concerns in Tropical Africa for a long time.

IN the early stages of their African involvement, both the United States and the Soviet Union were concerned with extending their ideologies

[20] A. A. Lavrishchev (ed.), *Razvivayushchyesiya strany v mirovoi politike* (The Developing Countries in World Politics), (Moscow: 1970), pp. 209–10.

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to the new states. This emphasis was a reflection of the prevailing atmosphere of Cold War competition. For by aiding the establishment of a mirror-system, each Superpower could list this not only as another link in its security/alliance network, but also as proof of the superiority of its own model. The Soviet Union and the United States shared not only the goal, but also a sense of optimism that it could be realized. In fact, for a short time, the hopes of both were concentrated on the same state—Nigeria.[21] Furthermore, in the race for ideological influence in Tropical Africa, writers on both sides penned laments about the unfair advantage of the competitor. Thus, the United States was said to possess greater financial resources, while the Soviet Union, on the other hand, could more 'easily take advantage of the violent anti-Westernism' and the fact that 'Soviet policy . . . has no long-run stake in the relaxation of tensions or in political stability'.[22]

Although Washington and Moscow became involved in Tropical Africa partly to win converts to their belief-systems, the importance of the African states' receptivity varied widely for both Superpowers over the years. Representatives of the Eisenhower administration, as already noted, tended to interpret moves not in accord with American policy as evidence of anti-Americanism. John F. Kennedy apparently attempted to develop a new correlation between ideological considerations and aid allocations; in the first months of his administration, it seemed that the emphasis of American policy was shifting from one of rewarding 'friendly' states to one of using aid to win converts. (Note that both the United States and the Soviet Union were thwarted in their efforts to buy ideological allies.) Thus, Kennedy ignored the complaints of even the most liberal Democratic Senators (e.g. Church, McGee and Moss) against Nkrumah's domestic policies and agreed to participate in the financing of the Volta Dam. His hope was that US involvement would halt, or at least temper, Nkrumah's move to the left. When this hope was not realized, the demand was voiced in certain official circles in the United States that aid be withheld from 'socialistic projects'.[23] Roger Hilsman has remarked that this reaction was not surprising. Given Kennedy's 'oversell' of the foreign aid programme, i.e. his promise that it would not only assist American alliance-building efforts, but also lay the foundations for democracy in the Third World, the gap between promise and reality disappointed both liberals and conservatives.[24]

Such disappointment only increased in succeeding years. This mood, combined with the perception of more pressing economic and political

21 L. Kim, 'Pervyi god nezavisimosti Nigerii' (Nigeria's First Year of Independence), *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, No. 8 (August 1961), pp. 96–9.

22 Hans Jeymann, Jr., 'Soviet Foreign Aid as a Problem for United States Policy', *World Politics*, XII, No. 4 (July 1960), pp. 529–30. Also, Lucian Pye, 'The Foreign Aid Instrument: Search for Reality', in Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good (eds.), *Foreign Policy in the Sixties* (Baltimore, 1965), p. 101.

23 See the 1963 Clay Report, quoted in Nielsen, op. cit. p. 298. See also Thompson op. cit. p. 169.

24 Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 547.

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concerns elsewhere, not only produced a steady decrease in US assistance to Africa, but also coloured American reactions to the policies of these states. Under Lyndon Johnson,

> the Americans no longer reacted to Nkrumah's machinations as if they just had nuisance value. They now saw concrete American interests as being affected. Nkrumah could threaten the status quo in Africa, he could undermine regimes friendly to America. . . .[25]

The Johnson administration did not consider making allowances for regimes so heavily committed to an independent foreign policy and to a programme of domestic centralism. Rather, as AID (Agency for International Development) Administrator David Bell wrote in 1966, the United States was most interested in those countries fostering 'multiple sources of private and local initiative and energy'.[26] The Nixon administration has reaffirmed these principles, explaining that African governments tolerant of free enterprise—and hence of the middle class, the backbone of democracy—would be the foci of US contacts with the sub-Saharan regimes. The states of Mali, Zaïre (Congo-Kinshasa), Kenya and Nigeria were lauded for their 'progressive people', 'encouragement of Western investment', and sound political traditions.[27]

Soviet concern with the ideological orientation of the Tropical African states shows similarities and contrasts with the progress of United States views. The approaches are similar in that Khrushchev displayed both a tolerance of nationalist leaders in the early 1960s and an optimism that Soviet economic aid and political influence would help these leaders to realize the superiority of the socialist path. In May 1964, in a no less authoritative vehicle than an editorial in *Kommunist*, it was proclaimed that nationalism, if it is truly based upon patriotism, 'must inevitably develop on the side of socialism'.[28] Such optimism, which began to attenuate even under Khrushchev, has not been a hallmark of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. However, unlike US administrations since the late 1960s, the present Soviet regime has not combined pessimism (or realism) with a continued insistence on an African state's ideological potential as a main determinant of aid policies. Many observers, of course, would argue that Soviet ideologues have always displayed great flexibility and that this provides evidence only of a tactical variation. However, in the words of William Zimmerman,

> in matters touching on the Soviet Union's external relations, there have been important changes in the roles of ideology, coupled with the *alterations in core doctrinal positions.* It was, moreover, the

[25] Thompson, op. cit. p. 395.

[26] David Bell, 'The Quality of Aid', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1966), p. 604.

[27] *United States Foreign Policy 1969–1970*, pp. 140–52. Note also the 1969 charge to AID that it stress the development of democratic institutions in administering its funds. Walters, op. cit. p. 56.

[28] '*Soyuz sil sotsializma i natsionalno-osvoboditelnogo dvizheniya*' ('Union of the Forces of Socialism and the National-Liberation Movement'), *Kommunist*, No. 8 (May 1964), p. 9.

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> ideological high priests who were in large measure the instigators of that process. . . . Given the diminished role of ideology in analysis, it follows almost by definition that ideology served less as a guide to action than it had in previous Soviet analysis and that the conscious and purposive dimensions of Soviet ideology had been lessened.[29]

The pragmatic approach of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime to its African programme was made clear by late 1966. The moderation of ideological formulations as well as of policies was intensified by efforts to bridge the gap with the Communist Chinese (who considered Khrushchev's flights of ideological fancy intolerable) and by the sudden overthrow of Ghana's Nkrumah earlier in the year. In the ideological sphere, the emphasis of the Khrushchev era on the positive aspects of African nationalism now gave way to an emphasis on the 'tendencies of national superiority and egoism'. As a prominent Soviet analyst noted in *Kommunist*,

> these tendencies not only do not aid the interests of the future *rapprochement* of the national-liberation movement with other contemporary revolutionary forces, but also do not aid the strengthening of the anti-imperialist solidarity of the peoples of Asia and Africa. . . . Besides this, reactionary nationalism, as a rule, is inextricably connected with anti-communism.[30]

Meanwhile, in the not unrelated sphere of policy, the present Soviet regime has not confined its African involvement largely to states with compatible belief-systems. Instead, Moscow seems to have concluded that although it would be wasteful to spend time and money in Africa with the aim of effecting revolutionary transformations, a smaller amount of aid could be used effectively to further the national interests of the Soviet state. Thus, whereas prior to 1967 Soviet aid offers 'were concentrated on a limited number of recipients, usually of radical political orientation, by the end of 1967, aid went to 14 states, including Nigeria and Tanzania, countries which had never previously received Soviet aid'.[31] Furthermore, ambassadors were exchanged for the first time with Upper Volta and the Ivory Coast—countries previously described as 'presidential dictatorships'.

The decision to extend Soviet diplomatic and economic relations to such Tropical African states indicates that, for the USSR, the stability and low economic drain of such contacts is more important than considerations of ideological affinity and revolutionary potential. After all, Nkrumah's Ghana apparently had satisfied both these criteria: it was deemed leftist in its foreign policy, and had also been named a national

29 William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956–1967* (Princeton, N.J., 1969), pp. 287–9. Emphasis added.

30 K. Brutents, '*Voprosy ideologii v natsionalno-osvoboditelnom dvizhenii*' ('Questions of Ideology in the National-Liberation Movement'), *Kommunist*, No. 18 (December 1966), p. 40.

31 Nielsen, op. cit. pp. 203, 206.

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democracy—an accolade accorded only to those governments with the strongest non-capitalist orientation. Furthermore, Nkrumah's invulnerability to military coups provided additional proof of the progressive nature of his regime, for such coups were deemed part of a big 'swing to the left' in Tropical Africa.[32]

Needless to say, Nkrumah was overthrown by the Ghanaian military two months after the publication of these rather sanguine remarks. The initial Soviet reaction to this event was multifaceted, with allegations of CIA complicity commingling with acknowledgments of Nkrumah's errors. Finally, in August 1966, two prominent Soviet analysts made public the ideological and policy conclusions drawn from the Ghana debacle. In a *Pravda* article somewhat wistfully entitled 'Intrigues of Imperialism in Africa',[33] Iskenderov and Starushenko explained the dominance of socio-economic considerations over 'the choice of the correct path' in the current epoch. They explained that large-scale adoption of the 'forms and methods typical of developed states' could cause great havoc in African states, especially since a premature transition could alienate 'the middle strata'. Thus, in language reminiscent of American injunctions to respect and promote the interests of the African middle class, these Soviet commentators warned that 'an alliance with these [middle] strata has always had and continues to have great importance for the successful development of the national-liberation revolution in Africa'. The implication was clear: the desire for stability, moderation, and gradualism characteristic of the middle strata should influence strongly the policy choices of African regimes.

BUDGETARY considerations are among the most salient, if not paramount, concerns of the United States and the Soviet Union in mapping out the extent and nature of their Tropical African involvement. The policy-makers of both countries have come under increasing pressure from allies, domestic interest groups, and the sheer intractability of major crises at home and abroad. As a result, considerations of Tropical African development have become more the concern of speechmakers and humanitarians than of foreign policy bureaux and presidential advisers. The important role to be played by the United Nations in redressing the gap between rich nations and poor nations is a subject of political comment in both capitals. However, as indicated by their reaction to the demands for preferential treatment voiced by the Third World nations at the UNCTAD meetings (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), neither Superpower is prepared to make any extensive commitments that would require a re-evaluation of its own national goals and priorities.

[32] See Lev Stepanov, 'Third World in Three Dimensions', *New Times*, No. 2 (10 January 1966), pp. 3–5.

[33] *Pravda*, 14 August 1966, p. 4.

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As we have seen, American foreign aid appropriations began to encounter stiff Congressional resistance during the Kennedy administration. The pleas of Kennedy and many Administration spokesmen were several: foreign aid, with its buy-American strings, would increase American exports [34]; the programme was preferable to trade concessions since it enabled the US to retain control of the flow of economic resources; Americans should not interpret independent policy moves by African states as evidence of ingratitude. However, while proposing no workable alternative to the existing programme, Congress responded by slashing the 1963 appropriations bill.

This mood has continued. While Lyndon Baines Johnson was president, the level of the AID programme fell by almost 50 per cent. The burden fell most heavily on the states of Tropical Africa, as can be seen from the fact that the 1967 Congress not only cut the aid budget,

> but excluding Latin America, it imposed a world-wide limit of twenty on the number of countries to receive development loans and of forty on the number to receive technical assistance. For Africa, this meant that only a handful would be able to receive significant capital assistance for their development programs and that bilateral activities of AID would be closed in about twenty-five countries.[35]

That this cutback should have occurred in spite of the dire implications of the 1966 'McNamara Poverty Thesis' [36] and the rising incidence of military coups and other forms of political instability in Tropical Africa, provided ample indication that American attention was becoming increasingly inner-directed. As Senator Frank Church (Democrat, Idaho) wrote in the *New York Times*, 'the long-run influence we exert abroad will hinge, in large measure, upon the kind of society we build in our own land'.[37] Corollaries to this argument were, as voiced by the Nixon administration, that the United States should be interested in Tropical African countries that were 'good areas for investment', and that 'the primary responsibility for accelerating development, of course, rests with the developing countries themselves. Their resources, their labor, their will to succeed, are the basic elements of progress.' [38]

The United States will assume a larger part of this responsibility if strategic considerations are involved. Thus,

> of the total economic aid distributed by AID and its predecessor agencies to the less developed countries through fiscal year 1968, almost half went to nine [countries] in the United States alliance system (South Vietnam, South Korea, Pakistan, Turkey, Taiwan, Greece, Iran, Thailand, and the Philippines).[39]

[34] *New York Times*, 18 September 1963.
[35] Nielsen, op. cit. pp. 321, 326.
[36] 'There's a direct and constant relationship between the incidence of violence and the economic status of the countries affected.'
[37] Frank Church, 'We are In Too Deep in Asia and Africa', *New York Times Magazine*, 14 February 1965.
[38] *United States Foreign Policy 1969–1970*, pp. 140–52, 213.
[39] Walters, op. cit. p. 15.

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However, in the effort to ensure United States security, Tropical Africa—a region thousands of miles from the focus of the struggle and never a part of the post-war US alliance network—does not loom very large. Furthermore, in a domestic political climate where official American development assistance reached its lowest point in 10 years in 1971,[40] aid to Tropical Africa will suffer even greater reductions.

AS with the United States, Soviet offers of economic aid plummeted sharply after 1965. Thus, whereas from 1954–65, such offers to Tropical Africa totalled $271 million and had been extended to 14 states, in 1966, the figure dropped to $32 million for three states, and in 1967, to only $9 million for two states. 1971 saw the lowest annual Soviet commitment in almost a decade.[41] However, what is even more interesting than the fact of this reduction or the timing is that the explanation mirrors that of the American experience. The Soviet government has been plagued by a major intra-alliance conflict, dissatisfaction among the East European members of the bloc, and pressure from consumer and other domestic interest groups. Furthermore, as Kosygin himself has explained, the USSR is also burdened by its commitments in the Middle East and the Vietnam arena.[42]

The result of these political and economic pressures, combined with the disappointments in Mali, Ghana, etc., is that Moscow has become very realistic in its goals, expectations and prescriptions for the Tropical African states. In fact, as Nielsen indicates, ' Soviet spokesmen by late 1966 and 1967 were advocating measures almost indistinguishable from the recommendations of American experts on technical assistance and economic development '.[43] For example, the Soviet government seems more concerned that a balanced pattern of economic growth and internal stability be achieved than that the African states should follow the potentially dislocative measures dictated by the socialist model. As a result, even a cursory reading of the latest Soviet books on African development reveals a noticeable tolerance of ' private initiative ', foreign investment, and the acceptance of capitalist foreign aid. The Soviets realize the moderation of these measures, but they are quick to answer their critics:

> In present-day conditions . . . it is naive to think that ' with a leftist phrase ' and by verbal revolutioneering one can achieve the overthrow of imperialism in the West and redistribution of existing world resources in the interests of the peoples of the three underdeveloped continents, as they hope in Peking.[44]

[40] *New York Times*, 30 January 1972, III, p. 12. Note also that in 1971 the US ranked 12/16 among OECD members in contributions as percentage of GNP.
[41] *New York Times*, 28 December 1971, p. 5.
[42] See the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/3234/E/4, 1 December 1969.
[43] Nielsen, op. cit. p. 205.
[44] S. I. Tyulpanov, *Ocherki politicheskoi ekonomii: razvivayushchyesiya strany* (*Notes on Political Economy: The Developing Countries*), (Moscow: Mysl, 1969), pp. 137–38.

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Of course, the image of the USSR as bearer of the ultimately victorious politico-economic tradition must be maintained; under no circumstances, therefore, should the impression even unwittingly be fostered that capitalist aid is as good as socialist aid. As Obminsky warns, '"one dollar" does not just mean "one dollar", no more and no less'.[45] Nevertheless, this concern with long-term revolutionary prospects in no way implies that Moscow is prepared to reinstitute the pre-emptive aid policies of the early 1960s. As Tyulpanov points out,

> The dimensions of the socialist aid potential are limited not only in relation to the needs of the developing countries, but also in comparison to the size of the loans and grants given by the imperialist states. The creation of the material and technical base of socialism and Communism demands colossal capital investments. . . . Here there is not and cannot be 'surplus capital' by the very economic nature of socialism. The socialist countries have never entered into competition with capitalism in the volume of capital resources they export to the developing countries and in the existing stage of development they cannot do so.[46]

In other words, the exigencies of the capitalist-socialist struggle are no longer such that Moscow is prepared to sacrifice the realization of its own domestic priorities.

IT has long been an accepted truism when making comparisons between Soviet and American assistance programmes that while the USSR was primarily concerned with political considerations, the concerns of the United States were more purely economic. Two points regarding this analysis should be made. First of all, while the motivations of the USSR were, at one time, political, they applied more to attempts to change the orientation of an African regime than to efforts to affect the process of development. Secondly, since the advent of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, the distinction between American and Soviet goals has tended to blur. The Soviet relationship with the countries of Tropical Africa, discussed in the late 1950s and early 1960s primarily in terms of political ramifications, is now evaluated in light of the objective domestic capabilities of African states and their effect on the economic and trade position of the USSR. No longer are calls for the rapid and relatively selfless development of Tropical Africa common in Soviet writings. Rather, there is a noticeable trend towards balancing the needs of the region against the necessity of securing a significant return on the investments of the USSR.

Like the United States, therefore, where the Nixon administration's 'new' emphasis on 'social innovations' and 'institutional capacity' is found to refer almost totally to the need for creating an adequate base for

[45] E. Ye. Obminsky, *Vneshneyekonomicheskiye svyazi razvivayushchikhsiya stran* (*Foreign Economic Ties of the Developing Countries*), (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1970), p. 228.

[46] Tyulpanov, op. cit. p. 135.

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the application of modern technology,[47] Soviet writers seem increasingly to be equating the success of the non-capitalist path to development with economic stability, debt repayment, and industrialization.[48] Another parallel between the Superpowers' African policies is that the absence of overt concern with African political development results from 'uncertainty' about the relation of aid to *any* type of development'.[49] A decade of foreign aid has done little to alleviate the traditional African problem of over-bureaucratization, the urban-rural gap, and tribalism; furthermore, the political instability index seems to be increasing.

A final similarity between the development programmes of the Superpowers is that even projects restricted to economic development are severely limited in size and scope. Both countries urge the Africans to develop greater self-reliance; both have increased the significance attached to workability and profitability in evaluating requests for aid. According to one Soviet writer, a socialist country should be guaranteed 'not only the recovery of its actual expenditure, but also a definite return on the resources invested'.[50]

Soviet analysts will grant that the return should, perhaps, be less than that sought by the capitalist states in order that Moscow may retain some symbolic advantage in its relations with Tropical African states. Trade, meanwhile, will take into account the fraternal duty of the USSR to aid the less developed countries, and might involve importing goods with a higher degree of finishing than is usually the case. However, it is felt that the obligation to help these countries transcend the limitations imposed by a monocultural economy should not blind the USSR to the relatively low-cost raw materials which these restricted economies can provide for its development needs.[51] Nor should the Soviet Union overlook the fact that any price subsidies or artificial regulation of prices, however morally appealing, must involve reducing the standard of living of the Soviet people. This cannot be tolerated. For only if the USSR is a strong and ever-growing economy can the eventual success of the anti-imperialist revolution be assumed.[52]

OF course, it can be argued that for the United States and the Soviet Union, as for any Great Power, an uneasy truce always obtains between considerations of international goals and responsibilities and

[47] *United States Foreign Policy 1969–1970*, op. cit. pp. 215–6. See also Bell, loc. cit. pp. 601–7, and Robert Packenham, 'Political Development Doctrines in the American Foreign Aid Program', *World Politics*, XVIII, No. 2 (January 1961), pp. 194–235.

[48] R. A. Ulyanovsky, '*Aktualnye problemy natsionalno-osvoboditelnogo dvizheniya*' ('*Actual Problems of the National-Liberation Movement*'), *Narody Azii i Afriki* (No. 4), p. 5; Obminsky, loc. cit. pp. 227–8.

[49] Packenham, loc. cit. p. 229.

[50] Iu. F. Shamrai, '*Problemy sovershenstvovaniya ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva sotsialisticheskikh i razvivayushchikhsiya stran*' ('*Problems of the Realization of Economic Cooperation between Socialist and Developing Countries*'), *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4, 1968, p. 13.

[51] Ibid. pp. 5, 7.

[52] Interview with V. Vigant, economist, Africa Institute, Moscow.

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' narrower concepts of economic and strategic self-interest '. Involvement in Tropical Africa seemed to satisfy both criteria in the early 1960s. Optimism ran high then in Washington and Moscow that development could be furthered by a finite infusion of foreign aid. Furthermore, it was expected that this development could be engineered not only to correspond with the model of the donor country, but also to push the general international stance of the recipient along a plane favourable to the Superpower interests. When these expectations proved to be somewhat too sanguine, the United States and the Soviet Union shifted their attention elsewhere—to South-East Asia, the Middle East, and the increasingly serious domestic problems of a technocratic society.

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Neo-Colonialism, Imperialism and the 'New Class'

L. H. Gann

NEO-COLONIALISM has become a central concept in most forms of socialism. Western—and, above all, American—capitalism supposedly derives a major part of its wealth from investments in the underdeveloped countries of the world. In the backward regions, particularly the former European colonies and semi-colonies in Africa and Asia, land, labour, and raw materials, the argument goes, are cheaper than in the developed countries. Hence foreign investors can earn super-profits. The prosperity of Western Europe and, especially, of the United States is said to derive from the ill-gotten gains obtained in Africa and Asia. This surplus wealth is used in the US to buy off the white American worker, the world's new aristocracy of labour.

Put in more technical terms, neo-colonialism allegedly follows certain guiding principles. Foreign investors maintain the domination of alien capital in the new states and prevent the breakup of the colonial structures. They wish to preserve Western political and military predominance by imposing economic and political agreements on these states, by maintaining foreign bases, by using the administrative machinery inherited from the colonial regime as an instrument of policy, by extending their ideological influence, by hindering the development of democracy. Neo-colonialists aim at continued profits; hence they wish to limit their economic activities to the production of raw materials.[1]

Neo-colonialism and colonialism reputedly have other failings. According to Marxist economists such as the late Paul A. Baran, the capitalist system in its various guises has accounted not only for the poverty but also for the stagnation of the underdeveloped world: capitalism, 'once a mighty engine of economic development, has turned into a no less formidable hurdle to human advancement'.[2] Foreign-owned

[1] L. Goncharov, 'New Forms of Colonialism in Africa', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. I (December 1963), pp. 467–74. The literature is too extensive to be cited in full. Perhaps the main African spokesman of the case against neo-colonialism in former British Africa was Kwame Nkrumah. On the eve of independence, Nkrumah still argued that an independent Ghana would have to attract private capital and prove itself 'credit-worthy to national and international financial organizations' (Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology* [New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961], p. 105). In 1965 Nkrumah published *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons), which represented a sharp shift to the left and attempted to reconcile Marxist-Leninist thought with Nkrumah's own version of militant African nationalism.

[2] Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), pp. 249–50. For a more detailed study of American 'monopoly capitalism' in particular, see Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968).

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corporations engaged in extractive industries have come to be looked upon as a particularly obnoxious form of enterprise, on the grounds that they have been purely exploitative, and have stood in the way of economic diversification. But whatever form capitalist ventures might take, they are regarded as part of a cohesive and worldwide system. The destruction of neo-colonialism has thus come to be looked upon as a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for the creation of a peaceful and productive socialist world.

Socialism today is divided into innumerable schools of thought. But despite all the disagreements among them, there is almost general accord with regard to the evils of neo-colonialism. Chinese theoreticians agree with their Soviet counterparts regarding the validity of the foregoing analysis. Yugoslav thinkers are in unison with spokesmen of different brands of African socialism with respect to the evils entailed in the 'counteroffensive of private capital' against the ex-colonial countries.[3] The various segments of the New Left have all taken over the doctrine of neo-colonialism. So have many bourgeois reformists in the Western world. Few American or European student newspapers appear without some allusion to the iniquities of neo-colonialists and their lackeys.

The doctrine of neo-colonialism has by now acquired a wide variety of political and social uses. It supplies an essential element of continuity between Lenin's thesis of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism and the anti-capitalist ideologies which developed after World War II. The creed of anti-colonialism has become the principal bond between many divergent ideologies. Its anti-American dimension is welcome to European right-wingers who deplore the rise of American power; it is equally popular among European left-wingers who grieve over the lack of revolutionary success in their respective home countries. The real or assumed machinations of foreign capitalists supply a universal excuse for the political and economic failures of the Third World. In the US, critics of the mass culture, of suburbia, and of blue-collar workers derive new ammunition for their attacks on domestic reactionaries from the supposed iniquities of neo-colonialism. The notion feeds the sense of guilt experienced by many liberal intellectuals. Neo-colonialism putatively accounts for the conflict in Vietnam and other outbreaks of war in distant parts of the world. The concept has become inextricably interwoven with a great variety of Black American ideologies; neo-colonialism is now said to be practised on the American domestic as well as on the foreign scene. Few doctrines have ever been used in so extensive a fashion as neo-colonialism and its ideological predecessors.

[3] The literature is vast. For various theoretical interpretations, see, for instance, William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., *African Socialism* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964), and Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed., *Africa and the Communist World* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963).

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Neo-Colonialism and American Investments

Despite numerous assertions to the contrary, the belief that American capitalism derives its prosperity from foreign investments, especially those in the Afro-Asian world, is completely unfounded—this interpretation indeed has an almost phantasmagoric quality. A few figures will help set the record straight. In 1970 the Gross National Product of the United States amounted to some $974·1 billion. Total US investment abroad came to about $78 billion, that is to say, less than one-twelfth of the GNP and only slightly more than the $72·4 billion the Americans spent on 'clothing accessories and personal care' alone. But, in turn, only a small proportion of this foreign investment was placed in Asia or in Africa. US investments in the entire African continent amounted to just under $3·5 billion. The total value of American investment in Africa and Asia together stood at just over $9 billion, or about 11 per cent of the nation's total foreign investment.

The total profits repatriated from abroad to the US in 1970 amounted to about $6 billion, i.e. considerably less than 1 per cent of the total GNP. American profits repatriated from the entire African continent totalled no more than $680 million—something like one-fourth of the wealth of one great American philanthropic body, the Ford Foundation (market value of holdings in 1970: $2·83 billion).

The bulk of US capital exports in 1970 went to 'white', industrialized countries, not to backward regions. The United Kingdom, for instance, had by that year absorbed nearly as much American capital as all of Africa and Asia together. (See Table 1 for the distribution and returns of US investments abroad.)

The argument that 'neo-colonialist' enterprise restricts the development of manufacturing and only exploits raw materials has no validity either. In 1969, for instance, US private long-term investments in the 'less developed countries' came to about $20 billion. Of this, just over $2 billion was invested in mining and smelting, just under $8 billion in petroleum industries, over $5 billion in manufacturing and slightly more than $4½ billion in other industries.[4]

In any case, the sharp distinction commonly drawn between 'extractive' industries, which are 'bad', and 'development industries', supposedly 'good', makes little economic sense. It is based on a value judgment with no more validity than the Nazi slogan about *schaffendes* as against *raffendes Kapital*. Agriculture working for export thus begets its own industries. The earliest manufacturing industry in Rhodesia, for instance, was engaged in the processing of such commodities as bacon, cheese and tobacco. The mining revolution brought about in Zambia by American, British and South African capital from the 1920s onward had far-reaching economic results in many spheres apart from mining proper. Large-scale operations in the remote bush

[4] US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1971* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1971).

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TABLE 1

US Direct Investment and Earnings by Region, 1970
In $000,000

Area	Total value of assets at end of year	Net investment			Earnings	
		Reinvested profits	New funds	Total	Repatriated profits	Total
Canada	22,801	791	915	1,706	972	1,622
Latin America	12,201	319	307	626	899	1,236
Other Western Hemisphere	2,483	83	252	335	182	252
EEC	11,695	448	971	1,419	774	1,245
United Kingdom	8,015	236	642	878	375	592
Other European countries	4,761	270	291	561	229	486
Africa	3,476	157	363	520	680	845
Asia	5,613	187	210	397	1,526	1,714
Australia and New Zealand	3,485	143	226	369	215	325
International (unallocated)	3,563	251	226	477	174	416
Total	78,090	2,885	4,403	7,288	6,026	8,733

Source: US Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*.

entailed the employment of a whole army of experts, engineers, laboratory technicians, managers and chemists. Mining thus involved a vast transfer of technical and entrepreneurial skill, as well as physical capital, from the developed parts of the world to a backward region. In addition to attracting specialists to distant mining sites, entrepreneurs had to train indigenous workmen. As time went on, developers found that an efficient labour force required a great variety of facilities; permanent townships had to be created, complete with housing, health services, waterworks, sewerage, training institutions, and the like. Mining also demanded a host of auxiliary services: repair shops, smelting facilities and plants for the manufacture of iron and steel, cement and a diversity of other products. The growing settlements, in turn, provided markets for farmers and for persons supplying other services. The mines, moreover, provided public revenue on a substantial scale, and thereby helped to finance a variety of state services. The development of mines, in turn, would have been impossible without transport by road and by rail.

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The railways, like the mines, acted as 'multiple accelerators' of economic progress. Marx had already noted this point in assessing the extraordinary economic and social revolution which the British had wrought in India.[5] Marx's analysis concerning the value of the British-built infrastructure in India was vindicated by India's subsequent economic history. Between 1883 and 1913, during the heyday of the British raj, the growth of large-scale manufacturing in India compared favourably with the manufacturing growth rates of Germany and the United States.[6]

APART from the aforesaid allegations regarding the heinousness of US investments abroad, the assault on neo-colonialism has wider implications. American capitalism has supposedly created for itself a new world empire, which has to some extent supplanted the older empires of Western Europe. American bankers and their allies despoil the more backward countries of their wealth. They have turned a nation such as Brazil into an 'economically occupied country' whose economy is being 'denationalized' in a frightening manner.[7] The American capitalists' power for doing evil is almost limitless. At the behest of American financiers, a Greek junta rules in Athens, reactionary generals install military dictatorships in Latin America, white racists maintain apartheid in South Africa, Portuguese soldiers fight black freedom fighters in Angola, American airmen drop bombs on North Vietnam—all for the purpose of maximizing the profits of Yankee millionaires. Finally, the new empire has created its own ideological superstructure. Hence, 'intellectual missionaries and para-espionage agents have through their research and publishing efforts, training programmes, and control over the means of ideological formation helped to shape and perpetuate the new framework of neo-colonial rule'.[8]

These preconceptions represent the highest stage of Leninism, whose tenets will subsequently be examined in greater detail. Suffice it to say at this point that the neo-colonial creed, as formulated by many American

[5] Marx had pointed out as early as 1853: 'You cannot maintain a network of railways over an immense country without introducing all those industrial processes necessary to meet the immediate and current wants of railway locomotion, and out of which there must grow the application of machinery to those branches of industry not immediately connected with railways. The railway system will therefore become, in India, truly the forerunner of modern industry. . . . Modern industry, resulting from the railway system, will dissolve the hereditary division of labour, upon which rest the Indian castes, those decisive impediments to Indian progress and India power.' Karl Marx, 'The Future Results of British Rule in India', in Shlomo Avineri, ed., *Karl Marx on Colonialism: His Despatches and Other Writings . . .* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1968), pp. 128–29.

[6] Russell Lidman and Robert I. Domrese, 'India', in W. Arthur Lewis, ed., *Tropical Development 1880–1913* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 309–10.

[7] Paulo Schilling, 'Who's Who in the Brazilian Economy', *Tricontinental* (Havana), March 1972, pp. 1–2.

[8] African Research Group, *African Studies in America: The Extended Family* (Cambridge, Mass. [1969?]), p. 1.

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scholars, represents almost an inverted form of Great American chauvinism. For nothing evil can happen in the world unless America wills it, or at least permits it to happen. In actual fact, Greek dictators like General Metaxas, or Latin American tyrants such as Francisco Lopez, the most infamous of Paraguayan presidents, had seized power long before the US had become an exporter of capital. In countries where American investors do operate, their power is consistently being overestimated. Contrary to widespread misconceptions among American Africanists, for example, the Americans are ill placed to exercise economic pressure on South Africa, where their economic influence is strictly limited.[9] Applied to US policy in South-East Asia, the economic interpretation of history makes even less sense. Americans are said to wage an enormously costly, lengthy and unpopular war in Vietnam in order to protect and expand their markets. Yet by 1970, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia between them accounted for considerably less than 1 per cent of American exports—$371 million out of $43·22 billion.[10]

If the economic interpretation of America's South-East Asian policy were correct, American neo-colonialists would certainly be distinguished by a complete inability to understand their own best interests. But the hated American plotters, like the Elders of Zion in the Nazi polemics of old, can do no right. If they invest overseas, they exploit foreigners. If they do not invest abroad, they are guilty of boycotting other countries (an important consideration at a time when communist countries are increasingly interested in borrowing in the American money market).[11] If capitalists earn profits, they impoverish the masses. If they do not earn profits, they prove that capitalism must be decadent. If American entrepreneurs try to preserve indigenous customs in the Third World, they promote 'dysfunctional' forms of tribalism. If they disrupt indigenous customs, they are guilty of cultural genocide. The list can be extended indefinitely. It embodies a surrealist form of dialectic which renders argument impossible. A historical philosophy claiming to be founded upon scientific objectivity has turned into the most extreme form of subjectivism.

Imperialism and the Leninist Legacy

Colonialism occupies a central place in modern history. It is indeed credited at times with almost demiurgic qualities, serving as an explanation for the most diverse and contradictory phenomena. Colonialism

[9] Already by 1967 foreign capital represented only 6·3% of total gross domestic investment. South Africa had become capable not only of furnishing most of its own capital needs, but also of exporting some capital. Foreign investments in 1966 amounted to R3,825 million of which only R741 million came from the dollar area. See Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, *South African Progress . . .* (Johannesburg, 1969), pp. 38, 71.

[10] US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1971* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 770–71.

[11] *Wall Street Journal*, 20 June 1972, p. 1.

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provided the Western European countries with untold riches—on this point there was agreement between Nazis and communists. On the contrary, argued J. A. Hobson, Lenin's intellectual predecessor in the colonial field, as well as modern economists like Andrew Shonfield, colonialism occasioned the export of capital from the metropolitan countries which might have been employed to much better advantage at home. Colonial profits, according to the British Left Book Club orthodoxy of the 1930s, enabled the Western European bourgeoisie to maintain formal democracy, and to avoid the totalitarian alternative thrust upon 'have-not' powers like Germany, Italy and Japan. On the contrary, says Hannah Arendt, colonialism laid the foundations of fascism.

The postulates embodied in current critiques of neo-colonialism derive their fundamental assumptions from older theories concerning the supposed mainsprings of European colonial expansion in the late nineteenth century. Of these critics there were many. They included revolutionary socialists like Lenin, reformist economists like Hobson, anti-semitic literati like Hilaire Belloc, and right-wing Continental nationalists fond of belabouring the 'decadent Carthaginian oligarchy', which supposedly ruled over Britain and the United States. However much these polemicists disagreed among themselves, they were united on certain central notions. The British Empire represented oligarchic exploitation at its worst. Its existence enabled British capitalists to make more money abroad than they would have been able to make at home; African enterprises such as the Rand mines reputedly yielded superprofits; from the Boer War onward the top-hatted, hooknosed, cigar-smoking 'Rand lord', with a mansion in Park Lane and gigantic bank accounts in Lombard Street, became indeed the very prototype of the self-seeking, war-mongering capitalist.

THE most influential critique of imperialism was Lenin's *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism.* Its central theses are well known and have now become part of a well-established orthodoxy.[12] Yet contrary to Lenin's notions, there was in fact no correspondence between the pattern of European capital investments abroad and the 'New

[12] For critiques of the Leninist position see, for instance, W. H. B. Court, 'The Communist Doctrine of Empire', in William Keith Hancock, ed., *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, Vol. II: *Problems of Economic Policy, 1918–1939*, Part 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 416–41; D. K. Fieldhouse, 'Imperialism: An Historiographical Revision', *Economic History Review*, 2nd Ser., Vol. XIV, No. 2 (1961), pp. 187–209; L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, 'Reflections on Imperialism and the Scramble for Africa', in L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, eds., *Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960*, Vol. I (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 100–20; L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *Burden of Empire: An Appraisal of Western Colonialism in Africa South of the Sahara* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967); Richard James Hammond, 'Economic Imperialism: Sidelight on a Stereotype', *Journal of Economic History*, December 1961, pp. 582–98; David S. Landes, 'Some Thoughts on the Nature of Economic Imperialism', ibid. pp. 496–512.

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Imperialism' of the late Victorian era which Lenin had castigated. The newly conquered regions in tropical Africa attracted a relatively small proportion of British or French capital. By 1911, a generation after the scramble for Africa had started, a large percentage of British capital abroad was still invested in the 'white' countries of North America (above all, the United States, by far the most important single recipient of British capital during the last century). British investors had placed nearly as much money in Canada or in Australia and New Zealand as in the entire African continent. (See Table 2.) French financiers had little interest in the French Empire, which for long remained the neglected stepchild of the Paris *bourse*.

German colonialism is even less susceptible to purely economic explanation than its British counterpart. German colonization in the Bismarckian era took place at a time when the Reich was developing its industries at home and as yet had relatively little capital to spend for overseas loans. Those German lenders who did risk their capital preferred the Americas, or Central and Eastern Europe. The German colonies accounted for an insignificant proportion of German capital investment. Some East German historians have recognized the difficulty in applying the orthodox Leninist interpretation to the German colonial experience. According to revised interpretations, Bismarckian expansion was occasioned therefore by the older form of mercantile capitalism,

TABLE 2

Great Britain's Foreign Capital Investments, 1911

The Colonies and India	
North America—	£
Canada and Newfoundland	372,541,000
Australasia—	
Australian Commonwealth	301,521,000
New Zealand	78,529,000
Africa—	
South Africa	351,368,000
West Africa	29,498,000
Asia—	
India and Ceylon	365,399,000
Straits Settlements	22,037,000
Hong Kong	3,104,000
British North Borneo	5,131,000
Other British Possessions	25,024,000
Total British Colonies and India	1,554,152,000

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Great Britain's Foreign Capital Investments, 1911—*continued*

Foreign countries

United States	688,078,000
Cuba	22,700,000
Philippines	8,202,000
Argentina	269,808,000
Mexico	87,334,000
Brazil	94,440,000
Chile	46,375,000
Uruguay	35,255,000
Peru	31,986,000
Miscellaneous American countries	22,517,000
Russia	38,388,000
Turkey	18,320,000
Egypt	43,753,000
Spain	18,808,000
Italy	11,513,000
Portugal	8,134,000
France	7,071,000
Germany	6,061,000
Miscellaneous European countries	36,319,000
Japan	53,705,000
China	26,809,000
Miscellaneous foreign countries	61,907,000
Total foreign countries	1,637,684,000
Grand total, all countries	3,191,836,000

Source: Sir George Paish, 'Great Britain's Capital Investment in Individual Colonial and Foreign Countries', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. LXXIV, Part 2 (January 1911), p. 186. This is an essential source for the study of British overseas investments during the period.

rather than by the more modern form of monopoly capitalism dependent on the export of capital. But colonial trade always represented a negligible portion of Germany's total commerce; hence conventional Marxist interpretations are of little use in any form in accounting for Bismarck's colonial ventures.[13] Economic interpretations of the Leninist kind are

[13] Between 1891 and 1910 the percentage of exports to the colonies rose from 0·17 per cent to just 0·73 per cent of Germany's total exports. For tables see Andrew R. Carlson, *German Foreign Policy, 1890–1914, and Colonial Policy to 1914* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1970), pp. 58–59. The direction of European investments has been documented in detail in Herbert Feis, *Europe, the World's Banker, 1870–1914* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930). For East German discussions concerning the economic interpretation of German colonial history see, for instance, Horst Drechsler, *Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft: Der Kampf der Herero und Nama gegen den deutschen Imperialismus (1884–1915)* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), especially pp. 9–10.

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of course even less relevant for the history of colonialism in Italy and Portugal, both of which were net importers of capital at the time when they were expanding their respective African empires.

The assumption that European capitalists earned super-profits in the colonies likewise requires modification. The doctrine in some ways oddly reflects the propaganda put out by Victorian share-pushers who promised golden riches to investors willing to risk their money abroad. Socialists and company promoters alike were apt to underestimate the enormous expenditure required to create a colonial infrastructure—the schools, hospitals, power plants, harbours, transport facilities and so forth, which were needed before capital investments would yield profits. A great deal of money was lost. Hence it is not surprising that from 1887 to 1932 the Witwatersrand gold mines, supposedly one of the most profitable undertakings in the world, accounted for an average yield of no more than 4.1 per cent.[14]

There are other objections to the Leninist theory. The percentage of British trade with Europe remained much the same during the Victorian era and its aftermath. So, interestingly enough, did the percentage of British commerce in the purely 'white' continents of North America and Australia, which, together with Europe, between 1850 and 1930 consistently accounted for just over 55 per cent of UK exports. (See Table 3.) Despite Lenin's strictures concerning monopoly capitalism, competition had clearly not ended in Western European industry during Lenin's lifetime.

Lenin asserted that under modern capitalism, the export of capital had become the typical feature, as against the exports of goods which supposedly had characterized the older mercantile capitalism. In actual fact, the export of merchandise from the capitalist countries continues at a greater rate than ever before. But the character of the goods has changed, with more specialized products, such as typewriters, bicycles and transistor radios, increasingly taking the place of textiles, beads, muskets and hatchets, the characteristic merchandise of the African trade a century ago. The export of capital goods in fact stimulated the commerce in consumption goods, as workers employed in foreign-built mines, factories and oil refineries acquired wants and developed consumption patterns unknown in the pre-colonial days. Moreover, a large proportion of capital from Western capitalist countries went to other developed capitalist countries, rather than to colonies or ex-colonies. In fact, the so-called underdeveloped countries have had to take active steps to attract capital.

The export of capital as against goods is, of course, by no means a new phenomenon. During the earlier part of the nineteenth century British capitalists had already loaned vast sums to entrepreneurs in France, Prussia and the United States. For all the fashionable polemics

[14] S. H. Frankel, *Capital Investment in Africa: Its Course and Effects* (London: Oxford University Press), p. 91.

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TABLE 3

UK Exports by Continent, 1850–1930
(*Percentage of Total Exports*)

Year	Europe	Africa	Asia	South America	North America	Australia	Europe, North America, Australia
1850	37·1	3·8	14·9	25·9	14·6	3·7	55·4
1870	39·7	6·8	18·9	18·1	11·5	5·0	56·2
1890	34·8	6·7	21·8	15·7	12·2	8·8	55·8
1910	34·9	10·6	20·5	12·7	12·8	8·5	56·2
1930	39·3	12·1	18·6	10·9	10·3	8·8	58·4

Source: W. Schlote, *British Overseas Trade from 1700 to the 1930's* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952) pp. 158–59.

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against the supposed evils of foreign lending, modern America, for instance, could hardly have developed its present form without the tremendous influx of European (especially British) capital, which fiananced railways, port installations, ranches, factories and a host of other enterprises. Contrary to Lenin's assertion, late nineteen-century Europe was by no means bursting at the seams with surplus savings anxious for lucrative investments. Most British investors thus preferred smaller risks than those accepted by the gold speculators. In 1911 Sir George Paish, a British economic expert, calculated that 60 per cent of British foreign investments had gone into the construction of railways. Most of this expenditure yielded but modest dividends, while a good deal was lost. Vast sums, moreover, had to be expended on military and administrative overheads. It was this outlay which caused Marx to question whether the cost of governing India was not likely to equal the revenue expected from the British Empire in India.[15]

THE financial interpretation of imperialism has been refuted over and over again, yet it remains as popular as ever. The appeal of this interpretation must however be seen in a wider context, in moral as well as purely economic terms. The Leninist dogma rests on the charge that wicked capitalists exploit the weak. The term 'exploitation' can, moreover, be used in many different ways. According to traditional usage, it implies tribute levied by a conquering nation on subject provinces, but, of course, no modern capitalist colonial power (except briefly the Congo Free State) ever transferred colonial taxes into the metropolitan exchequer. The term 'exploitation' may also stand for 'low' wages paid to workmen, low in relation to wages paid in other countries, or low in relation to the remuneration received by employees in other occupations—the charge is rarely made specific. According to common-sense notions, however, it makes little sense to talk of exploitation by oil companies in Kuwait, or in sugar refineries in pre-communist Cuba, when these undertakings have paid a freely negotiated wage and have provided wages and working conditions distinctly better than are available in indigenous economies, or were available under conditions prevailing before foreign investment had begun in the first place.

The term 'exploitation' can also be used in a more technical sense; in this case it is linked to the Marxist theory of surplus value. According to this interpretation, commodities derive their value from the labour which is needed to produce them under given technological conditions. But an American or a British investor in, say, Zambia, does not necessarily become richer if he employs more African workmen. On the contrary, he introduces more and more machinery, and tries to get richer by cutting down the number of his workers. Marx would then argue that the new machinery itself creates no surplus value, but that the new instruments of production themselves merely represent the

[15] Karl Marx, 'British Incomes in India' (1857), in Avineri, op. cit. p. 225.

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product of sweated labour. If this theory were correct, mechanization in underdeveloped countries should logically be linked to increased exploitation of highly skilled labour in the more advanced countries, where this machinery is produced. There is, of course, no evidence for such a trend. This theoretical explanation would itself conflict also with Lenin's assertion that colonial and neo-colonial super-profits enable capitalists to 'buy off' the more prosperous section of the working class in the metropolitan countries. Lenin's polemic in turn fails to square with the empirical findings of sociologists, historians and pollsters. These show that the rise in real wages experienced by the European working classes had begun long before the start of the 'New Imperialism'. Working-class militancy, moreover, never mirrored the size of empires. Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Denmark all lacked colonies which might have enabled local capitalists to bribe their workers. Yet the workers of these countries were far more reformist than those of France, Italy or Portugal, countries which had acquired a more substantial slice of the colonial empire. Furthermore, within a colonial country such as Britain, communist workers were not recruited from the most lowly section of the proletariat, but from the most highly remunerated strata.[16]

COLONIALISM has also been attacked on other grounds. Some critics have written in highly romanticized terms of the supposedly golden days of pre-colonial village life.[17] This theory appears in different guises. For instance, the European impact is said to have aborted the emergence of indigenous African states which, in the course of time, would have evolved by developing the economic potential of their respective countries in a more 'natural' fashion.[18] This theory implies that pre-feudal economies, dependent in the main on cattle herding or hoe farming, could somehow or other have made a 'quantum jump' into an industrial economy; that, say, in Zambia, Ngoni warriors could have built factories, Lamba cultivators could have developed deep-level mining, Ila spirit mediums could have developed veterinary science. This interpretation is so 'voluntarist' in character, so ahistorical in approach as to negate the most fundamental assumptions of the Marxist tenets which the critics profess to uphold.

A Critique of 'Financial Conspiracy' Theories

What of the more fundamental implications of the various Leninist and post-Leninist interpretations of colonialism and neo-colonialism? As we have seen, they have one thing in common: they all strip capital-

[16] See, for instance, Kenneth Newton, *The Sociology of British Communism* (London: Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1969), passim.

[17] This notion was bitterly attacked, insofar as it referred to pre-colonial India, by Karl Marx, 'The Government of India Bill' (1853), in Avineri, op. cit. pp. 88–89.

[18] See, for instance, Heinrich Loth, *Die christliche Mission in Südwestafrika: Zur destruktiven Rolle der Rheinischen Missionsgesellschaft beim Prozess der Staatsbildung in Südwestafrika (1842–1893)* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1963).

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ism of its 'progressive' function as an engine of economic development. Capitalism in its colonial or neo-colonial guise is, in fact, said to be responsible for the economic backwardness of the underdeveloped countries. As Nkrumah put it, with special reference to Zambia, 'It is not Africa that is poor. It is the Africans who are impoverished by centuries of exploitation and domination.' This interpretation is, of course, one that would have been strongly criticized by Marx, who imputed a progressive role to European capitalism in Asia. In the author's own opinion, Marx's generalizations concerning India in the early nineteenth century are as valid when applied to sub-Saharan Africa in the first half of the twentieth century. Whatever the failings of European colonizers may have been in a country such as Zambia, they were conquerors with a difference. Unlike earlier invaders in Zambian history, such as the warlike Ngoni or the Kololo, the British brought to Zambia an entirely new technology. The era of British rule in Zambia, from the end of the nineteenth century to 1964, was less than the lifespan of a grandmother. Within this brief period the peoples of Zambia were hurled from the Early Iron Age into the world of modern industry. Before the arrival of the British, Zambians had no source of power except human muscle, no means of transportation save the porter's pack and the canoe, no agricultural implements except the axe and the hoe. After two generations or so, Zambia had become one of the world's great mineral producers. Life had become more secure than ever before. Goods and services had become available on a scale that would have been inconceivable, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to a Zambian villager of the pre-colonial era.

The 'robbery of resources' argument has been similarly refuted by economist Peter T. Bauer in reference to Nkrumah's native Ghana. Bauer stresses that today the bulk of exports are produced by Africans and practically all imports are for their use.

> In 1890 there were no exports (or production) of cocoa; by the mid-1930s about 300,000 tons were exported annually and by now over 400,000 tons, all from farms established, owned and operated by Africans; there are no foreign-owned cocoa farms. In 1890 combined imports and exports were less than a million pounds sterling, by the 1930s they were in tens of millions, and by the mid-1950s in hundreds of millions. Over this period there has been a spectacular increase in imports of both consumer and capital goods. In 1890 there were no imports, or negligible imports, of flour, sugar, cement, petroleum products, or iron and steel. For decades now these have been on a massive scale. In the early 1890s there were about 3,000 children at school; by the mid-1950s over half a million. In the 1890s there were neither railways nor roads, but only a few jungle paths, and transport of goods was entirely by human porterage and by canoe. By the 1930s there was a substantial railway mileage and a good road system; by then journeys by road required fewer hours than they had required days in 1890. Statistical information of this sort can be both multiplied and

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interpreted easily, but it is hard to convey the far-reaching and pervasive changes which have transformed life there, as elsewhere in West Africa.[19]

The Ghanaian experience, of course, was in no sense unique. Capitalist—like subsequent socialist—development was naturally extremely uneven in its impact and subject to severe fluctuations. The fact remains that the age of the 'New Imperialism', so scathingly referred to by Lenin and others as an era of crude exploitation and capitalist decadence, saw startling economic expansion in the colonies. In the tropics as a whole, food supplies kept pace with the population growth, exports rose at an average rate of 3·6 per cent per annum with purchasing power (relative prices) in terms of manufactures the same in 1908–12 as in 1879–83, while schooling, housing and other services generally improved. Thus 'the period 1880–1913 has to be regarded as one in which many tropical countries grew as rapidly as many of the industrial countries. Many, many more grew just as rapidly in their modern sectors . . .'.[20]

Critiques of colonialism also embody the widespread assumption that businessmen and their allies formed a cohesive class, conscious of their common economic interest. In fact, the bourgeoisie was never capable of making such simple decisions, because they never formed a united front and could never agree on a broad range of specific issues. Throughout the nineteenth century European middle-class groups, for instance, fought bitter struggles against one another on subjects as diverse as franchise and foreign policy, tariffs and taxes, factory laws and food prices. Mill-owners in the same line of business competed against one another. Producers of a single commodity had great trouble in maintaining a united international front. To mention just one example, during the inter-war years the world's great copper producers did not succeed in pursuing a common production policy for any length of time. Low-cost producers, such as the Northern Rhodesian mines, pressed for increased output quotas, while the high-cost producers generally preferred restrictions, so that international price fixing broke down. Even within the same territory, companies engaged in the same line of business were apt to clash. During the 1950s, for example, two principal copper-mining groups in Zambia had considerable differences of opinion concerning such vital questions as the location of Central Africa's main hydroelectric undertaking, the speed of African advancement in industry and the extent of support to be given to the United Federal Party, the governing party at the time.[21]

[19] Peter T. Bauer, 'Marxism and the Underdeveloped Countries', in Milorad M. Drachkovitch, ed., *Marxist Ideology in the Contemporary World: Its Appeals and Paradoxes* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 142.

[20] W. Arthur Lewis, 'The Export Stimulus', in W. Arthur Lewis, ed., *Tropical Development 1880–1913* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 30–31.

[21] See, for instance, Lewis H. Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964), pp. 251, 256–57; and Lewis H. Gann and Michael Gelfand, *Huggins of Rhodesia: The Man and His Country* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964), passim.

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THESE and similar facts have often been pointed out. Yet the 'financial conspiracy' school of history remains influential. It would hardly have made sense to the contemporaries of Louis XIX or of Frederick the Great, who would have been disinclined to regard great kings as helpless puppets of faceless financiers. On the contrary, historians were apt to condemn what they called the spineless cowardice of merchants, as exemplified by the contemptible behaviour of Carthaginian oligarchs unwilling to furnish adequate supplies to the heroic Hannibal. Secret conspiracies were imputed more often to religious groups. Both French Calvinists and English Jesuits, for example, have been accused in the past of weaving the most fantastic plots against their countrymen. The conspiratorial school of history was later secularized, and the beginnings of the nineteenth century saw an important change in intellectual attitudes. The disdainful, aristocratic poetry of Lord Byron's 'Don Juan' presaged the economic determinism of subsequent Marxist and social-liberal writers.

> Who hold the balance of the world? Who reign
> O'er congress, whether royalist or liberal?
> Who rouse the shirtless patriots of Spain?
> (That make old Europe's journals squeak and gibber all).
> Who keep the world, both old and new, in pain
> Or pleasure? Who make politics run glibber all?
> The shade of Buonaparte's noble daring?—
> Jew Rothschild and his fellow-Christian, Baring.

These sentiments, which opposed the assumed virtues of the man on horseback to the supposed vices of the financier in his counting house, have continued to plague the world ever since. German nationalists during the Wilhelminian era thus used to contrast *Händler und Helden,* the British being cast in the role as horsetraders, and the Germans as heroes. After World War II, this interpretation was brought up to date with a new mythology, which contrasted valiant guerrillas against money-grubbing investors. These, and related assessments, catered both to romantic sentiments of the Byronic kind and to the incessant demand for a 'scientific' explanation of history.

Leninist and post-Leninist assessments of imperialism and neo-colonialism also served another ideological function. They provided alibis for failed prophecies. Marx had still assumed that the socialist revolution would first come in the West, and that it would come within his lifetime. Marx never entered the promised Jerusalem, and Lenin's thesis provided an apparently convicing explanation of how the Western bourgeoisie had managed to default on history and had put off the inevitable day of reckoning. The 'New Imperialism' came upon the historical stage as a *deus ex machina,* and helped to postpone the revolution. Lenin in turn argued that already by 1917 world capitalism had become subject to 'stagnation and decay'; the destruction of the Western colonial empires was bound to inflict a crushing blow on world capitalism. But again the world bourgeoisie apparently

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managed to cheat on Lenin's predictions. Far from collapsing, the economies of the Western capitalist powers all expanded at a very considerable rate after World War II. Why? Because the bourgeoisie had discovered a fresh device, neo-colonialism, which provided yet another unforeseen means of delaying the capitalists' inevitable descent into historical oblivion.

Lenin's doctrine, moreover, brought a revisionist element to classical Marxism. Marx's philosophy was essentially Euro-centric. The Fathers of Marxism, with their nineteenth-century optimism, had been convinced that Western capitalists were still performing a progressive function in the backward parts of the world. Engels had welcomed the French conquest of Algeria as the victory of civilization over barbarism. Marx had extolled the contribution made to the development of India by British mechanics, railway builders, engineers, teachers and drill sergeants in terms reminiscent almost of Kipling's. Lenin, on the other hand, now denied that capitalists and their minions could do any good, even though their activities clearly kept adding to the means of production available to the world. According to Lenin, railway builders, far from serving the cause of progress, merely converted 'this work of construction into an element for oppressing a thousand million people'.[22] This interpretation cut Marx's doctrine of progress from its economic moorings. European railway builders and their like had created new forms of transport unknown to the indigenous peoples of Africa, and had thus supplied instruments of economic development which could not have been fashioned by pre-colonial means of production. Railway building, moreover, had far-reaching indirect social consequences. Back-breaking human porterage, for instance, disappeared; railways provided new types of employment and facilitated new methods of production. Under the Leninist dispensation, however, these achievements all became irrelevant. The doctrines of neo-colonialism served an identical purpose. For no improvements brought about by foreign firms in conditions of employment, wages, medical facilities and technical training are, in fact, subjected to the older Marxist notions of 'progress'. Foreign investors by definition are in a state of total depravity from which there is no salvation, either by works or by faith.

'Financial Conspiracy' Theories and the 'New Class'

Leninist and post-Leninist theories of imperialism can be interpreted in different ways. They can be examined on their merit. But they can also be assessed in a Marxian sense, as ideological tools. In this capacity they are capable of serving new economic interest groups. In Africa and Asia alike, the colonial powers created educated indigenous elites

[22] V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism; A Popular Outline* (New York: International Publishers, 1939), p. 10.

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specifically trained to administer and in turn to educate. The training of these elites provided a variety of new academic positions for European intellectuals who, naturally, tended to take up a favourable attitude towards their charges. The new elites in turn took over the governmental machinery created by the old imperial administrations. But the colonial powers had managed to govern with relatively small administrative establishments, and in many cases there were not sufficient jobs for all the available candidates who applied for posts after independence. The situation shows no sign of improving. Education is now the largest, as well as the fastest-growing, industry in Africa. In Nigeria alone, the number of teachers exceeds the number of all workers employed by modern manufacturing and commerce. In Kenya, expenditure on education now accounts for something like 39 per cent of all public expenditure—a striking tribute to the mystique of scholastic education and the strength of the pedagogic lobby. Yet only some 23,000 youngsters out of a total of 150,000 who finish school every year will manage to find paid jobs.[23]

In many cases, moreover, the training provided by the new universities in Africa, and quite often also by institutions of higher education abroad, has not adequately raised the productivity of those whom it certifies to be qualified. Post-colonial governments have thus been under constant pressure to expand the number of available government and party posts so as to provide enough jobs for the diploma-bearing elite. The struggle for government jobs is liable to exacerbate tribal tensions, as ethnic affiliation has come to be used as a weapon in the scramble for bureaucratic advancement. In addition, there is resentment towards employers in the private sector:

> It is only logical to expect the certified elites to despise and distrust anyone who pays so poorly for their services and appears to look upon them as largely irrelevant and an unnecessary drag on productive activity. Therefore, nationalization, or some form of administrative control, is necessary to restructure the private sector so that the certified elite are appreciated, employed, and rewarded according to their need rather than their productivity.[24]

Material interests in turn may be reinforced by a moralistic folklore according to which profits derived from business appear somehow despicable, whereas the income derived from a salaried position in the public service seems just. Profits from business or industry spring from individual transactions. These can be both identified and censured individually on the grounds that they 'exploit' known persons. On the

[23] Arthur T. Porter, 'University Development in Africa', *African Affairs*, Vol. LXXI (January 1972), p. 74.

[24] Alan Rufus Waters, 'A Behavioral Model of Pan-African Disintegration Again', *African Studies Review*, Vol. XIV (September 1971), p. 300. For an African critique of Waters' view and of expatriate firms see Kalonji Ntalaja, 'A Behavioral Model of Pan-African Disintegration: A Reply', ibid. pp. 293–97. For an even more critical assessment see Martin Kilson, 'African Autocracy', *Africa Today* (April 1966), specially p. 5.

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other hand, the income derived from taxation springs from an anonymous source, and hence bears no comparable stigma. This value judgment is as common among modern diploma-bearing bureaucracies as it was among the gentlefolk described by Jane Austen. This philosophy can itself come to hinder economic development when it freezes into a system whereby, in Kipling's words:

> By the Laws of the Family Circle 'tis written in letters of brass
> That only a Colonel from Chatham can manage the Railways of State,
> Because of the gold on his breeks, and the subjects wherein he must pass;
> Because in all matters that deal not with Railways his knowledge is great.

On the international level, the interests of the new administrative strata have been reinforced by revisionist notions which transfer the class struggle from the national to the international plane. According to these interpretations, the real world conflict is to be found in the clash between the rich nations of the West and the poor nations whom the former exploit. This assessment, of course, obscures the conflicts between the different states of the Third World itself; it ignores ethnic clashes between races as varied as Kurds and Arabs, Ibo and Hausa, Galla and Amhara. Above all, it may create the illusion of a perfect community of interests existing between the governors and the governed in the Third World, an image useful to the rulers, but inaccurate nevertheless. The notion that 'young and righteous' nations are engaged in a historic battle against ageing capitalist countries is, of course, neither new nor progressive. It echoes the German and Italian propaganda of World War I vintage which described Germany or Italy, as the case might be, as a proletarian nation engaged in a struggle for survival.[25] These interpretations should, naturally, be relegated to where they belong—into the realm of political and academic fantasy. This is not, however, likely to happen. These assessments minister to too many psychological needs, they serve too many material interests to be easily discarded. Hence they are likely to remain frozen in a solid body of post-colonial orthodoxy which is apt to distort history for generations to come.

[25] See, for instance, Max Scheler, *Die Ursachen des Deutschenhasses: Eine national-pädagogische Erörterung* (Leipzig: Neuer Geist Verlag, 1917), p. 61; and Enrico Corradini, *Per la guerra d'Italia* (Rome: L' 'Italiana', Società Anonima Editrice, 1915), pp. 31–32, 81.

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The Congo in Soviet Policy

Benjamin Nimer

DURING the first six of its 12 years of independence a variety of forces, both internal and external, converged in and upon the former Belgian Congo, resulting in a situation in which what are usually treated as the plane of international action and the plane of domestic action were scarcely distinguishable. Since 1967, the Congo (the Republic of Zaïre since October 1971), has been a more ordinary 'new' state, and one aspect of its latter-day ordinariness has been that its internal affairs have become more easily separable from its external affairs and from world politics in general. On the other hand, Zaïre's present international situation and foreign policy are largely the product of the extraordinary events of the earlier post-independence years. *Pari passu*, Soviet-Congo relations today are on their present modest scale largely because during those earlier years the Soviet Union successively supported the losing sides in a series of struggles for the control of the Congo.

The Soviet Union had a weak basis from which to move effectively in response to the situation which emerged after the mutiny of the Congo's army, the *Force Publique*, five days after independence. Opportunity was afforded it by an extremely fluid situation, but actual Soviet response on the territory of the Congo, as opposed to the propaganda which it quickly put forth from a distance, was belated and, when finally made, kept within narrow limits.

This belated Soviet response may have been due to the absence of any organized Soviet presence in the Congo which could serve as a bureaucratic point of departure. But the continuing Soviet policy of keeping its political investment in the Congo low was the deliberate choice not only of First Secretary Khrushchev but of his successors as well.

To say that the Soviet Union has held throughout to a low level of political involvement in the independent Congo is not to say that its behaviour has been consistent over the years. At times its involvement has been intense; at other times it has diminished markedly in the wake of a setback. But quick withdrawal or acceptance of forced withdrawal without much ado are actions which governments, especially governments of major powers, permit themselves only with respect to non-essential objects of policy. Though the Congo has been worth keeping an eye on and making an effort to gain influence in, it has not been close to the centre of Soviet interest and concern. Soviet policy towards the Congo has, rather, been connected with other interests and concerns, and it is the purpose of this review to show this.

PHYSICALLY and culturally remote, the Congo had come within the Soviet purview only very recently. It was part of the West by virtue

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of Belgian rule, economic control and religious and educational influence, and even Americans, as private individuals, had had an interest in Congolese life such as Russians had not acquired, either in the tsarist or the Soviet eras. On the public level, the Soviet Union did not even have a consulate in the country before its independence, whereas the United States had perforce subsumed the Congo within the context of its relations with Belgium as a NATO ally, although the country was not included in the territorial zone embraced by the mutual defence commitments of the NATO treaty. To Great Britain and France the Congo was familiar territory, each having had governing responsibilities in adjoining territories and substantial economic interests in the Congo itself.

After Ghana's attainment of independence in early 1957 there was bound to be increased Soviet attention to the Congo as the prospect drew nearer of the emergence of other independent African states. Among such future states the Congo stood out by virtue of its vast expanse, spanning the centre of Black Africa, its eight international boundaries, its great mineral wealth and its potential as a major force in Africa. It could not be ignored by a Soviet Union which was both a great power and a self-proclaimed leader of revolutionary change in the world.

Belgium had erected fairly effective barriers against communist relations with Congolese but these were removed in mid-1958 with the legalization of political activity in the colony and the opening up of opportunities for travel abroad. Soviet diplomats and other representatives could now meet Congolese in Belgium and the Soviet Union itself, but, until a Soviet delegation arrived in Leopoldville for Independence ceremonies, the connexions between Congolese and communists were mainly those established with the Belgian Communist Party, and, to a lesser extent, the Czech consulate (opened in 1955) and the World Federation of Trade Unions. On the Congolese side these connexions were essentially individual—on the part of a few leaders of certain Congolese political parties and of the National Union of Congolese Workers, whose command of their followers was somewhat uncertain. Some of these leaders, as well as certain second-echelon activists, had travelled to various communist capitals and a few had taken what were reputed to have been indoctrination courses there. But the association of Patrice Lumumba, the most important of these leaders, with communist representatives was not as close, certainly not as evident, as that of Anicet Kashamura, Antoine Gizenga and Pierre Mulele.[1] Unlike them, Lumumba had not visited any of the 'countries of the East', nor had he publicly taken on Belgian Communist Party advisers as had Kashamura.

1 Kashamura was the leader of a wing of the *Centre Regroupement Africain* (CEREA) of the eastern border province of Kivu. Gizenga and Mulele were leaders of a wing of the *Parti de la Solidarité Africaine*, which drew its support from residents of, and immigrants to the capital from, the Kwilu and Kwango districts of Leopoldville Province.

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On the other hand, Lumumba had apparently received subsidies from communist sources during the Parliamentary election campaign in spring 1960.[2] It must be added that he had also received campaign financial support from anti-communist Belgian sources. As for the Czech consulate in Leopoldville, its political assignment, as distinguished from its regular commercial activities, seems to have been to serve as a channel for the arrangement of travel by Congolese to Prague and other communist capitals and for the dissemination of political literature.

These organizational links between Congolese and communists were of minor importance amidst the multifarious and primarily regional and ethnic-based political activity which characterized the country on the eve of independence. They were nevertheless more substantial than the links forged by doctrinal sympathies. There was, in the first place, no inclination on the part of the Soviet Communist Party to give what it would have considered the very premature accolade of 'socialist' to any Congolese. In the second place, it was intellectually easy for any Congolese who felt like doing so to take from the Marxist-Leninist definitions, slogans and explanations such items as suited his taste and/or political purpose. There were, therefore, frequent invocations of socialism and unsystematic analyses employing Marxist-Leninist categories and terminology among the radical nationalists, Gizenga being a conspicuous example. But this was of minor significance to both the Soviet and Belgian communists and to the Belgian government. Interest on both sides was focused on organizational links between Soviet-associated agencies and Congolese individuals and groups. And on this plane there had developed from the Soviet standpoint only a potential by Independence Day.

Had the development of Congolese government not been thrown off course by the mutiny, communist influence within the new government might have spread and deepened, although it must be borne in mind that opposition to such influence was strong in the politically heterogeneous Cabinet and Parliament and had behind it Belgium and its principal allies. Pre-independence communist influence in the Congo is less revealing about the Congo itself than of Soviet intentions, which seem to have been to keep a hand in by various means, with an eye to future possibilities. It is true that the Belgians were worried as to whether their 1960 decision to grant almost immediate independence would prove viable and most observers on the scene expected trouble. But the particular form of trouble which in fact so soon occurred was expected by few, and set the Congo on a path different from that of any other new African state.

In the case of the mutiny, too, there does appear to have been communist-inspired agitation among the soldiers, most clearly in the form of pamphleteering, but the grievances which soldiers were articulating during the spring of 1960, particularly in the nationalist press, dealt with

[2] See Robert E. Bartlett, *Communist Penetration and Subversion of the Belgian Congo, 1946–1960* (Berkeley, Cal.: The Acorn Press, 1962), p. 18.

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the lack of Africans in the officer corps and the resistance of the Belgian Commandant of the *Force* to any rapid change in this policy, as well as with other kinds of racial discrimination in the *Force*. Not the least of the soldiers' targets was the new Congolese leadership on the General Executive Council. Although these leaders had no real executive authority on this interim body, which was a Belgian sop to nationalist demands for a provisional government, they were seen by some soldiers as men who, having attained power, were ignoring their fellow Congolese, particularly those in the *Force Publique*—as men who had become Black Belgians. Communists could certainly play upon their grievances, but the soldiers' vehement criticism of Lumumba personally and the General Executive Council as a group was a threat to some of the very Congolese politicians whom the Belgian Communist Party and the Soviet Union were trying to cultivate. It is clear, moreover, that simple partisanship along ethnic lines was a factor in the hostility shown specifically to Lumumba by the numerous Bangala members of the *Force*. At the very least, then, communist sympathizers and agents were not the only activists working on the soldiers.

SINCE the Russian presence in the Congo at the time of the mutiny was so much less substantial than that of Belgium, the US, or Britain, only something very special about it would have led Soviet leaders to consider it a country worth taking serious risks for. But for all its promise as a major African state and the opportunity for a Soviet influence which the sudden turn of events seemed to offer, the Congo was not *so* special. On the other hand, an activist Congo policy *would* entail serious risks, for while the United States wished to avoid any major commitment there, it would not, in view of the country's potential importance, concede it to the Soviet sphere.

This became evident very quickly, as the mutiny and the efforts of the untried government to deal with it became the central facts of Congolese political life. While the low-ranking Soviet delegation on the scene was arranging for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Congo and using a Soviet aircraft at Ndjili Airport for its office, the American ambassador was hard at work, not only keeping his government informed but offering advice both to the distraught Congolese leaders and to the UN representative in Leopoldville, Dr Ralph Bunche. Certainly the most important advice which Ambassador Timberlake gave President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba during those crucial days was to solicit military aid from the UN through Bunche. This they did early on 10 July 1960, apparently even before they were aware that Belgian paratroopers had already been dropped at Elizabethville, and thereby set in motion a UN intervention that was to continue for four years. Well-publicized requests by the Congolese leaders for UN military aid followed on 11 and 12 July, by which time the Belgians had reoccupied

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several towns and the government of Katanga Province had declared its secession.

In the circumstances, the Soviet propaganda line characterizing the Belgian military action as NATO-imperialist, under the ultimate direction of the United States, was an easy one to take. But political and military involvement in the Congo itself was a different matter; on this plane, action had to be taken in the light of probable consequences for other relationships. These included a general deterioration in relations with the United States; intensified struggle with the CPR; rivalry with both the United States and the CPR in the Third World; membership in a suspect UN within the framework of which this contest was to a large extent taking place; and a struggle for power and over policy within the Soviet leadership in which Nikita Khrushchev was losing ground.

By mid-1960, the Soviet Union's relations with Egypt and Guinea had become especially significant for the extension of its influence in Africa. The relationship with Egypt was the more complex. The Soviet Union had a strong position there due to a continuing programme of military and economic aid, culminating in the signing in September 1959 of a general contract for Soviet assistance and equipment for the first phase of the construction of the Aswan High Dam. But the relationship had been marred by Nasser's thoroughgoing repression earlier in 1959 of Egyptian and Syrian communists and vehement Soviet criticism thereof, which were probably felt necessary in Moscow to blunt CPR accusations of betrayal of the UAR comrades. In this situation, Nasser had re-opened the line to the United States, shut off during the 1958 Lebanon crisis. The Soviet position in Egypt was certainly not therefore an assured one. Nevertheless, even at the height of mutual recriminations over the domestic communists, both the Soviet Union and Egypt had demonstrated their wish to preserve close inter-state ties. The Soviet determination to continue with the economic aid programme had not been affected by the public outbursts, and by February 1960, not only had the Aswan Dam contract been signed, but Moscow had announced that more than 100 industrial projects would be built in the UAR with Soviet assistance.

With respect to Guinea, the Soviet Union was in a very favourable position. The French withdrawal of all aid and facilities after Guinea opted for independence in late 1958 and the hesitation of the United States and the other Western powers to offer help for fear of offending General de Gaulle, presented Moscow with an opportunity which it was not slow to seize. Generous Soviet trade arrangements and Czech military aid helped to build up in Guinea a substantial Soviet bloc presence, competing with a comparable presence of Communist China.

In previous months, moreover, Soviet relations with Ghana, previously impeded by suspicion of Soviet aims within the Ghanaian leadership and by British influence on Nkrumah himself, had taken a promising turn as well. Ten days before Congo independence the announcement of an

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invitation to Nkrumah by Khrushchev to visit Moscow and of Nkrumah's acceptance gave a clear indication of this shift.[3]

Of these three African states, Egypt was of greatest interest to Russia, mainly because of its geopolitical position vis-à-vis the Mediterranean-Red Sea-Middle East region and its hostility under the Nasser regime to a Western presence there. But by virtue of a common interest in the widely ramifying Nile River system, Egypt's relations with the Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda made it an important African state, too, of key strategic importance for the future in the north-eastern quadrant of the continent. Its religio-cultural, as well as political, influence in the Sudan was pronounced; and Sudan's southern borders lay deep in Africa, the Congo being one of its neighbours.

Ghana and Guinea were in the vanguard of the African anti-colonialism which was at this time culminating in the virtually simultaneous accession to independence of some 15 other, chiefly Francophone, territories. Presidents Touré and Nkrumah were the spokesmen for Pan-African unity and African socialism. They were the fellow-nationalists to whom Patrice Lumumba was most attracted, and he had by the time of his own accession to the premiership of the Congo established personal relationships with both. State-to-state friendship alone with these regimes would have been valuable to the Soviet Union, but their leaders' professed adherence to socialism made them even more attractive. Doctrinally, it is true, these versions of socialism were unacceptable to the Soviet Union, but they were welcome for their repudiation of Western doctrines and institutions and gave the appearance of providing fertile ground for the eventual establishment of Soviet-style socialism.

By no means all newly independent Black Africa was looking to Nkrumah or Touré for a lead. The kinds of socialism which they professed, Nkrumah's Pan-African activism, personal rivalry, and even geopolitical contention had made for suspicion and downright enmity between, for example, Ghana and the Ivory Coast, between Ghana and Nigeria, due to become independent in October, Guinea and the Ivory Coast, and Guinea and Cameroon. And the close Soviet relationship with the two 'radical' regimes was for some African leaders additional evidence to confirm their suspicion that Soviet interest in Africa was itself subversive.

THE period of Lumumba's effective premiership had afforded the Soviet Union its greatest opportunity so far to establish an influential position in the Congo. Seizing this opportunity by political and military action, the Soviet Union increased its influence to the point where it became a factor of menacing proportions to its Western rivals in the Congo. Then, within two weeks, the Soviet presence collapsed.

[3] See W. Scott Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957–1966* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 100–2.

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In the event the Lumumbist wing of the Congo government with which the Soviet Union had completely identified itself proved too weak, as the strains of government brought to the surface intra-Congolese antagonisms which had been papered over in June to permit the formation of the Congo's first African government. The administration had broken down as the Belgians who worked in its middle and upper echelons fled in panic, being only partially replaced by UN personnel. In addition, the fragmented but still armed *Force Publique* remained a disruptive force, prepared to fight, usually out of ethnic loyalty, for one political leader against another despite policing efforts by a mainly African UN force that had begun to assemble from 15 July. The UN Secretary-General and his ranking representative in the Congo, while endeavouring to obtain the withdrawal of all Belgian troops and the reintegration of Katanga into the Congo, would employ only diplomatic and political means. In opposition, Lumumba, denouncing the Katanga regime led by Moise Tshombe as a puppet whose strings were being pulled by the company which mined and processed Katanga's vast copper and cobalt deposits, the *Union Minière d'Haut Katanga* (UMHK), demanded that the UN Force be put at his disposal to achieve these purposes. Moreover, since 12 July—that is, even before the UN Force had been constituted—there had come into being a most interesting communication system between Khrushchev and Lumumba through press conference and telegram which served as a substitute for diplomatic relations. A public statement by Khrushchev would be picked up as a cue by Lumumba, and vice versa.

There had all along been anti-Lumumba sentiment in the capital, but it did not threaten to split apart his government until after the Prime Minister's return from a remarkable overseas trip which, beginning on 22 July, had taken him to Washington and Ottawa as well as several North and West African capitals, including Conakry and Accra. He had gone, with his Cabinet's approval, to solicit political and material aid, and had talked with UN officials in New York, although not with Hammarskjold. Lumumba had also used his considerable exposure to the press at his several stops to continue his condemnation of Belgium and of the UN. And, although he was thus out of the Congo when the Soviet embassy finally opened on 1 August, his complaints triggered similar Soviet statements, as in the first days of the UN intervention and prior to his departure. But immediately upon his return Lumumba's relationship with a number of his colleagues began to change.

Lumumba's hostile remarks about Belgium, the UN and the West are of minor importance in explaining this change, although they were rendering him increasingly objectionable to those whom he was attacking, as were his frequent meetings with the Soviet ambassador since his return to the Congo on 8 August. But the fact that such major colleagues as Kasavubu, Mobutu and Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko now felt that they were being pushed aside in favour of recently-arrived and obscure

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foreigners is of much greater significance. Although these foreigners were not Soviet citizens, they were widely taken to be communist-connected,[4] and this perhaps accentuated the resentment of the other Congolese leaders and disposed them to welcome the friendship and advice of Western representatives with whom they were in any case on better terms than was Lumumba. The most important factor which emerges was a sense of personal injury, a feeling that Lumumba and his closest associates were bad for the country, and the fear that if allowed to continue he would become a dictator and destroy, at least politically, all who did not submit to his wishes.

The anti-Lumumba trend within the government and in Parliament converged in the last days of August with Western and UN dislike of Lumumba's behaviour over the Katanga issue and fear that, even if only to obtain a good bargaining position, he was permitting Soviet entrenchment in the country. Hammarskjold and his closest associates—Ralph Bunche and Andrew Cordier, both Americans—were pursuing UN interests and were thus determined that the operation in the Congo should not end in disgrace and ridicule. The Belgian government now regarded Lumumba as a thoroughgoing menace. The United States government, though less harshly disposed towards him, feared the consequences of the close relationship which seemed to have grown up between him and the Soviet ambassador, and, while striving to avoid any military involvement on its own part except for transport and other logistical assistance to the UN Force, was also eager for a UN success.

The catalytic event was the Congo government's military campaign against South Kasai, which began on 22 August and was conceived as a preliminary to an assault on the Tshombe regime in neighbouring Katanga. Initially, it must be noted, the move against the Mining State, proclaimed on 9 August by Lumumba's bitter foe, Albert Kalonji, in the diamond-mining Baluba area, was generally supported within the government. Colonel Joseph Mobutu, as Chief of Staff, was a principal planner of it. However, the quick victory of the government's troops, Kalonji fleeing to Elizabethville, was almost immediately followed, as Baluba offered resistance, by the massacre of hundreds of civilians and the flight of thousands from their homes. With this turn of events in South Kasai, the original consensus within the Congo government, already seriously frayed, was ruptured. President Kasavubu denied ever having been for the venture[5]; Mobutu attempted to recall the troops but ran foul of Lumumba, who from that moment looked upon him as a foe to be replaced by someone more reliable.[6]

It was into this situation that the Soviet Union now stepped, sending in response to Lumumba's request 15 transport planes with pilots, which took to ferrying government troops from Leopoldville to South Kasai as

[4] Notably Mme Renée Blouin and Serge Michel.
[5] See Francis Monheim, *Mobutu, l'homme seul* (Paris: Editions Actuelles, 1962), p. 114.
[6] Ibid. p. 115.

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of 2 September. The planes were thus in action as the depredations by government troops against the Baluba continued.

Lumumba had requested the planes on 15 August, a week before the start of the South Kasai campaign. Planning for it had, however, begun, Lumumba having known, very probably, that he could have them; it appears that, as far back as 29 or 30 July, at his meeting with the Soviet Ambassador to Canada in Ottawa, he was offered both transport planes and 100 trucks, and accepted.[7] Just how dependent on Soviet planes the Congolese planners of the Kasai campaign saw themselves this writer cannot say, nor when the actual dispatch of the planes was decided upon in Moscow. It is significant that between 22 August and the arrival of the Soviet planes, chartered Belgian (that is, *Sabena*) planes were carrying troops to South Kasai. Moreover, the Kasai action had been under way for four days before the Soviet trucks that had been sent by sea at the beginning of August were unloaded at Matadi. It appears that the dispatch of the Soviet planes, though presumably intended when first offered to give Lumumba an independent means of dealing with Katanga, was not well coordinated with the course of events in South Kasai.

In the event, the Soviet planes only contributed to Lumumba's downfall, after which central government troops were withdrawn from South Kasai and the Kalonji regime revived, although thereafter until October 1962 it asserted only an autonomous status. However, it was not the fact of Soviet military intervention outside of, and in open opposition to, the UN authorities which led President Kasavubu to announce on 5 September the dismissal from office of Lumumba and during the next 24 hours of all the latter's principal adherents as well. He blamed Lumumba directly for the blood-letting in South Kasai. The planes were a factor for Kasavubu only in so far as they were instruments which Lumumba might equally use against his Congolese opponents in the capital. Based at Stanleyville, his political stronghold, they might be used to ferry pro-Lumumba soldiers to Leopoldville, where hostility between Lumumbists and anti-Lumumbists had further intensified and street battles were going on. But there were other grounds for Kasavubu's perceiving Lumumba as a menace who could no longer be tolerated in the office of Prime Minister. No matter whose planes were used in South Kasai, Lumumba's impatience and 'murderous initiative' were threatening to 'destroy the bridges' which Kasavubu still saw linking both Kalonji and Tshombe to the rest of the Congo.[8] Even more immediately, on the morning of 5 September, the leader of the Lumumbist youth organization[9] had been discovered carrying weapons into the Parliament chamber. He had been arrested but was shortly afterwards released following direct

[7] Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence: January, 1960 to December, 1961* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 158.

[8] Charles-André Gilis, *Kasa-Vubu au coeur du drame Congolais* (Bruxelles: Editions Europe-Afrique, 1964), p. 283.

[9] Emmanuel Nzuzi.

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intervention by Lumumba.[10] And in the background rumours of plots against Lumumba and himself were circulating.[11] Kasavubu had either to move quickly or risk destruction himself.

The UN authorities and the Belgian and US governments were for their part alarmed by the Soviet planes. Like Kasavubu and his anti-Lumumba colleagues, they feared that the planes would be used to transport pro-Lumumba soldiers to Leopoldville, with massive violence as a result. But, unlike Kasavubu, they were also worried about the separate Soviet presence in the Congo signified by the planes, and made this clear in their protests. However, not until some 24 hours after the dismissal of Lumumba did the UN Secretariat attempt to do anything beyond protest about the continuing flights of the Soviet transports. Andrew Cordier, acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo—on the scene for less than two weeks and serving until the impending arrival of the next regular Special Representative, the Indian diplomat, Rajeshwar Dayal—used the UN Force to close the major airports to all but UN planes. The Soviet Union might have tried to defy Cordier's edict; the UN would have had little with which to meet defiance. But it did not: fierce Soviet protests followed, but the transports flew no longer.

At the same time, Cordier, fearful that the recurrent violence in Leopoldville would be inflamed by Lumumba as he attempted to recover office, had the Leopoldville radio transmitter disconnected and entrance to the building housing it barred by a contingent of UN-Ghanaian troops. Cordier has stated that he had no intention of harming Lumumba politically, that he was concerned only to keep the public peace in especially hectic circumstances.[12] Nevertheless, Lumumba was denied the opportunity to employ his considerable oratorical skills to rally his supporters, and the UN members whose governments favoured his cause vehemently criticized Cordier's moves. Within six days the transmitter was rendered workable and the airfields opened. By then, Cordier had returned to New York, and Dayal, who would perhaps have acted differently, had taken up his post. But during those six days the man who could have best helped Lumumba, Colonel Mobutu, refused to give his support either to him or to Kasavubu, both of whom sought it. Indeed, had Mobutu joined Lumumba, the unavailability of the radio transmitter would have been of little significance. And then, on 14 September, Mobutu himself took to the air and declared both Lumumba and Kasavubu 'neutralized', Parliament dismissed and constitutional government suspended.

DURING the next two months Lumumba's future, while very uncertain, was not yet lost; the possibility existed of a role for him in a future government, perhaps even as Prime Minister again. For the UN

[10] Gilis, op. cit. p. 283.
[11] Ibid. pp. 283–4.
[12] To the author orally.

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authorities refused to acknowledge the legality of the Commissioners' government which Colonel Mobutu had set up after his coup and dealt with it only as a matter of administrative necessity. At the same time, to the distress of Belgium, Britain and the United States, the corporate UN was pressing the government, as well as Kasavubu (who had very soon been restored to his office by Mobutu and whose position the UN did treat as constitutional), to recall the Parliament dismissed by Mobutu, whereupon a constitutional government inclusive of Lumumba would be re-established. In the meantime, Lumumba remained in the Prime Minister's residence, which he had refused to vacate, protected from arrest by UN soldiers. One of Mobutu's first moves was to order the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to withdraw their entire embassy staffs within 48 hours. Ambassador Yakovlev at first tried to ignore the order but five days later complied; on the same day the Soviet transport planes were also flown out of the country. The Soviet Union continued to support Lumumba, but now it could do so only from a distance.

Its constitutional ambiguity was one reason for the distant attitude of the UN authorities towards the Commissioners' regime; the main reason, however, was the pro-Lumumbist demands of an important group of members—India, Indonesia, the UAR, Morocco, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Ceylon. With these Third World states on one side of the Congolese political struggle and other members on the opposite side, Hammarskjold was forced to compromise, and in this lay an opportunity for the Soviet Union to achieve by diplomacy and propaganda what it was no longer able to achieve by direct political and military activity.

But that was not to be. Hammarskjold, regarding the Soviet Union as an open enemy—and Khrushchev's performance at the 15th UN General Assembly in late September 1960 had left no doubt on this score—succeeded in restraining even the 'radical' Third World states with which the Soviet Union maintained close relations. Those states refused to go beyond the pro-Lumumbist efforts in which they were taking part with the Soviet bloc to the direct assault upon the office of Secretary-General now being conducted by the Soviet Union. This was true of Nkrumah, who had staked so much prestige on Lumumba. It was especially true of Nehru, who saved the UN operation in the Congo by his agreement on 15 February 1961 to contribute what presently came to some 5,000 Indian combat troops to a UN Force from which Guinea, the UAR, Indonesia and, most important, Morocco, were in the process of withdrawing their contingents.

One must bear in mind certain immediately preceding events to appreciate the singularity of Nehru's action. Only two days before the Indian-UN agreement, the Katanga government had announced that Patrice Lumumba, who had been a prisoner of the Commissioners' government since 1 December, and two other prisoners, close associates of his (Maurice Mpolo and Joseph Okito), had been transported to Elizabethville by plane and taken into custody there, had then escaped

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into the bush and had finally been killed by locals. Their transfer from the Thysville military camp in the Lower Congo to Katanga had been general knowledge for almost a month and for many days before the official Katanga announcement pro-Lumumba UN members had been pressing Hammarskjold to secure Lumumba's freedom, even as they expressed their suspicions that he was already dead. Few, whether friend or foe of Lumumba, accepted the official Katangan account of how he and his fellow-prisoners had died, and Lumumba's supporters both within and outside the Congo immediately attributed the killings either to members of Tshombe's cabinet or to Belgians in their employ. Seizing upon this opportunity to exploit the feelings of Lumumba sympathizers, the Soviet government promptly charged Hammarskjold with personal responsibility for Lumumba's death and urged an end to the UN presence in the Congo. Nehru's promise of troops, then, was an assertion of a policy towards the UN wholly at odds with that of the USSR, yet maintained at a time when the Soviet Union was, vis-à-vis the CPR, giving increasingly explicit support to India. At the same time Nehru's action was indicative of a rather pragmatic Indian attitude to the question of who governed the Congo.

The corporate UN's attitude concerning this question was also essentially pragmatic. A superficial constitutional absolutism had covered what was actually a problem in diplomatic manoeuvre. But with Lumumba gone the Congo situation was suddenly much simpler. The corporate UN, India, by whose goodwill Hammarskjold set so much store, virtually all the African states, and the United States agreed that Katanga should be reintegrated into the Congo. Even Belgium and Great Britain accepted this in principle, although both had reservations as to the way in which reintegration ought to take place and how centralized a regime Katanga should submit itself to. And with the possibility of Lumumba's return to power now ended, the Leopoldville regime could also take a more tolerant view of the UN's urging that it reconvene Parliament and re-establish normal Cabinet government, embracing a very broad representation of Congolese interests.

Within two months of the announcement of Lumumba's death, the corporate UN and the Congo government moved from hostility to cooperation—from a hostility which had led Leopoldville into political alliance with Elizabethville and acceptance of Tshombe's proposals for a united but very decentralized Congo. As early as 21 February 1961—in the heat of the emotion aroused by Lumumba's death—a Security Council Resolution gave the UN Force a mandate to transform itself from a defensive, non-interfering peace-keeper into an instrument for the prevention of civil war. At first feared by the Mobutu-Kasavubu regime as a threat to its position, the Resolution was soon made to serve as an instrument of the central Congo government in its efforts to end the Katanga secession. What Lumumba had sought was thus given to those who had triumphed over him.

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But this restructuring of the Congo situation left the Soviet Union on the sidelines. Despite its vehement opposition to Katangan separatism, the Soviet Union had no standing with Congolese whom it had denounced as Western stooges. Nor had its three close African friends—Egypt, Guinea and Ghana. The African state now most favoured by the Congo government was Western-oriented Nigeria, a major contributor to the UN Force since shortly after its independence on 1 October 1960. On the other hand, the members of the regime which the Lumumbists had set up in Stanleyville in November with Antoine Gizenga at its head and which the Soviet Union had first supported informally as a surrogate for the dispossessed Lumumba and then had recognized as the government of the Congo, were now capable only of negotiating individually some participation in the revived constitutional regime which the corporate UN and Leopoldville, with strong American support, were aiming at.

In responding to the killing of Lumumba the Soviet government seemed to imply that it would now give military aid to the Gizenga regime of the sort it had given Lumumba in August–September 1960. But it did not do so, at least not directly. Rather, it undertook indirect military aid, via Ghana and Egypt. According to W. Scott Thompson, a Soviet representative made a secret agreement with Nkrumah during the Casablanca Conference of early January 1961, even before Lumumba's transfer to Elizabethville, to send Ghana Soviet arms for trans-shipment to the Gizenga regime in Stanleyville, and these arms began to arrive in Ghana in late March.[13] But, as Nkrumah himself relates, he was unable to secure Sudanese permission to move the material across its territory, with the result that none of these arms were ever dispatched to the Congo.[14] On the other hand, Egypt did manage to send a modest quantity of arms across the Sudan to Stanleyville. But this aid had ceased by the end of February 1961, when the Sudan, acquiescing in vigorous, albeit discreet, American representations, closed the access route.

THE second constitutional government of the Congo, set up on 2 August 1961, under the premiership of Cyrille Adoula, an early critic of Lumumba, was a national coalition; of the major parties, only that of Tshombe, the CONAKAT,[15] was omitted, Leopoldville and Elizabethville having been unable to agree on the terms of Katanga's reintegration. Gizenga, after some hesitation, became one of three deputy prime ministers. Accordingly, the Soviet Union moved to re-establish a diplomatic presence in Leopoldville a month after the new government took office.

The Soviet Embassy was re-opened on 19 September, just as the UN authorities were caught up in still another crisis in the Congo. At the

[13] See Thompson, op. cit. p. 157.
[14] Nkrumah, however, does not acknowledge the Soviet Union as the source of the arms. (Kwame Nkrumah, *Challenge of the Congo* [New York: International Publishers], 1967), p. 153.
[15] *Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga.*

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end of August, they had deported some, but not all, of the Europeans of diverse origins who had been hired by the Katanga government to command the gendarmerie established under Belgian tutelage after the secession of the province. Then, on 13 September, with the regime presumably weakened, the UN Representative in Elizabethville, Dr Conor Cruise O'Brien, and associates, apparently acting on instructions from UN-Leopoldville,[16] had attempted to end the secession without further ado by the seizure of key public buildings and the arrest of Tshombe and other members of his government. The attempt had failed, in the face of strong resistance by the Katangans and British and Belgian diplomatic intervention. Trying to retrieve the situation, Hammarskjold had then arranged to meet with Tshombe just across the border from Katanga in Ndola, Northern Rhodesia, but was killed when his plane, in circumstances which are still obscure, crashed in the nearby Northern Rhodesian woods.

The selection as Acting Secretary-General of the Burmese diplomat, U Thant, induced some relaxation in Soviet pressure on the office. But in the Congo the Soviet presence remained a minor one until in mid-1962 Leopoldville's frustration over what it felt had been fruitless negotiation with Tshombe seemed again to be offering the Soviet Union the opportunity for political gain. That was what the American ambassador, Edmund Gullion, was reporting, and Adoula was not loath to let that be thought the case. The new Soviet ambassador had indicated his government's willingness to help solve the Katanga problem. Moreover, it is true that Adoula's varied domestic opposition used Katanga's continuing secession as an instrument with which to beat the Prime Minister. Actually, the opposition was anything but cohesive: Lumumba's MNC was now split into three groups. Gizenga, who had left his position to again oppose from Stanleyville, was in prison. Another major Lumumbist who had left the government in July, Christophe Gbenye, went into exile in November. Adoula was to be much weaker the following year, after the secession had been ended.

Even for the United States, fear of Soviet gain was not the only reason for encouraging the corporate UN to act forcibly if the Tshombe regime did not accept the terms laid out in the U Thant Plan of August 1962, which was scarcely more than a brief for Leopoldville's position. Indeed, the sense of triumph vis-à-vis the Soviet Union with which the United States came out of the Cuban missile crisis at the end of October appears to have carried over into the Congo situation to the extent of infusing the Kennedy administration with the feeling that it was about time now to dispatch that problem too. There was also the question of the future of

[16] But it may be without the approval of UN-New York. Hammarskjold and his staff repudiated the action, insisting they had not been informed it was going to be taken. O'Brien, strongly anti-Katanga, rebuts this but stops just short of asserting that Hammarskjold himself was in on the move. (See Conor C. O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back* [London: Hutchinson, 1962], pp. 247–88.)

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the UN, which, of course, was the central consideration in the corporate UN's own calculations. The UN now had a massive debt, both the Soviet Union and France having refused to pay their share of the cost of the Congo operation on the ground that it was illegal. Equally important, although the great expense of the operation was impelling the UN to leave the Congo soon, for the sake of its future, it could not leave without being able to say with some plausibility that it had succeeded. Yet the Tshombe regime stood in the way, its perverseness having been exacerbated for the corporate UN by several factors: by a second battle in Elizabethville in December with Katanga gendarmes once more led by Europeans; by the continued presence of these Europeans who seemed the epitome of neo-colonialist control of the Congo's wealthiest region; and by the generally hostile and contemptuous manner towards UN officials and soldiers of both African and residential Belgian supporters of the secessionist state. Finally, the UN Force in Katanga now consisted mainly of Indians, whom the Indian government wished to withdraw from the Congo in view of its need to concentrate on a Chinese enemy with whom a border war had broken out in September.

THE ending of the Katanga secession in mid-January 1963 by the UN Force, strongly backed by the United States, had therefore little to do with the Soviet Union; at the most, the reduction of opportunity for Soviet political gain was only one of several, more compelling, factors. In the following months, however, Soviet activity in the Congo did increase to the point where it became a matter of genuine concern to the Adoula government. To some extent the government had itself encouraged this. Despite steady Soviet propaganda on behalf of the imprisoned Gizenga and of the remaining Lumumbist Parliamentary opposition, the Soviet Union was permitted to build up a large embassy staff once more and thereby to acquire the means of involving itself in an increasingly disruptive political situation, in which Parliamentary opponents from left and right were combining in efforts to bring Adoula down. At the same time, the significance of the UN operation in Congo political affairs was rapidly diminishing. But as the UN withdrawal proceeded, the closeness of the bilateral tie that had existed between the US and the Adoula government since its inception became more obvious, furnishing the government's opponents with the argument that it was too closely associated with the United States. And in mid-summer officially-sponsored Parliamentary and youth delegations visited the Soviet Union.

But on 21 November, the Soviet physical presence in the Congo was again terminated, as in September 1960, with the expulsion of the entire embassy staff. This time, moreover, a counsellor, two attachés, and a Soviet correspondent were arrested, held for two days and apparently roughed up, while utility services to the embassy building were shut off. Behind this seemingly abrupt reversal of trend was the heightened sense

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of urgency about its security that had seized the government since the summer. There had been a worsening of the political situation in Leopoldville, culminating in a public service strike, street demonstrations, and then the dissolution of Parliament and the declaration of a state of emergency in the capital. In addition, Lumumbists had in October established a Council of National Liberation just across the Congo River in Brazzaville, under the presidency of Christophe Gbenye, sustained by a new left-professing regime under whose favourable eye Soviet and CPR presences were also being built up. In addition, the government had learned by September that Pierre Mulele had come back from the CPR to his Kwilu homeland (about 200 miles east of Leopoldville) and was building a revolutionary organization there which, it was feared, was directed by the CNL.

The first two Soviet diplomats arrested were stopped as they were returning from Brazzaville and were, according to the government, carrying documents showing a direct Soviet connexion with the CNL. Although the Soviet government dismissed this as absurd, the intentions and hopefulness in relation to the Soviet Union ascribed to the CNL in the seized documents are highly credible: the provision of Soviet portable radio transmitters, the dispatch of young fighters to the USSR for training, and Soviet monetary aid.[17] One of the more interesting aspects of this Congo-Soviet clash, however, is the mildness of the official Soviet reaction to the arrest and deportation of a staff of more than 100. Continuing the pre-rupture line, Adoula himself, despite his hostile remarks, was treated rather courteously. Manifestly, Moscow did not wish to break off relations, and, jumping at Adoula's apparent willingness to continue them, took the position that the ousted diplomats would be replaced and that no counter-measures would be taken against Congo embassy personnel.

IN fact, only the Congo embassy in Moscow remained active, until the Soviet government forced it to close a year later in a move to assist the neo-Lumumbist rebels who had been fighting government forces since April 1964. But the most striking feature of the Soviet Union's involvement with the civil war in the Congo was its modest degree and, again, its belatedness. Both with respect to the isolated Mulelists in Kwilu, active since January 1964, and the much more numerous eastern rebels, the Chinese People's Republic was the most involved of any communist power. In the case of Kwilu, the Chinese provided inspiration only, but to a marked degree; in the case of the east, a significant amount of Chinese assistance, material, organizational and agitprop, was given from a base just across the Kivu border in Burundi. Indeed, it is tempting to speculate that the Soviet Union preferred not to take any risks on behalf of Congolese who might have a sense of gratitude towards Peking, while at the same time its very rivalry with the CPR guaranteed a strong

[17] See *Congo 1963* (Bruxelles: CRISP, 1964), pp. 106–7.

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propaganda campaign by it in favour of those who talked of true national liberation. Furthermore, by December 1964, when the Soviet Union did intervene, the eastern rebels, who in early August had had control over half the Congo, had been in retreat for nearly four months. What induced Soviet intervention at so late a date was the spectacular Belgian paratroop drop from American planes on 24 November onto Stanleyville airport and the prompt occupation of the city by Belgian troops, in an effort to rescue white hostages whom the rebel leaders had threatened to kill unless the approaching government troops were halted.

Certain associated factors may have entered into the Soviet decision as well. On the Soviet side, a new regime was in power, Khrushchev having been deposed the preceding October, and it was then less inclined than its predecessor towards limited *détente* with the United States. On the Congo side, the Prime Minister was Moise Tshombe, still reviled in certain African circles as a neo-colonialist traitor despite the fact that, recalled from self-imposed exile, he had been duly appointed by President Kasavubu in early July. In addition, hired white officers, many of them men who had served secessionist Katanga, were once more leading Congolese troops, albeit now employed with the concurrence of Tshombe's associates, including General Mobutu, Furthermore, the United States had itself intervened in the fighting in a semi-clandestine manner, providing government forces in the crucial days of August with several light fighter planes piloted by anti-Castro Cuban volunteers. None of these additional actions, however, had impelled the Soviet Union to intervene other than with propaganda until the Stanleyville paratroop operation. This aroused such a furore not only in such expected African capitals as Accra, Conakry, Bamako and Brazzaville, but in such moderate places as Nairobi and Addis Ababa, that it provided an opportunity not to be passed over. Even when it did intervene, the Soviet Union did so indirectly, as it had in support of the Gizengists in early 1961, when Khrushchev was in charge. During the first week of December, therefore, the Soviet ambassador in Cairo negotiated an agreement by which the USSR undertook to finance and supply an Algerian-UAR airlift to the Congolese People's Republic in Stanleyville. The UAR and Algeria would give Soviet arms and ammunition previously supplied and the USSR would replace them. It was reported shortly thereafter that such supplies, as well as Algerian instructors, were arriving. This was aid, it is to be noted, in conformity with the principle enunciated shortly before in *Pravda*—that the Congo problem was an African one to be solved by Africans.[18]

Over a period of some two months, arms and ammunition of Soviet origin reached the rebels via Egypt and Algeria. But the consequences were slight. With the arms falling into the hands of government forces, Egypt ceased shipment in late March 1965, and by the end of that month government forces had sealed off the border with the Sudan. As in the

[18] *Mizan*, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1965.

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winter of 1960–61, the Sudan government had again allowed its territory and air space to be used for aid to the rebels and had then revoked the authorization, although its sympathy for the rebels this time had been outspoken. And it was to Khartoum that the principal rebel leaders, divided among themselves, fled in mid-March.

When, on 16 December 1964, the Soviet government ousted the sole Congolese who constituted the embassy staff in Moscow, it took pains to specify once again that this did not mean a break in relations. In fact, none of the governments supporting the rebels recognized the Congolese People's Republic which Gbenye had proclaimed in September. However, the effect was as if Soviet-Congo relations had been broken. A few weeks later, while its military aid by proxy to the rebels was going on, the Soviet Union was subjected to the indignity of the arrest of the *Izvestia* correspondent in Leopoldville on charges of attempting to organize a spy ring. Brought before a magistrate in mid-February, he was expelled a month later.

THE depth of Soviet sympathy for the neo-Lumumbist opposition is suggested by the reception given to Gaston Soumialot, colleague and rival of Gbenye, when he led a delegation to the Soviet Union in mid-September 1965. Coming to Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Committee of Asian-African Solidarity, the Congolese were met by a very senior Politburo figure, Mikhail Suslov, and his associate, Boris Ponomarov, who was in charge of the International Department of the Central Committee. But a month later the dismissal of the Tshombe government by Kasavubu presented the Soviet Union with a political situation which once more induced it to turn away from Congolese radicals towards the central government.

For six weeks following Tshombe's dismissal the picture was very unclear. Then on 25 November, General Mobutu intervened in a manner reminiscent of his intervention of September 1960, deposing both Tshombe's successor, Evariste Kimba, and Kasavubu. This time, however, there was no ' neutralization ' of the principal politicians; Mobutu assumed the Presidency himself and appointed the capable commander, Colonel Leonard Mulamba, Prime Minister. Nor was the government immediately given over to technicians, as in 1960; it was highly political, including some key anti-Tshombe men, despite Tshombe's own expressions of enthusiasm for the coup.

The USSR took its time in deciding what line to follow with respect to the man whom it had characterized as a Western stooge. A significant indication of how it was leaning came within two weeks of the coup, with the recognition by Poland of the Mobutu/Mulamba government. But there was no move on the part of the USSR itself to resume diplomatic relations with the Congo, an event which had to await Mobutu's willingness. Early in July 1966, the *Izvestia* correspondent who had been arrested on spying charges in Leopoldville at the beginning of 1965,

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Nikolai Kholkhov, cautioned his readers against premature, glib characterization of what was going on in the Congo. Most interestingly, in referring to Mobutu, now possessed of dictatorial powers, Kholkhov observed that 'a politician is not like a singer—you can't judge his talent on one performance'. Then, in a remarkably detached manner, he added that although the victory of the national liberation movement would indeed come with time, it was not true that it was growing. One should not mistake 'tribal skirmishes' for 'mass anti-colonial or anti-government demonstrations'.[19]

Kholkhov's comment suggested that the Soviet leadership was again seeking friendly relations with the central Congo government, and this goal seemed nearer when Mobutu stated in late November 1966 that he would shortly re-establish diplomatic relations. Actually, the Congolese were then engaged in acrimonious negotiations with the UMHK which soon reached a climax with the seizure of the company's Congo assets. Mobutu's reference to the USSR was probably designed to retain American support for his side in the quarrel and to deter Belgium from exerting pressure on the company's behalf. This interpretation is supported by the fact that, a provisional agreement between the government and UMHK having been reached in February 1967, it was not until the end of that year that diplomatic relations were actually restored with the USSR.

It is interesting that Soviet-Congo relations were apparently unaffected by the struggle which Mobutu's government was forced to wage between July and October 1967 against white-led Katanga gendarmes, who had broken away from Congolese National Army control after Moise Tshombe was hijacked in an aeroplane over the Mediterranean, brought to Algeria, and imprisoned. As in the period when the Adoula government was engaged in its struggle with secessionist Katanga, there was no opportunity for any special Soviet relationship with a central Congo government battling opponents on the right with the support of the United States, even though the Soviet Union was also against those opponents.

A further four and a half months elapsed after the re-establishment of diplomatic relations in December 1967, before a Soviet ambassador—after more than four years—again took up residence in the Congo. Subsequently, however, relations were purely perfunctory. Then in August 1968, with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the underlying Congolese dislike flashed out, Radio Kinshasa averring that 'Muscovite communism has once again degraded itself in the eyes of the world and will not in the short term be able to rehabilitate itself'.[20] Hence, as late as July 1969, the reopening of friendly relations was still, to use Foreign Minister Bomboko's phrase during a visit to Moscow, a matter of anticipation. To which Foreign Minister Gromyko responded in kind and added, 'To this end we are not considering ideological differences

[19] *Mizan*, Vol. 8, No. 4, Supplement A, July–August 1964.
[20] *Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. 5, No. 8, p. 1159.

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or differences in social systems. We are motivated by the wish for coexistence. We regard the Congo as playing an important role in Africa.' [21]

Nor was Gromyko's response mere verbiage. Ideological differences were what the Soviet Union had in fact considered in its dealings with the Congolese since before Congo independence. But now, whatever its ultimate weaknesses, the Mobutu regime was by far the most stable the Congo had yet had. Internally, Mobutu, in his attempt to enhance his and the Congo's image as genuinely nationalist, had been systematically invoking the memory of Lumumba become hero. Mobutu now ruled essentially by decree, although Parliament continued a nominal existence. The intensely competitive electoral and Parliamentary politics had disappeared, and the only party, so-called, on the scene was an all-embracing Popular Revolutionary Movement directly under Mobutu's control. Tshombe had just died in his Algerian prison, officially of a heart attack. The once formidable Pierre Mulele had been persuaded to return to the Congo from his latter-day sanctuary in Brazzaville to partake of a general amnesty, only to be arrested, perfunctorily tried and executed immediately after his arrival in Kinshasa. Kasavubu was in retirement in his home village. Gizenga, eventually released from prison, was in exile. Mobutu had so mended the Congo's relations with the rest of Africa that it had not only become an important member of the Francophone African and Malagasy Common Organization (OCAM), but an active participant in Organization of African Unity affairs, as well as an initiator of, or participant in, still other interstate African meetings and groupings. The UMHK problem had been settled by an agreement which left the Congo government sole owner of the property, while an affiliate of the Brussels-based UMHK now managed the operations of the new Congo company. Relations with Belgium, too, had entered upon a new era of cordiality. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union should be describing its newly re-established relations with the Congo as non-ideological and co-existential.

A month after his visit to Moscow, Bomboko replaced Cyrille Adoula as ambassador in Washington, while Adoula, who had returned to official roles after Mobutu's coup of November 1965—first as ambassador to Belgium, then to the United States—came home as Foreign Minister. Shortly thereafter, in a general foreign policy review, Adoula also expressed the non-ideological, co-existential theme. But to him the mere fact of now having relations with the Soviet Union as well as with the United States demonstrated the government's 'positive neutralism'. Pursuing somewhat further this new policy of even-handedness, he noted also fruitful talks during the recent UN General Assembly session with several communist foreign ministers, but the meeting which he chose to emphasize was the one with the Foreign Minister of Rumania.

[21] Ibid. Vol. 6, No. 7, p. 1475.

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Notwithstanding Adoula's characterization of the Congo's position as one of positive neutralism, Congolese policy has continued on the whole to be Western-oriented. The basic lack of confidence in Soviet intentions has not been dissipated and has again expressed itself in specific anti-Soviet outbursts. In May 1970, four 'influential' members of the Soviet Embassy were expelled for subversive activities. They were said to have had connexions in the Congo army, the Ministries of Information and Foreign Affairs and in student groups, and were ordered to leave within 48 hours. Much more seriously, on 30 July 1971, some 20 diplomats—from the USSR, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Poland—were expelled, allegedly because of their involvement in the student demonstration of early June at Lovanium University which had ended in a fight with Congolese troops in which at least six students were killed. Soon after the clash with the students, Mobutu linked the demonstration with a plot to assassinate him. Then in early August it was put out by government sources that three separate subversive networks were being dismantled by the security forces, one of these networks, the least important of the three, having been responsible for the student disturbances. The focus now shifted from the students to the trial, from 14 to 24 August, of seven amnestied Lumumbists, including the 1964–65 rebel general, Nicholas Olenga, on a set of charges of subversion, in which Soviet, as well as East German and North Korean involvement was asserted. In addition, the Congo-Brazzaville leadership was said to be providing anti-Kinshasa guerrilla training facilities on its territory, by no means a new charge during the previous eight years of relations between the two Congos.

EVENTS in the Congo since the end of the civil war in late 1965 have offered no real opportunity for the Soviet Union to acquire a special influence there through political and diplomatic action, and even if such an opportunity should arise, the Russian response will depend, as before, on how it relates to the overall international position. The Congo continues to be an area of secondary interest. While this is true, broadly speaking, for the United States too, it ranks high among such areas for the United States, especially within Africa.

For the present Congo government, still inclined to be anxious about Soviet policy, this is one side of the coin. The other side has been its fear that the USSR would use adjacent countries to support Congolese dissidents, such as, in particular, the Sudan and the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), which were active political frontiers in the earlier years of pervasive internationalization of the Congo's domestic troubles.

Although primarily of interest to the Soviet Union as part of the Middle East, the Arab-dominated Sudan, with six black African states on its borders and a predominantly black population in the southern third of the country, looks to the interior of Africa as well as to the other Arab

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states. On two separate occasions it was the principal access route for aid of Soviet origin to internal opponents of Congo central governments. On the first occasion a non-revolutionary military regime was in power in the Sudan; it was trying to steer carefully between friendly relations with the West, the Soviet Union and the CPR. Military assistance came to it from both Britain and Yugoslavia. On the second occasion a revolutionary civilian regime was in power, in which for a while there was considerable communist influence, and which, at the time in question, just two months after the overthrow of the Abboud military regime, was an object of great Soviet satisfaction. This new regime looked enthusiastically towards Egypt and, like Nasser's government, had openly expressed its intention of supporting the Congolese rebels. But in its eagerness to further the Congolese revolution, it had fallen into something of a trap. For the Sudan faced an even more deeply-rooted rebel problem of its own, which had become serious some time after Abboud's brief association with the Soviet/Egyptian policy of early 1961. Across the very territory which adjoined the Congo battle area, Khartoum was carrying on a major military campaign to suppress the efforts of non-Moslem Nilotes of southern Sudan to achieve by force autonomy or, as some southerners wished, outright independence. And so, as Congolese rebels, now too hard-pressed by Congo government forces for the arms coming in from the Sudan to be of help, fled across the border into the Sudan, they traded their new weapons to the southern rebels for money, food and alcohol.[22] The Tshombe government subsequently undertook to provide additional weapons to the Anya Nya, the military arm of the southern liberation forces, in exchange for 'local, tactical support to the Congolese army in tracking down those rebels who had been armed with the direct help of the Sudan government'.[23] This was enough to persuade the Sudan government to behave more prudently.

To a degree, then, so long as the civil war in southern Sudan continued, the Congo had some leverage against Sudanese interference in its affairs. However, the successful military coup of General Numeiri in May 1969 again brought a potential danger to the Mobutu regime. Numeiri espoused a revolutionary socialism, was much more hospitable to local communists than the previous regime had turned out to be and was the beneficiary of a major Soviet military and economic aid programme.

Then, in July 1971, an anti-Numeiri coup and Numeiri's recapture of power within three days produced an immediate turnabout in Soviet-Sudan relations. Accused by Numeiri of having been behind the short-lived coup, designed to replace his regime with one more explicitly in the hands of his erstwhile communist allies, the Soviet Union and its East European companion states (excluding Rumania) have become, in

[22] John Howell and M. Beshir Hamid, 'Sudan and the Outside World', *African Affairs*, Vol. 68 (1969), p. 302.

[23] Ibid.

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Numeiri's words, 'the bloc of the new imperialism'.[24] The Sudanese president, still an advocate of socialism, now describes himself as an arch enemy of communism, by which, evidently, he means communism at home, and the very large Soviet military and economic presence in the Sudan has almost completely disappeared. As intentional counterpoint, the CPR was quickly invited to increase its aid and has responded promptly.

Since the break with the Soviet Union, Numeiri has also opened much wider Sudan's door to the West, going so far as to indicate, without putting it in so many words, that even support for Israel will no longer be a factor in his relations with third parties. Thus, in December 1971, independently of the rest of the Arab League, he resumed the diplomatic relations with West Germany which had been broken off by the previous Sudan government in 1965 when Bonn established diplomatic relations with Israel. And at the end of July 1972 the Sudan announced its decision to re-establish diplomatic relations with the United States, broken off at the time of the Six Day War. In all this, President Mobutu, whose relations with both the United States and Israel are very good, doubtless has cause for satisfaction.

No less pertinent to Soviet-Congo relations is the agreement to end the long civil war reached on 27 March 1972 between the Sudan government and the leaders of the Sudan Southern Liberation Front. It does not seem far-fetched to suggest that the break with the Soviet Union was the decisive factor in Numeiri's decision a few months later to make the rebels a serious offer of compromise on the issue of autonomy which neither he nor his predecessors had previously been willing to do. Soviet equipment had increasingly become the means whereby the war against the rebels was being waged; a continuing supply would no longer be available, unless, of course, Numeiri were to call the Soviet Union back. On the other hand, the rebels remained undefeated, and they, too, had been able to secure aid from outsiders, notably Israel, although not in the form of the heavy military equipment which Khartoum was now employing in the south. In addition, Numeiri's near-disaster had revealed the extent of Soviet influence among the Sudanese. He had moved ruthlessly against these internal enemies but he cannot have thought that his position was now safe. Ending the civil war, which had been a disturbing political issue even in Khartoum, would aid in further consolidating his position.

The March agreement is significant for Zaïre both in respect of direct relations between it and the Sudan and of the more involved sphere of north-east African interstate relations. As we have seen, when governments in the Congo and the Sudan were simultaneously beset by rebellion, each was obliged to show regard for the other's interests. When, subsequently, the Congo was free of rebellion but that in the Sudan

[24] See President Numeiri's anniversary speech of 25 May 1972, as summarized in *Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. 9, No. 5, p. 2472.

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continued, Sudan became dependent to some extent upon the good will of the Congo. But, if the civil war strengthened the Congo vis-à-vis a potentially hostile Sudan, the fact remained that the Soviet aid programme included aid against the southern rebels, and reports in March 1971 that Mig 17s, bombers, helicopters, heavy tanks, artillery, howitzers and about 1,000 Soviet military personnel were in action [25] must have disturbed Kinshasa. Not only might this mean defeat for the rebels, but it was very dangerous to have such equipment on the Congo's back doorstep, where it might be made available to Congolese dissidents. One can therefore take as wholly sincere the congratulations which Mobutu promptly sent the Sudanese leader on his recovery of power.[26] As to the ending of the civil war, so long as the lightening of Khartoum's burden would also mean the withdrawal of Soviet military equipment from the Congo's border, Mobutu had an interest in helping Numeiri along. He in fact did so by immediately expelling from the Congo the Sudanese rebel leader, Gordon Mayen, hitherto a welcome guest, when Mayen denounced the settlement as not being in accord with the wishes of most of the Anya Nya.[27]

The Sudan-Soviet break and the ending of the civil war also affected Soviet-Zaïre relations in a less direct way. The Sudan had previously been at the centre of a north-east African interstate system which included not only the Congo, but Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. On the margins the Central African Republic may be added, by virtue of its involvement with its Sudanese and Congolese neighbours, and Tanzania, because it is intimately involved with Kenya and Uganda, has a boundary with the Congo on Lake Tanganyika and is the recipient of the largest Chinese aid programme in Africa, as well as substantial aid from the USSR.

The distinguishing feature of this system was a set of cleavages among the member states which had resulted in the de facto establishment of two opposing alignments. Like Egypt the locus of a large Soviet presence in north-east Africa, the Sudan was also caught up in worsening relations with Ethiopia on its east. For his part, on his eastern frontier, the Christian Emperor of Ethiopia faced another Moslem-ruled state, Somalia, their long-standing quarrel over the future of the large Somali population in Ethiopia still quite unresolved, albeit quiescent. The Somali army, in turn, was virtually a product of Soviet aid, and Somalia enjoyed propaganda support from Sudan and Egypt for its Pan-Somali aspirations. Kenya, on Sudan's south-eastern border, Ethiopia's southern border and Somalia's western border, and also faced with a Somali problem, was Ethiopia's ally, the relationship made explicit in the only mutual defence treaty between two black African states directed against a third one.

[25] Reports to this effect appeared on 5 March in *The Guardian* and on 7 March in the *Observer Colour Supplement*, as abstracted in *USSR and Third World* (London: Central Asian Research Centre), Vol. 1, No. 3, 15 February–21 March 1971, p. 142.
[26] See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 24752. [27] Ibid. p. 25159.

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Uganda, equally the neighbour of the Sudan, Kenya and the Congo, was less easily placed in the regional strategic scene because its foreign relations posture was wholly a function of General Amin's preoccupation with the need to secure his power internally and to have his regime, which was established by a military coup in January 1971, accepted by the rest of Africa, and especially by Uganda's neighbours. While his main animus was towards President Nyerere of Tanzania, who took an uncompromisingly personal stand against him and provided a home for the ousted President of Uganda, Milton Obote, Amin for a while suspected the Sudan also of preparing military action against him on Obote's behalf. By mid-1971, however, Numeiri had succeeded to some extent in reassuring Amin that he had no hostile intentions.

But such fluctuations had not removed the longer-standing problem of border security between Sudan and Uganda, which had arisen from the spilling over onto Ugandan soil of the civil war in the Sudan. Nor was this aspect of the civil war a matter only between Sudan and Uganda and Sudan and the Congo. Kenya, Ethiopia and the Central African Republic had also been taking in Sudanese Nilotic refugees for years. Some of these refugees had been resettled among members of their own ethnic groups in the host countries, but many were still committed to the southern autonomist and secessionist objectives that had kept the war going for so long. Consequently, some refugees were using their sanctuaries as jumping-off places for rejoining the battle in the Sudan. Furthermore, Kampala, Nairobi and Addis Ababa, as well as Kinshasa, were extending hospitality to leaders of the various insurrectionary groups which constituted the southern liberation movement. In Ethiopia's case, such support had more recently gone rather far, as Addis Ababa attempted to have Khartoum withdraw its own extension of sanctuary and other aid to Eritreans, predominantly Moslem, who since 1961 had been trying to detach the highly strategic Red Sea coastal province from the Ethiopian Empire.

There was, then, from the Congo on the west to Somalia on the east, and from Egypt on the north to Kenya on the south, a confrontation, one aspect of which was Moslem versus Christian or pagan. For both the Sudan and Ethiopia this opposition was an internal as well as an interstate condition. With respect to this facet of the regional alignment pattern, the Congo was on the margin; the Moslem/non-Moslem question is not important to it. But superimposed on this confrontation was one of pro-Soviet and pro-CPR states (even though the Soviet Union and the CPR were themselves rivals in Africa and elsewhere) versus pro-Western states, and, within this opposition, Arab and pro-Arab (Somalia) states versus pro-Israel states (Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya and, until General Amin's sudden about-face in early 1972, Uganda). In relation to this aspect of the opposing alignments, the Congo was not on the margin, and its position resembled Ethiopia's more than that of any of the other states.

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If, however, in the several north-east African capitals it is considered to be unlikely that the events in the Sudan will be reversed, either with respect to a major Soviet presence or a resumption of the civil war, then this pattern of interaction will not continue. With the settlement in the south, the Sudan is relieved of a burden with respect to all those neighbours to whose territories refugees had fled and from which many of them continued to fight against the control of Khartoum. Ethiopia has received compensation for its considerable effort as friend and host to both the Sudan government and the Southern Liberation Front in the form of the Sudanese agreement to cease aiding the Eritrean rebels, a service which may well be decisive. At the same time, the withdrawal of the Soviet presence from the Sudan and Numeiri's continuing attacks on the Soviet Union and its East European allies, together with his new cordiality towards the United States, must certainly relieve Mobutu of such anxiety with respect to his Sudan frontier as he may have had hitherto. Although the still more recent Egyptian demand for withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Egypt, and the Soviet compliance, were not accompanied, as in the case of the Sudan, by general denunciation of the Soviet Union, it can ony accentuate this direction of change, provided this Soviet military withdrawal (the Soviet economic aid programme in Egypt does not seem to have been affected) is not reversed.

As far as the Mobutu regime is concerned, the events in Egypt must be especially gratifying, for even on the occasions when the Sudan did make its territory available for aid to Congolese opponents of the central government, it served primarily for purposes of transit. On the other hand Egypt, together with the Soviet Union, was an initiator of these hostile acts, transmitting equipment of Soviet or East European origin to its Congolese favourites. However, from the standpoint of the Congo the strategic location of the Sudan is of paramount importance. Initiation of hostile action from other points in the north in support of opponents of a Congo central government would require transit across, or over, the Sudan.

The strategic proximity of Congo (Brazzaville) to the big Congo has also served domestic opponents of Congo central governments. Indeed, whereas since 1965 the Congo government has seen Soviet support from the Sudan for dissidents as a potential threat only, continuing bad relations with Brazzaville have recurrently included both Soviet and CPR elements down to the present day. As already mentioned, in August 1971, both Moscow and Brazzaville were charged with supporting attempts to overthrow the Mobutu regime. And in Brazzaville, the Soviet Union, provider of a large portion of the economic and military aid which the People's Republic receives, thus far retains its strong position.

While acknowledging the present Congo government's concern for the use which either the Soviet Union or the CPR may try to make of adjacent territories, one should also take account of recent developments beyond Africa, and in particular the new fluidity in American-Chinese-

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Soviet relations. Should the Soviet Union and the CPR, in their own rivalry, both pursue at least a limited *détente* with the United States, then the Mobutu government, among others, may have less to be concerned about from either quarter than has hitherto been the case, even though neither the CPR nor the Soviet Union may so change its ways as totally to forgo opportunities to associate itself through resident agents with ' revolutionary ' groups in Third World countries.

The Zaïre Republic, to use the Congo's new name, will continue, one feels warranted in saying, to be a zone of opportunity in Soviet foreign policy, but only within the limits set by more immediate Soviet preoccupations in the world. The Middle East remains a region of greater importance both to the Soviet Union and to the United States than sub-Saharan Africa, even though the Congo is one of Africa's major countries. One of the main determinants of Soviet relations with the Congo will continue to be the state of inter-Congolese relations. On the other hand, the United States, as a result of the reaction at home to the Vietnam war, has probably been rendered, at least for the near future, less capable than it was of outmanoeuvring the Soviet Union should events in the Congo require it to do so.

The Private Sector in Soviet Agriculture

Karl-Eugen Wadekin

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Edited by George Karcz. Translated into English by Keith Bush.

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Dr Wadekin is the author of several books concerning the economy of the Soviet Union.

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Judge in a Communist State

Leonard Schapiro

IN the summer of 1953 the author of this book,* then aged 23, graduated from the Law School in Prague. It so happened that shortly before that a particularly severe purge of the Czech judiciary had left it largely denuded of incumbents. And so Mr Ulc was directed to become a judge and was duly 'elected'—he is not quite sure to this day by whom he was officially nominated, and it may be doubted whether anyone cared. For six years he served first in the Regional Court of Pilsen as an Assistant Judge to a former railway worker, who headed the Criminal Division; and thereafter in Stribro, where he was concerned mainly with civil matters. In June 1959 he succeeded in escaping from Czechoslovakia through West Berlin, and eventually reached the United States where he now teaches law in one of the New York State Universities. This book is an account of his experiences. It is written in a lively and readable style, it is imaginative and witty, and is spiced with anecdotes, many of them rather salacious. The degradation and servile corruption of the judiciary which this book depicts is no laughing matter. But the mood of the book is probably in accord with the cautious and quite cynical conformity with authority which Mr Ulc, according to his own account, displayed throughout his period of office. We know too much about communist regimes to expect idealism, let alone martyrdom, to be usually displayed by those who serve them. When such idealism occurs it is all the more remarkable; but the sad fate of those of Mr Ulc's compatriots who tried to stand up for standards of decency in 1968 will, no doubt, confirm the cynical conformists in their view that to go along with 'the system' is the only way to survive.

LET us then be grateful to Mr Ulc for providing us with what I believe to be the only first-hand account of his experiences by a judge in a communist regime. In terms of the relationship of the judge to the party and other officials who exercise constant indirect pressure on him of one sort and another his account tells us little about the regime that we did not know before. What makes it particularly valuable, however, is its detailed portrayal of the day-to-day relationship between a judge and the authorities, as seen from the point of view of an intelligent, conscientious, but always cautious judge—cautious, because he is perfectly well aware that he is under constant surveillance, that his nominal 'independence' is a farce, and that a false move can cost him his livelihood, if not his liberty. Two points in particular stand out in this narrative. First, that the status of a judge, both as to pay and dignity, is very low down the scale (as in the case of the Soviet Union); and secondly, that the least important factor in deciding a case is the law, which is always outweighed by such matters as class origins, party intrigues or political expediency. But with regard to the latter point I

* Otto Ulc, *The Judge in a Communist State* (Ohio University Press, 1972).

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suspect that the author may, in retrospect, be giving a somewhat over-coloured picture, in the sense that it is the cases which display these political features which have remained imprinted on his mind. Even in a communist dictatorship cases must occur in the courts in which neither the party nor other officials are likely to be in the slightest interested, and where even the most cautious judge can afford the luxury of applying the law without fear of causing offence in any influential quarter. It is unfortunate for the serious student if in his endeavour (highly successful) to make his book entertaining, Mr Ulc should have omitted to tell us more about the more humdrum and uneventful daily life of the Czech courts. But this is something which it is difficult for the outsider to judge; and there is no doubt that this well-written account adds a great deal to our knowledge of what it feels like to serve as a judge under a system which has no respect, and little use, for law. He does, however, record at least one case where the local judge defeated the party by sheer persistence. This was a paternity case, involving as defendant a local party potentate, against whom the evidence was overwhelming. After seven orders for retrial on some pretext or other, on appeal the eighth judgment at first instance against the defendant was allowed to stand, and nothing apparently happened to the judge.

This incident prompts the reflection that perhaps even in communist states it may be possible for a courageous judge to defy pressures and do his duty. But let us not forget that the dignity attached to the person of a judge in Great Britain is almost unknown anywhere on the European continent, let alone in communist states. An English judge has centuries of dignity and independence behind him: his dignity stems from the fact that he represents the King, and his independence from the fact that he is neither the King's servant nor an official of the state, but the trusted interpreter of immemorial custom, or common law, which is above both, and emanates from neither. In contrast, the continental European judge, communist or non-communist, is a state servant, interpreting the law which emanates from the state. There is already a world of difference here which the victory of communism has done its best, with success, to accentuate.

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TIBOR SZAMUELY 1925-1972

Robert Conquest

Tibor Szamuely, who died on 10 December 1972, was a personal friend and a frequent contributor to this journal. His last article, 'The Birth of Russian Marxism', appeared in the summer 1972 issue of Survey. *He will be greatly missed. His knowledge of Soviet affairs, his wit and personal warmth, and his polemical skill were quite unique, and so was his all too short life-story.*

THE death of Tibor Szamuely at the early age of 47 is, from the purely professional point of view of readers of and contributors to *Survey* to whom I chiefly address this brief note, the severest possible loss to all interested in the study of political cultures. But it is, of course, a far broader loss than that: to his family and to his friends; to the public life of his adopted country; to the study and discussion of educational problems; and more. And indeed, the mere breadth of the expression of this feeling, not only from those who agreed with him, but from his opponents too (as in the *New Statesman*, 15 December 1972), was unprecedented. This is particularly remarkable when we consider that Tibor had only been in this country eight years. In that short period he had made a mark greater than most men could do in a long lifetime.

Moreover, though he had contributed widely and effectively in journalism and on television, and in learned periodicals as well, he had not at the time of his death published a book here. We are fortunate that *The Russian Tradition* was nevertheless completed before his death: its publication this year may be expected to put a worthy crown on his achievements.

It will demonstrate, as his less formal work has demonstrated in less complete manner, the quite unrivalled grasp which he had not only on the history and the culture of Russia, but on the histories and cultures of the West, and of the rest of the world. It was matched, too, by the broadest experience, from labour camp to lecture room. For, when it comes down to it, it is only by the profoundest knowledge and feeling, the most powerful exercise of the intellect and the imagination, the broadest combination of erudition and common sense, that the modern world, or any part of the modern world, can be fully understood and presented. Many people have possessed one or other of these qualities, without a sufficient admixture of the others. This total grasp is an extreme rarity: it is also an urgent necessity. For those of us who

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cannot attain it, it is the greatest good fortune that there was a man who could, and whose wisdom will soon be available in its completest flowering.

Tibor Szamuely was productive enough. One reason why he was not even more productive is that he was always ready to put aside his own work to advise and assist others. In my own *The Great Terror* I thank him in the introduction, before and beyond any others 'for much and invaluable discussion and criticism': and that is inadequate tribute (any tribute would have been inadequate) to his irreplaceable help. Many others could say the same.

In fact, it is too early to sum up Tibor's whole achievement. His own work, his pervading influence on our thought, his trenchant role in public polemic, his effect as a much respected teacher, will make a greater monument than we can see at present—and what we can already see is great enough.

He has powerfully helped to change the Western mind in the direction of truth rather than preconception, of reality rather than illusion. Of his personal qualities I have written elsewhere, and in these pages I would only mention the good humour, the panache, the unpretentiousness, the honesty which, so apparent in his private affairs, were also part and parcel of his intellectual and public influence. *Survey* and its readers will join me in extending the deepest sympathy to his bereaved family.

VICTOR S. FRANK 1909-1972

ANOTHER friend and contributor to *Survey*, Victor S. Frank, died in London on 2 September 1972. The son of the prominent Russian philosopher, S. L. Frank (whose ideas are discussed in this issue in the article on *Vekhi*), Victor Frank was an example of an extremely cultivated scion of the old Russian intelligentsia. Educated in the West, he was deeply attached to Russian culture and literature, and wrote on these subjects with rare feeling and understanding. He was planning to write a major article for *Survey* about the revival of Russian literature after Stalin. His death is a great loss to all his friends and to the cause of free Russian culture.

L. L.

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Minerva

A REVIEW OF SCIENCE, LEARNING & POLICY

Editor: Edward Shils

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COMMENT

The Invitation to Caesar

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